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### Bosnia and Herzegovina



INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SARAJEVO



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### “Culture of Remembrance: Twilight or New Awakening”



International University of Sarajevo  
12—13 April, 2014 Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina





**CULTURE OF REMEMBRANCE**

*Book of proceedings*

**I INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM**

*“Bosnia and Herzegovina – Culture of remembrance:  
Twilight or new Awakening“*

*Editors*

Sabahudin Hadžialić

Alma Jeftić

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*“Bosnia and Herzegovina – Culture of remembrance:  
Twilight or new Awakening“*

**I MEĐUNARODNI SIMPOZIJ  
KULTURA SJEĆANJA**

*„Bosna i Hercegovina – Kultura sjećanja:  
Sumrak ili Novo buđenje“*

**И МЕЂУНАРОДНИ СИМПОЗИЈ  
КУЛТУРА СЈЕЋАЊА**

*„Босна и Херцеговина – Култура сјећања:  
Сумрак или Ново буђење“*

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**“When A Man Does Good...”: Representations of Help and Rescue  
in Movies about the 1992-1995 War in Bosnia and Herzegovina**

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*To what extent do fictional movies about the Bosnian War deal with the topic of rescue and help during the war, and how does this relate to general tendencies in the public remembrance of the War, in Bosnia and Herzegovina and elsewhere? In many films that have been produced since the end of the war to the present day, rescue and help are either not present or are shown as something irrelevant or impossible. There are, however, a certain number of movies which present and deal with acts of help and rescue. Differences in the treatment of the topic can be found between international (Western) productions and productions from the Western Balkans: while the first emphasize the positive and successful intervention of international actors and, in a later arena, the ambiguity of perpetrator-rescuers, the latter insist more often on the absence of rescue or on interethnic rescue in combination with dramatic and tragic aspects. Nevertheless also among film directors from the Balkans an evolution can be seen, with the appearance in the past decade of films showing partially successful interethnic rescue actions. The fact that interethnic rescue is not a dominating topic but is lately attracting more attention on the cinematographic level reflects general tendencies of public remembrance in the Balkans: The strong focus on victims and perpetrators within the highly polarized public remembrance of the war does not leave much space for the topic of interethnic rescue, but the public interest in figures of interethnic rescuers as role models for reconciliation and civic courage has been growing in recent years. There are also links between this general tendency and the cinematographic production, as is illustrated by the movie “Circles” from 2013, which has actively participated in the popularization of the memory of Srđan Aleksić, a young Bosnian Serb who saved a Muslim in 1993. Additional to the analysis of the cinematographic treatment of the rescue-topic in relation with the public remembrance of the Bosnian war, the article puts this treatment in the context of the development of rescuer-movies, especially in relation with the Holocaust, which occurred in Europe and elsewhere in the last two decades, in parallel with the growing general public interest in the memory of rescuers in times of war and mass violence.*

**Key words: Rescue, Cinema, public remembrance, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Srđan Aleksić**

## 1. Introduction

Helping and rescuing civilians who are threatened by mass violence and war: There has been an increased interest, in the last 25 years, of both film directors and the public in making and watching films related to this topic. This concerns especially the Holocaust and the rescue of Jews, the most known film in this regard being Steven Spielberg's "Schindler's List" from 1993. But there are many other movies which have been produced in the last two decades that focus on this topic in one way or another, as, for example, "Divided We Fall" (Czech Republic, 2000), "Monsieur Batignole" (France, 2002) or "In Darkness" (Poland/Germany/ Canada, 2011). Movies have dealt with rescuers and rescue previously, but the focus has become stronger in the last two decades, so that certain observers now even talk about "rescuer-movies" as a specific sub-genre of Holocaust-related cinematography (Insdorf, 2003).<sup>1</sup> It can also be noted that the cinematographic attraction of rescuers is not only limited to the Holocaust, but touches also other historical events, as illustrated by "Hotel Rwanda" (USA, 2004), related to the genocide in Rwanda, or "John Rabe" (Germany/France/China, 2009), related to the massacre of the Chinese population in Nanjing by Japanese troops in 1937.

This evolution seems to reflect a more general tendency of a growing global interest in the figure of the rescuer and the topic of help and rescue in face of war and mass violence. The status of "Righteous Among the Nations", through which the State of Israel designates and honors Gentiles who saved Jews during the Holocaust, was established in 1963, but the number of recognitions has proliferated in the last two decades, parallel to the institutionalization of the tribute to the "Righteous" in many European countries (Gensburger, 2010). In the same period, articles and books about individual rescuers, about rescue in general or specific aspects, especially in relation to the Holocaust, have been blooming, also within the field of scholarly research (Sémelin 2008; Klütze 2012). Furthermore, several monuments and museums have been inaugurated in recent years, for example in Berlin in 2008 the memorial "Silent Heroes" (Kosmala, 2012), and two monuments to Polish rescuers of Jews are to be inaugurated in Warsaw in 2015 (Israel National News 2014). This general boom in the rescuer-remembrance is not exclusively limited to the Holocaust. In 2001, the "Gardens of the Righteous Worldwide Committee - Gariwo", dedicated to raise awareness about rescuers related to different genocides and mass crimes of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, was established in Milan,<sup>2</sup> and in 2012 the European Parliament decided to support the idea of the creation of a "European Day of Remembrance for the Righteous to commemorate those who challenged crimes against humanity and totalitarianism with individual responsibility".<sup>3</sup> Different reasons can be advanced for this increasing interest in rescuers and their actions; for example the growing need and will to insist on positive stories in the framework of the developing global remembrance of the Holocaust, and, after the end of "the era of ideologies", the search for new role models in line with the new political and social importance of the concepts of Human Rights and of Humanitarian Aid (Gensburger, 2010). The films mentioned are not only reflective of this general interest in the topic of rescue and help in face of mass violence and war, they are also articulating and partially influencing it. The most striking example is again Spielberg's movie "Schindler's List" which has made Oskar Schindler a near universally-known symbol of rescue and often quoted reference in this field, and stimulated the interest in and research of "the other Schindlers" (Grunwald-Spier, 2010).

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<sup>1</sup> Significantly, Insdorf has added a new chapter "Rescuers in Fiction Films" in the renewed edition from 2003 of her book (258-275), which was first published in 1983.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. the website of Gariwo : <http://www.gariwo.net/?lang=en>

<sup>3</sup> Declaration of the European Parliament of 10 May 2012 on support for the establishment of a European Day of Remembrance for the Righteous. Retrieved from <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2012-0205+0+DOC+XML+V0/EN>

How do films represent certain historical events and issues? And to what extent do these films mirror and influence general social and political tendencies of their time regarding the reflected past? These are two of numerous questions which can be formulated to address the complex relationship between film and history (Ferro 1977; Strübel 2002; Rosenstone 2006). Concerning the topic of rescue, I will address these questions in the following text in relation to the 1992-1995 War in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). Since the end of the war in 1995, a large number of fiction movies has been produced in BiH, the region, and elsewhere about the most violent of the Yugoslav break-up-wars, and different aspects of this cinematographic production have also attracted scholarly attention (Iordanova 2001; Maroto Camino 2005; Elsaesser 2005; Žarkov 2014a; Žarkov 2014b), but the topic of rescue and help as a specific and transversal question within these films about the Bosnian War has not been treated so far. By looking at local, regional and international fictional movies that have been produced to date, my leading questions is: How is rescue represented in films about the War in BiH, and how can these representations be situated in the more general context of dealing with the war in BiH? In order to answer this question I will proceed in two steps: I will first analyze different movies to see to what extent and in which way the topic of help and rescue is present(ed). I will then examine to what extent rescue is in general a topic when it comes to dealing with the Bosnian War, and which role the named movies are playing within this public remembrance. In my conclusion I will connect the results of my analysis for BiH to the general contemporary remembrance of rescue evoked in this introduction, in order to see which place the cinematography about the Bosnian War and its approach of the topic of rescue holds in the general cinematographic and sociopolitical treatment of this question.

## **2. From “No Man’s Land” to “Circles”: Dealing with help and rescue within movies about the Bosnian War**

To what extent is the topic of the rescuer present in films about the Bosnian War, and if it is present, in which way(s)? When looking at the totality of fiction movies realized about the war in BiH, the first observation that can be made is that rescue and help are not a dominating topic. Even to the contrary; what is striking is the absence of rescue. One example is the most known movie about the war in BiH, “No Man’s Land” (2001) from Danis Tanović, which won the *Academy Award for Best Foreign Language Film* in 2001: This movie focuses on the absurdity and the drama of the war, by showing two ordinary soldiers, a Muslim and a Serb, who will not stop shooting at each other and are intent on killing one another, in spite of having opened a dialogue. The question of rescue is not entirely absent in “No Man’s Land”, as United Nations peacekeepers are due to arrive at the location and are supposed to rescue one soldier who is lying on a mine. But they fail to do so, a metaphor through which Tanović expresses the whole failure of the International Community during the war. Even worse, the UN fake a rescue, and in the end they pretend, for the media, to have saved the soldier, while in reality he continues to lie on the mine, totally abandoned; which is also the closing image of the film.

As with “No Man’s Land”, many other movies about the war in BiH focus on death and mutual killing, the absurd or tragic dimensions of the war, and on the hopelessness of the people caught in the war, which seems to exclude the possibility of talking about such positive and hopeful acts as rescue. Rescuing and escaping simply seem not to be seen as an option, not for the persons caught in the trap of the war and therefore also not for the film directors, as if rescue and/or salvation would be indecent in the face of the tragedy and the violence of the war. Interestingly, some films do not evoke a lack of will to help and rescue others, but a refusal or a lack of will *to get rescued*. The movie “Shot Through the Heart” (1998) is the story of two best friends, a Serb and a Muslim, who become snipers on each side of the besieged Sarajevo. Each of them offers at one moment the other the opportunity to escape, but both times they refuse, and the story ends tragically when finally one kills the other. In “The Perfect Circle” (1997), Hamza, the main character, refuses to

follow his wife and daughter who are evacuated from besieged Sarajevo, and chooses deliberately to stay in the city. He then unwillingly takes guardianship of two orphaned children, Adis and Kerim, who he finally decides to take out of Sarajevo. However, Adis is killed during the attempt, and Kerim remains with Hamza in the besieged city. Escaping the war zone seems to be a mission impossible.

Even if in the majority of the movies about the war in BiH rescue and help are not present or are shown as something irrelevant or impossible, there are nevertheless a certain number of movies which present acts of help and rescue, in an accessory or more central way. By looking at these movies, we can distinguish four different aspects that they emphasize: the individual help through international actors; the hidden, inter-ethnic rescue; the question of perpetrator-rescuers; and the topic of open and heroic rescue, which ends tragically but has positive effects.

1) *The rescue of endangered civilians by international actors during the war.* These movies send a different message from the film of Tanović, as they show how individual international persons try to help and also sometimes manage to do so. “Welcome to Sarajevo” (1997) is the most well-known film in this category, where a journalist decides that he cannot be a bystander any more, and brings a young girl named Emira out of the war zone and to his home in England. Another example is “Warriors” (1999) where some British UN soldiers attempt to save civilians against the orders of their superiors: they fail twice, but at least succeed once when they evacuate Muslim refugees from a neighborhood before Bosnian Serb forces take control of it. There is also the movie “Savior” (1998), where an American mercenary, who is fighting on the side of the Bosnian Serbs, decides to protect a Serb mother and her baby, who are threatened by their own family, and then finally saves the baby during a massacre orchestrated by Croatian paramilitaries.

The common point of these movies is that they are all international productions showing international protagonists who are saving innocent civilians. The focus is on saving children, the most innocent of the innocent, and even if the attempts take place in dramatic circumstances, they are shown as partially successful. These movies do not pretend that the International Community was not passive during the war in BiH; on the contrary: they portray the passivity of the International Community in general, and they show the role of rescuer as being performed by individuals. At the same time, we can also see these movies as an attempt to save the honor of the international community by showing at least these courageous individuals, and could interpret these movies as a sort of compensation for the failure of the international community to intervene and to help in its totality. The representation of international actors as rescuers appears also in the Pakistani television series “Alpha Bravo Charlie” (1998), where one of the main characters, Khan, as commanding officer of his company, launches a number of successful rescue operations to protect endangered civilians.

“Welcome to Sarajevo” and “Savior” both conclude with a sort of happy end, as the threatened child is rescued, and the spectator does not know what happens after. Another film, “War Child” (2006) starts its story when the others are ending, and deals with the ambivalent and also dramatic consequences of rescue. The “war child” in question is Aida, who, as a two-year-old girl was brought out of the warzone by the Red Cross and then adopted by a German family. Ten years later, hearing that her daughter is alive, her mother Senada goes to Germany to search for her and bring her back, which leads to the question of impossible choices, between Aida - who has become Kristina - and her adoptive family on the one hand, and Senada as the biological mother on the other.

2) *The topic of secret inter-ethnic rescue, where Serbs try to hide or secretly help Muslims or vice-versa.*

In relation with the Bosnian War this topic appears randomly in “Remake” (2003), where at one moment Miro, a Serb soldier, helps his best friend Tarik to escape from a prison, but the attempt fails, and both are caught. A much more central topic is interethnic help and rescue in “Go West” (2005), with the story of Milan and Kenan, a homosexual couple living in Sarajevo at the beginning of the war. They decide to leave the city, and, in order to hide from Serbian militia, Kenan, disguised as a woman, is brought by Milan to his native village, where he presents him as his wife-to-be. The rescued Kenan manages to survive the war years in the village, and can finally leave to the Netherlands, but without Milan, who has died while fighting on the front line. The common point of the two movies is that they are made by filmmakers from BiH who picture help and rescue in the middle of tragedy and hopelessness of war and who refuse to show a happy end.

3) *The topic of the perpetrator-rescuer, in other words persons who are committing crimes, but at one moment help or rescue a person “from the other side”.*

In “In the Land of Blood and Honey” (2011), one of the two main characters is Danijel, who directs a rape-camp during the war, but at the same time helps his former girlfriend to escape. The movie “As If I Am Not There” (2010) is also about the rape of women, and we can find a similar character, the commander of a rape-house, who at one moment starts to “protect” Samira from being raped by other soldiers. Another example is the short movie “In the Name of the Son” (2007), where the commander of a Bosnian Serb unit kills his own son, but decides to spare the life of a Muslim soldier and to let him escape. This last movie is also interesting because the story does not end during the war, but deals primarily with the consequences of this dramatic rescue, as it shows how both men meet again several years after the war and how they deal with the situation. Interestingly, the three movies are all international productions; it seems that the notion of the perpetrator-rescuer has until now been a more difficult topic for filmmakers in BiH, who are more insistent on the fate of “ordinary” people caught in tragedy, and for whom picturing perpetrators who show some humanity seems a more difficult option to choose to tackle.

4) *The open and heroic rescue, ending tragically but producing positive effects:*

This is the central topic of the film “Circles” (2013), which is based on the real story of *Srdan Aleksić*, and which shows how Marko (representing *Srdan Aleksić*) intervenes openly when his Muslim acquaintance Haris is beaten up by other Bosnian Serb soldiers. Marko manages to save Haris, but is himself beaten to death. As with “In the Name of the Son”, the film “Circles” mainly deals with the question of the consequences of this tragic-successful act of rescue, and the main question which the director raises is formulated by Marko’s father twelve years later: “There is just one thing bothering me. Was it all for nothing? A life, just like that ... You understand? (...) When you throw a stone in water something happens... Those circles appear and spread. And yet this... That is what I fear: That when a man does a good thing, it means nothing to other people.”

Actually, the film endeavours to illustrate that the act of Marko was indeed not for nothing, and will show that this act had positive effects, as for the different persons concerned by Marko’s act and death, twelve years later, something positive will result from it. However, even though the film shows that Marko’s tragic act of rescue has different positive effects, it is important to notice how the director chose to end the film: not with the situation twelve years later, but by coming back to the original scene during the war, showing how Haris can escape thanks to Marko, and how then Marko is beaten to death in the middle of the city while other persons watch on. The last image is Marko’s dead body, lying in the middle of the marketplace, with nobody around him. Significantly,

the French co-producer of the film did not like this ending, and wanted that the movie to finish on a positive note, with one of the positive outcomes twelve years later, arguing that this would be better for a Western public. However, the film's Serbian director Srđan Golubović insisted on ending the film with Marko's death, explaining his choice as follows: On the one hand, it was just unconceivable for him that a film from and about the Balkans ends with an entirely positive note; on the other hand this end was necessary for him because he also wanted to transmit the following message: "We have to forgive, but not to forget."<sup>4</sup>

To summarize this short overview of the cinematographic representation of help and rescue in films about the war in BiH, we can see that while in many films the topic is absent, there is nevertheless a certain number of films where it is addressed, which, taken together, show a wide range of aspects and perspectives on the topic of rescue, and in combination illustrate the complexity of rescue in times of war. Differences in the treatment of the topic can especially be found between international (Western) productions and productions from the Western Balkans: the first emphasize the positive and successful intervention of international actors and, in a later arena, the ambiguity of perpetrator-rescuers, while the latter insist more often on the absence of rescue or on interethnic rescue in combination with dramatic and tragic aspects. Nevertheless also among film directors from the Balkans an evolution can be seen, with the appearance in the past decade of films showing partially successful interethnic rescuer actions. That Western productions have not focused on interethnic rescue, except under the ambiguous angle of perpetrator-rescuers, but on rescue by international protagonists confirms what Žarkov (2014a, 2014b) writes about Western film production regarding the Bosnian War reproducing Balkanist and Orientalist discourses, situating humanity and morality in the Western world, and violence and victimhood in the Balkans.

### **3. Movies dealing with help and rescue and public remembrance of the Bosnian War**

To what extent do the mentioned movies reflect the ways in which the Bosnian War and the question of help and rescue during the War are in general remembered in BiH and the region from 1995 to today, and what is the role of these movies within this aspect of dealing with the wartime past? The fact that help and rescue are not a dominant topic within movies about the war reflects indeed also the general situation regarding the public remembrance of the Bosnian War. The public remembrance regarding the war - in BiH and the region - is dominated in general by a focus on other topics: on suffering, civilian victims and heroic soldiers from one's 'own' group, or evil perpetrators from the other side. Since the war, BiH is an extremely divided country, where the war memories continue to be strongly polarized and constitute an important factor of the ethnic, political and social division (Moll 2013). The strong polarization in the public culture of remembrance does not leave much space for stories of interethnic help and rescue as they do not conform to the dominating narratives of division between "us" and "them".

At the same time, from the end of the war to the present day, there have been efforts to promote the memory of rescuers in BiH and the region. Several books gathering stories about interethnic help and rescue during the Bosnian War have, for example, been published by civil society actors (Broz 1999; Milošević 1999; Research and Documentation Center 2010 ). The Sarajevo-based NGO "Gariwo", since its creation in 2001, has engaged in this field through different activities, likewise the Post-Conflict Research Center (PCRC) which realizes educational activities around the topic of those who had the courage to help and rescue others during the Bosnian War.<sup>5</sup> The case of *Srđan Aleksić*, the young Bosnian Serb whose story constitutes the basis for the film "Circles", has in particular been promoted since 2007 by different civil society actors in BiH and Serbia, and has also reached some institutional recognition, for example with streets being named after him in

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<sup>4</sup> Interview with Srđan Golubović by N.M., Sarajevo, 20.8.2013

<sup>5</sup> See their websites [www.gariwo.org](http://www.gariwo.org) and <http://p-crc.org>

Sarajevo, Novi Sad, Pančevo and Podgorica.<sup>6</sup> In general, civil society actors emphasizing the memory of interethnic help and rescue aim through this to promote ideas of reconciliation and/or civic courage, and to propose alternative role models in a society where war criminals are often celebrated as heroes. These efforts face much resistance, as they usually challenge the existing lines of division, but they have nevertheless been developing in recent years. The successful promotion of *Srđan Aleksić*, who has become a well-known example of rescue in the public sphere in BiH, is the best illustration of that.

The fact that the film “Circles” was made very recently seems to illustrate and reflect this strengthening, even if the promotion of the rescuer-memory remains marginalized in general. But the film “Circles” not only reflects this strengthening, it has also actively contributed to it by helping to popularize the memory of *Srđan Aleksić*. The film attracted a lot of media attention in BiH and the region between the beginning of filming, in 2011, and the film’s release in 2013, and was successfully shown (and won several awards) in a series of film festivals, worldwide and regionally. Through this, *Srđan Aleksić* became more known, both on an international level, where his story was nearly unknown until then, and also in BiH and the region, where, although the promotion of *Aleksić*’s memory had already started some years before, the fact that a fictional movie was dedicated to him constituted a new and important step in this process. Regarding this it is also important to see the interaction between the movie and the general efforts to remember *Srđan Aleksić*. For Golubović, the film was explicitly a way to honor and promote *Srđan Aleksić* whom he called “a true hero of our time” (Agar, 2013). Also, different civil society organizations showed the film “Circles” in the framework of their activities to honor the memory of *Srđan Aleksić*. And it is certainly not a coincidence that an initiative was launched in Belgrade to name a street after *Aleksić* shortly after the film was released; the initiators also referred to the movie in order to legitimate their idea, and Golubović agreed to publicly support the street-naming initiative (Agar, 2013).

Nevertheless, the impact of “Circles” should not be overestimated. Even if the film provoked mainly positive reactions, there have also been negative, as for example from the Veterans’ Association in Trebinje who rejected the movie due to its depiction of Bosnian Serb soldiers. And despite the fact that “Circles” received positive media feedback and a warm reception by the public in the festivals where it was screened, the quantitative outreach of the film remained rather limited: in Serbia less than 25,000 persons went to see the movie - which should be compared to the 800,000 who went to see Srđan Dragojević’s “Pretty Village, Pretty Flame”, one of the most successful Balkan movies about the war, which predominantly shows each side as perpetrators of killings. This raises the further question of the impact of other movies related to the topic of the rescuer: To what extent have they raised public awareness or provoked discussion of this topic? Beside “Circles” and the memory of *Srđan Aleksić*, fictional movies have until now not triggered a significant increase in interest concerning the rescuer-topic in BiH and abroad: Firstly, because in general help and rescue are not a central topic of films about the Bosnian War, and secondly, even in the quoted movies where the topic of rescue is more or less present, and which have attracted a significant level of public attention, on the one hand the directors in their statements have insisted on other aspects, and on the other discussion of other topics has overshadowed the rescuer aspect in the public sphere. Two striking examples may illustrate this: The movie “Go West” has attracted much public attention, but discussion has focused predominantly on the fact that the story was built around a homosexual couple and on the way the different characters were pictured (Cornet, 2006), while Angelina Jolie’s movie “In the Land of Blood and Honey” was immediately caught in a

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<sup>6</sup> See my conference presentation: “A positive hero for everyone? Challenges and possibilities of creating consensual memory sites in divided post-war societies: the memorialization of Srđjan Aleksić in the countries of the former Yugoslavia”, Conference “Perspectives in (post)conflict academia and society”, University of Sarajevo, 14-16 March 2013. The publication of an updated version of the paper is in preparation.

polarizing controversy between those who saw it as an “Anti-Serbian” film, those who saw this as sacred testimony of support for Bosniak victims, and those who simply saw it as a bad movie (The Sofia Echo, 2012). In this context there was nearly no chance for a differentiated perception and discussion of the film, and especially about the character of Danijel as a perpetrator-rescuer. The question of the perpetrator-rescuer is also in general a topic that is absent from public discussion, also from the side of the civil society initiatives which, in their will to promote positive stories and role models for reconciliation and civic courage, avoid addressing these cases and prefer instead to focus on non-ambivalent cases of help and rescue, or at least on cases which in their eyes appear as unambivalent.

#### **4. Conclusion**

Rescue is not an easy topic to explore, even for filmmakers. First, because the rescue itself can be ambivalent and problematic, as we see for example with the question of perpetrator-rescuers, or with the sometimes dramatic fate of persons who were rescuing or were rescued. Second, because a person who chooses to talk about rescue in times of war faces the challenge of bringing together two extremes: on the one hand, talking about help and rescue is talking about a positive act, even more so if it succeeds, while on the other there is the issue of war which is mainly about violence, suffering and killing. On what should the filmmaker wish to place the focus? If they consider the war first and foremost as a drama or a tragedy, they cannot focus on rescue, at least not a successful one. If they want to counter the general negative image, and to take something positive out of the war, then the rescue topic offers an opportunity to do so – but then the danger is that they may depict the war in a too positive light.

There is no rescuer film (sub-)genre which exists concerning the Bosnian War. But there are movies which deal with the topic, in different ways. That it is not a dominating cinematographic topic reflects, as we have seen, tendencies of the public remembrance in BiH in general. At the same time, all of the aforementioned films, when taken together, transmit a rather complex view of the topic of help and rescue, including its problematic sides, while civil society actors who are involved in the remembrance of rescuers mostly insist on presenting non-ambivalent cases. Overall, the approach to the topic is becoming stronger in the Western Balkans, both in film, as best illustrated by “Circles”, and in the public sphere in general. It can be expected that with the growing temporal and emotional distance from the war this development will continue.

In other European countries the development of a strong public remembrance regarding rescuer-figures and the topic of rescue has also taken some time. The stronger promotion of the memory of rescuers, especially concerning the Holocaust, but also beyond, in the last twenty years has occurred parallel to the efforts to develop their memory in Balkans regarding the Bosnian War. The efforts in BiH are connected to this general evolution, which can, for example, be seen in the fact that the director of the Bosnian NGO “Gariwo”, Svetlana Broz, is also very active in the “Gardens of the Righteous Worldwide Committee” and that her own NGO is situated within this general initiative. Another illustration is that the PCRC in its exhibitions and educational workshops not only uses examples of rescue from BiH, but also from Cambodia, Rwanda and the Holocaust.

To come back to the question of cinematographic representation: What is the place of movies about the war in BiH which deal with help and rescue within the general cinematographic opus regarding rescue, especially related to the Holocaust? Quantitatively, far more movies have been realized on the subject of the Holocaust and the rescue of Jews, than movies on the war in BiH. The spectrum of the movies dealing with this topic, produced from the 1940s until today, is very large, oscillating between positive-heroic and ambivalent figures, developing different aspects of the complex relationship between rescuers and rescued, showing also sometimes the fine line between rescue

and betrayal. Even if there is not a ‘typical’ Holocaust rescuer movie, there is nevertheless one tendency which has become stronger in the past twenty years, and for which “Schindler’s List” has become the prototype: movies which focus on a heroic rescuer who might be ambivalent to a certain point, but who turns out to be “a good person” and succeeds in saving those he wanted to save, including himself. It is noteworthy that so far, as we have seen, no film about the Bosnian War has been made in the mould of “Schindler’s List”; film directors have obviously, to date, had no wish to show this kind of overall-happy end concerning the war in BiH, although this does not mean that it will not be done one day. At the same time, some of the movies dealing with rescue during the Bosnian War can be seen as original contributions to the general cinematography broaching rescue as a theme, as “Go West”, which combines a story of rescue with grotesque-dramatic elements and the question of sexual and ethnic identity, and “Circles”, which links an original narrative technique with the question of the long-term-consequences of an act of rescue.

One final remark which can confirm that interest in the topic of rescue and help is getting stronger in BiH and the region, and which concerns two other aspects of cinematography not discussed here, but which would be worth investigating to complement this research: In recent years, several documentary films have been produced in BiH and Serbia about rescuers during the Bosnian War, and it would be interesting to see their role in dealing with that memory and how they relate to the treatment of the topic in fiction movies.<sup>7</sup> Additionally, the topic of how civilians helped and rescued endangered Jews, Serbs and others during the Second World War in Yugoslavia, which has not yet been an important topic in cinema (and also more generally), is now receiving more attention: Three film projects have been launched, in Serbia and Croatia, to tell the story of Diana Budisavljević, who saved thousands of children from Jasenovac Concentration Camp in 1942 (Večernje Novosti, 2012). It would be interesting to examine how these efforts to promote rescue related to the Second World War are linked (or not) to the efforts concerning the wars of the 1990s, and also to the general remembrance of rescue during the Holocaust, also on the cinematographic level. The title chosen for one of the three productions, a Croatian docu-fiction scheduled to be released in 2015, is already a clear reference to the most famous of all rescuer-movies: “Diana’s List”.

#### Quoted Films about the War in BiH:

- “Pretty Village, Pretty Flame”, Srđan Dragojević, 1996 (Serbia)
- “The Perfect Circle”, Ademir Kenović, 1997 (BiH)
- “Welcome to Sarajevo”, Michael Winterbottom, 1997 (UK)
- “Shot through the Heart”, David Attwood, 1998 (USA / UK)
- “Savior”, Predrag Antonijević, 1998 (USA)
- “Alpha Bravo Charlie”, Shoaib Mansoor, 1998 (Pakistan)
- “Warriors”, Peter Kosminksy, 1999 (UK)
- “No Man’s Land”, Danis Tanović, 2001 (BiH)
- “Remake”, Dino Mustafić, 2003 (BiH/France/Turkey)
- “Go West”, Ahmed Imamović, 2005 (BiH)
- “War Child”, Christian Wagner, 2006 (D)
- “In the Name of the Son”, Harun Mehmedinović, 2007 (USA / BiH)
- “As If I Am Not There”, Juanita Wilson, 2010 (Ireland)
- “In the Land of Blood and Honey”, Angelina Jolie, 2011 (USA)
- “Circles”, Srdan Golubović, 2013 (Serbia)

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<sup>7</sup> See for example the documentary-series “Living Together” (<http://zivetizajedno.net/>) and “Ordinary Heroes” (<http://p-crc.org/project/ordinary-heroes-documentary-series/>)

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**Stećak: A(dis)continuity or resurrection of the art of *stećak***

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Key words: *stećak/stone sculpture, remembrance, identity, Bosnia and Herzegovina, medieval tombstone*

**ABSTRACT**

This article presents recent outcomes of my ongoing Visual Arts Doctoral research of *the art of stećak (Mediaeval Bosnian sepulchral sculpture)*. The broad aim of this research in the theoretical sense is to explain the *art of stećak* within the theoretical framework of the general stone sculpture. In its practical component, another equally important research goal is also to enliven this art as my personal expression and metaphor, and as a cohesive factor in our contemporary realm – an expression of remembrance of the crown quality of the Bosnian spirit and history in which the paradigm of pluralism still resides. *Stećak* – an ‘endemic’ native Bosnian artistic expression – is approached through a multi-semantic sculptural amalgamate which is recognised as a *timeless principle and absolute potential of stone sculpture*. I explain the *art of stećak* as a knot of various sculptural forms, expressions and traditions; an inclusive format capable of conciliating “primitive” and “sophisticated”, “primordial” and “contemporary”. These qualities are also present in the aesthetic and the socio-cultural dimensions of *stećak*. The multidimensional Bosnian identity, as a specific *mediaeval pretext* to modern European pluralism and multiculturalism, has its parallels and presentation in the *stećak’s* syncretic form. This is an inspirational impulse for my creative work, and also a potency, which can cultivate/transcend “Bosnian memory”, at least into a vision of a better future. This empirical, exploratory, descriptive and explanatory qualitative research is strategically structured as a combination of methodological approaches preconditioned by the complex nature of the (sculptural) phenomenon of *stećak*.

**Keywords: tombstone, traditional and contemporary stone sculptures, cultural heritage, identity, creative syncretism.**

## INTRODUCTION

The aim of my research, in its theoretical aspect, is to add and contribute to the existing body of knowledge about the art of *stećak* – to explain how and why I see *the art of stećak as a timeless principle of an absolute stone sculpture potential*. This study will contribute towards understanding of *stećak* in the framework of the global stone sculpture history and aesthetics (contextualise *stećak* within contemporary sculpture). In search of my own expression in syncretism and fusion, in the practical/creative sense, I enliven this mediaeval Bosnian sepulchral art in the context of the 21<sup>st</sup> century sculpture (and) as my personal expression and metaphor. Researching the art of *stećak* within this milieu is of great importance for the country of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Currently, my research is even more actualised through the process in which our/Bosnian cultural heritage is formally becoming the World cultural heritage (under the UNESCO's protection/aegis). The significance of my research, and the accompanying creative effort, is in the fact that, until now, there have *not* been *any* studies analysing/explaining traditional *stećak* as a sculptural phenomenon or enlivening and contextualising this art form within the Bosnian (and world's) contemporary complexity. In this article, I am presenting recent creative results of this novel research, more specifically those I consider significant in terms of the 'culture of remembrance'.

*A (dis)continuity and/or resurrection of the art of stećak ...* is how I name (and describe) current creative results of my Doctoral research dedicated to the art of *stećaks* Queensland College of Art, Griffith University, Brisbane, Australia. The goal of my research is to explain the art of *stećak*, through seeming ambiguity of its complex sculptural form and content, as the timeless principle and the absolute potential of stone sculpture. The art of *stećak* (like Bosnia and Herzegovina itself) is not exclusive, but inclusive – a syncretic blend of different forms, expressions and motifs. Within *stećak*, a spirit of amulet, sculpture and architecture are, in a unique way, fused into one – in this I find a "living sprout" of an "original monument", as Herbert Read called the primordial form of architecture and sculpture. (Read, 1961) Through my research, in a creative way, I revive this medieval Bosnian sepulchral art as my own personal expression and metaphor. This revival is not a mere copying / replication of the medieval *stećaks* and motives; it is rather an honest creation of the new and different (although based on traditional principles). So, it is a way of "a retrospective moving forward". Otto Bihalji-Merin describes *stećak* as "a primordial art in which eternity itself became a style". (Bihalji-Merin and Benac, 1962) This thought deepens my understanding of the art of *stećak* and stimulates my innate creative urge to move the lines that separate styles while seeking a syncretic fusion, blend of different forms, expressions and motifs. Such fusion can also be a symbol of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian cosmopolitan identity introduced to my work by the ethno-anthropological dimension which I 'inscribe' into stone and/or the landscape. This enriches my research with the characteristics of "action research" as an alternative philosophy of social research. (Kemmis & McTaggart, 2000) The included element (and/or problem) of remembrance through art, in this case, tells the story and reminds us of who we were and who we are (not) now. I am attempting to put some of my art in the function of a conveyer of this paradigm. Researching *stećaks*, generally speaking, is also of great importance for Bosnia and Herzegovina for an additional reason – the results of my research will support the formation of a more informed perception of Bosnia and Herzegovina on various levels, and also from within Bosnia and from the outside. Now (even more than ever before), when our heritage is becoming the official UNESCO World cultural heritage, one should be reminded that 'national culture can be valuable only if it is (somehow) universal'. (Matoš, 1973) This is why my research into contextualisation of *stećak* within the universality of theory and art (practice), in combination with other aspects of my research, is making a valuable contribution towards filling the gaps in current body of knowledge surrounding the phenomenon of *stećak*.

## METHOD

My research is qualitative, with the final triangulation involving both theoretical and practical results. The literature review has informed the process of defining and fine-tuning my theoretical and practical research – through collecting and analysing data from cultural history, the history of art and sculpture, and performing a combination of the context, historical, and theoretical review (overview of theories on *stećak*) (Neuman 2011) as a base for the creative practical element of my research. In addition to my theoretical and studio research, in order to collect the first-hand ‘data’ and capture my own ‘tick description’ of *stećaks*, i.e. make sense of what I observe, I also use elements of ethnographic research when conducting fieldwork at the sites of *stećak* necropolises. (Geertz 1973)

The theoretical research is constructed around two main elements; the art of *stećak* and stone sculpture (in general) – researching theory, aesthetic, technology and its place and perspective in our contemporary world. This means studying in situ, consulting literature and experts from different fields, collecting theoretical information, identifying similarities and differences ... and further analysis of findings and conceptualisation of my own theories. (Hesse-Biber & Leavy 2008; Holly & Smith 2008; Neuman 2011) According to Neuman’s division of research into three broad types, my research falls into all three categories to varying degrees (Neuman 2011), namely: Exploratory, Descriptive and Explanatory research of the art of *stećak* (including historical and comparative research. (Pollard 1986)

My theoretical and practical research components somewhat overlap and hence inform each other, creating a dialogue between inquiry and art, image and word, the so-called “third space”, merging the subjective and objective. (Leavy 2009) The complexity of thinking through simultaneous *writing and carving* brings both theoretical and practical/creative effort in a position of being continuously (re)contextualised and (re)conceptualised in/by each other. This tension between the two levels (theoretical and practical) generates the depth of thought required in the final results of my research. (Macleod & Holdridge 2006) The qualitative nature of my research is inductive; I am measuring and creating new concepts simultaneously with the process of gathering data in both theoretical and practical parts of my work. (Neuman 2011; Strauss & Corbin 1998) I can find parallels between the concept of my theoretical research of the art of *stećak* and the practical component of realising *stećak* as my personal sculptural expression and metaphor in the writing of Davey:

That a given practice is rooted in what has been transmitted historically does not mean that the practice is destined to remain the same. The inheritance of a tradition or a work practice is not definitive, closed and/or resolved. To the contrary, they retain tensions, contradictions and unrealised futures. One role of theory is to uncover the possibilities that remain inherent within practices and thereby liberate them towards futures already latent within them. In this context, theory serves as a midwife to practice. Sympathetic theoretical engagement with practice can release this unfulfilled potential. (Davey 2006)

My research is *art-based* and *practice-based* through my commitment, creative observation and practice in order to articulate the art of *stećak* as a form of contemporary stone sculpture and my personal metaphor. Visual arts research should be grounded in practices that come from the art itself, involving inquiry that is studio based. (Sullivan 2004, 2005) Because this research is *artistic*, and art is subjective, I, naturally, depend on my observations, opinions, practice and experience, as well as self-reflection and reflection on research findings. (Sullivan 2005) Sometimes, as Nelson put it, the outcome of work in the creative arts is not knowledge but a form of communication. (Nelson 2009) If a dialogue can occur between the visual and the textual, then their relationship is both dialogical and elliptical with either practice finishing the sentence implied by the other.

(O'Riley 2006) Artists are expected to have an artistic disposition relative to their sources; they exploit them, extrapolate from them and ultimately owe little to the historical integrity of their context. (Nelson 2009) Ultimately, how art relates to knowledge is a crucial point in the practice-based (doctoral) research. (Renwick 2006) My practical studio work will revive the art of *stećak* by using its potential in communication with various sculptural achievements. My creation process, based on the classic method of stone carving, is in the phase of advanced experimentation, evaluation, and planning to test my ideas developed through researching the art of *stećak* along with other relevant topics (in relation to stone sculpture (from Neolithic era to our time)).

*After all one's art is not the chief end of life but an accident in one's search for reality or rather perhaps one's method of search.*

W. B. Yeats to Ezra Pound (Jones 2006)

A(dis)continuity and/or resurrection of the art of *stećak*

The discontinuity in the creation and production of *stećaks* that lasted five centuries, I have already turned into A(dis)continuity – my work is a "logical" modern continuation of Bosnia's medieval stone sculptures. However, the function of my sculptures has widened; traditional *stećaks* are tombstones or cenotaphs (Bešlagić, 1982; Lovrenović, 2010) and my concept of *stećak* (Addis*stećak*) is open to any spiritual or formal function that sculpture in general can have. In this context, here I present three sculptures: *Sentinels*, *B&Hierophany@terraAvstralis.MMXIII*. Addis and *Bosnian-Herzegovinian Triumphal Gate*.

Along with representing the practical aspect and creative outcomes of my doctoral research on the art of *stećak*, these sculptures, of course, reflect my own specific relationship with the stone and stone sculpture in general.

### Sentinels




*Sentinels* limestone, 3x (170x30x40cm), 2012, Počitelj, Bosnia and Herzegovina

The sculpture *Sentinels* (2012) was specifically created for Počitelj – a historic Herzegovinian town which evolved over the period from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century. The architecture of Počitelj, the survived stone-built parts of the fortified complex, shows two stages of evolution: Mediaeval and Ottoman. Sculpture is placed in the *Gavrrankapetanović* housing complex that currently serves as the space for the Bosnian Visual Artists' colony. My intention was to create a sculpture that visually fits into the environment and is in accord with the ongoing Program of the permanent protection of Počitelj. The sculpture I created (*Sentinels*) could be easily mistaken for an authentic part of the environment. I intended to support (even emphasize) the already existing visual

and symbolic meaning of Počitelj itself. Moreover, with *Sentinels* I also wanted to metaphorically protect the soul and body of Počitelj. Nevertheless, I sought even more from it – I also wished to evoke the existing consciousness of persistence and continuation ...

Bosnia and Herzegovina is a country with one of the richest histories in the region – permanent human settlements can be traced back to the [Neolithic](#) age. Interestingly, sculpture *Sentinels* and its “micro location” can also be seen as some sort of an ancient, pagan, sacred site. *Sentinels* fits into the environment of Počitelj and, at the same time, it can be perceived as something that was there before Počitelj even existed, something around which Počitelj has been built. *Sentinels* are symbolically guarding the unspoiled mediaeval town of Počitelj by bridging the aesthetic of prehistoric and contemporary sculpture. This sculpture conveys and embodies the memory about the ‘lasting’ itself.

### [B&Hierophany@terraAvstralis.MMXIII.Addis](#)



[B&Hierophany@terraAvstralis.MMXIII.Addis](#), sandstone, 196x120x100, 2013, Canberra, Australia

[B&Hierophany@terraAvstralis.MMXIII.Addis](#) (2013) Bosnian gift-sculpture to Australia, permanently situated in the Formal Gardens at the Australian Parliament House in Canberra, unveiled on the occasion of the 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary of diplomatic relations between these two countries. In addition to my artistic acclaim, my academic pursuits also uniquely positioned me to immortalise my visions of Australia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, with their shared multicultural values. My proposal, furthermore, literally entailed ‘setting these values in stone’. This gift therefore represents ‘a summary’ of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Australia – artistically expressed through depictions carved into the Australian sandstone. The term “hierophany” signifies a manifestation of the sacred (from the Greek roots “*ἱερός*” (*hieros*), meaning “sacred” or “holy,” and “*φαίνειν*” (*phainein*) meaning “to reveal” or “to bring to light”). (Eliade, 1959)

This is the first *stećak* that can be officially considered to be a bona fide resurrection or continuation of the *stećak* tradition after the 500 year gap. Also, it is the first one that was created as a new and

original *stećak* instead of being a replica – while still belonging to the tradition of *stećak*. In addition, it is the first *stećak* dedicated to the existing country and its habitants rather than being a tombstone or a cenotaph. And it is the first *stećak* that was made and situated outside of the Balkans, on another continent, and, finally, it is the first *stećak* to be placed in front of a foreign country's Parliament house.

On the four sides of my *stećak* there are four different motifs. There is the anthropomorphic lily – a more ornamented version of the authentic mediaeval depiction from *stećak*; On the other side, there is a Sleeping knight – an homage to Mak Dizdar's *Stone sleepers* (Dizdar, 1999). On the third side there is a door or portal-like motif which will be elaborated on later. The most significant depiction on my Canberra *stećak* is the one that I named *Abraham's Seal* – comprising the Star of David, a cross, and a crescent – all appearing as one and representing the multicultural and multi-religious Bosnia and Herzegovina. The connection to Australia is further emphasised with the intertwining of the traditional Bosnian *stećak* spheres (so called *Apples*) constellated in the form of the Southern Cross.

*Stećak* is Bosnia and Herzegovina's cultural heritage, a symbol of its history and its multicultural essence. It represents a society where anyone, regardless of their religion or ethnicity, could always belong, making it a particularly appropriate gift from one such society to another, from Bosnia and Herzegovina to Australia. *Stećak* therefore remains Bosnia and Herzegovina's foundational stone, and it was a privilege and an honour to share it with the Australian people, turning my artwork into an additional symbol of memory and celebration of all that unites our two countries and their peoples.

#### Bosnian Triumphal Gate



*Bosnian Triumphal Gate*, mixed media prototype, 2x (250x120x60cm), 2013, Brisbane, Australia.

This sculpture, as well as the previous two, at the symbolic level represents the complexity of the Bosnian history, its syncretic format and content. The meaning of 'triumph' in Bosnia hasn't been experienced by anyone throughout the Bosnian history, and no one can even lie that they have triumphed over anyone else ... which is probably one of the important reasons why no one has ever been in a situation to erect a 'real' *Bosnian Triumphal Gate*. Up until the moment when I personally invented the *Bosnian Triumphal Gate*, it never quite existed; not as an idea/term/phrase, not as a form, not as a sculpture. A triumphant gate of any kind has not been documented in the known Bosnian historical sources, among documents and artefacts, nor in our rich narrative tradition. In this context, my *Bosnian Triumphal Gate*, through which there is no passage, is a novel invention and is also the most-Bosnian with all its attributes, namely it is the most suitable representation of the so-called 'triumph' in Bosnia... This tragic-comic sculptural undertaking is not just an adequate metaphor of Bosnia and Herzegovina itself, but also an opportunity to send a realistic and deeply humanistic message from Bosnia to the world. This message can directly and tragi-comically, in a lyric-satiric manner, attempt to deconstruct the concept and context of many existing triumphal gates that are, more or less, erected in the context of the celebration of 'some' because of the spilled blood of the 'others'.

My *Bosnian Triumphal Gate* is also a part of the opus that I am creating as a 'logical, contemporary' continuation of the Bosnian tradition of the medieval sculpture. Bosnia and Herzegovina as an idea/term represents more than a historical, geographical, and political content and meaning. In its micro-framework, Bosnia represents global and universal problems and solutions of the human existence. Bosnia and Herzegovina is a crossroads, or a meeting point, of various cultures, epochs, Orient and Occident... Its capital, Sarajevo, is already widely recognised as the European Jerusalem, and Bosnian and Herzegovinian multidimensional society as a model for the modern Europe. (Levy & Ferrari, 1994; Radević, 2012) Despite this heritage (or perhaps exactly because of it), the modern Bosnia in the 90s was savagely attacked and betrayed from the inside and outside. (Donia & Fine, 2004; Hoare, 2007; Noel, 1996) During and after the aggression, Bosnia and its multi-meaning were almost completely destroyed. (Toal and Dahlman, 2011; Halilovich, 2013) The rich and complex qualities of Bosnia, her multicultural, multi-religious, and even multi-mythical content in this sculpture is represented through the abstract, condensed ornamentation – knotted up in itself, preventing the passage through the portal... appearing simultaneously as a delicate filigree as well as a frightening snake-knot. No one triumphed under anyone else here. This is, fortunately, and unfortunately, our Bosnian destiny. The narrow, vertical crack, empty space between the two monoliths, enables a limited view from one to the other 'triumphal side', but this only deepens the 'tragedy', since this crack-passageway cannot be passed through. However, the crack still enables the view through it, over to the other side, which can, eventually, bring hope that the knot can be cut through, as if through a bad spell. Or, if nothing else, as in all good Bosnian jokes, one can reach over to the other side by simply walking around the sculpture's blocks (not through them), denying any triumph or pomp. With its symbolic and (non)historic implications, my *Bosnian Triumphal Gate* is, absurdly, completely open for the 'reading' of Bosnia, and in this sculpture one can feel a universal global dimension of the human existence. It is important to emphasise that, in 2015, the original medieval Bosnian art of *stećaks* will be enlisted on the UNESCO's World Heritage List. Simultaneously, 2014 also represents the hundredth anniversary of the Sarajevo assassination (beginning of World War I), which, in the European centres has already been recognised as a reason/motive for sending positive messages through cultural projects. The *Bosnian Triumphal Gate*, with its universal messages, connects these two principles. With its form, this sculpture connects *stećaks* – cultural heritage of our multicultural medieval past (our "forgotten memory") with today's unfortunate, almost destroyed, multicultural Bosnia, along with much hope for a better future.

## Conclusion

My doctoral research of the art of *stećak* first began as a "sculpture-Puritan" analysis of its form, relatively isolated from any "unsculptural" meanings. In addition to the focus on visual or sculptural format and content of the tombstones, my research soon acquired multidisciplinary character. This effort of mine, a resurrection of the art of *stećak* – after five hundred years of discontinuation of the art of *stećak* I turned it into A(dis)Continuation – has been performed with the intention of carving deeper the meaning of the ancient Bosnian multidimensionality as a message to the present Bosnia and the world. Both are in need of being promptly reminded and admonished. It is of both "local" and "global" significance to be (come) aware of the meaning (less) of life with (out) being human – being able to reach a civilizational level where the Latin phrase *Homo homini lupus (est)* will be incorrect. Humans are meant to be humans to each other. At the basic level, my work is in the function of remembering this. Remembering – one of the central functions of all art plays a big role here too – art is a response to the consequence of forgetting; it helps us to hold on to things we love when they are gone. (Botton & Armstrong, 2013) With my art, I am trying to understand and enliven the core significance of the meaning of *stećak* and the corresponding meaning of Bosnia as an idea – all quite valuable things, but in our contemporary conditions very challenging to hold on to.

My study of understanding of the art of *stećak* while reviving this tradition within the modern paradigm has been transformed into an artistic and anthropological intervention. I see the multidimensionality of expressive forms (and potential) of *stećak* as the appropriate symbol of the equally multidimensional Bosnian identity developed through complex historical circumstances. (Donia & Fine, 2004; Hoare, 2007; Noel, 1996) Unfortunately, this identity, in the technical sense, is almost completely politically 'deleted' from existence at present time, while it still thrives in the actuality of our 'ordinary life', as well as our collective memory. It continues to live as a specific type of cosmopolitanism. I perceive the amalgamate format of *stećak* as a symbol of that which can be the 'Bosnianhood' paradigm (and hope and model) of a global future ... I believe that only such humanity can have a future at all.

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## Interpretation and Point of View in Cinema: Bosnian Film from 1997 to 2013<sup>8</sup>

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### Abstract

The persuasive character of films depends not solely on author's vision but the inherent feature of cinema and its most effective kinesthetic storytelling device – POV (point of view). Different types of characters' memory and reminiscences are made through the editing devices and the compatible POV if the author of the film. Inevitably memories of humans are changeable and they differ according to the individual background. Can objective memory of the camera contain the subcontexts that might be warped by different influences and stereotypes? Is fictional world liberated of the twisted memory and distorted truth of reality? The comparisons and contrasts between the POV of the conflict are to be discussed in the case studies: domestic, foreign and films from the region taking place in the war and after war Bosnian produced from 1997 to today. Some of the sample movies for the discussion are: *Gori vatra*, *Srpski film*, *Venuto al Mondo*, *The Hunting Party*, and *Halimin put*.

**Keywords:** Bosnian cinema, Bosnian conflict, stereotypes, POV, representation, identification, ideology.

Only human beings use symbols to denominate something that is not the prime significance of the sign thus forming the process of connotations. Human communication is of persuasive character, since the perspective to determine the difference between fact and opinion differ according to sociological and cultural backgrounds. Reality is perceived in groups of signs that we have societies' approval for. The artistic attempt to convey the reality or the author's vision of the reality can be reduced to the simple communication process between the creator of the strategic artistic idea or message aimed at emotions of the recipient. Manipulation with the impact of the art work results in the stereotyped values on the matter presented in the art work. Such impact is vividly evident in the motion pictures.

Ever since the beginning of the film exemplary influences of the film on its audience are enormous. Riccioto Canudo's manifest *The Birth of the Sixth Art* from 1911 for the first time argued and proclaimed cinema as the new art and the synthesis of the five ancient arts: architecture, sculpture, painting, music, and poetry. Plato's mimetic art quality was immediately recognized among early film theorists (Stojanović, 1978). Realism as the main style was implemented immediately in this new art. The main feature of realism is to present the world as the real one, in which all the narrative elements (plot, situation, characters, conflicts, locations, etc.) stand on their own within the organized structure of the story conducted by that own world's rules. "Realism as a self-effacing form of storytelling draws on the general tendency in much art to hide the process of its

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<sup>8</sup> This essay is continuation on the series of texts on the same subject by the same author among which the first one is copyrighted article in the edited book by *Cities of Memory*, Queens University Belfast by the publisher Palgrave McMillan.

own making in favour of the impression that the world it represents exists on its own, autonomously” (Nichols, 2010, 177).

Even latter stylistic features in film, such as modernism and postmodernism, are relating to one simple quality of film: it has to be real to be convincing. The pioneer in documentary Dziga Vertov experimented with the leftovers film stock in the editing room, making the new document of the already documented reality on the film reel. For him, the camera and editing are equal in the process of filmmaking and by reformulation of the reality; a new, more perfect reality is born, seen through the cinematic, as well as human lenses of the creator of the film. His famous statement: “Life caught unawares” refers to the ability of film to be perfect as opposed to the imperfections of human eyesight (Cook, 2007). This cinema-eye perfection enables the creator to reinvent the perfect reality (or a new one) according to his own ideas and the messages that he wants the audience to be focused on. Nevertheless, everything in this process of cutting and editing reality depends on the point of view of the author. Whether it’s the fantasy world or the documentary, both of these genres are in the domain of mimetic and realistic qualities. The audience easily identifies with the reality on the screen. This reality can transfer the real reality, as the photograph does. The birth of cinema is characterized by this kind of mimesis.

Documentation of the train arrival to the station by brothers Lumière is copy pasting the real life. On the other hand *A Trip to the Moon* from 1902 makes its own reality. This first fantasy film, by George Méliès, draws the viewers into the fantasy travel to the space, but nonetheless very much real within its own made up narrative elements rules. This discrepancy between fantasy and realism is evident at the beginning of film, but also accurate and applicable today within the complex genre system of film storytelling. Both opposing styles have possibilities to be suggestive and persuasive, because both are real and we believe in them. The story of President Abraham Lincoln can be told in a realistic manner as was done by Steven Spielberg in an Oscar awarded film *Lincoln* from 2012. In the same year *Abraham Lincoln: Vampire Hunter* a fantasy horror vampire movie was released, directed by Timur Bekmambetov and based on the novel by Seth Grahame-Smith. Both are indexical presentations of reality and mimetically interpret the made-up world of fiction based on the true events in history. One is a drama, and the other a vampire action. In both films we entrust our belief that the reality represented on screen is worth trusting and following. No other art has this trust issue with its recipients. For literature one does not need to trust, but imagine. When reading fiction or poetry imagination is the most important factor in the communication process. For paintings and fine art, aesthetic components of admiration, not trust in the given reality, is what is important. For music, emotions and catharsis, but not trust, are the most inherent features of the artist – consumer process.

Ever since the beginnings of the film, influences of the celluloid narratives on its audience are registered and this new medium, at first considered nothing more than an entertainment tool, showed that the slights of hand can have considerable convincing power. After seeing, what’s considered to be the first film, brother Lumière’s *The arrival of the Train at La Ciotat* in 1895 people jumped out of their seats believing that the train will enter the screening room when approaching in the close up shot to the camera. Broadcasting of the H.G. Wells’s interpretation of *The War of the Worlds* in 1938 by Orson Wells, making people believe that the actual aliens are invading earth, caused mass hysteria in USA. Internal Revenue Service noted the increased tax payments in 1943, after the mass distribution of the cartoon by Walt Disney, in which the famous children’s character Donald Duck is portrayed as the conscious citizen and diligent tax payer. The summer film season in 1975 was marked by the box office success of *Jaws*, the film that is to be taken as one of the first blockbusters. The horror story of the giant shark attacking and killing swimmers and tourists at random in the quiet Amity Island, caused the same devastating effect in the real world of tourism. The summer season was nearly destroyed, because people were afraid to

swim in the ocean. The vividly real and palpable fear of the giant aquatic monster was masterly directed by Steven Spielberg, and to this day has gone through so many sequels and different interpretations such as the latest Piranha 3D movie in 2010 (Panjeta 2006). Brazilian newspaper headlines in December of 1992, covering the story of the murder of Daniela Perez revealed the shocking truth about the psychological process of actors' identification. The partner of this young actress brutally murdered her in real life, after staging and shooting a scene in the soap opera *De Corpo e Alma* produced by TV Globo. In the said love scene the character played by Daniela Perez states that she does not love her partner anymore. After the murder in real life, the actor surrendered himself claiming that he confused the reality and the fiction he was playing in. The production company was later announced to be the accomplice in this brutal act. (*Telenovelas: BBC*, 1995, Alexandre Valenti)

It is an inherent feature of film to be convincing, because if it is not, the audience does not believe the interpreted reality or identify with the story, and thus the communication process is not working properly. Truthfulness and verisimilitude are the immanent features of narrative in film language. When looking at the simple Jakobson's explanation of communication process, one finds that it can be reduced to the simple equation consisting of sender, receiver and the message (Jakobson, 1966). The creator or sender of the message puts the information he or she possesses into an action with the goal aimed at the receiver's or customer's response. This action produces the message that is received and perceived by the receiver based on his or hers cultural and social background and in doing so produces the reaction of the receiver. This reaction can be considered as immediate feedback to the sender, but also as a delayed outcome of the perceived information resulting in the receivers beliefs, stands, emotions, behaviour, etc. This simplification of the human communication indicates that it can be of persuasive nature, because in any information that is put into the action by the receiver, there is some kind of goal, purpose, hidden agenda or strategy. Whether it's a simple statement that the weather today is bleak or the enchanted advertisement for the new Chevrolet, the sender of the message is sending his or hers own perception of the world towards the receiver and waiting for the response, that can, but does not always have to, qualify as the desired and strategically formed outcome. The impact that the message produces can be anticipated and premeditated by the creator of the communication process. The accuracy in achieving the goals in this persuasive communication is measured by propaganda experts, marketing tools, media and advertisement industry criteria, etc. The sophisticated methods for the manipulation of the receiver's responses are within the realm of propaganda techniques, but it is not possible to neglect the basic principles of communication that can be of persuasive nature even if it is not conducted by propaganda experts.

Film is, therefore, mimetic interpretation of the creator's vision and presentation of some given reality. The story of Snow White is worldwide spread and known, and it can be interpreted like Disney's 1937 animation or 2012 gothic horror version of *Snow White and the Huntsmen*. But, in both versions the good guys and the bad guys are the same: wicked evil stepmother is the antagonist (the bad guy), and the beautiful, innocent Snow White is the protagonist (the good guy). Everything else can be interpreted according to the author's vision.

War is similar to fairy tales. It is a story of two different sides; good and bad. How to portray the war in the fiction, and stay true to the reality of good and bad, as well as the victims and aggressors point of view? There be both in the real life, but is there room for both interpretations on one screen? If so, how is then possible to transfer such reality on screen without taking sides and producing further conflict. Is it possible for film to not use the above described persuasive techniques (intentionally or not) and stay true to reality? Which or whose interpretation of reality?

The battle between good and evil is an essential narrative for films. After the devastating war in Bosnia from 1992 to 1995, no winner is official proclaimed. The Dayton Accord signed in December 1995 stopped the killings and that's how the massacres in the centre of Europe in the 20<sup>th</sup> century were ended. No winner. The International Court of Justice in The Haag in 2007 delivered the decision on Genocide (not ethnic cleansing) committed in Srebrenica. Two entities: Serbian and Bosnian-Croat were created, as those were major two the sides in the conflict. Bosnian history now has the story with no winner that will always be subjected to the future interests of power. Baring this in mind, can film communicate or transcend the reality? How is the reality interpreted in films? Can film replace and become a collective memory?

The persuasive tools for making strategic goals in creation of collective memory or other persuasive outcomes in the films based on the dramatic devices and film storytelling are as follows: plot (conflict), antagonist propagates the protagonists causes, character (actions, lines, opinions, emotions), set design, props, costumes, POV in narrative, camera position and cutting the reality, cultural stereotypes, and genre of the film. The features of cinematography (placing the camera for the point of view thus interpreting the reality and transgressing the author idea and or ideology) and storytelling (narrative on Enemies and Saviors), subjugated to the stereotypes along with the propaganda possibilities and impacts of film contents and contexts in reference to the war and after war reality are of great importance in the analysis of the persuasive and denominating character in the verisimilitude of the fiction film reality.

The truth caught in *Savršeni krug* shoot in real location just after the war is evident to the survivors. In the same way the fake set design of the fighting scene background in which the glass windows are intact can be easily detected in the 2011 *In the Land of Blood and Honey* by someone who has witnessed the siege of the European city at the end of 20<sup>th</sup> century. The film loses the viewers trust (especially survivors' attention) not just because the images aren't transcending the right message. The story is purely conceived as the romance between the victim of the rape and the rapist. It is rumoured that the film is inspired by the true story. The reality behind it is not questionable. The film reality is not holding well the strings and stretches of the narrative, performing and editing.

Foreign movies (American production especially) are in need to determine who started the war, whereas domestic, including the Serbian films, are harsher and more realistic in depicting the horrors of war but not focusing so much on the bad guy. They also do not openly state that everybody is equally to blame. The general idea can be drawn as a conclusion that the war is stupid, and we did not need it. As the good story needs the dichotomy of good and evil, foreign understanding of Bosnian conflict has to be simplified and stereotyped. It is often given as a justification of the political silence at first and then the humanitarian or military intervention.

That's why *The Hunting party*, directed by Richard Shepard in 2007, tells the story of the catching of the bad guy, the war criminal Radovan Karadžić. It is very clear who the good guys are. Although filled with stereotyped judgmental images, the impression of justification, remorse, and pay off for the actions international community and the USA were taking (not taking) concerning the war in Bosnia is the major idea behind the film. Opening scene shows the arrival of the plane to Sarajevo International Airport along with the collage of images associated with Bosnian. The background music is of oriental origin, as has nothing in common with the Bosnian musical heritage. The shoot of an old guy in the Old Town of Sarajevo that was constructed during the Ottoman rule in middle ages, shows the fez on his head that has not been worn in real life for a century. Incidentally that costume is also of the Ottoman origin, not Bosnian. The comparable referent this stereotyped image, would be if one expected a cowboy to greet him or her upon the arrival at the J.F. Kennedy Airport in USA. The final title card in the film justifies the international involvement in the conflict, pointing out the Bad guy:

“In theory, the official hunt for war criminals, in Bosnia continues to this day. However, the two most wanted men – Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić – continue to elude the US, the United Nations, the European Union, NATO, The Hague and all in the civilized world who claim to be looking for them. In the ten years, that Radovan Karadzic has been on the run, he has published two books and one play. Perhaps, if the International Community opened summer stock theatre...” (*The Hunting Party*, final title card)

One year later the war criminal was caught.

Opposing to this cinema of good and bad are the domestic comic interpretations of war. Almost grotesquely comic are the Muslim, Serbian, Croatian and Albanian characters in *Parada* from 2011. Ex war heroes (each on their own side) that are united as bodyguards of the gay pride procession in Belgrade against the almost neo fascist chauvinist youth. As much as the earlier work of Srdjan Dragojević can be considered ideological and provocative, this film is mocking the war conflict and even though the stereotypical characters are offensive cultural representation, the film ends in the bitter sentiment of the tragedy and absurdity of violence. The bad guys are defined, but do not bare the necessary mask of religion, ethnicity or nationality. Opposing to the bad guys in reality but also heroes of the film (war criminals) these violent filled with hatred antagonists are the really bad ones - ugly ones. This concept of someone outside being the Ugly one (international community or fate itself) is evident in the 2010 snuff Serbian film *Srpski film*. If the content of this film is reviewed as the metaphorical subtext, the context is connotative and applicable to the war and break off the Yugoslavia.

One of the best foreign movies about the war that are indexical and symbolic at the same time to the referencing reality of war is *Shoot through the Heart* from 1998. The twisted, almost surreal world of city during the siege and subtle explanatory features of the everyday life, are of the utmost importance for any study of the war. Good guys and bad guys are defined and their motives explained.

*Savršeni krug*, the first after war Bosnian film is a metaphor for the siege of Sarajevo in reality, but also the connotation of resistance and refusal to submit in the face of violence and surrender by dying. The idea of totally experiencing the opposing religions and multi culture by an individual becomes collective in the film reality. Shot on the locations devastated by the shelling; the set designs are ideological but also witnesses of documented reality, because they become the certain historical reality.

It is evident that so many Bosnian films are keeping and propagating this multiculturalism quality. Characters are of different national and religious backgrounds and not necessarily the bad guy is always the aggressor or soldier. Whether it is *Turneja*, a Serbian movie that describes the beginning of the war from the point of view of the theatre group from Belgrade that happen to be in the wrong place at the wrong time, or Bosnian films *Ostavljeni* and *Grbavica*, stories about the post-war perspective of the younger generation, whose life is effected extremely by the past: all of these movies are not openly propagating either side in conflict, but rather sophisticated ideological opinions and views are subtly given through the characters' behaviours and actions. The bad guys are stated clearly, but not insisted upon. The memory of enemies and victims is changeable, in films as in reality, but one adamant position of authors of these films stands: war was unnecessary, there were no winners, and it was all for nothing.

The Bosnian understanding of what the war was like for a common citizen (ordinary film character) is best explained in the tragically ending comedy *Gori vatra* from 2003. Bosnian Muslim Hamdo and Bosnian Serb Stanko are having a drink and discussing the war and who started it referring to it

as a “screw up”. Raising their voices in the conclusion that the problems in the whole story were the outsiders who came to save “me and you”. The conversation ends bleakly stating that the separation to each of its own ethnical groups was unnecessary. The film is not negating the fact that the Serbs were the bad guys in the war, but also portrays some Bosnian Muslims in the post-war period as corruptive and morally devastated. The conflict between Hamdo and Stanko (the Bosnian pronunciation of the names sounds similar), both Caucasian, similarly dressed, visually from the shared social status, and judging by the eloquently delivered lines having the same background education, is an incomprehensible phenomenon to be solved unless one of them is on the side of evil completely.

Almost all the domestic film production in the ex-Yugoslav region inclines subtly to the ideological views of the country of origin. But, all the post-war films are coherent in one idea: the war was stupid and the consequences devastating. Subtle offensive characterizations in lines or action of the antagonist are noticeable, but not adamantly claiming the rights of the winner and hero. Twenty years after the war one would expect to find at least one feature movie in the James Bond style, or at least following the Yugoslav cinema tradition of partisan action films. But, of all the films made, every one of them is related to the war and after war experience; and none of them is made in the style of partisan propaganda style and genre. „Ideology describes the lens through which individuals see and understand how they fit into the social world around them... There is, in fact, no guarantee that a given work will have a specific effect or generate a given response“ (Nichols, 2010, 287). Film can be persuasion tool; a memory of the culture in time with great impact on the audience, but the outcomes of the film communication are not always predictable.

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*In the Land of Blood and Honey*, 2011, Angelina Jolie

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
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## **RED JACKET WITH A HOOD**

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### **Abstract:**

The purpose of this article is to analyze the novel „Red Jacket with a Hood”, from the point of view of Culture of Remembrance. The author of the novel was a child of four years in July 1995. He witnessed his father being taken away from the family from this accursed factory complex in Potočari. For years he had lived among the people who were getting apart, dying, starving, but also gathering, singing, playing, going to a wedding ceremony, participate in other small celebrations by which he was defying his harsh reality. These contrasts were decreasing tension of his memory, but still could not completely eliminate it. When he grew up to a youngster, he started to remember, and think over his father’s final words. While looking at him as he progresses, holding red jacket with a hood under his armpit, father put his forefinger up to his lips signaling to his boy: “Keep silent, stay strong and carry on!”. Young man reinterpreted these final gestures as “Shut up and go on living!”. Soon he realized a link between living, and writing. Just as in 1001 nights stories, hadn’t story tellers taught us that the story can save lives? Characters of 1001 nights tirelessly recite their stories in order to save their lives. At first hesitated to start writing about what had happened, but eventually decided to write so that he can avoid death, and fulfill his father's last will. About this imperative to write, in order to live, the whole novel was knitted.

### **Keywords: Memory; Trauma; Socialization; War**

When an enemy force attacks one country, its dignity, its statehood, its independence and its people, that country will do all it can to defend itself. And when that country succeeds to preserve all its values, one of the most important things it can do after, is to remember, is not to forget, and also to keep the memories alive. Because these memories will teach the oncoming generation important lessons; lessons about importance of their country and people who gave their lives to protect it, and lessons that would prevent anything similar to happen in the future again. The known fact is that at the period between April 1992 and December 1995, there was a war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In a 4-year occupation around 100 000 people were killed and more than 2 000 000 had to leave their homes. The war in Bosnia is known to be the first most recorded war by the time. Numerous international news corporations, agencies and independent reporters, including also domestic news televisions and papers, covered all the events almost at the moment they were happening. But that serves good only to a cold database of facts. That's why evidences in form of narration are something most valuable that a nation as well as every individual can have by itself. The memories and recollections, give us the human note to the trauma, and give us knowledge on how the trauma affects the social threads in the community. One of the many disasters that

happened during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was the Srebrenica genocide, in which more than 8 000 people were killed. And after all of this, people who stayed alive want two things: justice to be satisfied and happenings not to be forgotten. And one of the witnesses wrote a book, and coauthors this paper.

### **One jacket and a memory: Social interaction**

This paper is based on a novel „Red Jacket with a Hood“, written by, at time when war started, a 6-years-old boy, who in July 1995 witnessed as his father was taken away, carrying his red jacket with the hood in his hand. As boy and his mother tried to stay together with him, he has just put a forefinger to his lips and wove his arm aside, which meant: „Shut up and go!“ (Jusufović, 2008). They never saw him again since then. And after many years, the boy saw his father in dreams who asked him to write a book, not too big book, just a simple book that will serve as a reminder of what happened to them. Boy gave promise that he will. At that time he realized that his fathers' last words actually meant that he should continue to live, no matter what, and that he should not turn round for the past or step back in front of anybody but go forward.

Basically, this book represents an autobiography of a writer, based on his autobiographical memory, which describes period in which war took place. Modern theories of psychology claim that autobiographical memory is a social construction, meaning that its origin is in experience but it is elaborated and maintained through social interaction with others (Nelson, 1993, 2000, Cordon et al., 2003, Fivush et al., 2003). In this paper we will try to explain how an autobiographical memory was created at this child, how he was able to convey his memories to the book after that much time, and how his memories were influenced over the time, that is, how his memory might be disturbed.

Autobiographical memories are created under influence of many factors: person's age at the moments when the event(s) took place, some characteristics of an event itself, but also the way in which that person reminisces the event, that is, when, in which occasions, and in front of which people he had described it most, as well as if there were any other reminders about that event present (Cordon et al. 2003).

### **Creation of memory: Trauma and recollection**

It is proved that memories are formed from the early ages (Cordon et al., 2003). Memory itself consists of multiple interaction systems, which make different contribution to our ability to store and recall information. This entire story is difficult in terms that its path leads us through the war destructions. This story didn't choose its characters, it simply happened. Even if the main character of this particular story is small boy who is not spared from any single situation; simply he had to be there and to live these events in a way that is known only to him. He was forced to watch fearsome scenes and listen to even darker stories of other people. We can conclude that most of his memories are actually a trauma: dozens of painful experiences, both emotional and physical, which most of the times were leaving him without any way to cope with them. It is discussed that trauma experienced in this age might affect memory in many different ways (Cordon et al. 2003). It can be engraved in child's mind or it can be suppressed by it; it is only up to how mind "decides" to cope with it. Writer had also lived some nice events: gatherings of the family, singing, playing instruments, weddings, which was attempt to try to keep the normal flow of life and to defy the brutal everyday life. These moments were like the ray of light in everyday darkness. Because of that, these eventseven can be remembered easier; they can be seen even more precious than they would be in normal situations and they actually represent structures which form specific episodes of this story within the whole.

When it comes to the writer, all of the events related to war were surprising and scary. In the year when he supposed to play carefree around with other children, to explore the world he has been in, to start to school and enjoy it, he was waking up with the sound of grenades, sleeping at the floor in some kind of shelter, watching how dozens of people were hurt and transported to the hospital, he was witness of situations when there was lack of food, basic needs for living, when people had to leave their homes with the knowledge that they maybe never come back there, and at the end when he was taken away from his father. If this child lived normal life he supposed to, maybe he would not remember many events or details. But since he had lived a childhood like this one, it is more possible that all of the stressful, painful, and extraordinary event memories will be impressed to his mind even more intense. So most important thing for establishment of long-lasting memory is function of retaining memories that are meaningful to the self; as the writer lived these events in a way particular to him only (Fivush, et al., 2003). Any horrific experience is unforgettably engraved on the mind, but mind can also defend itself by banishing traumatic memories from awareness. In this way a person will not be able to remember them until many years later. However, memories are there and that is the key how such small child at that time is now able to remember all the things he had lived. Constructing memory has also to do with explaining to the self why certain things happened the way they did; via his mind, the boy has been sending messages to the aggressor to stop shooting as he was trying to understand why they are doing it, why his mother looked so frightened and worried, and why did they have to leave their home.

### **Small details - big memories: Subconscious**

Young children have extraordinary ability to store information and retrieve them later on. Even if memory of one event is suppressed at the moment of happening, it is highly possible that he will remember it later, when he grows up and sees, feels, smells, experience, or live something that will remind him to what happened long time ago. But that memory can change over time, some details, like time of the event can simply be forgotten or unable to be recalled. Most important details like what and where happened, are often remembered. Traumatic experiences generally appear to be remembered better over longer delays than is typically the case for other experiences (Bernstein, 2002). In the same manner, writer often states that he cannot remember the date, while he clearly remembers events, and even how he felt during that time. How one will recall event is related with many factors: his language skills, socialization, and his cognitive development. Also, the numbers of times he has told his story is important as well: each time the story is told some new details can emerge from the sub consciousness. In this process, conversation with adults is also very important where child's memory is able to emerge; this is referred to as social interaction theory (Fivush et al., 2003). Talking with adults about happenings in the past serves as a framework for reconstruction of child's own specific memories which leads to the preservation of memory over the time. Mother-child post event conversations especially play extremely important role which leads to remembering, as they are able to freely talk about their experiences and feelings (Fivush, 1997, Fivush et al., 2003). It is known as maternal reminiscing and we can say that in writer's case it was out of crucial importance, especially because he lost his father and was unable to communicate with him. At this very point we can conclude how much remembering of war events is valuable: it serves as indelible proof.

Writer himself stated that he had tried to tell his story many times but had lived such things that he was afraid to tell them to anybody. At first he hesitated to start writing, but then his fathers' command „Shut up and go!“ has been replaced by „Write!“, meaning „Live!“. Then he realized that only in that way he could continue to live, to avoid death, and save his identity. As a result of such thinking this book has appeared to remind us on what happened and to be writer's link with the life, which is difference between “to die” and “to live”.

Author gave us a portion of his memories in the “Red jacket with the hood”. An argument to that is the fact that the story was told in numerous flashbacks to times of war.

We might find several reasons to it. First of them being that the mind of a young boy chose to selectively store only defining moments he experienced, moments that were not a part of a day-to-day routine (Fivush et al., 2003). For instance, we cannot find mentioning the habits of daily meals, but we can most definitely find a memory of scarcity in meals. A simple association to a notion of memory gives us understanding that mind is not wired in a way to “think” of creating memory, but rather is programmed to retrieve, by association, events in different durations. The book itself is written in associative manner, where a recollection of a certain memory of the author provokes even older memory, or a memory that came afterwards (Nelson, 1990, 1993).

An associative connection in memories, as we speak of “The red jacket with a hood”, has only one purpose – to find an explanation of why certain tragic events are happening, stretching also to lengths as to understand an abstract, spiritual and, we may say, metaphysical notions, such as destiny, and its role in one person’s life.

### **What does a live memory mean to a survivor?**

It is quite unordinary to have a person store his/her memories from the deepest of his/her childhood. As we noted previously, in order to have a memory, or that some event becomes a memory, it is necessary that the event is of significant magnitude and effect on the person witnessing it. Therefore, the psychological reason to have such deep memories of the author of this novel is clearly understood, knowing that the novel describes a life of a child who was forced to witness and live through the worst of what a mankind can give – the war. Jasmin Jusufović was only a child of four, when he was forced to leave his home with his family, since the Serbian aggressors came to claim his village. As he writes in his book, the boy is from that point on thrown into a four years long chain of incredibly tragic events, which his child mind could not comprehend. In the ages when the boy was supposed to get acquainted with the world, and how the world works, his mind was forced to witness a war and to crunch on thoughts of why would they, meaning the boy’s family and himself, be targeted, why they would be hated, what was so special about them, etc... In the occasion of such events, a mind turns into a recorder. The sole purpose of the mind becomes to clear the space for storing every detail sensory system grasps. Yet, even at the moment when the event is recorded we do not have a memory, but rather some sort of data. Once this data is revisited in some other time, revived, narrated, then it becomes a memory.

Person recollects memory selectively. If we look back at the testimony in the novel, we may see that there is almost identical balance between the good memories, and the bad memories. The reason for that is not that the mind skipped recording something, but rather it allows access only to some of the stored data. The reason might be that the boy from “Red Jacket with the Hood” just could not accept all those atrocities he was witnessing and therefore subconsciously tries harder to recall the good memories, to outweigh all the bad he has witnessed.

The novel is therefore only a portion of what this boy has witnessed. It gives us a significant but still a portion of all recorded mind data of the war and Srebrenica massacre. Not even the boy will access all of them.

As the war ended and until the time the boy saw his father in a dream, who told him to write a book, there was a phase of denial. As it is said in his words, when he was speaking to his father in a dream, “what had happened to us” (that requires a book as a permanent record), it is a good

example of a denial in affect. It took several years to finally tackle memories, and write them down in a novel.

The significance of memories reflects in the fact that they provide a unique source for personal development. Namely, when this boy's father was taken away, and as he signaled to his boy to "keep silent" and continue, he actually signaled that the primer goal of his boy's life should be to always stand tall, to always raise after he falls. This being one of numerous examples shows us that the good memories can be the source of life optimism. On the other hand, bad memories can be the source of moral improvement. As the boy has been seeing all the tragedies in the war, he witnesses to feel the wrongness in what he was seeing. Hence he accepted his memories of a bad events as a guidelines of how not to behave, how to be the good-different. Knowing that those memories are the vast source of many life-directing lessons and signals, one can conclude that for that reason it is very important to keep them alive. Therefore, the task of writing a book was almost a natural thing to do.

Memories, or the process of revisiting, recollecting, never stops, or should never stop, if we choose to keep our memories alive. But, just by talking, narrating them, one cannot assure their long lasting. One cannot also find and attachment to them if they remain in this abstract, "virtual" form. Therefore, every memory tries to find a physical embodiment, as a sort of a trigger, a physical token of the memory. The little boy from the novel, besides loosing numerous male members of his family, also lost every physical evidence of the existence and trace of his family and himself in times of war and before. His house was burnt down, and with it all photos were also burnt. The magnitude of his survival never let him keep anything he possessed in the times of war. Even the remains of his murdered family took a long chain of years to be found. After a long period of time seeking closure, and seeking the memory token, the boy found a little blue toy shovel, buried under the rubble of his destroyed home. This is thus far the only physical embodiment of his memory.



Picture 1 - Plastic blue toy shovel - the only surviving embodiment of the memory

## Conclusion

Being a boy who has to face the worst of people's suffers in ages when everything in the surrounding world is supposed to be nice, easy and beautiful, results in a great deal of disappointments. Thus the boy was forced to quickly learn of a set of true life values, home, family, religion, morality, et cetera. Strong evocation of those memories is reflected in the fact that they are the source of the important life's lessons. In that line of understanding, the notable balance in "good" and "bad" memories in author's testimony is his mind's battle to keep alive "bad" memories as a source of life's lessons, and "good" memories as a proof that, with all those disappointments a boy had to face, life still brings some beauties and joys with it. Even the memory of last gestures of the boy's father was flavored with the optimistic tone, to go on with life, and not succumb to despair. Namely, the events that the boy suffered were the empirical foundation to set of life values to be learned.

As a final thought we may say that the more proper answer to the role of memory in the boy's recuperation, post-traumatic coping, is to seek an answer to a question "What if the boy was not able to recall his memories?"

The character-defining attribute of the survived tragedy gives an important role to the memory of is, since, the boy, if he had not been able to recall memories, would not have a juxtaposition to which he can compare the events he is encountering. The life lessons of optimism, moral, faith would not have its empirical foundation. Memory is, additionally, the only "place" where people dear to person, and who were abruptly separated, are alive and close.

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## **Affirmation of "ugly" art and its role in the culture of memory**

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### **Abstract**

In this text (as well as in my practical work in the medium of artistic printmaking) I am trying to "provoke" the observer -the participant and encourage them, if it's possible, to seriously rethink everything we witness in the extent of the current cultural - sociological aspects. Specific quality of this region, and this time, is that the visually - artistic speech must take the features (both in concept and in practice) of a more engaged expression. This is a term that indicates the reality and history of our misfortune. The expression keeps and inherits both the experience of a bloody war, and the experience of "defective" peace. Art of such spiritual and geographical environment is "ugly" ... such kind of creative expression became a warning - it refers to the truth, it is opposed to kitsch and to establishing of false, incorrect values.

Such kind of "ugly art" is humane because it is appropriate to the man who was wounded by the war and who is persistently injured by peace. To shine a light, and underline the importance of this kind of artistic commitment, it was necessary to look back on what can only be considered its foundation or a predecessor of the appropriate historical review and analysis. As the author of this work was also a participant in the war, and is a participant in what could only be considered as a post-war everyday life trauma, a special section is dedicated to his own artistic handwriting, poetics and attitude. In short, art is primarily supposed to be means of active influence on each and every devalued, diminished aspect of life and living.

The creative act is a reminder and a testimony. It is a testimony that the unfortunate times (maybe even Don Quijote-esque times) were attempted to be changed and "healed" with consistent attempts and faith.

### **Introduction**

The age of hypocrisy, the age of false values ... the age of callousness and profiteering ... age of marketing and lies ...that would be our age. We shape it and are shaped by it. Art, as the highest individual's expression of Himself within space and time, therefore must reflect precisely these same "values" ... but, it should only reflect and describe - on no account to magnify or to even glorify. A society that is in addition to all of the above, a "hostage" of the recent bloody and traumatic war experience has an additional obligation to educate and cultivate such kind of artistic language that "illustrates" and "deciphers" the pain, disappointment, loneliness and loss... everything that could be considered a sacrifice in one way or another - something that can not, and must not be forgotten. In this sense of the term, the concept and the role of "ugly art" certainly has its role and significance - it can be seen as an interpreter of the current and the actual situation, within "the Here and the Now". More engaged, but also more profiled approach to the problems of spiritual, cultural and social downfall truly arises as a high priority aspect of action. This "injection" revitalizes the art scene and its very essence, allowing it its necessary and associated momentum which, we must admit, is currently drowning in general bleakness and apathy. Death is obviously omnipresent ( it integrates all that we consider as suffering, loss, pain into One), it is obvious as

well as unknown and unfathomable. Thus an everlasting inspiration.(Jankelevitch, 1997)Death and its phenomenology became an integral part of life, even for Freud... It is accepted as the beginning and the end of life – furthermore, as its essence.(Dufresne, 2000)Understanding the overall meaning and presence of death as an artistic motive that we describe, “decipher“, we realize that it is yet a fact of life itself. Thus that death no longer resides as horrifying. (Spivey, 2005)As an artist who forms his own artistic (graphic) language within the classical art and printmaking, I try to point out what is our history and our heritage with direct and straightforward expressions: those are cruel, shocking, grim and frustrating experiences worthy of recording. To preserve these and similar fragments of collective consciousness and memories (through my own artistic statement) becomes a priority in my case.I am a supporter of the thesis that the classic technical-technological process in modern circumstances becomes the adequate and exemplary way of showing yourself inside such era. The ability of the traditional, conditionally speaking – “essential“ approach (respecting the laws of the craft which the artist's hands master) is something that I have always persevered. (Fosijon, 1964)Multiplication of the artist's inner world scribe and all of the levels of such world – in such manner I am bringing it closer to the viewer and sending a message... Ideal field of acting.It is already being discussed of such abilities of printmaking inside the modern frames, but not enough, I fear. (Melot, Griffiths, S. Field, Beguin, 1981)My own judgement, my own thoughts about what is, and what should be a piece of art (both general and specific) I established additionally in observations of Felix Guattamaria:

A work of art, for those who understand it, is activity. The activity of breaking the frame, of termination ... whether it is a baroque refinement or extreme debauchery that leads to recreating and redefining the subject as such.  
(Massumi, 2002)

In order to achieve a greater sensation, it should be, by all means, an artistic endeavor that requires the whole man, and proclaims the truth. It is necessary to consistently believe (through creative engagement) that the better tomorrow is possible and deserved. With terrible and shocking approach to the world which is around us, and which limits us, it should be endeavored to "beautify", to heal and improve the same set framework. True coping with ourselves, and with the past that simultaneously forms us, embodies the artist's plan - internal suppressed cries assume an image and a purpose. The truth in the service of art - and art services the truth! Such "ugly" truth should actively and affirmatively affect memory that must not be short-lived, and a subject to categoric manipulation.

## **Methodology**

The art of these times and this surroundings (in my opinion) must be warning and disturbing ... as such, it is humane and engaged -it is just right in its dark form, and it keeps the message of light and the very beginnings. I'm talking about a beginning that follows the effective and concrete encounter with the wounds of the past, the wounds of which none other than the artist should speak. Set goals of such artistic considerations are establishing the "ugly" art that has its own language, orientation, and sociological purpose and foundations. It is both the inside and the outside of (the concrete) space and time. Construction and elaboration of this artistic and humane messages are based on empirical methodological approach, where various historic developments and circumstances are adopted and perceived, and on such experiences are (conditionally speaking) established peculiar artistic expressions. As an artist that bases his manuscript, in large part, on what is called a classic, traditional approach, and poetics based on it, it is understood that such a path requires an enviable knowledge of the development of art and thought processes (during the epoch) which pointed to similar problems and thematised frames. Records of all kinds and of

timeless horror, suffering and death were most certainly a worthy guide and basis for my own artistic and scientific quest. As a support to already mentioned, and as well as what follows, it is my obligations to note several appropriate examples, and authors who certainly find their place in the general history of art as "heirs" of the humane - artistic worldview and commitment, that I feel so close to my own. These works of art are primarily strong in their stressfulness and as such, are touching to our senses, they become the permanent part of our memory and perception. My opinion is that they are truly great artistic successes which I deliberately refused to portray by reproductions. If the case is such that the reader is not familiar with the works, it just might be stimulating enough to start individually exploring these great artists. It is entirely worth trying provoking the reader's curiosity. As the first in the series I would mention "Crucifix" by Matthias Grünewald...

This central part of Isenheim altar at first encounter does not leave the observer indifferent - it is about an unbeautified view of Jesus' suffering, which is, as such, able at the same time to present and bring closer the religious message, and wake condolences over the artist's horrifically real vision of suffering and sacrifice. He's able to awaken a human in each and every one of us. Taking into account that this is a period of the German Renaissance, the impression that you get, as well as the importance of the mentioned work, is somewhat stronger and bigger. A similar situation occurs when faced with Rembrandt's "Slaughtered ox" ... a concrete, true and strong presentation of, conditionally speaking, banal motifs, suddenly gets much deeper qualities and arouses emotions. Through the time, the most brilliant of artists established their present status and significance because they dealt with the real, timeless causes of misery, misery, death, despair ... and that way (perhaps paradoxically) contributed to a better, more moral and more sensitive society, and to the reactions to these phenomena. In short, they "humanized" their art and the world in which it was created. Definitely a must for this analysis is, Edward Munch. Hereby we look back on the famous "The Scream". The painting and the print of the same name (almost identical) in an expressive way give us a closer look on anxiety, loneliness and mental pain from which the artist simply did not want to avert his eyes. Extreme interpretation of an omnipresent spiritual enfeeblement. Following Pablo Picasso and the unavoidable "Guernica" - an image, about which was almost all been said but, again manages to revive the hope that after the sacrifice and suffering (in this case the war) comes the ascension and victory. Unfortunately, like many times before history proved to be a really bad teacher - and people the worse students. Joel - Peter Witkin in his fascinating and shocking way represents the entire gallery of bizarre characters and situations that at first impression certainly evoke a feeling of discomfort, but essentially, it is all about a highly consistent author and his work which says that there is no one and nothing that can not be seen as dignified performance. Any form of accidents, mutilation, anomalies of the common man, the artist experienced in a special way and elevates him to a level worthy of the Child of God. (Celant, 1995)

This elementary review of the artists who, in my opinion, share a similar worldview and sensuousness like myself, had a purpose to briefly confirm that art (and artists), during different periods of their development, had a need - an obligation to be much more than a conformist chronicler or someone whose works can be labeled as just pleasant. It comes as no coincidence that in relatively recent history Adolf Hitler's fascist regime mercilessly pursued and belittled the artists who dared to stand up to the established standards, constantly criticizing the omnipresent crisis and lack of spirit. The greatest of the painters, poets, cinematic directors lose their status of great and deserving people. They were pursued, marked and antagonized for their rebellion against the ideological monotony. Each age has its own chosen individuals, but also an ideological antonym, its own Goebblesque propaganda. Ironically, we haven't gotten very far... We witness an epoch that, within this "misfortunately bewitched" climate, requires considerably bigger, stronger, better planned and more direct questioning of the causes and consequences of the state that lasted far too long and that hampers the overall mental perception of the Better and the Different... Frustration


and discontent of such setback had me prompted on a more serious dealing with the problems that I interpret. For presenting authentic visual expression, it was necessary and thought about, the constant monitoring of everything that political occurrences in Bosnia ( post-dayton, unbuilt and not entirely accomplished) carry and contribute. Such conglomerate of objective daily life and subjective experience has formed and sobered own worldview. "Principally, it came to occurrence that the rational, conscious design becomes overpowered by irrational uncontrolled result". (Lucie Smith, 1975)Therefore I will make this a personal statement and consideration of additional "boost" and with a few of my own prints reproductions that definitely round off (in its own medium) all that's already been written. It is, therefore, a copyrighted review of what I experienced, as an intimate reaction of a man who survived the war and post-war spiritual, political, social ruptures and wrongdoings. With my prints I point to the religious hypocrisy and false celebration of warped values, all under the slogan "The Icons Of Our Time". It is an obvious ironical toying with something that should be sublime - sacred, but in today's order is clearly not. This deliberate flirting with elements of Sacred should indicate the general hypocrisy and falseness.



*Danis Fejzić: "Lost Child", etching, 50x70cm, 2012.*



*Danis Fezić: "Icon", etching, 50x70cm, 2013.*



*Danis Fezić: "Holy Mother", etching, 70x100cm, 2013.*



*Danis Fejzić: "Warrior", etching, 70x100cm, 2013.*

## **Result**

A few key moments seemed additionally crystallized and clearer and, (trying to avoid the trap of pretentiousness) above all that was a clearer understanding of the overall cause – the resulting mechanism which allows systematic chaos of society, institutions of the State, distorted criteria and values and so on. But, as after Auschwitz art was necessary, the same applies after Srebrenica, art must react, recollect ... and be kept from oblivion. I must notice, the artist's role as an effective promoter of ideas and messages has been unreasonably doubted. Likewise, he is assumed to be a subject of cleansing, conscious and aware, a sort of a civilisational wheel. Pertaining to that the main idea behind "Twilight or New Beginning" certainly does not affirm or negate either of those roles. Namely, we are witnesses of a constant limbo syndrome - a sort of a cultural and sociological purgatory where no lasting true virtues can be established. In such an undefined everyday, a situation is created where false idols can fester into existence, easily being installed, and implanted into the prestige, which is being slowly overtaken by the aesthetics and philosophy of kitsch. It's too soon for us to know twilight, and entirely too early to experience awakening, at least in the sense of creative and meaningful enlightenment. Which brings the term "true moment" once again before us.

As I have already mentioned, I act within the classical - traditional artistic expression, but I feel it obligatory that such a creative way, in my case it is the art of printmaking, should have a more visible and "circulatory" role, in a more direct collision with the realities of everyday life. A painting, printmaker's sheet, sculpture, all are necessary just outside the white, sterile and isolated walls of the gallery space. It is a priority. The circumstances are such. The situation is alarming. Stephen Bann polemized in detail of the artist's conscious and resolute intention of being the conductor through which own creative forces become the main factor of communicating with the surroundings. (Bann, 1970) Exhibitions with clearly defined objectives should be held in places like frontlines, ignition sites, slaughter locations... and such as an act of promoting the idea of a new beginning, seeing further, the idea of waking up ... whether it's hope, or a better understanding of the source that are repressed postulates of immeasurable Power of culture and knowledge.

Museums, religious temples and historical monuments must be recognized as the center of events and information. The interest is mutual and the moment is crucial. There are too many anomalies and specificities to hesitate. For it not be just words on a paper, my next art project will be designed and carried out exactly in accordance with the terms just mentioned.

## Conclusion

In short, I was talking about the importance and affirmation of "ugly art" - art that, despite the seemingly awkward and unattractive name, essentially completes the factual order of things on this geographical and historical milieu. It is required, as it follows and corrects the current given framework of life. Such art is Our image and likeness. The mistakes and experiences of the past served me as lessons, and the impending possibility of war, intolerance and change of ideology in our region made me realize that it is high time for art to reconsider its values and to work towards completing tasks set upon it. Unmasked, it essentially modifies the exhibition process, which brings its own change in approach. The town square, a park, the "street ambient", government buildings, the localities of pain and suffering, all of which imperatively transform into exhibition venues, which, thanks to its natural and spontaneous circulation of information and people, additionally activates and promotes the artist's cause and mission. That sort of almost missionary dedication speaking of the past in the cause of celebrating the future (healthier than the one offered now) is a sort of idea that I am striving to perpetuate. To contain a glimmer of hope within oneself, a hope that this kind of endeavor and reasoning will find understanding and support among the fellow (especially younger) artists, is inspiring by itself. An encouragement that after sundown, awakening does truly arrive. This highly personal - intimate manuscript (and artistic expression) has the purpose to substantiate and encourage (based on personal experience and affinity) thesis that the downfall of overall values (and thus the artistic standards) can be prevented only by nonconformist approach or collision with everyday life ... with real environment, the real needs of real people ... collision with "crippled", disturbed and sick criteria and ideals. Yes, ideals - in a word, a term and a sublime concept of the aim of survival ... it's a tragic conclusion that just uttering such words evokes fear that all persevering and humane efforts are retained under the context of pathetic and banal. Change is possible, feasible and visible ... It becomes visible thanks to the cry of the artist. Such cry really is the only language which we have left. This kind of art and its presentation are in no way a reflection of nihilism or any (often mistakenly interpreted) aspects of blackness. For that reason, a few words on the black ... Black, in this case, is not only a design and symbolism of the dark, sordid abyss ... but also it represents light - that it is way to the light, the path to a way out and peace, to completed and achieved desires ... inevitable and unavoidable path to the way out- so, in a way an exit itself. In this regard, it is no accident that my prints are "black". My art, taking all of this into account, is black; it is full of contradictions, searching and proofs that continually collapse just to be reborn. It is eerie and morbid, but it is also dreamy and humane. It is (I gave myself the right to say it) noble; noble in concept, intention and purpose. To free oneself and to be free - to be a light, leastways it meant to be illusory devoured by darkness. A treasured guide through this field were the thoughts of Alan Clements, who emphasizes the worth of freeing oneself (in the broadest sense), and that process alone is closely associated with everything that build the individual and the individually.(Clements, 2003)An important segment of this work relies on something that we interpret as faith, hope ... On that note is the following quote:

The virtue of hope consists in the vision of human life as a journey that leads to the infinite and eternal satisfaction of all possible desires, if they meet certain conditions which are well within our capabilities. This objective can be achieved not only after death but also for a small number of exceptional people - exceptional as in the current phase of the cycle - even during this life.(Lings, 1997)

And so, let it be darkness ... darkness ... because how else could we recognize the light!

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**"Culture of oblivion or remembrance:  
Conversion of the city identity "**

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***Resume***

For author Jens Brockmeier, a culture memory is forming by capturing of oral narrative within memory texts and practices which are not independent, but significantly intertwined with socio-political narration or they are susceptible to such narratives. In such manner the memory narratives are created, which main texts carry main social, political and material settings of community of people who are remembering or forgetting, as well as people who are predicting, expecting or endure the outcomes of precarious cultural or political future. A picturesque example of agency of such memory narratives toward creation of culture memory is everyday consummation of new, wartimes, pro-Serbian names of streets and settlements in Banja Luka. These new memory notes had been put in place between 1992 and 1996 when authorities have erased from memory the names of 15 settlements and around 250 or half of pre-wartimes streets.

Goal of this research is to present intensity and basic contextual directions of these violent changes, through discursive analysis of street names. To point out, how much indeed a culture memory in today's Banja Luka is built up on violent oblivion of non-Serbian ethnic or religious, as well as of leftist and multiethnic memory narratives. As well as, on fulfilling the „memory gaps“ with romantic and mythological historic and political constructs. By reading the new street names such as King Lazar Str. or Ravnogorska Str., people of today are placed in mnemonic relations toward prevailing and imposed cultural and political (re)interpretation of Banja Luka's past. It factitiously connects the value and cognitive horizons of past and presence, writes cultural memory of the city backward, and gives to the citizens a sense of belonging to the ceaseless and simulacrum chain of politically lucrative and ethnically desirable explications of historic events and conflicts. Such time-space inversion in interpretation of historic events toward past is bizarre condition for the establishment of cultural and ideological justifications of Banja Luka's presence and for the setting of people's expectations into the future. Whereas a discursive meanings and memory narratives of street names such as Vahide Maglajlić Str. or Ferhatpaše Str. don't pass the filter of selected memory frame of „Serbian Banja Luka“, so they are expelled from

the chain of desirable explications, and therefore are not allowed to be placed in the mnemonic relation with average citizen of Banja Luka.

Empirics and approach of this review wants to illuminate facts and to contribute to the answers on questions such: whether today's RS can even survive with such quantity and intensity of artificial memory narratives on which it's created and whether a new cultural remembrance which aim to reach a level of independent cultural memory of „Serbian Banja Luka“ can be built up on massive and violent oblivion and distortion of narratives?

***Key words: memory narratives, cultural memory, street names, Banja Luka***

## *Introduction*

### **Goals of research**

In this text I want to present how and why street names and names of local communities have been changed in Banja Luka between 1991 and 1995. Goal is to unriddle meaning and symbolism of this renaming. To determine which old ethno-religious, cultural and ideological identifications and identities of Banja Luka are erased, and which new identities have imposed themselves and conquer the public space of street, square, local community and city? Why these changes, even 20 years after the war, still create ethno-religious and cultural identity of the city, revising individual remembrances and cultural memory of community all the way to the breaking point of all connections between new memory narratives and old, pre-war timeflow of cultural memory of Banja Luka, to the point of unrecognizability of today's Banja Luka for almost every person who have lived here before 1992?

My aim is to present relations between timing of creation of these new street names and their duration on one side and consequences of war, ethnic cleansing and ethnic homogenization of territories of today's Republic of Srpska (here and after: RS) in today's Banja Luka and Bosnia and Herzegovina (here and after: BiH), on other side. By grasping these changes and relations I want to question whether conversion of city identity has once and for all changed or destroyed cultural pattern and memory of coexistence in one multiethnic and multi-confessional or interethnic and inter-confessional environment such as Banja Luka once was. Or perhaps there is a hope that we can in same time feel security of our existence on this land as our own land on one side and feel that humanness and tolerance toward our neighbors or other wont decrease our feelings of security, regardless of identities which we live or prefer.

The goal is also to emphasize a devastating effect of folklore quasi-ideology of Serbian pop-nationalistic elite (war-time and post-war one) on public thought, opinion and collective remembrance of citizens of Banja Luka, the remembrances in which there is less and less room for pre-war and non-Serbian, Banja Luka's narratives. War-time elite has brutally changes ethnic, religious and ideological identification and demography of this city and post-war elite has tolerated and abused these heritages of war and ethnic cleansing as well as war-time "all-Serbian" identity and look of Banja Luka, justifying it as „will of the majority“ or as „new written history“. This topic is very shyly brought into the public discourse of today's RS, while ethno-political elite and media outlets under their control stays passive or support Serbianized public identifications and identities in new-Serbian city of Banja Luka. Many media outlets, even those which consider themselves alternative, relativized these topics by considering that by now all war issues are definitive and "final" and by bringing these topics down to the questions of obeying regulations and

decisions of war-time municipal administration. As there are no interests, nor courage, nor will to pose a question of ethics of new, war-time names or will to critically re-question these war-times decisions. Same as there is no will for facing and acknowledging committed war crimes, genocides and ethnic cleansings which consequences still last. There is no will to see how much this new artificially constructed identity of today's Banja Luka is damaging the generations of young people which grew up along the side, by making their living patterns, ideological values and cultural memory autistic, extremely irrational and absolutely unusable for living in BiH and Europe. There is no will to confront auto destructive emptiness in collective memory, an emptiness which is presented to the new generations of Serbs as "their history" .

In some extent, this text represents an attempt to disclose deceptions and myths which ethno-political elite impose to the citizens, members of Serbian ethnic group. To disclose a model on which elite is abusing human emotions, already formed national feelings, war and collective remembrances, epic and mythical narratives and historical literature, in order to radicalize people to the desirable level. Level on which the answer on true question will remain unanswered: what have been done, and what still needs to be done and how much is going to cost, so that Banja Luka gets and preserve label of „monoethnic property“, so that Banja Luka becomes and remain something that it never was, a pure „new-Serbian“ city.

### **Conceptual framework**

Jeans Brockmeier said that narrative is basic nor which knit and shape a fiber of time-space continuum of cultural memory, and under narrative he means each texts or practice which tells us a certain story (context). For this author cultural memory is forming by capturing oral narrative into the memory texts and practices and they all, from morpheme and monument to computer database and film, are intertwined with or subjected to the narrativization. This author emphasizes that while memory texts can be read at the first glance, their entire narrative (text + context) can't be decoded without analysis of cultural conditions of time and space of their origin. This is because, cultural memory isn't simple psychologized pile of individual and group memories about flow of past events and uncertain future, but it is weaved out of social, ideological and material settings of the community of people who remember and forget, as well as out of expectations, predictions of outcomes and hopes which all impose to us our desired and almost certain future. In the process of forming of cultural memory, past, present and future don't have clear frontier nor are they ontological categories. So Brockmeier defines a cultural memory as multidimensional temporal process in given social, cognitive and symbolic framework of presence which can every day repetitively regenerate some cultural remembrance or enable cultural oblivion of the community, in continuous reconfiguration, selection, amalgamation and unbundling of past and present events,

experiences, knowledge, causes, consequences and desired outcomes.<sup>9</sup> The most picturesque example of regeneration of cultural remembrance and example of agency of narratives is everyday consummation and meaningful experience of street names and names of local communities which connect citizens and institutions with dominant ideological, political and cultural settings and reinterpretations of our reality and past which inevitable are standing behind these names. In the case of street names and names of local communities this agency is much more comprehensive, more frequent and massive than in the cases of some other memorabilia. Names of streets, squares or local communities are public manifestation of cultural and national identity of citizens, ethnic or religious groups, but also a test markings of dominant social, political and economical processes and discourses in given community. They are public and formal symbols in which citizens and groups recognize themselves and through which they remember, memorize or forget. So story that these names are telling us, together with social context of their origin and duration is one of narratives in formation of cultural memory of our community. These names are memory notes on columns, envelopes, memos and walls of public and private houses of our city. They radiate not only simple and meaningless name of street but a variety of cultural symbols. Name of some person or some event has its own ethnic, or religious, or historical and political, or ideological, or cultural symbolism. Biography, national or religious identity, profession, ideology, historical or political role, life of person which name carry some street, or school, or local community suddenly are pouring into the public space of our presence and become part of street, address, walker, square, community or our communication. The very choice of community or elite to name part of public space with certain name or event or ideas, is telling us how ruling elite wants to shape collective remembrances, what is important to them and what isn't. Also it is telling us why something isn't important. Usually the "story" which these names are telling is complementary with other memory texts which elite or community put into the monuments, school books, theater plays, museums or state celebrations and holidays. Uncomplementary memory content is often ignored, out of ethically right or wrong reasons. Very quickly a variety of symbolic memory notes on walls and complementary memory narratives in given social, political and historical context of one community start to build a network of desirable and undesirable remembrance. Citizens in public space start to identify with all or with parts of these memory symbols, and their prior knowledge, understandings, reinterpretations and expectations together with their dominant ethno-religious, ideological or value settings, start to convert these symbols in valuable remembrances which then become narratives of dominant cultural memory. This transposition is more direct as memory texts and symbols are direct too. Meaningful and valuable experience of street name put public in certain

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<sup>9</sup> Brockmeier, Jens. *Remembering and Forgetting: Narrative as Cultural Memory*, Culture Psychology 2002 8: 15

relation with desirable or expected or imposed ideological or political reinterpretation of past and future of community.

Experiencing name or event from street names or names of local communities, artificially converge values and cognitive horizons of past and presence and thus write culture memory to citizens in reverse order from our presence to our past. This time-space inversion in reinterpretation of historical events towards the past, instead from the past, is almost unavoidable and condition for establishing of ideological and political explanations of our presence or some part of our reality, regardless how rational or irrational this explanation sounds. By consuming these memory narratives hidden in our street names we suddenly acquire certain cultural and political feeling that we all are nothing else but a part of continuous and unbroken chain of historical and political events which all deterministically and inexorably lead generations of people all the way to our present reality precisely as it looks like today, in which precisely me, a person of precisely such and such ethnic or religious or ideological identity or orientation, should live in place where I live now and should be a dominant ethno-political subject in that space, and not someone else. This inversion is therefore legitimizing and use memory narratives as its agency. In some community this timespace inversion in given memory timespace is almost unnoticeable, but in others it is extremely visible, all the way to the absurdity. This inversion in reading of memory narrative from presence toward past is possible because way that people perceive time and remembrances has nothing to do what's so ever with more rational concept of physical timeflow. Our perception of time flow is always open for more or less irrational memory concepts or interventions, out of ideological or other social or political reasons, which all have roots in practicing of social or political power of community or elite. Physical timeflow imply temporally linear, one-dimensional model of forming and interpreting of events in causal direction from cause toward consequence, from past toward future, from the state of lower entropy toward the state of higher entropy, in the direction of increasing of volume of entropy, or in another words from the state of smaller chaos toward the state of greater chaos. The other way around would represent a miracle. But human consciousness produces its own, so called physiological arrow of timeflow. In such psychological perception of timeflow, there is a certain deflection from the principle of entropy and physical timeflow, because human mind and impulses of memory are focused as well as open toward constant evocation and reinterpretation of the past. Our remembrance is suddenly free from the laws of entropy and free to interpret events from consequences toward causes, to chose most adequate and most desirable instead most probable cause(s) which are explaining our reality today and here, regardless whether these chosen causes are logical, or complex, or complete, or objective enough to cause our complex reality now. Because of such characteristics of human remembrance, not even absolute absence of

consciousness about physical timeflow (like absence of clock, calendar, shifts between night and day or starlit sky) wouldn't influence the way of creation of our psychological perception about timeflow. This absence wouldn't change the way we are remembering or the way in which our consciousness about ephemerality, repeatability or predictability of events is created. Only formats of remembering would probably be slightly different. Even if physical time would flow opposite to physical arrow of time of our existing cognitive world, from the future toward past in the direction of decrease of entropy, the universality and timelessness of human remembrance would make that in our trip toward "past" we remember "future" (a state of greater entropy) same as now we remember "past" (a state of lower entropy), thus mixing horizons of presence and past events, again without obligation to stick to the principles of entropy. Our individual remembrance isn't completely rationalized, naturalized and logical, because while learning we adopt and inherent dominant memory narrative through which we gain cultural meanings and enter in symbolic flow of remembrances of our community. Our personal remembrances are becoming more and more collectivized and important role in that process plays repetitive and emotional experiences, evocations and reinterpretations of most important and thus selected personal, family, communal, historical, political, cultural and ideological symbols. Whoever governs these symbols or this selection, influence and governs collectivization, values and contents of our memories. In every community there is a certain selection of values, ideological and cultural contents that are desirable or suitable to experience, evoke and remember from those which are desirable to forget. Contents and their selection are more or less rational, archived and artificial, depending of community.

Thus, individual remembrance becomes mix of cerebral operation of remembering and forgetting and selected memory framework of given community or culture, and cannot operate outside of this framework. This selection of remembrances that won't be forget and will become prevailing or official cultural memory Brockmeier calls a mnemonic selection of symbolic memory framework of given group, which can be re-questioned and deconstruct, but cannot be denied or ignored. This framework has a function of amalgamation of individual experiences, expectations projections and hopes in one symbolic memory space of presence, which person can call her/his culture where she/he belongs. That's how culture memory becomes a value, meaningful, ideological and cognitive continuum of community or culture.<sup>10</sup> And Dewey emphasizes that cultural memory acts laterally, giving to the great number of individuals on one territory already shaped meaningful, ideological, value and cognitive memory apparatus and code, as source of sense and feelings of communion. But also it acts longitudinally, giving to present community resistance on time and

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<sup>10</sup> Brockmeier, Jens. *Remembering and Forgetting: Narrative as Cultural Memory*, Culture Psychology 2002 8: 15

layers of history, but also a power to predict, hope and creation of safety and future<sup>11</sup>. This Dewey's laterality and longitudinality of cultural memory is most visible in times of turbulent social and political changes which occur in various communities, cultures and historic moments. It is often the case that such changes are first and best seen in changes of official names of cities, local communities, streets and squares. These names are the most convenient mean for that, because their changes are public, swiftly implemented, produce effects immediately, have long-range and long-term effects and they are hard to correct. Changes of these names often signify certain U-turn, the cut in the timeflow of one cultural memory and its revision, but also a desire for swift change of cultural identity and creation of new flow of cultural memory. If these name changes produce some effects, then timeflow of cultural memory is converted and revised forever, but if they don't, then new timeflow of cultural memory will have a competition in old timeflow of remembrances in public or cultural space. From these, apparently small, changes one can read a scope and direction of changes, their ideological orientation, characteristics, intensity, starting intentions and motives. In that sense, changes can reveal which ideological, social or political discourses stands in the roots of mnemonic selection of desirable and undesirable narratives.

### **Changes of street names and names of local communities**

As we are distancing from the darkness of the war, ethnic cleansing, genocide and violent homogenization of the Serbs in one political territory within today's Bosnia, memories on the reality of these events is fading away rapidly. We are forgetting all the depravities and perversions of those times, irrationalities, criminal and profiteering backgrounds of the conflict. We are forgetting its political lucrateness for the regimes of those days, in first instance for the regimes in Belgrade, Pale and Knin and then for the regime in Zagreb. Post-war ethnic division of Bosnia is easily accepted as "necessary state of mind", as "normality" after the bloodshed, something as "vis maior". Citizens, deeply saturated with scenes of violence, blood, deaths and fear, as hypnotized have accepted "the state as it is", along with slogan "it is good as long as there are no war" and with beginners' courses of neoliberal and wild west cowboys' privatization, democracy and consumerist culture. Political elite in RS, don't even want to start thinking to relax public space of Banja Luka, or to do "a cultural restoration" and bring back to the city an inter-ethnic character and openness city used to have. They are doing quite opposite, constantly resending messages of hate and intolerance, reviving old/new divisions, evoking individual and group war remembrances and pains and inflaming new generations with old/new "Serbian patriotism", irrational and empty in its core. New new-Serbian symbols in the public space from the monuments, street names and institutional sings all the way to the graffiti and signs of popular culture, though some made during the war still

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<sup>11</sup> Dewey, John (1938). *Experience and education*. New York: Macmillan

serve to the new Serbian elite in “new-Serbian Banja Luka” and RS. They serve to reproduce irrational memory narratives and political messages which constantly reclaim the Serb possession of Banja Luka and other parts of Bosnia, occupied by mononational and homogenized RS. That’s way they are not to be touched or to be re-questioned. These symbols are there to reproduce oblivion and some “brand new remembrance”. These symbols are there simply to exist until some new conflict.

That’s way street names, names of schools or local community can be observed as memory texts and their contextual messages can be understood as memory narratives selected and put into the public and official space of ethnically cleansed and new-Serbian Banja Luka. In their existence these memory narratives are acting as witnesses of violence, violence that have cleansed Banja Luka biologically and culturally. But as time goes by, they are slowly becoming witnesses of absence. Next stop for them is to become witnesses of neoliberal and consensual “normality”. The small invisible monuments that mark the end of inter-ethnic and egalitarian multicultural life in Banja Luka, and the beginning of uncertain future of today’s “new-Serbian” Banja Luka.

#### *Names of Banja Luka's local communities*

In municipality of Banja Luka during 1992-1995 war and aggression on BiH, RS war elite had changed names 15 out of prewar 58 or 57 today’s local communities (26%), thus erasing from public space and memory of Banja Luka ¼ of its urban toponyms, 50 or 100 year old. The most significant cleansing had happened in the center of the city<sup>12</sup>, where half of the local city communities (8 out of 17 prewar or 12 today’s local communities) lost its old and got a new „Serbianized“ name. Around 1/3 of local communities of city periphery (3 out of 10 prewar or 11 today’s local communities) had been renamed in the same manner. In rural areas of Banja Luka elite changed names of 4 out of 31 prewar local communities. In this way RS war elite changed name of local community „Mejdan“ into „Obilićevo“, Budžak“ into „Lazarevo“, „Čaire“ and „Hiseti“ into „Kočičev Vijenac“, „Gornji Šeher“ into „Srpske Toplice“, „Šargovac“ into „Srpski Milanovac“, „Ivanjska“ into „Potkozarje“, etc.

These changes happened during war and aggression on BiH in several occasions between March 1992 and December 1995, but most intense actions of RS elite in this sense were between February and October 1994. During this 8 month war elite had adopted 6 decisions with which they renamed 11 local communities<sup>13</sup>. For each local community, process of renaming went through two stages. First stage was an organization of referendum of citizens which had been living on the

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<sup>12</sup> According to the criteria from article 5 of still valid Decision on organization of the territory of City of Banja Luka, Official Gazzete of Banja Luka No. 9/2003

<sup>13</sup> Source: specified in the list of used literature and sources nder bulletpoint number 8

territory of targeted local communities. Second stage was adopting the declarative decision in the local assembly which declares the name changing, constituted by citizens' votes on referendum. Sole fact that RS and Banja Luka war elite had organized referendums about „Serbianization“ of official urban toponyms, in the conditions of aggression, war and ethnic cleansing of Banja Luka and territories held by RS army, in the time of war psychosis and fear which overwhelmed Banja Luka's still multiethnic local communities, sounds surrealistic, ridiculous and absurd. In fact those referendums and decisions represent parody, simulation and ethnicization of democracy and pure cynicism of RS war elite, but also they represent a manipulation with citizens of Serb ethno-religious identity. Who went and voted on these referendums? Much of voters of non-Serbian ethno-religious identity, who didn't succeed to left Banja Luka as city held by new Serb ethno-exclusivist and ethno-fascistic government, simply couldn't get, let alone express their opinions on such referendums. They had been living in constant fear for their lives and families with very limited freedom of movement and communication and with seriously threatened and endangered biological and economic existence. Even more, some of these citizens hadn't been living on their pre war addresses, neighborhoods and local communities, but hiding in other parts of the town where people didn't know them. International organization called these cases „floaters“<sup>14</sup>. Thus, the great almost unilateral majority of voters on these referendums were citizens of Serb ethno-religious identity, women by large cause men were recruited into the army and on battlefields. Later these referendums' results were processed by commissions constitute by Serb members only and declarative decisions were made by local assembly of City of Banja Luka in which Serb members were constituting almost absolute majority. Citizens of non-Serb ethno-religious identity weren't political subjects, or free or safe citizens in “new-Serbian” Banja Luka.


RS war elite focused their attention on the local communities of the city center and old urban area as symbolic conquest of the political center of power and decision making. What is even more interesting, they had been focus to change the names of those local communities in which citizens of non-Serb ethno-religious identity where majority in relation to the Serbs, according to the 1991 census. Thus, collected data shows that in city center where war elite had renamed half of local communities lived some 94,000 citizens (53% non-Serbs and 47% Serbs) and in city periphery where they had renamed 1/3 of local communities lived some 44,000 citizens (45% non-Serbs and 55% Serbs). Renaming were the least present in rural areas in which 57,000 citizens lived (32% non-Serbs and 68% Serbs) and where they had renamed just 1/10 of local communities. Correlation between the scope of renaming and ethno-religious structure of city

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<sup>14</sup> It is estimated that during the war there were 228 families in Banja Luka who had to leave their homes and find shelters in basements, lumberrooms or under the bridges. These people were called „floaters“ – refugees in their own city, Source: [http://gfbv.ba/index.php/Publikacije/articles/Banja\\_Luka\\_-\\_Povratak\\_u\\_aparthejd.html](http://gfbv.ba/index.php/Publikacije/articles/Banja_Luka_-_Povratak_u_aparthejd.html)

center, periphery and rural areas, gives an impression that changes were most frequent in the city center and those local communities in which number of non-Serb population was bigger than number of Serbs (see Graph 1). That was obviously case with local communities “Mejdan”, “Hiseti”, “Čaire” and “Budžak 1”.

Graph 1: Correlation between the ethno-religious composition (percentage of Serb population) and the scope of renaming of local communities in city center, periphery and rural areas<sup>15</sup>



Also, there were local communities which fulfilled these criteria, but still kept their old pre-war names, such as Borik 1 and 2 (58% of non-Serbs), 3 (55% of non-Serbs) and 4 (61% of non-Serbs) or Centar 1 (51% of non-Serbs) and 2 (55% non-Serbs). This implies that ethno-religious structure and central position of local communities weren't only motivation criteria of renaming.

Slightly careful analysis shows that this additional criterion was an etymological root of the word in the official name of local community. Thus, RS war elite decided to keep the names which are carried by the words that have Slavic or Serbian origin, or that have been perceived as domestic, “Serbian” words (“Centar”, “Borik”, Vrbanja”, “Nova Varoš”, “Rosulje”, “Starčevica”, “Paprikovac”, “Petričevac”, “Lauš”, etc). On other side they have changed names which were carried by the words that have etymological origin in Turkish, or Arabic or Old Persian languages, but which had become “natural”, domestic and everyday words in Serbian, Croatian or Bosnian languages. Such words weren't perceived by RS elite as “Serbian or patriotic enough” so they have been cleansed from the public space. This is a case with following names of local communities:

- Local community „Čaire“ – contain word „čair“ which origin lay down in the Turkish word „çayır“, which stands for a) a meadow which is being mowed, or b) an hayfields, or a pasture<sup>16</sup>
- Local community „Hiseti“ – contain word „hiset“ which origin lay down in the Arabic word „hisar“, which stands for a) a castle, or fortress, or fortified town, and b) word of Arabic and Turkish origin „hisarnik“ stands for small town;<sup>17</sup>

<sup>15</sup> Source: specified in the list of used literature and sources under bulletpoint number 6, 8, 9 and 15

<sup>16</sup> Source: <http://hjp.srce.hr/index.php?show=main>

- Local community „Mejdan“ – contain word „mejdan“ which origin lay down in the Turkish word „meydan“ and/or Arabic word „mäydän“, which stands for a) a bigger empty space in the city of the oriental type, or a field, or a square and b) a cattle fair; or additionally a wide field, a fair place, a market place, a place of battle, a duel;<sup>18</sup>
- Local community „Budžak“ – contain word „budžak“ which origin lay down in the Turkish word „bucak“, which stands for a) a hidden corner, or a hidden place in the house, or b) a place where you can find anything and everything [he hide himself in „budžak“]<sup>19</sup>
- Local community „Gornji Šehir“ – contain word „šeher“ which origin lay down in the Turkish word „şehir“ and/or Persian word „šehr“, which stands for a city, or a big town<sup>20</sup>

Similar destiny hit local community „Ivanjska“ which name has origin in the name of Christian saint „Sveti Ivo“ or „Sveti Ivan“ (Saint John the Baptist), the most celebrated saint among Bosnian Catholics. This name was erased and new pure geographical name „Potkozarje“ was introduced. Also, local community „Šargovac“ which name most probably come from the word for the oriental string instrument „šargija“ or „šarkija“ (similar to the long-necked mandolin) and as such has origin in Arabic word „Sarqiy“ (in Turkish „garki“). This name was also erased and new name „Srpski Milanovac“ was imposed to public space. Both local communities populated by majority of Bosnian Croats/Catholics. All above described examples of cultural cleansing are ethnically or religiously based, but there was a one local community which renaming was purely ideologically motivated. That was a case of local community „Bulevar Revolucije“ (Boulevard of Revolution), which „lost“ word „Revolucije“ and now carry the simple ideologically neutral and cartographic name „Bulevar“ (Boulevard), accordingly to the dogma of neoliberal political (quasi)correctness and proclaimed ideological (quasi)neutrality.

### *Names of Banja Luka's streets*

As in a case of local communities, RS war lords did massive renaming of street names in Banja Luka. Elite had decided which old street names, names of persons, events and other symbolic toponyms weren't desirable, acceptable and justifiable enough for the new political reality of Banja Luka, RS and BIH. And which were. Thus, they have erased names more than half of streets in Banja Luka, some 244 street names had been lost forever (or 53% of all streets). They have erased street names on several levels of meanings, but most obvious cleansing was on the level of binary

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<sup>17</sup> Source: Vujaklija, M. “Foreign words and expressions Lexicon” Prosveta, Beograd 1980


<sup>18</sup> Source: <http://hjp.srce.hr/index.php?show=main>; Additional source: Vujaklija, M. “Foreign words and expressions Lexicon” Prosveta, Beograd 1980

<sup>19</sup> Source: <http://hjp.srce.hr/index.php?show=main>; Additional source: Vujaklija, M. “Foreign words and expressions Lexicon” Prosveta, Beograd 1980

<sup>20</sup> Source: <http://hjp.srce.hr/index.php?show=main>; Additional source: Vujaklija, M. “Foreign words and expressions Lexicon” Prosveta, Beograd 1980

opposition of “non-Serbian – Serbian” street names, identifications, representations and memory narratives in public space. Elite did all this in 7 decisions between November 1991 and September 1997, but most intense street renaming happened during the war and ethnic cleansing of Banja Luka between July 1992 and October 1994. Just in two swift decisions in February and March 1994 Serbian war lords had erased almost 200 old street names. In first and second post-war decision RS elite have continued to erase 9 and 27 street names (see Graph 2).

Graph 2: Number of erased and new added street names with each decision<sup>21</sup>




Culture cleansings of unsuitable street names happened at several levels of meanings.

1) First, at the level of (un)suitable ethno-religious or national identifications, representations and memory narratives of street names in public space. RS elite erased undesirable ethno-religious, national and cultural identities and memory narratives. Most frequently erased street names at this level were names of persons and narratives which were perceived as Muslims and Croats. Out of 467 streets before the war, there were some 21,2% (or 99) street names which had carried the name of persons who were perceived as Muslims. After the war only 1,1% (or 5) such old street names had survived. Also, there were 13,7% (or 64) street names which had carried the name of persons who were perceived as Croats, while after the war only 3,2% (or 15) such old street names had survived. Slovenian and Macedonian (1,3% or 6 and 0,6% or 3 before the war) ethnic or national identifications in street names were completely erased during these cleansings, while Jewish identifications decreased from 0,6% (or 3) to 0,4% (or 2). On other hand, number of street names which carry the names of persons and narratives which are perceived as Serbs almost tripled during the war. Before the war there were some 28,1% (or 131) “as Serbian perceived”

<sup>21</sup> Source: specified in the list of used literature and sources under bulletpoint number 7 and 10

street names, and after the war 69,4% (or 324) street names carry old or new-Serbian identifications and memory narratives (see Graph 3)


Graph 3: Participation of different ethnic identifications and representations that could be percept in the street names of Banja Luka before and after the war (in % out of 467)<sup>22</sup>



2) Second, at the level of ideological identifications, representations and memory narratives in the public space. Under the oblivion attack of RS elite were undesirable historical, ideological and political identifications and memory narratives related to the communist revolution, communism, socialism, liberation war and anti-fascistic struggle in WWII. Within this group of leftist street names all Yugoslavian, AVNOJ's and ZAVNOBIH's memory narratives were erased from the Banja Luka's street names, despite very popular images and metanarratives, present among majority of Serbs and Serbian elite, which depict Serbs as most numerous victims of fascism, members of Partisan and anti-fascistic forces in WWII or Serbs as only nation who truly wanted Yugoslavia, created it and tried the most to protected and preserve it during 90s!?! Out of 467 streets before the war, there were in total 272 leftist street names (or 58,2%) which carried the names of communists, youth from SKOJ, revolutionaries and freedom fighters, Partisans' heroes and units, political events and thus had explicit ideological color of leftism, communism and revolution, supranational Yugoslavianhood or supranational identifications of BIH (see Graph 4). RS war lords had erased more than half of them, so after the war remained some 111 (or 23,8%) leftist street names, mainly names of Partisan's fighters who are perceived as Serbs and few Croats.

<sup>22</sup> Source: Decisions specified in the list of used literature and sources under bulletpoint number 7 and 10

Graph 4: Number of street names with explicit ideological and/or religion identifications and representations that could be percept in the street names of Banja Luka before and after the war<sup>23</sup>



It is interesting to see with what new ideological identifications, narratives and meanings RS elite replaced the old street names. Before the war most visible street names with explicit ideological narratives were those leftist one, but within them one could find different and balanced ethnic or national identifications and representations. Paradoxically, after the war street names became ideologically more diverse in their explicit ideological or religion identifications and narratives, within all those “democratically diverse” ideological narratives one could find a total domination of only one ethnic or religion identification and representation. The Serbian and Orthodox ones! Other ethnicities or religions are kept on the level of “democratic incident”. Beside 111 (or 23,8%) leftist street names from prewar era, RS war lords had poured into the public space some 125 (or 26,8%) brand new and explicit ideological identifications and narratives, mainly out of the hot soup of Serbian national-building romanticism and enlightenment, old and new-Serbian mythologies, Serb-Orthodox essentialism and clerical nationalism.

The most frequent new discourse in official street names carry *modern Serbian monarchist, warrior & rebellion national-building narratives and ideological tastes*, marking streets with names of Serbian and Montenegrin princes, kings, generals, dukes, tribal leaders, leaders of uprisings and rebellions, demotic outlaws from last two centuries, as well as names of foreign but “friendly”, mainly Russian monarchs and generals. There are 58 (or 12,4%) such names, as: „Aleksandra I“ and „Petra II Karađorđevića“, „Careva Romanovih“, „Vojvode Radomira Putnika“, „Petra Pecije“, „Relje Krilatice“, etc. Next most common new added ideological discourse is coming from *Serb-Orthodox religion narratives* which marks the streets with names of Orthodox saints, priests, churches and temples or have international pan-Orthodox, Greek or Russian touch.


<sup>23</sup> Source: Decisions specified in the list of used literature and sources under bulletpoint number 7

There are 27 (or 5,8%) such names, as: „Vidovdanska“, „Vasilija Ostroškog“, „Manastira Gomionice“, „Visokih Dečana“, „Patre“, „Carigradska“, etc. Next are street names with *old Serbian national-building mythological & epic narratives* from demotic literature, later redesigned within national-building political traditions of 19<sup>th</sup> and first half of 20<sup>th</sup> century. Of course, the most often names are from the Kosovo and post-Kosovo epic cycles. There are 23 (or 4,9%) such names, as: „Miloša Obilića“, „Majke Jugovića“, „Kraljevića Marka“, „Majke Jevrosime“, etc. Then there is a group of street names from *medieval Orthodox monarchist narratives*, mainly from medieval Nemanjići dynasty. There are some 11 (or 2,4%) such names, as: „Uroša Nejakog“, „Bulevar Cara Dušana“, etc. At the end of this ideological charade, RS war lords threw into the public space and memory the *Chetniks & ethno-fascist collaborators narratives*, mainly names of leaders and ideological fathers and supporters of Serbian Chetniks' movement, but also Chetniks' operatives, Nazi collaborators, Serbian ethno-fascists from Dalmatia and Bosnia. This movement was a heterogeneous compound of Serbian royal military officers (with different level of closeness to Serbian nationalistic ethno-exclusivity, ethno-fascism and sympathies toward German Nazism, Italian and Bulgarian fascism), local Serbian national and Orthodox religion leaders, nationalistic scourer-avenger leaders and groups, its helpers and sympathizers. All 4 Chetniks whose name carry streets in today's Banja Luka, were proven Chetniks' ideologists, Nazi and fascist collaborators, war criminals and proponents of Serbian pan-Slavic nationalism, Dragiša Vasić, Stevan Moljević, Vojvoda Uroš Drenović and Rade Radić. Beside these 4 names, there is also a street “Ravnogorska ulica” which marks the widely adopted name for WWII Chetniks' movement, a Movement of Ravna Gora (see Graph 4). There is no need to mentioned that Muslim religion or non-leftist Bosnian ideological narratives doesn't exist in Banja Luka's public space, and there is only one Catholic narrative, „Ivanj Franjo Jukić“.

Also, majority of Muslim and Croatian identifications and representation within the group of leftist street names were erased. Even on this level of meanings, dominant roles in street name cleansing once again had ethno-religious or national perceptions and identifications. Within this group Slovenian and Macedonian identifications were totally expelled as well as majority of Muslim, Croat and Jewish identifications (see Graph 5). Within this group of 272 leftist street names before the war, some 37,1% (or 101) street names had Serbian, some 15,8% (or 43) Croatian, some 29,4% (or 80) Muslim, some 1,5% (or 4) Slovenian, some 1,1% (or 3) Macedonian and same portion of Jewish ethno-religious or national identification. Also, there were some 11,8% (or 32) ethno-neutral and around 2,2% (or 6) international identifications. After the war, out of 111 remained leftist street names, some 78,4% (or 87) have Serbian, only 7,2% (or 8) have Croatian and just 1,8% (or 2) have Muslim ethno-religious or national identification, while there are some 9,0%

(or 10) ethno-neutral and around 2,7% (or 3) international identifications. Thus, 22 ethno-neutral and leftist street names have been erased, such as „SKOJ-a“, „AVNOJ-a“, „Bulevar Revolucije“, „ZAVNOBIH-a“, „VI Krajiške brigade NOB-a“, as well as half of international names, such as „Lenjinova“, „Bulevar Marksa i Engelsa“, etc.

Graph 5: Participation of different ethnic identifications and representations that could be percept in the group of leftist street names of Banja Luka before and after the war (in % out of 272 / 111)<sup>24</sup>



3) Third, at the level of perception about suitable and unsuitable geography. Before the war some 30,8% (or 144) of all streets in Banja Luka had some ethno-neutral, mostly a geographically related name. Within this group, some 32 streets carried the ethno-neutral and leftist names of Partisans units and important events from liberation war and revolution and some 111 streets carried the names of geographical toponyms, cities, lakes, mountains and rivers from BIH, Croatia, Serbia and entire Yugoslavia, as well as names of urban toponyms of Banja Luka. After the war, portion of these names in total number of streets have been decreased and now it is around 20,3% (or 95) of all streets in Banja Luka. Now, within this group there are only 10 ethno-neutral and leftist street names and some 83 streets have geographically related names. What is interesting here is that in same time while they draw their bloody maps of “Serbian lands” on the frontlines all over Croatia and BIH, RS war lords had been also drawing a map of “suitable“ new-Serbian and „unsuitable“ geography in the map of Banja Luka’s streets. Thus, RS elite erased “not Serbian enough“ geographical street names such as „Bihaćka“, „Mostarska“, „Travnička“, etc, probably because this geography was too Bosnian and Herzegovinian. Then they erased street names „Bosanska“, „Halilovac“, „Tabaci“, „Bana Kulina“, „Maglajlića sokak“, „Mejdan“, etc, because they probably had Bosnian historical and supranational narrative or Muslim cultural identification. Often erased street names were „Triglavska“, „Bledska“, „Pohorska“, etc, because they over the night became a part of „someone else“, a „foreign“ geography or street names such as

<sup>24</sup> Source: specified in the list of used literature and sources under bulletpoint number 7 and 10


„Dalmatinska“, „Zagorska“, „Zagrebačka“, „Osječka“, etc, which apparently became part of geography of „our enemies“. On other side, RS elite kept or introduced new geographical street names which stands much better with Belgrade ethno-colonialism, Serbian ethno-religious, historical and geographical identification and perceived „Serbian soli“. That's how Banja Luka kept old street names, such as: „Kupreška“, „Moslovačka“, „Moravska“, „Kosovska“, etc, or got a new ones: „Trg Krajine“, „Plitvička“, „Ravnih Kotara“, „Kninska“, etc.

### ***Instead of Conclusion***

Such incredible massiveness in cultural cleansing of official public names of local communities and streets implies that for Serbian elite was very important to deconstruct public space, cultural identity and multiethnic memory of Banja Luka with oblivion and selective remembrance. And then to completely conquer and occupy them with new-Serbian ethno-religious and nationalistic pan-Serbian identities and identifications, as well as Orthodox religion, monarchist and epic-mythical images and meanings which should serve to the elite to tailor quasi-statehood narrative construct of RS. Of course decisive battle was fought for the city center as political center of decision-making. In that sense all new street names and names of local communities created in war goes in direction of revision, distortion and „Serbianization“ of cultural identity and memory of Banja Luka, in direction of single-minded, mono-national collectivization of public space toward all-Serbian Orthodox religion and political congregation in which there is no room for differences. Such „Serbianization“ of public space is most often justified by the elite with demographic arguments. According to one such arguments elite emphasizes that in 1991 Serbs have made majority population in entire municipality of Banja Luka. According to other, during the war Banja Luka was additionally inhabited with Serb refugees and displaced population from Croatia and other parts of BIH, and number of non-Serb population was decreasing due to the „spontaneous emigrations“, as Serbian elite like to qualify ethnic cleansing of the city during the war. With such arguments elite wants to present that street names have been „spontaneously“ renamed as demographic picture of Banja Luka was also „spontaneously“ changing. But, such „spontaneity“ contains certain illogicalities. First, it is true that Serbs were majority in entire municipality, but in city center numbers are talking different story as less than one half of citizens had declared as Serbs. Comparison of the ethno-religious identifications in street names and factual ethnic composition of city center and entire municipality before the war shows strong correlation between these two numbers and implies that pre-war communist government had strived to balance local national demographic with national identifications in official political space of Banja Luka. When it comes to the second arguments, which emphasize immigration of Serb refugees and displaced persons and „spontaneous emigrations“ of non-Serbs out of Banja Luka, arguments clearly show

that non-Serbs were banished and finally almost completely cleansed from the city between April 1992 and December 1995, as well as that significant number of Serb population inhabited city between May 1991 and December 1995 mainly from other parts of BIH, and less from Croatia. But, arguments shows that such change of demographic features during these 4 or 5 years wasn't sole and independent initiator and motive for such massive street renaming and conversion of city cultural identity, because in the time of largest renaming at the beginning of 1993 and 1994, numbers of incoming Serb refugees and banished non-Serbs weren't in such proportion to justify complete erasing of non-Serbian identifications in public space. In those days Banja Luka city still wasn't urban center with significant Serb majority as it will become one and half year later, in winter 1995/96 when final demographic and political „solutions“ reach its today's point of ethnic purity. And beyond that, there is no „spontaneity“ what so ever in the fact that only in two municipal decisions war elite erased almost 200 street names which were perceived as non-Serbian or not Serbian enough, and introduced more than 200 new-Serbian street names. This example talks more about clear intention, a conscious desire to conquest the city, a violent political construction of new cultural identity and revision of pre-war memory of public space of Banja Luka. In summer and autumn 1995 Banja Luka had received a significant number of refugees and displaced Serbs from territories of West Bosnian municipalities and Croatia. About in same time, Banja Luka experienced a final massive wave of prosecution of non-Serb population, with significant help of international organizations, religious communities and security elite of RS. This was in a way, a politically agreed, severe inhumane „exchange“ of population as political continuation of brutal and criminal military campaign of ethnic cleansing, which differ from prosecutions and cleansings on the beginning of war, only by stronger presence of international humanitarian organizations. Even methods and techniques remained the same, despite international presence: demolition of religious objects, intimidations, beatings and brutal evictions of non-Serbs out of their homes, tortures, arrests and certain number of murders and disappearances, largely not investigated and prosecuted to this very day. That's way nobody can honestly state that in time of these massive renaming Banja Luka was an ethnically pure Serb city. It become that after winter 1995/96. You can say that by doing ethno-religious and ideological cleansings of street names RS war lords had constructed something that will become an exact demographic reality on the field, some year or two after (see Graph 6).

Graph 6: Change of ethnic composition of Banja Luka and change of ethno-religious identifications in the street names of Banja Luka between 1991 and 1997-98<sup>25</sup>



The first post-war estimations of ethnic composition of BIH and newly formed entities, published by group of ICTY court experts in 2003 had concluded that between 1991 and 1997-98 number of Muslim population had decreased for 95,5% and number of Croat population for 82,5% on the sample of 43 post-dayton municipalities in RS (including Banja Luka). Amazingly, when above mentioned percentages are compared with percentages of downsizings of number of street names with Muslim or Croat ethno-religious identifications in Banja Luka between 1992 and 1995, you come to very disturbing conclusion that they match completely. Number of street names with Muslim ethno-religious identification had dropped for 94,9% (and Muslim population for 95,5%) and those with Croatian ethno-religious identification for 76,6,0% (and Croat population for 82,5%). In same time number of street names with Serbian ethno-religious identification in street names had increased for 147,3% (and Serb population for 70,1%).

These comparisons, additionally diminish arguments that depict genocides and ethnic cleansings in BIH as „spontaneous migrations“ as well as arguments which favor theory of „spontaneous street renaming“, as „natural“ political outcomes of „spontaneous migrations“ and demographic changes. What can be stated as conclusion with high certainty is that RS and Banja Luka war lords didn't have any picture about ethnic composition, nor clear image about demographic outcomes of ethnic cleansing of Banja Luka from non-Serb population in February 1993 and March 1994 when they have undertook a massive cleansing of Muslim and Croatian

<sup>25</sup> Source: specified in the list of used literature and sources under bulletpoint number 6, 7, 9, 10 and 15

ethno-religious identifications from street names. Nor elite could have this picture until end of 1995, and first post-war years. RS elite could have certain and very inconsistent information about number of banished non-Serbs and inhabited Serb population in May 1993 when Center of Security Services in Banja Luka had created a list of dislodged and inhabited citizens in Banja Luka<sup>26</sup>. Or in February 1995 when Sector for State Security of RS Ministry of Internal Affairs made a review of number and national composition of population between 1991 and 1995 on the territory under authority of Banja Luka's State Security Center<sup>27</sup>. ICTY judges' decisions in case of Radoslav Brđanin, show that RS and Banja Luka war lords knew and were informed that Muslims and Croats are been systematically terrorized, evicted, banished and murdered in the city and that their number fall down in the entire municipality rapidly, since military and political cue and Serb takeover of Banja Luka in second half of March 1992. Parts of Serbian elite in Banja Luka even took active role in creation of atmosphere of fear and terror, in murders and robberies, in agitating for ethnically based violence and its later justification and cover up, as well as in creation of conditions in which dislodging and moving of non-Serbs out of Banja Luka, especially out of city center, were *sine qua non* for their biological as well as psychological salvation.

RS elite couldn't know for sure how many people lived in Banja Luka or what was its ethnic composition, until the first few post-war elections. Only the first few post-war elections and final scores of refugees and displaced populations in BIH and in region would show a true structure and proportions of ethnic cleansing and genocide in Banja Luka and entire RS. During the war RS war lords could only guess, and they did precisely that, not in accordance to the objective data but in accordance with their marauding desires. They projected their ethno-exclusivist and ethno-fascist desires and intentions on the street and local communities renaming, committing culturocide before they finally sealed the biological and demographical fate of non-Serbs in Banja Luka. Thus, final demographic changes of ethnic composition took place some year or two after massive cleansings of Muslim and Croat ethno-religious identifications in street names.

Culturocide in Banja Luka as a form of official "cultural politic" of RS elite, preceded genocide and announced final solution of Serb-Muslim and Serb-Croat relations in this city, in a form of total cultural, political and demographical annihilation of non-Serbs. Between 1992 and 1995 Serbian political elite in Banja Luka undertook cleansing of non-Serbian identities and identifications in street names and local communities (and generally in public space) with clearly expressed intentions, desires and visions that future scope, proportion and structure of final demographic ethnic cleansing and genocide in Banja Luka follow already proclaimed cultural politic in RS. Also, culturally announced genocide projected such desirable sizes and directions of

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<sup>26</sup> Source: specified in the list of used literature and sources under bulletpoint number 13

<sup>27</sup> Source: specified in the list of used literature and sources under bulletpoint number 14

ethnic, cultural and political cleansing of non-Serbs which will eventually lead to the consequences that we are observing and acknowledging right about now in 2013, in the year of the first post-war BH census. And those consequences are culturally and ethnical cleansed “new-Serbian” city of Banja Luka. This all speak in a favor of the thesis that massive “Serbianization” of public space and cleansing of all Muslim and Croat ethno-religious identities in street names during the war was:

1. The pure nationalistic and political construct and sign of irrational politic will for conquering and appropriation, without rational political or any other rational fundaments, except military and war power and criminal motives;
2. The pure projection of the final ethno-religious composition of the city and image on how future desirable political outcome of war should look like in Banja Luka, and generally BIH;
3. Indications about true initial intentions, desires, motives and probable strategies with which Serbian war lords in Belgrade and BIH started the aggression and armed conflict in BIH.

What this research had tried and hopefully succeeded to show is that Together with demographic ethnic cleansing, Banja Luka had experienced vast cultural and ideological cleansing, here portrayed in the massive renaming of official names of local communities and streets and demolition of Muslim and Catholic architectural legacies. Entire cultural remembrance of Banja Luka has been dismantled and significant parts erased, largely those that have been declared as non-Serbian or anti-Serbian and thus unsuitable. This affected that Banja Luka went true swift, bloody and painful process of conversion of its cultural identity from Bosnian-and-Herzegovinian multiethnic and inter-ethnic city into the mono-national, ethnically clean, Serbian city.

Described conversions of ethno-religious, ideological and thus cultural identity of pre-war Banja Luka formally happened in less than four years of war, simultaneously or even before real ethnic cleansing of the city, in a way predicting, some two years ahead, the outcomes of final solutions for non-Serbs in Banja Luka and RS – total annihilation of unsuitable. In this formal phase of conversion Banja Luka lost more than 30% and city center more than 55% of its pre-war citizens, non-Serbs, at least 60000 souls, as more than 100, according to more recent researches more than 300 civilians, had been murdered in terror campaigns in the city, nearby concentration camps or in slavery work on the war frontlines. Only because they were non-Serbs or not pure Serbs, the Muslims, Catholics, Croats, Bosniaks, ethnically or religiously mixed families and their members, and thus unprotected from criminals, extremists but also from entire ethno-fascist RS ethnocracy. While in same time you can feel how Banja Luka is losing, bit by bit, its well-known and centuries' old ethnic and cultural diversity, inter-ethnic and inter-confessional memory. extremely violent and ethno-fascist political homogenization of Serbs and pretended Serbian ethno-territorial and political property in BIH (or Croatia, or Kosovo) and transposing of everything that

isn't Serbian or Orthodox enough into the eternal Serb-Orthodox historical, territorial and political possession. Times after the war strongly disclose RS warlords as well post-war elites in their attempts to mask or justify genocide, culturocide and conversion of inter-ethnic into the Serbian Banja Luka, by pointing out majoritarian representation of Serbs in Banja Luka and other parts of today's RS, or political „feelings“ of Serb people or discrimination and „endangerment“ of Serbs immediately before the military operations had took place after dissolution of socialist Yugoslavia. There is no more war or alleged endangerment of Serbs, but war names of streets, schools and local communities are still there, Orthodox religion celebrations and saints within public institutions are still there, even 20 years after the war. RS and Belgrade elite are even announcing new patriotic street names which will carry the names of Serbian warlords Radovan Karadžić or Ratko Mladić. They are erecting monument of medieval monarch Stefan Nemanja in front of RS Museum in Banja Luka or opening imaginary all-Serbian city of “Andrićgrad” in the center of east Bosnian city Višegrad, severe ethnically cleansed from Muslims during the war, thus forging history and setting Serbian mythical-political fairytales as a regular bedtime reading. Simultaneously denying and depriving all citizens of BIH from the objective and archived knowledge about true political and cultural history of their towns, local communities and entire country. By doing all that they are making final brush-ups on the grand statue of genocide and culturocide in BIH, simultaneously providing for themselves political power and brand-new four-year government. And as a matter of fact, all post-war RS elites, especially today's one consider erased, denied, cut and ignored cultural memory and absence of prewar identity of Banja Luka as one of main legacy and acquisition of war. RS elite retention of post-war status quo and symbolical enumeration of Banja Luka in the list of “Serbian” cities, find the most important task in their attempt to obtain or retain political power. . That's way post-war elite doesn't want to change war names of streets or schools or try rebuild and restore cultural diversity and true memory of Banja Luka. Fight for streets or public spaces is fight for political space and power, regardless whether it is formal, like in case of street names or informal in the case of street graffiti. (Photos 1 and 2).

Photo 1



Source: Author

Photo 2



Source: Author

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## **War of Architecture: Creating New Places of Competing Memory in Bosnia and Herzegovina**

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### **Abstract**

Kondžilo is a Bosnian Croat pilgrimage place in Northeast Bosnia established in the 18<sup>th</sup> century. The main reason for pilgrimage is a miraculous painting of Mary, the Mother of God. Before the 1990s war pilgrimage to Kondžilo was just another pilgrimage place in Bosnia and Herzegovina: neither more prominent nor important than other similar shrines. After the war ended and the miraculous painting was returned to Kondžilo, the shrine's importance has rapidly increased. Pilgrimage to Kondžilo has become the symbol of the existence, homecoming, and survival for Croats from this area as well as for Bosnian Croats in general. The Catholic Church is now working with the local population and pilgrims to transform a small chapel in the woods into a sacred landscape with multiple functions. This process of place-making crucially involves the materialisation of symbols in the landscape in order to project an image and send out a story about the Bosnian Croat struggle and the need for national unity – thus creating new places of memory. Drawing on my own ethnographic research and experience as participant in the pilgrimage, I aim to demonstrate how building a shrine and creating new places of memory in the sacred landscape of Kondžilo affects pilgrims, their religious practices, and pilgrimage experiences, as well as the perception of their community. The construction and changes that have happened at Kondžilo and its environs recently have intensified the significance of this pilgrimage place, introduced new practices, created a sacred landscape consisting of prominent topoi, which seek to promote the sanctity of the home and the need for Croats to return to Bosnia to honour their ancestors and fallen soldiers, and to keep the faith in Christ and His Mother – the Queen of the Croats. This “programme” is materially present in the landscape, and while walking through this space people can easily learn what their heritage is, what the reality is and how they should work on the future.

**Key words: Kondžilo, Pilgrimage, Bosnian Croats, Sacred Landscape, Places of Memory.**

Bosnia and Herzegovina is struck by a “war of architecture”. Using architecture three national-religious communities of Bosnia and Herzegovina are trying to mark the landscape and expand or establish their natoscapes by building new places of competing memory. These places of memory are being used as “guardians” for important national narratives about memories from the past, mostly connected to last war in Bosnia, or they serve as “anchors” for memories directed to next generations.<sup>28</sup>

In this essay I analyse recent processes of building new competing places of memory, and marking the landscapes of Bosnia and Herzegovina. I first give a short overview of examples coming from all three constitutive nations of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats), and at the same time, the three major religious denominations (Islam, Orthodox, and Catholic) that are generally seen as linked to these nations. Later on I will focus on examples of marking the landscape by Bosnian Croats.

Most scholars agree that memory, landscape (place), narratives and practices are inseparable, and their often selective interweaving results in creating very distinctive places of memory embedded with “important” narratives that are performed in different contexts for different reasons (Smith 2008; Schama 1995; Sheldrake 2001; Nora 1996; Casey 1996; Ryden 1993; Symonds 1999; Connerton 2004, 2009).

Martyn Smith argues that every culture spreads out over its shared landscapes a layer of associations and narratives that assign meaning to otherwise insignificant spots on our earth. Significant narratives are thus mapped upon the physical landscape so that individuals within a culture feel themselves connected to places freighted with meaning and associations (Smith 2008: 5). As cultures change over time, their significant narratives also shift, and these narratives create new cognitive lenses through which the landscape is perceived (Smith 2008: 8).

Pierre Nora writes about material and non-material aspects of memory as ‘places of memory’. He defines places of memory as any important subject (material or nonmaterial) that by the decision of the people, or with time, becomes a symbolic element of heritage of some community (Nora 1996: 17).

However, it is not just the engagement with the landscape and/or place that is important in the relationship between people/community and their environment, but also the architecture that is built in that landscape. According to Lindsay Jones, architecture is the most visible and most powerful method of both expressing and stimulating religious emotions (Jones 2007: 251), I would extend this notion also beyond religious (from personal, communities, national, political, etc.). Jones claims that every built form functions as a multivalent symbol and evokes different meanings and responses from different audiences (Jones 2007: 257).

Although narratives and practices are inseparable from place of memory and keep the memory alive, architecture is how we create places, mark the landscape, emplace memory, and impose our interpretation of space and history, or in one word - dominate. By architecture I don’t consider only monumental buildings but also small-scale monuments, information boards, statues, different memorials, everything that is built in some landscape with the aim to send out a story, emplace a memory, and gather individuals or a community around some practices.

In the next section I give a short historical background for discussion about coexistence and religious sharing in Bosnia and Herzegovina, I will also outline main anthropological research on sharing and key topics that emerged from this research.

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## A short historical background of sharing and coexistence in Bosnia

Before the war (1992-1995) Bosnia and Herzegovina, like Yugoslavia as a whole, was perceived (by the outsiders but also many insiders), and presented, as a country of brotherhood and unity (*bratstvo i jedinstvo*), “small Yugoslavia”, of different nations and religions living peacefully together. The war ended that dream, or it was an awakening? The best known example of Bosnian tolerance is sacral buildings of Sarajevo standing next to each other (the Mosque, the Catholic and Orthodox churches). But if we historically contextualize these churches, we very easily realize that the picture, as it always is, is not black and white. Namely, the construction of the Orthodox Church, known as *Saborna crkva rođenja Presvete Bogorodice*, started in 1863, and was dedicated in 1872. That building was the first sacral object build in Sarajevo that was not Islamic in origin and it disrupted the Islamic construction monopole in the city centre. Although the Church was build with the Sultan’s political support and some financial assistance as well, the construction was not supported by local Muslims. Moreover, because of their resistance, the dedication of the church was prolonged for a year, and on the day of the dedication the ceremony was guarded by 1200 Ottoman soldiers. One of the main arguments against this Church was that it had a bell tower bigger than any Mosque Minarets of Sarajevo at that time, which was forbidden in Ottoman empire (Hayden 2013: 4).

The Catholic Cathedral Srca Isusova was build in 1889, when rule by the Ottoman empire had been succeeded by that of the Austrian-Hungarian kingdom, and the percentage of the population that was Catholic had increased from 3 % in 1878 to 25 % in 1889. The Synagogues of Sarajevo were built in 1902 and 1932. So, the most famous Sarajevo tolerance picture is the result of weakening and the end of Ottoman Empire and Islam as ruling religion and arrival of Austrian-Hungarian kingdom. It seems that the story of Bosnian and Herzegovinian religious coexistence, or to be more specific, the construction of the prominent sacral buildings of other religions (except Islam), started to profile at the end of 19th and the beginning of 20th century with political and religious changes (Baskar 2012: 52).

No one can deny that coexistence and even sharing the sacra existed in Bosnia and Herzegovina but it seems, like any sharing the sacra, it was a result of local context (historical, cultural, religious, etc.) and the concept of *komšilik* (good neighbourhood) rather than a general picture of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Robert Hayden disagrees with these ideas and considers them historical particularism. He is especially critical of the concept of *komšilik* asking how is it that the concept is so strong in one minute yet apparently not in the next?<sup>29</sup>

As Robert Hayden and Slobodan Naumović emphasize, the Ottoman Empire was, in fact, explicitly and legally a state in which Muslims dominated over non-Muslims. Christians and Jews were indeed tolerated so long as they did not threaten the dominant position of Muslims. Thus, the peaceable relations celebrated in this Balkan tale were premised on a stable configuration of Muslim dominance. When the dominance was threatened, there was conflict between these groups and also very brutal repression to restore Ottoman rule and the supremacy of Islam (Hayden and Naumović 331).

The emphasis on sharing and coexistence also parallels recent work in anthropology on the sharing of sacred space, which explicitly aims to counter models of interreligious interaction in the Balkans, among other regions, that emphasize an inherent antagonism between religious communities (Hayden and Naumović 2013: 325).

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<sup>29</sup> From personal correspondence with Robert Hayden.

There are two approaches to sharing the sacra (an in a way, coexistence in general). At one side are Robert Hayden and his supporters. Hayden after extensive ethnographic research in India and the Balkans, and recently in Turkey, Portugal and Peru, developed a concept of Antagonistic tolerance. He argues that coexistence does not mean tolerance as a moral stance, and that it is more a pragmatic strategy (2002: 205). For him coexistence can manifest the negative definition of tolerance – passive non interference (2002: 206). He realizes that the syncretism is possible and a fact, but for him this is a manifestation of relationship between two different groups at one period of time. This approach introduces time in analytical observance of sharing the sacra and coexistence which means that the practice of sharing happens in a particular time period (2002: 207). According to Hayden, avoiding the conflict is a result of awareness that the cost of conflict is too high, and when conflict happens the sharing of sacra, and even the coexistence is hard to except (2002: 128). The tensions between two, or more, communities can exist but they do not have to lead to a open conflict as long as one of them is dominant, or, as long there is a strong political power that holds the tensions under control (Hayden 2013: 14).

On the other side of researches of sharing the sacra are scholars that tested Haydens hypothesis and do not agree with him (Albera and Couroucli 2012; Bowman 2012; Baskar 2012; Albera 2012; Belaj and Martić 2014). Dionigi Albera argues that there are many examples of interaction between different communities that is unduly neglected, and despite Hayden's hypothesis, after a period of violence the sharing can be continued. It seems that most of them agree on main characteristic of sharing. The sharing can be a practise of moment after which people who participated in that sharing return to their ordinary life and traditional ways (Bowman 2012: 12). Hayden instead argues that we are not talking about "return" but the formation of a new configuration of interrelationship.<sup>30</sup> Sharing is a very complicated process (Couroucli 2012: 4). So, if we want to characterize some place as a place of sharing and coexistence we need to know in detail what is happening in these places, what do people do, what are they saying while they are doing some practices, who is talking to whom and who is listening (Bowman 2012: 13).

It seems that when we are talking about sharing we are focused on local practices which are almost always located on the borders, far from city centres, and centres of power, it happens among local population living in peace next to each other (Couroucli 2012: 4). Sharing and coexistence depends on local relations and context and it should be observed in such a way (Katić 2013).

Although I agree with Glenn Bowman and David Henig that in researching of sharing and coexistence we should focus more on what is really happening in the place and take a bottom up perspective, in this essay I give a top-down overview. Henig argues that this kind of perspective has a tendency to ascribe agency to entities such as ethnic and religious groups, which are then taken for granted: *...such analytical essentialism often reduces complex social fabric to their collective identitarian dimensions while overlooking at the same moment other related processes taking place on the ground.* (Henig 2015: 133)

Henig suggests that the possible escape from this trap is in engaged and detailed ethnography. He shifts his perspective from groupism with emphasis on top-down control toward the grassroots activities of divergent social actors who construct and negotiate fluid meanings and practices (Henig 2015: 133). Why then do I focus again in this essay on institutional actions rather on individual and group practices? Although both perspectives are equally important, I believe that creating new places of memory and marking the landscapes is primarily a top-down process because almost no sacral object or national monument cannot be build in a nationally and religiously important place without the approval and help of religious and political institutions.

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<sup>30</sup> From personal correspondence with Robert Hayden.

How individuals and communities react is equally important but not in the context of this essay. As Henig himself has highlighted, sacred landscapes in Bosnia and Herzegovina have undergone tremendous transformations by the actions of Bosniak politicians and Islamic clerics, who exploit pilgrimages to promote themselves in the public sphere or for their own factional political gains (Henig 2015: 145). He also shows how although individual Bosniaks bitterly object to these processes that are happening throughout Bosnia, the choreography of prayers for (local *dova*'s) are also contested in some villages where new mosques have been built, often thanks initially to foreign Islamic "humanitarian aid organizations" (Henig 2015: 153). I would extend this from Bosniak to all three constitutive Bosnian and Herzegovian nations. The changing of landscape, local practices and even population of some regions in Bosnia (Halilovich 2013) is happening by top-down, institutional, very strong political and religious act with or without individual or local communities support.

Robert Hayden continued to develop his work further and connected *Antagonistic tolerance* with a new concept of *Relioscapes*, which refers to the distribution of space through time using manifestations of religious traditions. *Relioscapes* consists of those manifestations but also of the populations that build them (Hayden and Walker 2013: 9). Hayden and Walker are mostly interested in the situations in which two groups, with different religions, inhabit the same territory. In those situations two *relioscapes* are crossing and could overlap. They consider that the best way of observing and understanding the sharing of sacra and coexistence is to observe those places as knots in which the social interaction between different communities happens. As knots those particular places are not possible to segregate from the social networks that surround them, which could be observed from local community, region, all the way to state or empire (2013: 10). *Relioscapes* are fluid, since people move, carrying their religious practices with them, and potentially changing the environment so that it reflects their religion (2013: 10). Hayden and Walker argue that places of sharing must be observed in different scales, over a longer period of time, and in a context of moving borders of different *relioscapes*. If there is no overlap of *relioscapes* there will be no sharing. When a certain number of members of one community live close to members of different community the practice of sharing could happen, but when one group becomes dominant their superiority will be visible through physical markers of space (sacral objects). As long as different *relioscapes* overlap, we can expect periods of *antagonistic tolerance* (Hayden and Walker 2013: 24).

In Bosnia and Herzegovina nationality and religion are two sides of one coin. Building sacral objects is almost synonymous with building an object of national symbolism. Moreover, almost all "secular" objects, like monuments, have religious symbols integrated at some point. Hayden and Walker's *relioscapes* in Bosnia are, at the same time, *natio-scapes*. The first thing you see, or look at, when you arrive for the first time in some village or a town in Bosnia is the sacral object. If you see a church you can be pretty sure you are entering a Catholic (Croatian) village, if you see an Orthodox Church you are probably in a Serb village, and if you see a Mosque it is most likely Muslim (Bosniak) village, if you see all of them – it is mixed village. This is the most common marker of space (landscape) and religio-national identity in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As a result of this, recently, different religious and national communities are promoting Bosnia and Herzegovina to one of the biggest sacral building sites in Europe. Hundreds of mosques, churches, crosses and other religious monuments are being rebuilt and erected throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. The war in Bosnia ended in 1995, but the "war of architecture" is still going on. The Croats (Catholics) are building monumental pilgrimage sites like Kondžilo and St John of Podmilačje, crosses overlooking towns, and big bell towers like the one in Mostar that overshadows all the Minarets. The Bosniaks (Muslims) have developed further their main *dova* Ajvatovica to a national and cultural centre of Bosniaks (Sarač Rujanac 2013; Sarač Rujanac 2014, Henig 2012), old mosques are being restored with the help of Republic of Turkey, new mosques and minarets are taking over

Bosnian landscapes, and memorials for victims of war are erected at places of mass murders (Potočari). The Ajvatovica pilgrimage site is portrayed in public rhetoric as holy land, emblematic of a threatened Muslim community's historical continuity and cultural heritage. The Bosnian Islamic Community promotes Ajvatovica as the biggest annual Muslim gathering in Europe. The Ajvatovica pilgrimage includes a parade, "The Days of Ajvatovica", political gathering, and folkloric parade. Ajvatovica quickly became a powerful instrument in post-Yugoslav public Bosniak discourse that symbolizes and articulates the collective identity of Bosniaks (Henig 2015: 142).

The Serbs (Orthodox), besides discovering churches and monasteries that are older than they possibly could be, are focused on erecting monuments that connects them to common, wider Serbian heritage, like erecting a statue of Stefan Nemanja in the centre of Banja Luka. On the other side the Serbs also erect memorials to war victims trying to present themselves as one of the victims of war, especially in places where mass murders from their side were committed (such as villages of Kravica and Zalazje near Srebrenica). Srebrenica is a very good example of competing memories through building of memorials and marking landscapes. The Muslim memorial of the massacre in Potočari on the spot where most of the women of Srebrenica last saw their sons and husbands, and Serb counter-memorial in nearby villages of Kravica and Zalazje, along with re-erection of the Kosta Todorović monument – a local Serbian World War I hero whose monument, erected in 1924, was moved in 1941 (Duijzings 2007: 147). New crosses, Orthodox churches and the destruction of mosques, are an effort to inscribe new a religio-national political order into the landscape and to send a clear message to the Muslims. Muslims on the other hand, through the commemorations and the creation of a memorial, are trying to re-establish their presence in Srebrenica and symbolically "undo" the results of Serb ethnic cleansing and genocide (Duijzings 2007: 153).

One of the functions of all these places and objects mentioned in the text, besides the primary one (for sacral objects, the religious ones), is to mark the space (landscape), to show the presence of one religious and national community, and in some cases to indicate dominance. These newly built places of memory compete with each other in carrying the memories of recent past but also, in some examples, these are places of memory for the future, and especially among Bosnian Croats. Every year more and more Croats are leaving Bosnia and Herzegovina, and with the decrease of population, the Bosnian Catholic Church is trying to, at least, mark the landscape where Croats use to live. In the next sections I present a brief example in which the Bosnian Croat community is trying, by building new places of memory and with practices connected to these places, to mark the landscape, show their presence, and reach out to younger and succeeding generations.

### **The example of Kondžilo<sup>31</sup>**

Kondžilo is a Bosnian Croat pilgrimage place located in the parish of Komušina, northern Bosnia, which is today part of the Republika Srpska (Republic of Srpska). Although most people living in the area were Croats before the early 1990s war, by 2014, the demographic situation had changed dramatically. In most of the Croatian villages surrounding the Kondžilo hill there are now very few permanent residents and these are mostly elderly. The main reason for pilgrimage to Kondžilo is the eighteenth-century miraculous painting of Mary, the Mother of God. The painting was probably brought by Franciscans, and since a Franciscan was the first to write down the oral tradition at the end of the nineteenth century about the arrival of the painting and the beginning of the pilgrimage, it seems that the Church was responsible for the creation of this pilgrimage place (Katić 2010). Before the 1990s war, pilgrimage to Kondžilo – the Feast of Mary's Assumption into heaven, on 15

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<sup>31</sup> This section is a short version of the paper published under the title: From the Chapel on the Hill to National Shrine: Creating a Pilgrimage "Home" for Bosnian Croats.

August – was just another pilgrimage place in Bosnian and Herzegovina: neither more prominent nor important than other similar shrines. After the war ended the miraculous painting that was in “exile” in Croatia returned to Kondžilo in 1999 on the Feast of the Assumption. In the last decade shrine’s importance has rapidly increased (Katić 2014: 16). The most important pilgrimage celebration still takes place on 15 August, when thousands of people arrive, mostly Croats from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croats ‘temporarily residing’ in the European Union, and those from Croatia and Switzerland. In fact, pilgrimage to Kondžilo is one of the reasons, and frequently the only reason, for those who were displaced from the surrounding villages and parishes, to visit their houses, if only once a year. Pilgrimage to Kondžilo has become the symbol of the existence, homecoming and survival for Croats from this area, as well as for Bosnian Croats in general. The Catholic Church is now working with the local population and pilgrims to transform the small woodland chapel into a sacred landscape with multiple functions. This process of place-making crucially involves the materialization of symbols in the landscape in order to project an image and send out a story about the Bosnian Croat struggle and the need for national unity (Katić 2014: 17).

When you visit a Kondžilo pilgrimage place during the main pilgrim event on 15 August, the first thing you come across is a big sign in the neighbouring parish on the road one must take to go to Komušina and Kondžilo, which says: ‘Welcome back to your homes!’ This is a symbolically very powerful sign, which etched itself into the memory. People are being prepared, psychologically and spiritually, for the rest of their journey and given various mental images which were food for thought. The second item that appears in the landscape, attracting attention through its appearance, size and position, is the bell-tower by the old parish church ruined in 1992. The old parish church is situated on the hill above the current church, giving it a dominant position, but since it was ruined and overgrown, it did not stand out. Now, however, one could see from afar an imposing, hollow bell-tower, made from non-corrosive aluminium, which dominates the landscape in all its shiny glory. The first time I saw it I headed straight up to the bell-tower. As I was approaching, I realized that it was not a bell-tower at all but a monument to soldiers who had died in the war. At the foot of the monument, on four sides were plaques containing the names of fallen soldiers, while at the front there were a few wreaths left over from a delegation visit. Later I found out that the hill had been given an official name – *Kalvarija* (Calvary) – symbolizing the suffering of people from that region in all wars (Katić 2014: 26). Since the 2012 construction of the memorial park (as it is called on the official website of the shrine), many delegations have laid wreaths at the monument, including the president of the Federation of BiH, representatives of the Ministry of Defence of BiH, a number of generals and various veterans’ organizations.

On 10 August 2012, after laying wreaths and paying respects to fallen soldiers, a Stations of the Cross procession began, which led up to Kondžilo, thereby connecting two sacred topoi – *Kalvarija* and Kondžilo. The old parish church had also been rebuilt. The only part left standing – the altar section – was preserved and partly reconstructed, while the altar had become the ‘altar of peace’ dedicated to all Croatian victims throughout history (Katić 2014: 27). The old chapel, from Kondžilo mountain, had been given a new function enabling it to be both symbolically and physically close to the painting. As it happens, the old chapel was moved next to the parish church and functions as the outdoor altar. Although the roof and roof construction had been entirely changed and the closed middle section had gone, leaving the chapel looking more like a gazebo, its familiar shape and the stone foundation, where the builders of the first chapel inscribed the year of construction (with letters which are now emphasized), did indeed confirm that this was the chapel of Kondžilo. This is where the painting is now kept during the Mass for the sick on 14 August, when pilgrims fulfil their vows and the cardinal kneels while saying the rosary. On the morning of 15 August, the procession with the painting leaves for Kondžilo, first passing through the old chapel as if through a door, making its way towards Kondžilo and the new chapel (Katić 2014: 28). This new practice connects the old and new chapels and, metaphorically, the older generations who

had built the old chapel, and the new generation building the new chapel and modern shrine, which is rooted in and connected to the past and tradition (Katić 2014: 29).

The construction and changes that happened over few years have intensified the significance of this pilgrimage place and introduced some new practices. They have also created a sacred landscape consisting of a prominent topos, where the emphasis is put on the home, the Croatian struggle during the war, the sacrifice of those killed, Christ's Way of the Cross, as well as Kondžilo itself as the central place and symbol of Croatian survival in Bosnia. Together, all of the topoi in this sacred landscape constitute the fundamental mission, which Kondžilo as an institutional pilgrimage aims to promote: the sanctity of the home, the necessity of Croats' return to Bosnia, honouring one's ancestors and fallen soldiers, and keeping the faith in Christ and our Mother – the Queen of Croats. Deliberately or not, it is as if the religio-political programme is present in the landscape, and while walking through this space, one can easily learn what our foundation is, what the reality is and how we should work on the future (Katić 2014: 31). Kondžilo is becoming a religious-national theme park, where visitors/pilgrims can see and experience all the things that make them a part of the Bosnian Croat community, and the things that make Komušina and Kondžilo a Croatian place (Katić 2014: 32).

### **Concluding thoughts**

The main role in this “war of architecture” has the institutional Churches which are focused on sacral buildings and objects, which have, in the same time, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, national features as well, as well as political elites that use these “sacred” landscapes for their own purposes but also create new one mostly memorials connected to last Bosnian war.

In this very complex interweaving between top-down and bottom-up processes and practices; sharing and coexistence, antagonistic tolerance, building new sacral and national objects, creating and preserving individual and collective memories, creating and emplacing new and selective narratives, changing landscapes, population, Bosnia and Herzegovina is going through a massive transformations that could only be compared to Ottoman conquest and the end of Medieval Bosnian kingdom, and later on, with the end of Ottoman rule and Austrian-Hungarian “protectorate” in the end of 19<sup>th</sup> century. What will be the final outcome of this “war of architecture” is yet to be seen.

Kondžilo is a good example of these processes. Once a small local pilgrimage place marked by wooden chapel built by local population today is a monumental national shrine of Bosnian Croats. Although this place has no importance without people (pilgrims), so it's a bottom-up perspective that is important as Bowman and Henig emphasize, the fact is that without official institutional initiative and support this pilgrimage place would never rise to this level (top-down). It's the interrelationship of these two poles that can create new places of memory and new practices of memorialization. Another fact is that, except pilgrimage days, Kondžilo surrounding villages are almost abandoned. This meaningful landscape with important places of memory is not in “use”. So for who is it built? If we rely on Hayden and Walkers *religioscapes* and/or in the same time *natio-scapes*, it could look as this (and not just this, as other examples from Bosnia and Herzegovina that I mentioned earlier show) sacred memorial landscape is a *natio/religioscapes* intentioned to mark the landscape, show the presence of one national and religious community and to emplace selective nationally important narratives for this and next generations.

Robert Hayden is especially critical to observing sharing and coexistence in local relations, and in the context of concept of *komšiluk* in Bosnia, arguing that it makes little sense to analyse any single site as if it were an isolate. He concludes that the critics of the AT model all present examples of a

single ethnographic present and then claim to be contradicting a diachronic model.<sup>32</sup> But, it seems to me, that he neglects the fact that the sharing and coexistence is a bottom-up process, located in a single site, happening in a specific time period. I think this is the main reason why we have two “camps” and different approaches to the concept of sharing the sacral and coexistence of different national and religious communities.

Hayden and his supporters are using diachronic perspective while their opponents are more focused on contemporary situation and observe the practices as they are happening (like Bowman and Henig). They have a problem understanding each other because Hayden is trying to generalize and create a grand theory of sharing and coexistence; others are using their local ethnographic research. Both are discussing the same thing but from a different perspective. Local practices sometimes contradict general theories, and vice versa. Bosnia and Herzegovina for example is so diverse that in just a few kilometres you can find yourself in completely different situation that contradicts your previous knowledge and assumptions. Not to mention different time periods even at the same location. I agree with Bowman, Henig, Couroucli and others that sharing does happened and is a local practice, but I also agree with Hayden that this can come to a roughly end, but this is more the result of a top-down influence that is reflected in local context. Hayden and Walker actually acknowledge this arguing that places of sharing must be observed in different scales, over a longer period of time, and in the context of moving borders of different religioscapes. And I think that they are on the right track with these ideas that could connect these two approaches and give more profound answers to many question concerning sharing and coexistence. But so far this is just an idea. Only using both approaches (bottom-up and top-down; diachronic and synchronic) at one local place of sharing we can try to get a better insight into practices of sharing, co-existence, antagonistic tolerance and war of architecture.

It will be interesting to follow up this process and the development of creation of these competing places of memory, and to see how this will influence Bosnia and Herzegovina landscape as well as local communities and their everyday life and interrelationship.

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<sup>32</sup> From a personal correspondence with Robert Hayden.

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**“Miner of Husino” statue, now and then  
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Oko Tuzle učestala buna,  
na ustanak digla se komuna.  
Borimose pred očima svijeta,  
gola prsa protiv bajoneta.  
Neka s nama počne nova era,  
crvena od krvi proletera.<sup>33</sup>

### **Abstract**

Reflection of rebellion in the “Miner of Husino” allows us to gain deeper insight into Tuzla's and Bosnian history of memories. Once, this statue represented a national symbol of Tuzla, monument which transferred messages to new generations. However, contrary to its mission, it fell into the oblivion and served only as material evidence of the past. Ninety-five years later, the statue again regained its meaning when disenfranchised workers peacefully protested and wanted to speak with an arrogant leader. He, not only didn't receive them, he gave the police an authority for excessive use of force. So that's how, once again, social unrest appeared that called for change and establishment of different political forces which will have to open new perspectives to the citizens of this country. The revolutionaries of the past and present are united, they were asking and they still ask for justice and a piece of bread. Once, “Miner of Husino” statue held a rifle in his right fist while leaning to the pick with the left; today, the same statue's raised fist is empty, while the pick is covered with large, printed, red letter P. Raised clenched fist is a symbol of national power around the world, but this fist is that of a miner, of a disenfranchised worker. Clenched fist is a sign of struggle, and perhaps the biggest advantage of this movement is the establishment of a plenum where everyone has a power to create, where everyone has the right to vote, where there is no leader, and everybody works together on destroying authoritative power that dominates and destroys.

The theme of the work is not, therefore, the protests themselves, as much as it is a dynamics of collective memory, which lies in the shadow of the statue of disenfranchised past reflected into the present, and the memory is a matter of present and future, at least as much as it is a thing of the past. The aim of this work is to connect the history, where these two rebellions reflect one in another, and reflect the constant reminder of the facts which are not overcome and which will happen again. This paper tries to find the answer to the question of whether these insurmountable facts, from the standpoint of the theory of memory, can be understood and overcome.

**Key words: Miner of Husino, rebellion, culture of memory, disenfranchisement, reflection**

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<sup>33</sup>Poem from the movie „Mutiny of Husino“

## THE STATUE OF THE HUSINO MINER AS A SYMBOL OF DEFIANCE, ACROSS THE CULTURE OF REMEMBRANCE

**Oko Tuzle učestala buna,  
Naustanak digla se komuna.  
Borimo se pred očima svijeta  
gola prsa protiv bajoneta.  
Neka s nama počne nova era,  
crvena od krvi proletera.<sup>34</sup>**

The reflection on the Uprising of Husino Miners<sup>35</sup> allows for a deeper insight into the Tuzla, that is, Bosnian history of remembrance. The statue once representing the national symbol of Tuzla, a monument usually transmitting messages to generations and generations, despite its mission, has fallen into oblivion<sup>36</sup> and currently only serves as material evidence of the ancient past. None the less, is this really the case? Is our unconscious painted with the colors of the defiance of the past, and we do not even know? Is it really possible to forget a nine meters high statue? And, what is our visual communication with this colossal man?

Answers to these questions may be found in the study of symbols using the Yong psychoanalysis. Symbols have always been used for marking identities and confirming commitment to a social group. Being based on shared beliefs or common interests and activities, all organized groups have their own symbols of identity. An important characteristic of symbols is their visibility: they are intended to provide easily recognizable sign of group identity as a way of codifying and structuring social relations, with the aim of inducing emotional responses such as fear, respect, pride and defiance<sup>37</sup>, in all who see them. Political groups, uprisings and revolutions have always been

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<sup>34</sup>A song from the movie „Husinska buna“ (The Husino Uprising)

Frequent uprising around Tuzla,  
the uprising raised commune.  
We fight in front of the eyes of the world  
bare chest against the bayonet.  
Let a new era begin wuth us,  
red with the blood of proleterians.

<sup>35</sup>The famous Uprising of the Husino Miners began on December 21st, 1920. Over 7000 miners led by the Communist Party and Mitar Trifunović Učo, went on strike due to low wages. Seven days later, the authorities ended the strike literally in blood. Thirty-two miners and peasants were killed, dozens were injured and hundreds were indicted. A miner, Juro Kerošević, accused of killing a gendarme during the conflict, was sentenced to death by hanging. Due to the gruesome way in which the strike was ended, rebellions across the country broke out eventually resulting in the commutation of sentence for Kerošević to 20 years in prison. In memory of Husinsko Uprising as well as the miners who were killed in the war, on July 27th, 1956, the largest monument in the city was raised in the park behind the current Bosnian Cultural Center. (Božo Mažar, The General BiH Miners' Strike and Husino Uprising, 1920).

<sup>36</sup> Oblivion in the mythological notion is located under the ground, its image is that of an abyss, Hegel called it "the deep pit of man's self", and Thomas Mann "the well of the past". And our phrase "fall into oblivion" indicates the belief that oblivion is located under the soil where the subterranean live their life. In our language oblivion is topically marked: it represents the negation of the verb to reside, which is connected to residing in an area. (SinanGužević, The Republic).

<sup>37</sup> Defiance is the attitude towards authority which is required or compelled to allow the subject to be powerful, independent, his own or free. The psychological assumption of defiance is a sense of self-esteem which is verified by comparing it with others and by seeking fair treatment from others. This can be noticed in situations where the subject defies the request of the person who has, in the past, rejected his similar request. In this case, defiance serves the purpose of social leveling and to serve justice. Defiance has probably played a major role in the progress in all areas of life and in the development of civilization. The history of the discovery of the most varied aspects of life is in fact the history of impairment and underestimation, and the consequent strive to prove the validity of a new idea or invention. When rebellion and defiance become the dominant sense of social relations, particularly in relation to authority, it becomes a determinant of a life style. (ZoranMilivjević, Emotions).

associated with specific symbols<sup>38</sup>. In memory of the Uprising of Husino Miners, a monument identifying the rebellion of disgruntled workers was built a century later.

In "The Art of Memory", by the well-known English historian Frances Amelia Yates, significant are the facts according to which the authoress awakened a renaissance thought researcher's sensibility towards some, until then, completely disregarded and unprocessed aspects of the Renaissance such as the role and significance of the Hermetic tradition, alchemy, magic, symbols... She states that memory is transformed through the Hermetic and Cabalistic influences of the Renaissance Neoplatonism. Furthermore, she points out that, according to G. Bruno, the primary task of the art of memory is to display the cosmic order and allow for its storage by using pictures and symbols, thus also memorizing the place of all things in that order.



**Kolo od sreće uokoli  
vrteći se ne pristaje:  
tko bi gori, eto je doli,  
a tko doli gori ustaje.<sup>39</sup>**

The belief that there are patterns or tendencies that organize nature and human experience has existed throughout the history of humanity in all cultures of the world. The Pagan conception of magic as a predetermined network of destiny<sup>40</sup> and all other mythological systems, the pantheon of

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<sup>38</sup> A symbol builds each symbolic form, and thus the culture and the arts as part of the culture. By creating culture, a man builds a special praxis, which is varied and contradictory on the inside. Within this praxis the symbol works in a special way, always with the aim of tightening the link between the elements of the praxis, especially if they are mutually contradictory. In this process, the symbol has a certain communicative and cohesive role, but it would be wrong to bring it to down only to that, considering that the symbol is actively involved in the entire cultural process. Bearing all this in mind, it is clear that the nature of the symbol, its origin and development can successfully be realized only by simultaneously clarifying the concept of symbolic culture that permeates the symbol and gives it an appropriate meaning. (Radoslav Djokic, Sign and symbol)

<sup>39</sup>Ivan Gundulić: Osman

The wheel of fortune goes round and round  
It doesn't stop turning  
He who was on top is now on the bottom  
He who was on the bottom rises to the top

<sup>40</sup> The Pagans define magic as the ability of psychic energy management of nature/the universe, with the aim of inducing a change at a mental and /or material level, all in accordance with one's own free will. So, magic is a completely natural process, and the magical process serves as a kind of "transformer" that turns the intention of subjective reality into an objective one that may be perceived by the senses of the material world. The tendency towards magic and spirituality is deeply rooted in the collective consciousness. Using magic the Pagans explore their dormant and hidden powers, they push the limits of their own abilities, and come to the realization that they are One with everything on the spiritual and material level. (Lothar; Paganism in Theory and Practice).

gods, individual deities or symbols, assume the term of the (in)visible influence behind everyday life. Carl Gustav Jung has taken this principle and developed a psychological theory of deep organizing patterns or archetypes, clarifying the choice of symbolism throughout the world.

The black statue, the Tuzla icon representing the rebellious strength and indestructibility of the human defiance, was named The Husino Miner. He remains an open story of the (un)consciously artistic challenge latently presenting different conceptual notions. However, these notional concepts, through symbolic study, can be interpreted as follows: the right hand with a clenched fist holding a rifle raised high in the air, symbolizes strength and courage. A hand fearing no death<sup>41</sup>. Also, the position of the hands represents a threat and the search for equality; one hand faces the sky and the other the ground, that is, the sky is God himself, and the earth is a natural law. The law of Hermes Trismegistus "As above, must be down." The black color, the color of coal and miners when they come out of the mine, a symbol of power and authority. Death is marked in black and, in this case, it marks the death of the ruling oligarchy. Or the death of oblivion? In Egypt black is the color of eternal life, precisely because it is considered that new life comes from the darkness. A new life that will begin once it comes out of the darkness and starts a revolution? The helmet<sup>42</sup> on the head is part of the mining uniform that protects the head. But, can a helmet represent a type of warning that the strong concentration of The Husino Miner will induce such states in the environment? A state of defiance and a state of an active mechanism of action of the common man, miners, as opposed to a passive, just another common man. The statue is on the move. Not standing still. It walks. It moves. Goes forward, not afraid, and passing down a message to generations: We may be in a deep pit<sup>43</sup>, but we constantly explore our pit, we know it relatively well and we dig even deeper. But, what about you? Are you just going to stand still and wait in line for a haircut?<sup>44</sup> According to cultural memory theorists, the past is alive and present in the present, and memory itself is, in many ways, built into the value and institutional framework of social life. Messages that are being unconsciously transferred (for example, through visual perception) are differently implanted into the conscious in relation to the way in which something is memorized, so that the past continues to exist independently of the will of those who continue to live. The way something is memorized is what gives memory power, and not the content. The psychological theorist Arnold Mindel points out that we are trying to see life in terms of conditions, solid symbols, solid identity, the state of the mind ... while in reality we actually live in a world of processes, getting a steady stream of signals and information. In the process approach, symbols are seen not only as something with a fixed meaning, but also as part of the current fluid process that requires constant vigilance. This is why, for a life without revolutions, what is important is the content of what is remembered and the way in which this content is embedded into the practices and institutions of society.

**Sad vrhsabljekrunavisi,  
sad vrhkrunesabljapada,  
sad nacarstvo rob se uzvisi,  
a tko car bi, rob je sada.**<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> A hand is a symbol of strength, authority, provided help and protection. It is also the tool of justice: a hand that holds the authority determines the sentence to the convicted. (Alen Gerbran, The Dictionary of Symbols)

<sup>42</sup> The helmet symbolism is linked to that of the head it covers. The helmet protects the thoughts, but also hides them: it is a symbol of power and elevation.

<sup>43</sup> A deep pit, according to Jung, symbolizes the unconscious

<sup>44</sup> All we know are only illusions in an uncertainty that changes constantly. The search for a real picture of the world is a complete waste of time. We should turn towards understanding ourselves. (Aristotel)

<sup>45</sup> Ivan Gundulić: Osman

Now the crown hangs on the top of the sword,  
and now the crown slides down the sword,  
now the slave is exalted onto the empire,  
and he who was an emperor, is now a slave.

The political and social order of Bosnia and Herzegovina speaks of a culture that squares with the legacy of the past and totalitarian regimes, with violence as an instrument of politics, as well as with the ideological legacy of nationalism. The strike of the Husino Miners began at the end of 1920, and ninety-five years later, the disempowered workers Tuzla went on peaceful protests. Since the ruling oligarchy refused to receive the representatives of protests, riots broke out and the power of social networks got stronger in one night than all the institutions of the political system. In solidarity with Tuzla, mass protest broke out in all cities across Bosnia and Herzegovina: Bihać, Sarajevo, Mostar, Zenica, Srebrenik, Tešanj, Tuzla, Travnik, Kalesija, Brčko, Zavidovići, Maglaj etc. and resulted in social fires<sup>46</sup>.

Protests in Tuzla standing under the wing of The Husino Miner did not only get the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina on their feet, but also the entire region<sup>47</sup>. Comments came from everywhere, as those of messages of support to Protestants, so as of criticism and condemnation of the ruling structure that, having no other choice, resigned on February 7<sup>th</sup>, 2014<sup>48</sup>.

The German constructivist, M. Albvas, when talking about memory, remains within the conscious psychological process and claims that the power and durability of memories abide within the sense of group belonging. To re-find the past, people reconstruct them in the form of different sources and monuments, and memory serves this well, that is, constructed memory. Also, the places of remembrance are common places of historical awareness with long duration<sup>49</sup>. They provide rapid understanding of historical assumptions and explanations: "It is a history located in language that cannot be told, but, once told, it can only be highlighted and applied in communion" (J. Riise).

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<sup>46</sup> After sentencing JuroKerošević to death, on July 9<sup>th</sup>, 1922 in Belgrade the workers' assembly began to protest against the violation of the rights of organizing and the freedom to strike and, in the resolution, sought amnesty for convicted workers for participating in strikes. News about justification crossed the Yugoslavian borders and reached America, Russia, Italy, France, Germany ... where workers 'assemblies were held, and millions of workers demanded that Kerošević be pardoned and the right to strike as a weapon of the working class be recognized. (AntoCigeljević, Husinski Miner)

<sup>47</sup> On the third day of the demonstrations in Tuzla, demonstrators gathered in the city center, demanding the resignation of the Government. In twenty major cities in Bosnia, demonstrations continued. According to official data, 130 people were injured in the riots, 104 of which were police officers. Some time after, around 10,000 demonstrators broke through the police cordon positioned in front of the Government of Tuzla Canton, and several demonstrators set fire to the building. The rapid intervention by the city firefighters failed, and the fire soon spread to other floors of the Government building. Following the announcement that one of the initiators of the action on Facebook has been arrested, demonstrators marched towards the building of the Cantonal Court, demanding his release. The Officers of the Court were timely evacuated, and further clashes with the police and the use of tear gas were recorded throughout the city. The building of the Court was stoned, after which it was announced that the police had joined the demonstrators and that clashes with the police were discontinued. (<http://www.media.1.rs/tuzla/politika>)

<sup>48</sup> "Dear people of Tuzla, your fight is today the brightest example of self-liberation of the working people of the Balkans, in line with the heroic struggle of the people of Tunisia, Greece and Latin America! The victory you have won today, the resignation of the state government and the capitulation of the state organs of repression, represents, not only inspiration, but irrefutable proof of the dependence of every authority on popular acceptance. Every oppressor is an oppressor only until the oppressed accepts the oppression - this is the lesson you have taught the world. The fight by your city and your country is the future that awaits for us all." (The Proclamation to the People of Tuzla, The Marxist Organization Red.)

<sup>49</sup> At the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> and the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the ayan, with janissaries, became the interference to the reconstruction to the Imperial authority of the central government and the implementation of necessary reforms. The first holder of reforms, Sultan Selim III (1789 - 1807), was a victim of the ayan-janissary rebellion, after which, in 1826, they were confronted by Sultan Mahmud II (1808 - 1839). Following the confrontation of Mahmud II with the janissaries (1826), the remaining autonomy in the Empire came to order, with Bosnia in the first place. Having discovered what was prepared for them in Istanbul, the Bosnian ayans met in Tuzla and in February of 1831 started with the preparations for resistance. Husein-Captain Gradašević was elected the leader of the resistance. (HazimSabanovic, Bosnian Pashalik)

**Ah, čijemsi se zahvalila,  
taštaljudskaoholosti?  
Sveštovišestereškriła,  
svećešpakanižepasti!**<sup>50</sup>

By interpreting the past, the present becomes more understandable, since memories are always connected to the present. They interpret, explain, arrange and define the present, but also justify it. However, we cannot relativize the present as a part of linearly understood time. The present is a component of the time that is moving from the past towards the future. The present is always a time pattern of perception of reality. It is the period of duration or stability, in which the space of experience and the horizon of expectations coincide, and memory and experience become orientation actions (Rosa Luxemburg, *Reform or Revolution*). Ninety-five years after the Husino Uprising, a new rebellion began in Tuzla when the entire cabinet resigned and formed a temporary, expert government. This expert government was supposed to be in power for eight months. However, not even this government has brought significant changes, and at the time of writing this paper (early December, 2014) protests are still ongoing. There are still around a hundred disempowered workers on the streets of Tuzla pleading for their rights. Elections were completed two months ago, and the new government has not yet been established, and the statue of The Husino Miner still defies and warns the ruling oligarchy to realize that the government is in the service of the people. Otherwise, a new revolution, which will certainly happen, (and historical facts say in ninety years time), could yield much more consequences than any so far. However, this shall be written and witnessed by another generation of kids.

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<sup>50</sup>Ivan Gundulić, Osman  
Oh, to whom do you thank,  
you vain human insolence?  
The more you spread your wings,  
the lower you shall fall!

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## **DAMNATIO MEMORIAE – SPACES OF MEMORY**

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### **Summary**

Parts of the burned Archive of Bosnia and Herzegovina represent spaces of memory and speak about our relation toward our past, but also about our own identity and establishment of tradition, more precisely its attempt, and conflict with destroyers of that same memory, as opposed to the bearers of so-called externalized memory that are not individuals nor species, but ethnic classes. According to Ian Assmann, they represent cultural memory as a parent term for functional frameworks that come under the names of establishment of tradition, relation toward the past and political identity, meaning imagination. It is cultural since it is realized mostly institutionally, that is artificially, and it is a memory since it functions the same way individual memory functions in relation to conscience.

What is *iustitia connective* in this case, this connective justice? Instead of retribution to barbarians who do not know what an archive is, there is a visible social cohesion and solidarity of citizens, connection and coherence that comes up in rare moments of temptations of a society, as it is the case in our country at present.

**Keywords: archive, document, memory, culture of remembrance.**

On the grave of the poet Joseph Brodsky in Venice, according to his wish is engraved this epitaph: “There are worse crimes than burning books. One of them is not reading them...”

Parts of the burnt State Archives of Bosnia and Herzegovina represent spaces of memories and talk about our relationship with the past, but also about our own identity and formation of tradition, more precisely, its attempt and confrontation with the destroyers of the same memory, as a counterweight to the holders of so called externalized memory whose holders are neither individuals nor sorts but ethnic collectives.

According to Jan Assmann they fall within the concept of cultural memories as an umbrella term for functional frameworks which come under the name of tradition formation, attitude towards the past and political identity i.e. imagination (Assman, 2005). It is cultural because it is realized only institutionally, namely, artificially and memory is because it functions in the same way as the individual memory in relation to consciousness.

What does in this case represents *iustitia connectiva* - connective, binding justice? Instead of retaliation against barbarians, who do not even know what the Archive, it is evident social cohesion and solidarity of citizens, cohesion and coherence that occurs in rare moments of temptation of a society such as the present times of our country are.

In this process, from heroic semantics of rebellion against the government, this comes to the discourse on perpetrators and victims - there is a subtle difference of the Latin expressions *SACRIFICIUM I VICTIMA* - the first is a determinant of a voluntary commitment of the victim, for example, a saint, while the other is a passive object exposed to violence and thereby deprived of any possibility of defense, what it is obvious in our case (Divković, 1999).

But let us return to basic concepts, in order to avoid eventual "poor communication lines", in the words of Ludwig Wittgenstein (Wittgenstein, 1974): Only term *DAMNATIO MEMORIAE* basically has Roma-law sanction usually pronounced with a death sentence followed by confiscation of property and it referred to erasure of every trace of existence and work of a convicted person, unfortunately, quite common phenomenon in the legal traditions of antiquity. Several studies (Horvat, 1987; Stanojević, 2005; Bujuklić, 2013) "*The prohibition of mentioning*" and "*A sentence of oblivion*" are coming in early antiquity as the will of the gods, later of their representatives on the earth, especially Christian or Islamic winners of pagan attributes, and it is consciously and decisively breaking with the past by deleting every trace of the inscriptions, statues, frescoes, and even coins. That is a characteristic of the territory of turbulent historical events and restless social history; based on the common belief that the physical destruction of traces means their real eradication and throwing into oblivion, of no return.

In the Roman tradition, the most used in the time of Caligula and Nero, was continued for the time Constantine I the Great; inevitably they should always be reviewed in chronological layers, by distinguishing deposits of antiquity from the the practice of the Middle Ages, all from the contemporaries of Vatican Popes Borgia to Stalin, and the immortalization in the literature of Orwell or Kundera themselves! Of course, the contemporary neologism *ideology* is inevitable - originally conceived as the science of ideas, designed in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, more precisely 1796, as a creation of the French thinker Antoine Destijja de Trasija, from the starting point of rational goal but the basic thought socio-cultural assumptions, without which a coping with the past can not be performed, which is today an integral part of what we call culture of memory.

Culture of memory, represents in expression of Aleida Assman, "*long shadow of the past*" - best visible in the work of the German writer Beate Niemann who published a book "*My good father*" in 2005, with the subtitle "*BIOGRAPHY OF MY FATHER THE CRIMINAL*": namely, her father Bruno Sattler spent 25 years in the DDR prisons of that time because he had been from 1942 to 1944 head of IV in Belgrade contrentation camp Staro Sajmište; according to postwar assessments in this camp under his command over 7,000 people were killed, mostly women and children (Assman, 2012). Niemann points out in the first part of the book her child's vision of her father character on his mother's romantic memory, as an innocent victims of the regime, while the second part brings the documents of its criminal activities in the Balkans during World War II. The book is in excellent translation of Ljiljana Glišović was published in the "Official Gazette", Belgrade 2012.g.at the book promotion the editor-promoter Slobodan Gavrilovic bowed in front of the author and called her the "giant woman" (Politika/Politics" Belgrade, 17.12.2012).

This is closer to Karl Jaspers who in the book "*Rhythm of guilt*" insists that the Germans are required to take a clear position in terms of their own guilt and draw from it conclusions because they are bound by *HUMAN DIGNITY* - Jaspers himself defines four types of guilt: criminal, political, moral and metaphysical (Jaspers, Rhythm, 2002).

We hope that, in the end of the debate on the Archive burning will become apparent Platonic-Stoic canon of cardinal virtues of humankind, painted in Philo, Clement of Alexandria and Origen works, in some such way what Plato says in the Republic (427 E) as elements of the 'Perfect goodness-

aretei "- wisdom, courage, prudence and justice. The below is some information about burning of BH Archive and kind of demolition of "space of memory".

Although it was located in four locations - in the buildings of the Presidency, Government, Parliament and the Court, the BH Archive stored its most valuable documents in Depo 1, which is set on fire due to civil rebellion, caused by general situation in the country. At least in 30 funds were kept the manuscripts of the late Ottoman period, documents the Austro Hungarian 40-year rule, the period between the two world wars and the rule of the so-called NDH (Independent State of Croatia).

The fire badly damaged and destroyed and the Collection of gifts and repurchases, the Collection personal files, microfilms on which were kept copies of materials ... All confidential and presidential documentation was located in the depot which burnt down and all is partially or completely destroyed. In one book, for example, were covered all spheres of life in BiH for a given year from the Austro-Hungarian period and of course it is a shame to lose the data for one year in history.

A huge damage is to lose and only one document, let alone what has lost BH Archive , because ia destroyed document can no longer be - as well as the time elapsed .

It is estimated that at least 20 percent of the material located in the premises of the BH Archive in the Presidency was destroyed. When the news of the burning the BH Archive was heard, from Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also from the region and the whole of Europe began to arrive the words of support, but also specific, professional help. Physically, the colleagues from other archives in the city, museums and libraries, came to help saving the materials as well as students of history from the Faculty of Philosophy, but also individuals - even from Japan.

The biggest help was provided by the agency TIKa, but it is important to emphasize the engagement of experts from the Italian Institute for the conservation and restoration of archival and library materials, which have made the assessment of damage, followed by teams from the Czech Embassy in Sarajevo, which provided 1,500 archival boxes, but also enabled training of two workers to be able professionally run, monitor and control the work ahead. Estimates of experts say that it will take three to four years to repair the damage caused by burning. Especially important is the engagement of scientific and professional community, not only in BiH but also in the neighboring countries. Staff archives, and domestic and foreign professional public, but also individuals aware of the importance of an institution such as the State Archive, did not spare the money, resources and effort to restore "areas of memory" in the Archive of BiH

As conclusion of the text stands citation of the great ancient Roman philosopher, statesman and jurist Cicero: *accipere quam facere praestat iniuria*. - It is better to suffer injustice than to apply one. Following this saying, Archives of BiH would not have been set on fire, and the spaces themselves of memory would be preserved as a valuable reminder for future generations.

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## Remembrance for the Future: 1914-2014

(*Bosnian angle*)

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### Abstract

The paper aims to approach the issue of the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) in its complexity and stratification. As such, the issue demands a multi-disciplinary analysis. The roots and consequences of the Balkan Wars are not only political and military, but also cultural, socio psychological, religious and primarily nationalistic. The failure in providing a synthetically relevant explication entailed in both ideological contentions and theoretical controversies. In order to contribute, the author intends to open following topics: 1. 'Eastern Question' as the root of the Balkan Wars; 2. Where have the Balkan Wars actually started: in Bosnia or Berlin?; 3. Did Bosnia transformed the 'Eastern Question' into a "Western Question"?; 4. The Balkan Wars/the Great War: the End of Multi-ethnic state and the Triumph of Nation State? 5. The Balkan Wars: Clash of Civilizations or Clash of Nationalisms? 6. Quite a Theoretical Dilemma: Liberation vs. Occupation, or vice versa? The answers provided by the paper might shed light on modern history of Europe. It also pretends to point out the Europe's current embarrassments with its own values on the basis of lessons from the Balkan Wars. The culture of remembrance, and the part of which also history is, is a precious means for the culture of moulding future eschewing the mistakes of the past.

**Key words: Balkan wars, multi-ethnic state, nation state, nationalism, occupation, liberation**

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“A spectre is haunting Western culture – the spectre of the Balkans.”

Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans*

### Introduction

It is commonly believed that the waves, or winds, of French revolution, i.e. of freedom, dashed against the rest of Europe. Even as metaphors, both waves and winds, however, are ambiguous. What Europe got after 1789 was the *idea* of freedom, but also the *reality* of terror and Napoleon.

Although the Balkan wars from the beginning of 20<sup>th</sup> century took place more than 100 years later, one maintains that the liberation of Balkan peoples from the Ottoman rule was an echo of this principle of French revolution. One also forgets that freedom, as well as liberation, is ambiguous. Nobody can deny that the reality of Robespierre and Mara's terror, let alone the awful reality of

Napoleon's wars against Europe, were the outcome of the idea of freedom too.<sup>51</sup> Such an idea of freedom, ambiguous in its conceit, became one of the fundamental values of Europe. (That is what also makes the Balkan wars ambiguous.)

Converse attitudes on the nature of Balkan wars ensue as much as from their ambiguous reality so, or even more, from the incapacity of science to define fundamental concepts. Let us leave aside 'freedom' this time, for I have probed the ambiguity of freedom at another place.<sup>52</sup> I will remind of those concepts without which an exact perception of the Balkan wars is possible neither. These lacking concepts are: war and occupation. That is where hence the inevitable - fundamentally theoretical, which is to say independent from the specific topic of Balkan wars - questions come from: What are the war and occupation?

Due to the lack of answer to these fundamental questions, one should inevitably raise the following ones as well: 1. Whether the Balkan wars were the wars of *liberation* the goal of which was the ending of Ottomans' *occupation*? 2. Were the Balkan wars a clash of civilizations, accordingly the conflicts having sprung from cultural and religious distinctions, or conflicts of nationalisms, both the Balkan's and European ones? 3. Whether the Balkan wars represented a turning-point in political history of Europe, i.e. the end of multi-ethnic states and triumph of nation state? 4. Have the Balkan wars actually opened "Western question" by "resolving" "Eastern question"? 5. Did the Balkan wars started in Europe (Berlin) and in Bosnia as the first "solution" of "Eastern question"? 6. Where is the root of Balkan wars: in so-called "Eastern question" or European nationalism? In order to provide the inductive character of our method of research, the answers to these questions will be following in the row which is reverse to the one they were raised.

Before the answers, I will put two hypotheses which are to be either confirmed or rejected by the answers. 1. Balkan wars were liberation wars of Balkan peoples, mainly south Slaves ones, from the Ottoman Empire. However, the Balkan wars were also – crimes, thus the outcome of freedom in its negative form. 2. Balkan wars were aiming against Ottoman authority and state, which was perceived and presented as occupying one. However, the Balkan wars terminated in new occupations, thus ended in the freedom which was denied to Turkey by victor states.

Both hypotheses open thus the question of legitimacy of the Balkan wars. The legitimacy of the Balkan wars, however, does not depend on whether the hypotheses will be confirmed, but also on the ultimate outcome of the wars: have the Balkans, namely, become something better without Turks? This question in fact contains the quintessence of the question which have been absorbing the attention of European public and which is still the dilemma of European statesmen: "They recognized the degeneration of the Ottoman Empire, but they could not answer the question of what should take its place. This is the essence of what came to be known as 'the Eastern Question'."<sup>53</sup>

## 6. The essence of "the Eastern Question": Nationalism

"The Eastern Question", i.e. the question of the position of non-Turkish peoples in European part of Turkey, is the question Europe has rightly raised, but from a very unprincipled standpoint. Namely, it opened the question of European Turkey's disintegration, although European powers decided after the Crimean War, on March 30, 1856 in Paris, (The Treaty of Paris) to respect and guarantee the independence and territorial integrity of Ottoman Empire.<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> G.W.F. Hegel, *Osnovne crte filozofije prava*, biblioteka Logos, Sarajevo 1989, p. 40.

<sup>52</sup> Džemal Sokolović, *Hegel o Bushu i ben Ladenu*, "Zarez", Zagreb, br. 178., 20.04. 2006; Džemal Sokolović, "Challenges of Freedom – Europe at Crossroad: from a Champion of Cosmopolitanism to Mega-nationalism", europe-from-the-champion-of-cosmopolitanism-to-european-nationalism.

<sup>53</sup> L.S. Stavrianos, *The BALKANS since 1453*, Hurst & Company, London 2000, p. 286-7.

<sup>54</sup> L.S. Stavrianos, p. 336.

French revolution, with all its immediate consequences, brought changes to Europe. The novelty founded by the Revolution was nationalism. In place of unavoidable and resistant religious diversity, which could have been erased by the hundred year's war neither, the national uniformity was established. On political level nation state was meant to replace aristocratic-theocratic state. Political form which would have to provide the change should have been democracy. This could have been achieved in two ways only. 1. Either by abolition of ethnic diversity through repressive moulding of national uniformity. 2. Or, by the disintegration of aristocratic-theocratic states through ethnic seams, through aggressive secessionist, *alias* liberation movements, which had, however, to also count on repressive response of central state. Both ways of establishing nation state came to serious confrontation with basic principle of democracy, which rests on the citizen, i.e. the individual, and not on any collectivity, including national one. First France, and then Germany are paradigms of the first one, while Hapsburgs Monarchy and Ottoman Empire are the paradigms of second way of establishing nation state.

From this, unprincipled standpoint - the principle of nationalism and nation state, the European "question of the East" has been raised.

*Ambivalent, controversial and ambiguous* character of nationalism, nation state respectively, is what makes so-called "Istocno pitanje" ambivalent, controversial and ambiguous as well. "Eastern question" was not opened from the standpoint of principles and values of Europe, therefore from the standpoint of liberation of European peoples within Turkey and democratization, but from the standpoint of interests of European nationalisms. That is what brings into question the legitimacy of "the Eastern question".

*Ambivalent* character of nationalism comprises in the fact that it did not grip only minority, subjugated peoples, but also dominant, ruling people. The wave, or wind, of nationalism griped also the Balkans, but not only non-Turkish or non-Austrian peoples, but Turkish, respectively Austrian and Hungarian people too. The immediate cause of the Balkan wars hence was not only nationalism of Serbian, Bulgarian, Montenegrin, Rumanian and Greek people, but that of growing Turkish nationalism in the shape of Young Turks movement as well. Both had their causes, and paragons, in Europe. Both so-called national awakenings emerged in tune with the national reality of Europe.

*Controversial* character of nationalism stems from its ambivalent character. Both will the nation state. Dominant people, now already nation, will nation state instead of aristocratic state retaining territorial integrity and establishing national sovereignty. Minority and subordinated peoples will secession (liberation) and building their own nation states. That is what put these two types of nationalism into an irreconcilable, hostile position.

*Ambiguous* (or even *hypocritical*) character of nationalism, at last, comprises in that that both nationalisms, that of dominant and that of minority groups, seemingly aim to emancipation, and in fact the national domination of one group. Dominant group will *emancipation from* monarchy and autocracy, while minority groups will *emancipation from* dominant group. The principle of freedom is thereby faked, and the liberation of own group achieves at the expense of subjugation of other peoples' groups. Nationalism of dominant group will assimilation of other ethnic groups into one national, and the establishment of nation state on that basis, without secessionism or autonomy. Contrary to that, secessionist nationalisms will *liberation from* both dominant ethnic/national group and from its state. (As it is noticeable both nationalisms rest on Fromm's notion of *freedom from*, i.e. negative freedom, and not on *freedom for*, i.e. positive freedom.<sup>55</sup>) Their goal is also nation state, thus the state of predominantly one group, i.e. political form which neglects or negates similar

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<sup>55</sup> Erich Fromm, *Begstvo od slobode*, Nolit, Beograd 1978.

or identical interests of other ethnic groups, at times even that of groups which are not minorities. (The cases of Macedonians and Albanians are paradigmatic. Macedonians were “liberated” by Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria. No need to be mentioned the fate of small peoples or minority peoples’ groups, as their position in new emerged states is apparent. Vlachs, for example.) The principle of freedom is not only faked, but it perverts into new repression and non-freedom of other peoples, sometimes worse than in previous regimes. In short, that is what nationalism in the case of the Balkan wars make ambiguous and hypocritical.

It is indicative that one of first of those who supported the process of liberation of Balkan peoples in 1860 ies, was Napoleon, “the champion of nationality principle”<sup>56</sup>, therefore the sovereign of the country which established its national integrity by repressing ethnic diversity. It is also indicative that Austro-Hungary, as an aristocratic state and multiethnic society, “was the great opponent of revolution and change in the Balkans”.<sup>57</sup>

However, it does not mean that Austro-Hungary (1867) did not already act from the standpoint of nationalism. In fact, Austro-Hungary acted from the standpoint of both Austrian and Hungarian nationalism even when was opposing “the Eastern question” and territorial partition of European Turkey. In the same way as when she started, as the first one, to “solve” the question. Either when Austria supported territorial integrity of Turkey, or when she took part in negation of the integrity, Austro-Hungary was always doing that from the standpoint of its own, admittedly specific nationalism. The specificity consists of the fact that Austrians and Hungarians had both specific and different reasons to oppose, and afterwards to support so-called solution of “the Eastern question” and, of course, the Balkan wars.

First of all, the transformation of Habsburgs Monarchy, thus an aristocratic state *par excellence*, into a double, k. u. k. Austro-Hungarian monarchy, thus a bi-nation state of Austrians and Hungarians, did not take into account a considerable, though multiethnic, Slav element within monarchy. It was prevented establishing a three-nation Austro-Hungaro-Slav state<sup>58</sup>, which would also include Slave multiethnic element satisfying Slave national pretensions within Monarchy. Hungarians opposed to that in particular.<sup>59</sup> If there were understanding for Slav requires, it could perhaps have recognized the multiethnic character of state and avoided the future development of events.

Moreover, one can say the transformation of Habsburgs Monarchy, thus an aristocratic state, into a bi-national state, which did not fully recognize the political subjectivity of other, and particularly Slav, ethnic groups, opened the question of position of non-Austrian and non- Hungarian peoples, alike the one called “the Eastern Question”. Therefore, here is the seed of what we will be able later on, after the occupation and annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, to call “the Western Question”.

The opposition of Austrian and Hungarian nationalism to secessionist nationalisms within Turkey was unprincipled, just as it was unprincipled their inclusion into the territorial partition of European Turkey on a later stage. Such an unprincipled view rested on a double fear, i.e. national paranoia. First, Austro-Hungarian nationalism, and Hungarian in particular, opposed to any annexation of Bosnia in order to eschew the enlargement of Slav element and, consequently, the inclusion of Slav element into tree-national state. The imperilment of territorial integrity of Turkey was a direct threat to national integrity of Austro-Hungary. Second, Austro-Hungarian nationalism opposed to the territorial partition of Turkey for fear of the establishment of a great Slav state, which was the

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<sup>56</sup> L.S. Stavrianos, p. 395.

<sup>57</sup> L.S. Stavrianos, p. 395.

<sup>58</sup> L.S. Stavrianos, p. 399.

<sup>59</sup> L.S. Stavrianos, p. 399.

interest of Serbian, as well as Russian nationalism. This national paranoia did not rest as much on the fear of such a state, as on the fear from such a Slav state on the Balkans could have induced on Slav nationalism within Austro-Hungary, secessionism, and eventually, the unification of all Slavs from both sides of Austro-Hungarian – Turkish border. The care for the territorial integrity of Turkey was actually the fear for its own. Which of these solutions of “the Eastern Question” Austro-Hungary will decide for, it depended on which of these threats to Austro-Hungary was more dangerous. None principles, or the care for Christian peoples neither, was in question. That is what makes Austrian, as well as Hungarian, nationalism controversial and hypocritical.

Therefore, it seems obvious that “the Eastern Question” has headed directly towards the Balkan wars. What I insist, and what is not so obvious, is that “the Eastern Question” was just the consequence of a more fundamental cause, which is growing nationalism in Europe.

### **5. Starting point of the Balkan wars: Bosnia or Europe?**

Where and when, in fact, started the Balkan wars? One should not point to the date when Balkan states declared the war to Turkey and where the armies of Montenegro, Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria crossed the border of Turkey. One should take into account the causes of these wars and former political solutions which have made the wars unavoidable. Thus, whether the beginning was in Nevesinje, Herzegovina (“Bosnian revolt”, “Nevesinjska puska”, 1875) or in Berlin, at the Congress of European powers (1878)? Instead of a phenomenal answer one needs to offer a response of mind. If we consider that the Balkan Wars were supposed to resolve “the Eastern Question”, which is to say the removal of Turkey from Europe, than the time and the place should be searched where the process started: in Bosnia, with the revolt of Orthodox peasants, and in Berlin, with the decisions of the Congress of European aristocratic, though already nation states’ diplomats. Assumptions for the Balkan Wars to begin were created by the decision to occupy Bosnia-Herzegovina and deliver it to be administered by Austro-Hungary.

If the essence of the Balkan wars is the solution of “the Eastern question”, and if, as I said, the essence of “the Eastern question” is European nationalism, as well as its Balkan version, then the Balkan wars were the wars of nation states, and as such, by their nature, nationalist wars. That is only way to realize the atrocities committed by these states, against Turks, but also against non-Turkish population, both Muslims and Christians. Likewise, that is only way to explain the politics of non-interventionism and indifference of European nationalisms towards these crimes. This is standpoint from which, with many reasons, one can bring into question the legitimacy of these wars.

Balkan nationalisms are the consequence of European ones. The establishment of the *Dreikaiserbunda*, the League of three emperors of Germany, Austria and Russia, thus an aristocratic attempt of European integration, was welcomed neither in France nor in Great Britain. Nationalism overwhelmed political mentality of European states while these states were aristocratic, and theocratic. Therefore, it was nationalism that separated Western Europe from Central and Eastern Europe. However, nationalism will prove to be as an impediment to Kaisers League too. Although both Austria and Russia were denying any expansionist pretensions towards the Balkans, it came up very soon that, in the words of Bismarck, the Balkans is “Achilles heel” of the League.<sup>60</sup> One can say today more precisely: Achilles heel was Bosnia, not only of the League but of Europe as well.

First nationalism which drew the eye on Bosnia was Serbian. In fact, Bosnia was targeted by a wider Balkan alliance which Serbian prince Michael Obrenovic was trying to establish along with

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<sup>60</sup> L.S. Stavrianos, p. 394.

other Orthodox countries (Romania, Montenegro, Bulgaria and Greece) having been recently liberated from Turkey. The Serbian-Greek pact (26. august 1867) allocated Bosnia to Serbia, and Thessaly and Epirus to Greece. The states signatories immediately started with propaganda and, as Orthodox states, with the armament of Christian (Orthodox) population of European Turkey. Simultaneously, they oppose any annexation of Balkan territory by foreign great powers. "A coordinated Balkan revolt against the Turks was planned for March, 1868."<sup>61</sup> It was thus the plan of five Balkan states, same ones which will make the plan into reality many years afterwards and take part in the Balkan wars. Two causes linked these states: first, the enmity towards Turkey, and second, all were Orthodox. I point to the fact that these states were Orthodox not in order to indicate Orthodoxy as responsible for their enmity towards Turkey, but quite the reverse, in order to emphasize that neither Orthodoxy was an obstacle enough to eschew their mutual conflict in a later faze of development. The fact that two countries, Romania and Greece, were not Slav was not an obstacle to the alliance. But not for a long time. Why this plan did not keep together "civilizationally" kin countries will be considered later on, in chapter 5, while responding to the question about "civilizational" character of the Balkan wars.

The menace to the territorial integrity of Turkey by Balkan Orthodox states had to also lead towards the shift of Austro-Hungary's view to the territorial integrity of Turkey. Very soon, feared by Serbia's expansion, as well as an imminent pan-Slav state, Bosnia becomes Austria's political goal. Paranoia which always pursues nationalism required its rationalization. It was found naturally in "the Eastern Question", i.e. in the alleged European, civizational care for Bosnia, as a matter of fact in nationalist interest opposed not as much to Turkey as to Slav political strengthening. Growing Austrian nationalism was rightly afraid of Serbian nationalism and the piedmont role of Serbia. The fear from South Slav unification, which threatened not only to the territorial integrity of Turkey but that of Austro-Hungary as well, alleviated also Hungarian resistance to the inclusion of new Slav element into Austro-Hungary. Austrian nationalism, lead by Austrian militarism, succeeded to convince Francis Jeseoph "to spend a month travelling in Dalmatia in the spring of 1875. During his journey the emperor received many petitions from the Christians of Bosnia-Herzegovina complaining of Turkish oppression and asking him for protection...Francis Joseph's tour was to a considerable degree responsible for the conflagration that began in Herzegovina in July, 1875."<sup>62</sup>

The fire had thus been prepared by Serbian nationalism and was kindled on the Austrian aristocratic ship. The revolt of Christian population in Bosnia (Nevesinje) in 1875 was the outcome of two entirely contending and irreconcilable nationalisms: Serbian and Austrian. That is what their support to Christian insurgents in neighbouring country Bosnia, respectively Turkey, makes unprincipled. Both countries have namely same, but mutually exclusive goal: the occupation of Bosnia.

Although concerned for their Christian brethren in Bosnia, aristocratic *Dreikaiserbund* was against intervention in principle. Instead of that a Berlin Memorandum was prepared in May 1876 which suggested extended reforms in Bosnia. It was offered to European powers France, Italy and Great Britain. "But the British refused to follow the others, and in doing so they ended the possibility of an early and peaceful settlement of the crisis."<sup>63</sup> British refused it not because of Turks or Bosnian Christians, but because of fear from growing German nationalism and new role of Prussia in Europe. Faced with the request to sign Memorandum in two days, Disraeli, Conservative Prime Minister, "sarcastically observed that Britain was being treated as though she were

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<sup>61</sup> L.S. Stavrianos, p. 395.

<sup>62</sup> L.S. Stavrianos, p. 399.

<sup>63</sup> L.S. Stavrianos, p. 400-1.

Montenegro or Bosnia”.<sup>64</sup> So it turned to be that Bosnia became the victim of Austria’s national paranoia, but of British national vanity as well.

Great Serbian nationalist sentiment could not have missed the chance provided by the peasants’ revolt in Nevesinje. The fact that Christian serfs were joined by Muslim serfs too had no meaning for historiography, but is crucial for a cultural analysis. This neglected fact also indicates that the revolt was both class and nationalist, but not civilizational clash. British consul in Belgrade reports his government about Serbian political leaders’ appetite, irrespective of their political orientation, to achieve Serbia’s enlargement.<sup>65</sup> Serbia declares war to Turkey on June 30, 1876, and Montenegro joins to it. Still incapable to cope with diplomatic games of great powers, Serbia overlooks Russia’s promise to leave over Bosnia to Austria. Serbia suffers unexpected and catastrophic defeat in the war with Turkey on the front in Bosnia. “Before the fighting ended Serbia mobilized one sixth of her total population, of which one tenth were killed or wounded.”<sup>66</sup>

Therefore, the Balkan war started – although without Greece, Bulgaria and Romania, long before the Balkan wars, and it started in Bosnia.

The defeat of two Balkan countries, and Turkey’s victory, reflects to the relations among great powers. Once again, confronted with Russia, Britain appears as the protector of Turkey, while misunderstandings between Russia and Austria also increase, for they do not agree how to divide Bosnia in the case of both scenarios – the victory or defeat of Serbia and Montenegro.<sup>67</sup> In order to ensure its intent to begin the war against Turkey, Russia had to give concessions to Austria. It happened on January 15, 1877, when two powers signed so-called Budapest Convention, which obliged Austria to remain neutral in the case of Russia’s war with Turkey, while she would get right to annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Two powers agree again that a large state in the Balkans will not be allowed to be created in any case.

Russia declares the war to Turkey on April 24, 1877, but Balkan states do not join her immediately, after the unexpectedly strong resistance of Turkish troops at Plevna. Serbia again enters the war against Turkey only two days after the fall of Plevna, while Greece tries same but remains neutral. Russians advance towards south and arrive close to the capital of Turkey. And again, Britain rescues Constantinople. Not for the sake of Constantinople, of course, but because of Russia’s eventual reaching of the Straits and Mediterranean. Although before Constantinople, at San Stefano, Russians must stop under the threat of British warships.

The Treaty of San Stefano, signed on March 3, 1878 between Turks and Russians, confirms once again the entire lack of principality of the politics and wars waged from nationalist standpoint. There was nothing of the liberation of Balkan peoples, or the care for Christians, nor democracy, nor avoiding to establish a large, and Slav state on the Balkans in particular, and not to mention the Turkey’s territorial integrity formerly guaranteed. Bosnia was promised earlier envisaged reforms by the Treaty of San Stefano. Bulgaria was transformed into a great Bulgaria stretching from Danube to Aegean Sea, and from the Black Sea to Lake Ohrid and beyond. Nearly entire territory “liberated” from Turks by Russians belongs to Bulgaria, even territories conquered by Serbia. So it happened that Russia eventually revealed which Slav and Orthodox state on the Balkans is her foreign politics favourite. As well as the reasons of her engagement in solving “the Eastern Question”.

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<sup>64</sup> L.S. Stavrianos, p. 401.

<sup>65</sup> L.S. Stavrianos, p. 402.

<sup>66</sup> L.S. Stavrianos, p. 403.

<sup>67</sup> L.S. Stavrianos, p. 404-5.

The Treaty of San Stefano provisions provoke dissatisfaction on many sides. Both Austria and Britain oppose to the formation of great Bulgaria. Greece and Serbia oppose strongly to the provisions from San Stefano. Serbia even more. After protesting to St. Petersburg, Serbs eventually receive a clear response about the nature of Russian pan-Slavism on the Balkan. Russia, whose main goal is the approach to Aegean Sea, something she gets with Bulgaria's approach, informs Serbs that the interest of Russia comes first, Bulgaria's second, and the last one that of Serbia.<sup>68</sup> The interests of other, truly politically rightless peoples on the Balkans, such as Macedonians, Albanians, and many others, was mentioned neither. The Treaty of San Stefano approaches the interests of Austria and Britain. The peace the purpose of which was not peace, that of San Stefano, had to result in either new wars or new negotiations of European diplomats. Congress in Berlin convened on June 13, 1878. And lasts one month.

The Congress in Berlin was the gathering of Europe's great powers representatives. Delegates from Turkey and Balkan countries were also present. The representatives of Balkan states "were at least politely heard before being ignored. But the Turks were both ignored and insulted".<sup>69</sup>

Great Bulgaria, the principle reason for the Congress to be gathered, was partitioned into three parts. "Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the crisis originated, were handed over to Austria to occupy and administer though not to annex."<sup>70</sup> In order to be secured from any Slav national unification, Austria was given right to deploy a garrison in Novi Bazaar in Sandzak, which would separate Serbia from Montenegro. Everything Russia had gained at battle field, she lost in Berlin. From the standpoint of Great Britain, it has even been achieved the success larger than the Russia's removal from Mediterranean: the breakdown of the League of three great European empires. In the words of Disraeli: "I maintain there never was a great diplomatic result more completely effected."<sup>71</sup> So it happened that the basic political principle of Europe, founded on nation state, has successfully been drilled on the Balkans.

L.S. Stavrianos concludes this part of his book titled, by the way, "The age of nationalism: 1815-1878", by these words: "For the Balkan peoples, then, the Berlin Treaty meant not peace with honour but rather frustration of national aspirations and future wars. The direct and logical outcome of the Berlin settlement was the Serbian-Bulgarian war of 1885, the Bosnian crisis of 1908, the two Balkan wars of 1912-1913, and the murder of Archduke Francis Ferdinand in 1914."<sup>72</sup>

#### **4. Bosnia: "the Eastern Question" transformed into a "Western Question"?**

Why was Bosnia the point where modern, regrettably tragic and bloody as well, history of the Balkan, Europe and the World began? It must be something what makes Bosnia exceptional and what makes it, such as it is, inappropriate to both the East and West. Although the part of "the Eastern Question", while having been the integral part of Turkey, Bosnia transforms, immediately after the occupation in 1878, and even before the annexation in 1908, into "the Western Question", i.e. the question of the position of non-Austrian and non-Hungarian peoples within the bi-national Austro-Hungarian state. Actually, Bosnia raised the question of nation-state, thus the fundamental political concept of Europe. As a multi-ethnic society, Bosnia will than begin to test not only Austria-Hungary, but the principles of entire Europe and the West. Bosnia was, namely, only European multi-ethnic society in which none of ethnic or religious groups had absolute majority. That is what makes Bosnia unique. That is, however, just what makes it contending to European

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<sup>68</sup> L.S. Stavrianos, p. 409.

<sup>69</sup> L.S. Stavrianos, p. 410.

<sup>70</sup> L.S. Stavrianos, p. 411.

<sup>71</sup> L.S. Stavrianos, p. 412.

<sup>72</sup> L.S. Stavrianos, p. 412.

reality. But, *alas*, that is what makes only Bosnia compatible and congruent to proclaimed principles, values and ideals of Europe. Society without majority is *eo ipso* a society without minorities. No man's land is everybody's land. Bosnia was, thus, only society without prospects to function within or as nation state. That is why nationalisms in Bosnia were not autochthonic then, as well as today, but imported, sparked and manipulated from outside.

One should say that Bosnia was not the cause of the developments, those before and that ones in the wake of the Congress in Berlin, but Bosnia appeared to be "Achilles heel" of modern political history of Europe being split between the reality of ethnic diversity and political ideal of nation state. Bosnia was namely the most suitable point of nationalist goals of neighbours and European powers. As such, such as a fresh-water lake within enormous salted ocean of European nationalism, Bosnia became the weakest point of nationalist Europe. And that of the Balkans, of course. However, just as such, Bosnia became the only hope, chance, and paragon for Europe – and the Balkans, of course.

As soon as Bosnia was annexed it became the challenge for Austro-Hungary. Despite all Austria's endeavours (large investments in Bosnia, religious tolerance, Muslims in particular, and, above all, keeping local Bosniak/Muslim landlords' aristocracy) Bosnia demonstrated to Austria that nationalism can not be a political solution. Austria's attempt to spark creating a common Bosnian national identity, particularly through setting up Bosnian language, confirmed that that is not possible not only in Bosnia, but in Austro-Hungary as bi-nation state neither.

However, Bosnia did open "the Western Question", raising it to Austria, but as a Slav country she not only increased Slav element in new state, exciting thereby secessionist nationalism of Slav peoples within the Empire, but she also sparked Serbia's nationalist aspirations. "The question to Austria" was: either a multiethnic state, which would include Slavs as well, or dissolution of the country in ethnic lines. The question raised to Austria then, Bosnia also asks today to Europe and the West. Bosnia is thus still "the Western Question".

Equal-rightness of peoples, i.e. a truly multiethnic society can namely emerge only in a political arrangement which is indifferent (tolerant) towards the diversity of peoples' identities. Such a political formation can be either monarchic or aristocratic or civil (democratic), or their combination. What matters is that the state does not undertake any sort of intentional assimilation or erasing peoples' identities. It is also very important that the state does not undertake any "diversity management" politics. Nation state is hypocritical faking social equality. In other words, a truly multiethnic society can emerge only in the state of equal rights citizens. Equal-rightness of peoples' groups which does not guarantee the equal-rightness of citizens, i.e. equal-rightness on individual level, is an abstract equal-rightness. There is no concretely general equal-rightness as long as it is not the equal-rightness on the level of individual, citizen. Europe is still to learn about that - concretely the general, from G.W.F. Hegel, the thinker of civil society.<sup>73</sup>

Bosnia knew that before Hegel. Multi-ethnic and multi-religious society there emerged through the melting process of peoples, faiths, cultures. None "diversity management" was needed. When one tried to apply it, it appeared to be unproductive. Bosnia was multicultural and multi-religious society before Turks. Catholic and Orthodox churches were active along with the autochthonous Bosnian Church. Bosnian Christians were not imperilled with the arrival of Islam, but by other Christian churches acting on its soil. Turks' arrival simply enriched the multicultural character of Bosnia's society. Arrival of Islam enhanced religious tolerance. Not only that islamization of parts of local population of all confessions has no forced character, for it is one of Islam's theological principles, but new religious (Islamic) state formally guarantees faith freedom to all loyal subjects.

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<sup>73</sup> G.W.F. Hegel, *Osnovne crte filozofije prava*, preveo Danko Grlić, "Veselin Masleša" – "Svjetlost", Sarajevo 1989.

The case of Ahdnama, the document still deposited in Franciscan monastery (Fojnica) in Bosnia, by virtue of which Sultan Mehmed II Fatih in 1463 guarantees religious freedom, undoubtedly confirms that. Alike as he guaranteed the freedom of faith and exemption from any tax to the Patriarch of Orthodox Church by similar Ahdnama, ten years earlier, in the wake of the conquest of Constantinople.<sup>74</sup>

All this was taking place in Bosnia long before the Peace of Westphalia, 1648, and Thirty years war (1618-1648) among Christians and on the soil of Europe.

Because of that one can conclude that so-called “the Eastern Question” has not been raised in a legitimate way, i.e. from the standpoint of interests of non-Turkish (and non-Muslim), as well as Turkish (and Muslim) population in the Ottoman Empire, but from the standpoint which was not in line with European principles and values. This standpoint was the standpoint of European powers nationalism, Austrian and Hungarian nationalism, nationalism of Balkan states, and at last, standpoint of young Turks movement nationalism. First “solution” of “the Eastern Question” – the occupation of Bosnia, had to be transformed into “the Western Question”, i.e. in the test of European values and political principles in this occidental region of oriental Turkey. In fact, the occidental occupation of oriental Bosnia has just uncovered that both the West and East, both European states (democratic and autocratic ones) and Turkey, encounter with the same growing political problem – state becoming more and more national.

Moreover, the principle of nation state, by becoming now not only western but eastern principle of political organization of society too, opens the fundamental contradiction of modern political life: the incompatibility of nation state and democracy. This contradiction thus opens a frightening political question: is democracy possible in multi-ethnic society? Bosnia raised the question already than, in 1878, as soon as it was occupied. In doing so, Bosnia brought into question the mere political basis of Europe – nation state. The response retaliated by Bosnia read: As long as political Europe rests on nation state, the integration of Europe at any shape is elusive. It was given then, and holds today. This response concerns herself: if multiethnic society is not possible in democracy, then nationalism is our curse, and the breakdown of EU, as well as the breakdown of many European states – threateningly imminent.

### **3. The Balkan Wars/the Great War: the End of Multi-ethnic state and the Triumph of Nation State?**

The occupation of Bosnia in 1878, as well as the annexation in 1908, still did not mean the end of multiethnic society in Europe. Both the Habsburgs and Ottoman monarchy retained its multiethnic character. Aristocratic states have never had a strong politics of assimilation. As a matter of fact, one can say that aristocracy in Europe was only social stratum which was multiethnic. As such aristocracy was indifferent towards the ethnic identity of its subjects too.

The final faze of multiethnic societies dissolution and establishment of nation states started with the Balkan wars. With World War I, and the formation of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, this faze was finally completed. Balkan wars and World War I were thus the end of multiethnic states and triumph of nation state.

Austria-Hungary became, as well Turkey, nation state in the course of the second half of 19<sup>th</sup> century. Balkan states eventually confirmed as such in the wake of Balkan wars, subjugating other

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<sup>74</sup> See: [http://www.ghbibl.com.ba/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=80&Itemid=1](http://www.ghbibl.com.ba/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=80&Itemid=1)

peoples, while Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia were the fruit of World War I and final breakdown of Austro-Hungary.

**Although multiethnic states by its name both Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia (originally State of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes) were actually a hypocritical attempt of forming bi- and tri-nation state. Their formation was based on Lenin-W. Wilson's concept of self-determination of peoples, but on the true will of some of these peoples to live in common multiethnic state as well.**<sup>75</sup> In both cases, it turned soon out that the idea and the will were betrayed. In both cases, it turned out that the state was, more or less, state of one of these peoples. So, the principle of peoples' self-determination was defrauded. Recent breakdown of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia as nominally multiethnic states opened, however, just the reverse question. It goes without saying that multiethnic society is incongruent with nation state. After all, it is *contradictio in adiecto*, apart from the vocabulary of CNN. However, it is also apparent that nation state is not political solution fitting to Europe. Whereas all states in Europe, except Island and Portugal, have multiethnic societies, nation state can head either to their dissolution or to repression over minority groups and their assimilation. Current state of affairs in Belgium, Great Britain, Spain, as well as in other European nation states demonstrates that such a scenario is not far from being realistic.

**Consequences of the Balkan wars, however, are far-reaching. Balkan wars did not open only the question of many ethnic identities survival, i.e. that of multiethnic society, or conversely the question of nation states survival in the case of minority ethnic groups' resistance. They actually opened the question of any political integration of Europe.** If multiethnic society is not possible within nation state, than the integration of nation states in whichever form result in the emergence of multiethnic societies as their contrariety.

At last, the triumph of nation state, as the dominant political form, and unavailability of multiethnic character of society, as Europe's social reality, open the question of authenticity or hypocrisy of democracy as well. Is democracy going to be based on consensus or the principle of majority depends on whether our societies will be multiethnic or impersonally national.<sup>76</sup>

## **2. The Balkan Wars: Clash of Civilizations or Clash of Nationalisms?**

Whether the Balkan wars were the final solution of "the Eastern Question", i.e. the question of position of Christian peoples within Ottoman Empire and, consequently, the solution to the presence of Muslim Turkey on European soil, shortly the clash of two civilizations - or something else?

First Balkan war was the war of Balkan Christian (Orthodox) states against Muslim Turkey. On the basis of this simple, empirical fact, one draws simple, empirical, but also conclusion of a biased historiography, that it was the clash of two civilizations. Second Balkan war, which was the war of Balkan Christian (Orthodox) states against Christian (Orthodox) Bulgaria - joined admittedly by Muslim Turkey on a later stage, was a necessary, logical and natural consequence of the First one. It undoubtedly corroborates that the genuine nature of these wars was something quite else.

Balkan wars can be explained neither by "the Eastern Question", i.e. by civilizational concern of European powers for their Christian brethren, nor by civilizational concern of Balkan states for their ethnic brethren. Nothing civilizational and nothing brethren was in these wars.

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<sup>75</sup> Dr. Enver Hasani, *Self-determination, territorial integrity and international stability: the case of Yugoslavia*, Buzuku, Vienna/Prishtinë, 2003.

<sup>76</sup> Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1997, p. 175.

(Comrade Lenin maintained, however, that these two wars could have been not only causally separated, but that the second war essentially differs from the First Balkan war. Second Balkan war was, namely, according to the Comrade, conquering, and consequently unjust war, while the First one was the war of liberation, and therefore a just war. War against “infidels” is thus, according to the opinion of an internationalist, justifiable, while the war among orthodox ones is unacceptable. Killing Turks, because they are intruders and Muslims, is allowable, while killing Slavs, for they are indigenous and Christians, even right ones, is not permissible.)

Balkan wars were a clash of nationalisms. “The Eastern Question” was just the evasion for some strategic, conquering and nationalist goals, and the Balkan wars just a hypocritical solution of the question. The proof is not phenomenal and can be found only in a profound analysis of Balkan nationalisms having preceded Balkan wars 1912-1913, and having been sparked by European nationalisms of great powers which peaked at Berlin Treaty in 1878.

1. Analysis will begin with nationalism which is, presumably, the least directly responsible for wars – *Turkish* one.

The inducement for Balkan wars and partition of European Turkey can also be found in internal collision between monarchy, which was becoming less and less aristocratic, and emerging Young Turks movement infected by the complex of inferiority of Europeanism, which was more and more becoming nationalistic. The more Europe tried to push out Turkey from Europe, the more Turkish nationalism was endeavouring to prove as European.<sup>77</sup>

It is indicative that Young Turks movement had two visions of Turkey without the sultan, thus of Turkish nation state. The only Young Turks, refugees in Paris, shared in common was their dissatisfaction with the sultan. One group, led by Ahmet Riza, “stood for Turkish predominance and centralized rule”, while another group, lead by the prince Sabaheddin, the sultan’s cousin, “favoured a decentralized empire in which the subject people should have full autonomy”.<sup>78</sup>

It is indicative, even more, how Young Turks, the group Saloniki, imagined the political goal of their movement: “They frequently stated that they wished all citizens of the empire to become Ottomans in the same manner that all citizens of France were Frenchmen.”<sup>79</sup> Indeed, in July 1908 Muslims and Christians were embracing each others in the streets. However, it turned out very soon what means becoming Turks French way. “The Young Turks leader, Enver Pasha, exclaimed: ‘There are no longer Bulgars, Greeks, Rumans, Jews, Mussulmans. We are all brothers beneath the same blue sky. We are all equal, we glory in being Ottoman.’ This euphoric atmosphere did not last long.”<sup>80</sup>

Turkification policy, performed by Young Turks after 1908, contributed to the rapprochement of Balkan states and formation of Balkan League. “Turkification policy” of Young Turks “as disciples of Western nationalism, attempted to enforce centralization and Turkish hegemony upon their polyglot empire...The outcome of Turkification was not unity but rather discontent and revolt.”<sup>81</sup>

Once more Turkish nationalism appeared unproductive. When the coup d’état was carried out, after the hard defeats in the First Balkan war, the power was seized by “Enver Bey, leader of the

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<sup>77</sup> Umut Özkirimli, Spiros A. Sofos, *Tormented by History, Nationalism in Greece and Turkey*, Hurst & Company, London 2008, p. 17

<sup>78</sup> L.S. Stavrianos, p. 525.

<sup>79</sup> L.S. Stavrianos, p. 527.

<sup>80</sup> L.S. Stavrianos, p. 526.

<sup>81</sup> L.S. Stavrianos, p. 532.

extreme nationalist Young Turks”.<sup>82</sup> By continuing the war Turkey lost two out of only four remaining cities in Europe, Yanina and Edirne. What remained of European Turkey were just Constantinople and Scutari, far away in Albania. The partition of European Turkey is indeed the consequence of European and Balkan nationalism. However, Turkish nationalism did contribute by its unoriginality.

2. Nationalism of *European* nation states has far more decisively determined the character of the Balkan wars.

The attitude of European powers toward the wars of Balkan states was seemingly determined by their relation to “the Eastern Question”, i.e. the existence of an Empire of distinctive civilization within Christian civilization in Europe. However, what determined the relationship of European states towards “the Eastern Question”, and the Balkan wars as a “solution” of the question, had been springing from the interest of these states as nation states. Even less, “The Eastern Question” was determined by the care of European powers for Christian peoples within Turkey as their civilizational brethren. The relationship of Europe and Balkan states toward Turkey hence did not rest on civilizational motives but on nationalism. That is what connected these states, but also put into different, often contending, and eventually into mutually hostile position.

Originally, the attitude of European powers toward the territorial integrity of European Turkey was positive. After Crimean war Turkey was recognized as European country. “The Treaty of Paris admitted the empire into the European concert of nations and explicitly guaranteed its integrity and independence.”<sup>83</sup> The unanimous positive attitude of European powers towards the integrity of Turkey did not ensue from the unity of their interests, but rather from mutual fear of prevailing one of these countries interest, Russia in particular. The domination of any of these countries interest could have disorder the balance which existed as long as Turkey was present in Europe and the Balkans. The weak, and yet integral, Turkey was the interest of European nationalisms confronted with Russian expansionist plans towards Mediterranean. Different strategic interests of European nation states, however, brought themselves into contending and conflictual relationship. From such a mutually nationalist relation, and not from civilizational animosity, a different attitude towards the territorial integrity of Turkey had been developed. The collision of Austria’s and Russia’s interests as nation states also entailed the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina as the immediate cause of the Balkan (states) League creation, and consequently the beginning of the Balkan wars.

At last, the introduction of money economy or capitalism on the Balkans is the outcome of European nationalism. New emerging Balkan capitalism entailed in Balkan nationalism. As Balkan nationalism was not equivalent to European one, so too Balkan capitalism was something quite different from its European variant.<sup>84</sup>

a) Russia

The ultimate strategic and national goal of Russia on the Balkans was the approach to Mediterranean. That was determining in Russia’s attitude towards “the Eastern Question”, towards other European powers and towards Balkan states. And eventually, it determined Russian attitude towards the Balkan wars.

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<sup>82</sup> L.S. Stavrianos, p. 537.

<sup>83</sup> L.S. Stavrianos, p. 393.

<sup>84</sup> L.S. Stavrianos, p. 423.

In many occasions, Russia made itself accountable to Austria in respecting the territorial integrity of Turkey.<sup>85</sup> Same relationship of two Christian European powers did not stem from civilizational tolerance of Muslim Turkey, but from mutual nationalist paranoia, i.e. from one another's fear, thus from the two civilizational close ones, and yet enough distinctive ones (Catholicism/Orthodoxy). The care for the territorial integrity of Turkey sprung from the necessity for nationalist balance among civilizational close ones.

Yet, Russian nationalism, under the guise of pan-slavism, i.e. liberation of Slavs from Austria and Turkey, dreams on the piedmont role of Russia and Constantinopolis as the capital.<sup>86</sup>

When Russia decided to give up from its promises to Austria, the war against Turkey aimed none solution of "the Eastern Question", i.e. the question of distinctive Turkey presence in Europe and position of Orthodox brethren. The interest of Russia was to approach Mediterranean. That Turkey stood on the road was only the combination of circumstances, while Bulgaria was the most suitable device for the aim to be achieved.

This is only way to also explain Russia's different relation towards Orthodox states on the Balkans – Bulgaria and Serbia. Treaty of San Stefano eventually dispelled the dreams on pan-slavism, pan-Orthodoxy and other civilizational illusions. Russo-Turkish war (1877) meant the renouncement of one more principle of great powers. The foundation of Great Bulgaria, instead of the liberation of Balkan peoples, proved that the Russian war against Turkey was waged exclusively by the interest of Russia as nation state.<sup>87</sup> The war opened not only the cleavage between Bulgaria and other Balkan Orthodox states, but also between these states and Russia. Britain again plays a decisive anti-Russian role in the modification of the decisions from San Stefano and in the partition of Bulgaria into two/three parts in particular. By demanding the re-establishment of broken balance of interests of great powers on the Balkans - Russia and Austria, Britons also back Austrian aspirations towards Bosnia.<sup>88</sup>

#### b) Great Britain

Between Turkey and Christian Russia, Britain chose Muslim Turkey. Therefore there is no trace of civilizational animosity, let alone a clash. It was so from Crimean war (1853-1856) to the Balkan wars 1912-1913. Only exception, though lasting briefly, took place when the news of bashi-bazouks' crimes in Bulgaria in 1876 were arriving. Despite the willingness in Russia and Bismark's urging on the partition of Turkey, Britain again appears as the protector of Ottoman Empire.<sup>89</sup> In Russo-Turkish war, when Russians approached Constantinopolis, Britain sends the fleet to the Sea of Marmora in order to prevent Russians of reaching the Straits and stayed there to the end of war and until the Treaty of San Stefano was signed.

Moreover, one can say that the Treaty of Berlin (June 13 – July 13, 1878) "was indeed a resounding triumph of Britain", while Russia "was humiliated and indignant".<sup>90</sup> So it happened that the strategic interest of Britain was helpful to the survival of European Turkey. The Treaty of Berlin decided the fate of Balkan countries, but it also planted the seeds of future protracted relations among nation states of Europe.

Once again, it turned out that national interest has priority over the "civilizational" one.

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<sup>85</sup> L.S. Stavrianos, p. 394.

<sup>86</sup> L.S. Stavrianos, p. 398.

<sup>87</sup> L.S. Stavrianos, p. 409.

<sup>88</sup> L.S. Stavrianos, p. 410.

<sup>89</sup> L.S. Stavrianos, p. 404.

<sup>90</sup> L.S. Stavrianos, p. 412.

### c) Austro-Hungary

Austrian and Hungarian nationalism had ambiguous relationship toward “the Eastern Question”, the Balkans and Bosnia. Austrians, and Hungarians in particular (Andrassy), feared both Slav element within Hapsburgs Monarchy and a Slav state on the Balkans. For that reason they were prone to both Russian presence on the Balkans, as the priority of pan-slavism, and to the annexation of Bosnia, as an impediment to pan-serbism.

Austro-Hungary pledged to Russia in many occasions to sustain the status quo on the Balkans and respect the territorial integrity of Turkey. She was doing so for the same reason as Russia.

Austria and Russia agreed in one more question (the Reichstadt Agreement, July 8, 1876): both were against a great Slave state on the Balkans.<sup>91</sup> They confirmed their consistence in opposing to Slave state on the Balkans by so-called Budapest Convention as well. (January 15, 1877) What they disagreed about was the question how to divide Bosnia-Herzegovina, if the occupation of it would takes place. Both attitudes were determined by national and not civilizational interests.

The interests of nation states Austro-Hungary and Russia were also decisive in their relationship towards Balkan states. Austria was particularly afraid of Serbia’s expansionism and its piedmont role in creating a great Slave state on the Balkans. Russia’s congruence with Austria, was thus determined by national interest of Russia, but also revealed the hypocritical character of Russian pan-slavism.

Austria’s attitude towards Bosnia, as the part of Ottoman Empire, was ensuing, naturally, from its attitude towards the territorial integrity of Turkey. However, the Austria’s relationship to Bosnia was also determined by the fear from Serbian nationalism or pan-serbism. The chance to get rid of the fear Austria got from the revolt of Young Turks in 1908. It was the incentive for the annexation of Bosnia in October 6, 1908.<sup>92</sup> Yet, the goal of Austria was more to thwart Serbia’s pretensions toward the West. Russia promises not to oppose Austria’s annexation of Bosnia, what was a civilizational cessation, but it requires Austrian support to Russian, which is to say – nationalist, plans with the Straits. (Buchlau Agreement, 16. Septembar 1908)

The formation of the Balkan League (1912), under the influence of Russia, aimed to hinder Austrian impact on the Balkans. It appeared however very soon that the League of Balkan nation states had first of all the pretensions of territorial expansion at the expense of Turkey. When it became apparent already in 1912 that the war is imminent, Austria and Russia come closer once again warning the Balkan states that any territorial annexation will not be allowed even if they defeat Turkey. This apparently confirms the national and not civilizational character of the warning. The fear from a great Balkan state had overwhelmed the “fear” from civilizationally distinctive Turkey.

Russian ambassador in Istanbul, Nicholas Ignatiev, half century before the final clash with Turkey, at the time of the formation of the first Balkan League (1860), with same intentions, had prophetically announced that “nothing stable will be built in the Balkan Peninsula until many years have elapsed”.<sup>93</sup> Many years elapsed, and his words are still sounding prophetically.

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<sup>91</sup> L.S. Stavrianos, p. 405.

<sup>92</sup> L.S. Stavrianos, p. 528-9.

<sup>93</sup> L.S. Stavrianos, p. 535.

### 3. Nationalism of *Balkan states*

The relationship of Balkan nation states was based on national interest, and not on civilizational proximity, solidarity and cooperation. European nation states' backing was needed only in their struggle against Turkey. Balkan states oppose any territorial expansion of European powers at the expense of the Balkans. Serbia and Greece oppose to the annexation of the Balkan's territory to any great power already in 1867.<sup>94</sup>

The Treaty of Berlin proved that European nation states had same relationship towards civilizational close Balkan states and - peoples. In the encounter of two nationalisms, European and Balkan one, it is quite logical to foresee which one is to overcome. "As a result, every one of the Balkan peoples was left thoroughly dissatisfied."<sup>95</sup>

From the very beginning, long before the Balkan wars, and in the course of them in particular, Balkan nation states consider by the "Eastern Question" exclusively their territorial extension at the expense of Turkey. None liberation of "subjugated" civilizational (Christian) brethren was a motive.

In their mutual relations Balkan states also behave as nation states, and not as civilizational solidary ones. The second Balkan war only dismantled the genuine nature of these relations as it used to be from the mere beginning they were established. Serbian-Bulgarian relations are, perhaps, a paradigm.

Nationalist character of the Balkan wars turned to be obvious in the relations of Balkan states towards the peoples they "liberate" from Turks. The fate of Albanians confirms that, although they are only people who succeeded in avoiding the occupation of "liberators". However, the most tragic victim of resolving the "Eastern Question" the Balkan way, which is to say the victim of Balkan states' nationalism, were Macedonians. Their "state of victim" has been lasting by now.

#### a) Serbia:

South Slave peoples have long dreamt about the liberation from Austrian and Turkish rule, thus about Yougoslavhood; what the prince of Serbia, Michael Obrenovich, was dreaming was a national dream on the piedmont role of Serbia.<sup>96</sup> The beginning of the dream was meant to be the annexation of Bosnia<sup>97</sup>.

Instead of Yougoslavhood Serbia dreams on pan-Serbism.<sup>98</sup> Pan-Serbism primarily targets Bosnia, or Orthodox part of Bosnia's population respectively. When Serbia tried, for the first time, to make the dream true in 1876, long before the Balkan wars, neither Greece nor Romania joined her, for Bosnia was not their national interest.<sup>99</sup> It also corroborates that the Balkan states were entering none civilizational clash.

The second, and presumably the first strategic goal of Serbia was the rapprochement to the sea. Anyone. When it was already clear that Bosnia, after the occupation and annexation, is beyond reach, in the first Balkan war Serbia directs its troops towards Aegean Sea, through Macedonia, and

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<sup>94</sup> L.S. Stavrianos, p. 395.

<sup>95</sup> L.S. Stavrianos, p. 412.

<sup>96</sup> L.S. Stavrianos, p. 395.

<sup>97</sup> L.S. Stavrianos, p. 395.

<sup>98</sup> L.S. Stavrianos, p. 397.

<sup>99</sup> L.S. Stavrianos, p. 403.

towards Adriatic sea, over Albania. When Serbia had to yield already conquered territories in Albania, now assigned to a state of Albania, under the warning of Austrian ships, Serbs require a larger portion in Macedonia. And there, they have to encounter, and confront, same interest of Bulgaria and Greece.

b) Greece:

Greece also behaves as a nation state. Cooperation with Slave states is not founded on civilizational proximity, which is apparent. As soon as national interest was imperilled the cooperation with Slaves transforms into animosity. Likewise, the struggle against Turkey has no civilizational character.

Here is a proof for that. Although Orthodox as Slavs, Greeks became anti-Slav as soon as Russia supported the independence of Bulgarian church from the Patriarchate. An anti-Slav society was established in Athens in 1869. Greeks even “advocated the *rapprochement* with the Turks, whom they considered to be ‘less dangerous for the expansion of the Greek spirit than is Slavism’.”<sup>100</sup>

Greeks’ connection to Slav states on the Balkans has naturally a civilizational appearance, but the nationalist background as well. “Natural” character of the alliance evaporates as soon as it faces the national interest of allies for same territory. It proved to be so after the Treaty of San Stefano and formation of Great Bulgaria, then in the course of the First, and in the second Balkan war in particular.

The principal political goal of Greek nationalism is Macedonia, Thessaloniki above all. This is the point for which one can say to be Black Hole of Serbian, Greek and Bulgarian civilizationalism, and Big Bang of Serbian, Greek and Bulgarian nationalism.

c) Bulgaria

Bulgarian nationalism was ambivalent just as were Bulgarian ethnic roots.<sup>101</sup> On the one hand, specific position of Bulgaria in relation to Russia put Bulgaria into a special relationship towards other Slav and Orthodox Balkan countries. On the other hand, being in the vicinity of Turkey put Bulgaria into a particularly vulnerable position, and also nurtured particular territorial appetites toward Turkey, toward the west and Macedonia.

The formation of San Stefano Great Bulgaria eventually opened the cleavage to other Balkan states and awakened national hypnosis.

Political goal of Bulgaria was Macedonia and, in particular, Thessaloniki, and therefore identical to Russia’s national goal of approaching Mediterranean Sea. However, when Bulgarians reached Thessaloniki, in the first Balkan war, only one day after Greeks, they met Greeks in mood which was not that of allies.<sup>102</sup> It was thus already in the first Balkan war that allies came to contending positions. Once again, nationalism surpassed civilizational “interest”, which actually never existed.

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<sup>100</sup> L.S. Stavrianos, p. 396.

<sup>101</sup> Georgije Ostrogorski, *Istorija Vizantije*, Prosveta, Beograd 1993, p. 140.

<sup>102</sup> L.S. Stavrianos, p. 536.

#### d) Montenegro

Although the smallest Balkan state, territorially and in population number (250.000), Montenegro played an especially decisive role in awakening nationalism on the Balkans. So it was before The Treaty of Berlin, in the wake of it and particularly in the course of the Balkan wars.

It was worthy of that. Montenegrin nationalism was directed towards Herzegovina, Sandzak, and Albania in particular. After the end of the wars nation state Montenegro doubled its population, many of whom were not Montenegrins. Montenegro was also among those who gained the most territorially, after Serbia and Greece. Its territory increased for 62% (Serbia + 82, Greece + 68).<sup>103</sup>

#### e) Albania

Albanians experienced terrible crimes, on the one hand, especially when Serbian troops reached Adriatic Sea. On the other hand, it is just this tragedy of Albanian people, as the outcome of Serbian nationalism, which enabled European powers to make decision of halting Serbian expansionism by the establishment of Albanian state.

Only Balkan's people which was politically liberated in the course of the Balkan wars were Albanians. However, the freedom, i.e. autonomous state, was granted to Albanians by foreign powers. Once again, national interest decisively surpassed civilizational one: between predominantly Muslim Albanians and Christian Serbs, Europe chose an independent Albanian state.

Albania was established both as an ethnic state of Albanians, and as the consequence of strategic plans of European nationalisms. This is to say that the state emerged as the expression of people's aspirations of Albanians, as well as the interests of nation states Austria and Italy, which pleaded for an "as large as possible" Albanian state<sup>104</sup> in order to thwart Serbia's approach to Adriatic Sea. Not a few of Albanians remained living outside the state's borders, what later sparked Albanian nationalism on both sides of the border.

It is indicative in many respects that Albanians were victims of Serbian troops, in spite of the fact that Albanians were expressing their willingness to live in a community with Serbs and required support from Serbia before the Balkan wars. It is best to rely on the words of a Serb, social democrat Dragiša Lapčević. In his speech, held in Narodna skupstina of Serbia, February 6, 1914, he said:

„Instead of doing everything on its part to ensure freedom for Albanians, Serbia – which was once struggling so long for its own liberation – sent its army to run ove Albania, to come out to Adriatic Sea in order to subjugate Albanian people and put it into slavery.“<sup>105</sup>

#### 4. Nationalism of *Balkan peoples*

It goes without saying that not only the Balkan states were nationalistic. People in these states was also caught by nationalism, though shored up by state propaganda and national institutions, such as

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<sup>103</sup> L.S. Stavrianos, p. 540.

<sup>104</sup> L.S. Stavrianos, p. 537.

<sup>105</sup> Dragiša Lapčević, *Izneverene nade i zahtevi arbanaski*, <http://www.e-novine.com/srbija/srbija-licnosti/77450-Izneverene-nade-zahtevi-arbanaki.html>

those intellectual ones. Nationalism does not spring from people, but people is very receptive and suitable material for nationalistic molding.<sup>106</sup>

This proves that not only “liberated” peoples were befooled, but their “liberators” as well. Instead of liberation from Turks the people(s) of the Balkan states got:

modern nation state strengthening bureaucracy and army<sup>107</sup>  
new taxes paid mainly by peasantry (for these societies were peasant)<sup>108</sup>  
states’ indebtedness<sup>109</sup>  
nation state which was more greedy than feudal Turkey<sup>110</sup>  
money economy, i. e. capitalism which chiefly served the interests of European nation states/economies.

Nothing of people’s emancipation occurred after the “solution” of so-called Eastern Question. One could have known that before the Balkan wars too. Serbian people’s song testifies to that:

“The roads will desire Turks, but there will be no more Turks.”

Bulgarian experience corroborates same, in the words of a Bulgarian writer:

“The peasant has but the vaguest idea of our transition from servitude to independent life; for him it matters little whether he pays tax to Akhmed or Ivan. In fact, Ivan is often more distasteful to him than Akhmed, for Akhmed could be more easily fooled or bribed; Akhmed did not take his son off as a soldier whereas Ivan does; Akhmed was naïve and spoke Turkish, while Ivan is to all appearance a Christian like him, speaks Bulgarian, yet exacts more from him than did Akhmed.”<sup>111</sup>

## 5. Bosnia:

One should not say that Bosnia experienced nationalism in this period (1815-1914). Three religious groups – Muslims, Orthodox and Catholics - being slowly moulded into ethnic, actually national groups, had no considerable nationalistic experiences.

Quite the reverse. In spite of aggressive nationalizing propaganda from Serbia and Croatia, through priests and teachers, the feeling of a common root of ethnic and political identity lasted as late as the occupation.<sup>112</sup> With Austrian occupation the sense of common Bosnian identity was excited. In spite of European powers’ decision on occupation and Turkey’s consent, Austrian troops encountered the resistance of Bosnian people. In the beginning it was the resistance of all: Muslims, Orthodox and Catholics. Five companies moved from Sarajevo in order to counter Austrians: three Muslim, one Orthodox and one Catholic. Last resistance to Austrians was given together by Muslims and Orthodox in Glavaticcevo.

During Bosnian crisis 1908 once again the resistance to Austrian annexation appears, which now includes only Muslims and Orthodox. Serbs in Sarajevo even require the return of the Sultan’s sovereignty. Bosnian Catholics already perceive Austria as their own state.

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<sup>106</sup> See Damjan Pavlica, *Srpska akademija nauka i umjetnosti*, <http://www.e-novine.com/srbija/srbija-tema/60600-Srpska-akademija-nauka-umetnosti.html>

<sup>107</sup> L.S. Stavrianos, p. 420.

<sup>108</sup> L.S. Stavrianos, p. 423.

<sup>109</sup> L.S. Stavrianos, p. 419.

<sup>110</sup> L.S. Stavrianos, p. 423.

<sup>111</sup> L.S. Stavrianos, p. 423.

<sup>112</sup> Muhamed Hadžijahić, *Od tradicije do identiteta*, IZ Zagreb, 1990.

Bosnian crisis 1908 had very unlucky consequences to the Balkans. None of Bosnian autochthonic nationalisms can be directly accused. However, the process of nationalization from neighbouring states, Serbia in particular, sparked very soon Bosnian nationalism making it extremist and, at the end, terrorist. Instead of the recent Austro-Russian cooperation which hold whatever balance, Russians now work on establishing Balkan League. “Thus the Balkan League and the Balkan Wars that followed may be said to stem directly from the crisis over Bosnia-Herzegovina.”<sup>113</sup>

## 1. Quite a Theoretical Dilemma: Liberation vs. Occupation, or vice versa?

It is not possible to draw a relevant conclusion on the Balkan wars before answering two quite theoretical questions: What is *war* and what is *occupation*? As it is known, different answers are given to both questions. For the sake of that the perceptions of both wars and occupations are diametrically opposed. The need for the conceptualizations hence appears urgent.

### 1. What is the war? Were the Balkan wars – wars or something else?

I have found the basis for an entirely theoretical answer to this question in Aristotle’s philosophy and offered it at another place. The war is namely determined by its purpose, and the purpose of war is peace. The purpose of peace, on the other side, can not be anything else but again – peace.<sup>114</sup>

The Balkan wars are an immediate outcome of so-called peace settlements and of the Treaty of Berlin in particular. Consequently, one can say that many peace settlements are, actually, just the cause of new wars. The Balkan wars are a paradigm, for they were consequences of certain peace agreements. Whether the Treaty of Berlin, which was supposed to ensure the peace on the Balkans, was an act of peace? Let L. S. Stavrianos answer this question: “For the Balkan peoples, then, the Berlin Treaty meant not peace with honor but rather frustration of national aspirations and future wars. The direct and logical outcome of the Berlin settlement was the Serbian-Bulgarian War of 1885, the Bosnian crisis of 1908, the two Balkan wars of 1912-1913, and the murder of Archduke Francis Ferdinand in 1914.”<sup>115</sup>

Having stemmed from the peace settlements, which were not that, the Balkan wars had peace as the goal neither. The fact that horrible crimes were committed in these “wars” indicates that the wars had to end in the “peace” (The Treaty of Buckarest) which paved the preconditions for new wars. And so in circle – *circulus vitiosus*.

The Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars is the document published by Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, in Washington, 1914. Report is full of data about the crimes.<sup>116</sup> I particularly refer a reader to the critical analysis of the Report by Frances Trix titled “Circling Adrianople: The 1913 ICRCBW”, submitted at the International conference held in Istanbul in October, 2012.<sup>117</sup> It is very indicative how close are the Commission’s conclusions on the nature of the wars to the views of comrade Lenin.

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<sup>113</sup> L. S. Stavrianos, str. 531.

<sup>114</sup> Džemal Sokolović, *Kultura rata – od izvora rata do pojma rata*, Odjek, jesen 2009, Sarajevo; Džemal Sokolović, *Culture of War*, <http://isd-bh.org/documents/CULTUREofWAR.bosanski.pdf>

<sup>115</sup> L.S. Stavrianos, p. 412.

<sup>116</sup> See: (<http://archive.org/details/reportofinternat00inteuoft>)

<sup>117</sup> See: ([http://www.icon.hacettepe.edu.tr/eng/4\\_ekim.htm](http://www.icon.hacettepe.edu.tr/eng/4_ekim.htm))

And yet, I will rather allege here the assessment coming from the Balkans. As such the critique of the crime is more valuable. In the words of Serbian politician Dimitrije Tucović (My translation):

“The book by Carlo Pauli is the successful accusation of Balkan governments and armies for their atrocities in Macedonia, Thrace, Epirus and Albania...Moving from page to page, from the first clash on the border up to the siege of Adrianople, horrible pictures come up in front of our eyes, affixing a seal on the face of bourgeois civilization...If one ascribes these horrors to racial and national hatred of Balkan peoples towards Turks, and vice versa, one can not find real truth, but one does enormous injustice towards peoples’ masses, while those guilty hide from responsibility...But the essence lies in a criminal plan made by army and government for the future, namely: Serbs were exterminating Albanians in Old Serbia, and Bulgarians did same to Turks in Thrace convinced that they do a national act, for while removing them from the face of land they are getting rid of enemies who might be unpleasant in the future...”

Confident in success and decisive from the Young Turks overthrow to assimilate and bind to themselves others’ element, Turks of this war had no an exterminating war-cry against Christian population. They were confronting only enemy army and their array of crimes decreases in so far as they did not act against civil population...There are writers who speak readily about the goodness of Turkish race and they will just now maintain that their opinion had been confirmed...Turks did not link their conquest of these land by a system of extermination not due to the goodness of their race but because it did not correspond to feudal and property interests of the sultan and ruling military and bay cast. The masses of Balkan peoples are today guilty to lesser degree for the politics of extermination which is nothing else but the reverse side of patriotism of bourgeoisie...”<sup>118</sup>

Tucovic’s assessment is, thus, much more precise, candid and honest than Lenin’s one we had to listen to for years.

Therefore, the question which immediately arises is: Whether the Balkan wars were wars at all? Or, simply – crimes, just as most of so-called wars?

2. What is the occupation? Consequently, whether the Balkan wars were the wars of liberation?

To the question: Whether the Balkan wars were wars of liberation one can respond only if there is a preliminary consent that these wars have ended the occupation. And, in order to settle dispute that the state authority of Turkey was occupying, it is necessary to come to the agreement about what the occupation actually is. However, there can not be political consent about that, for there is the theoretical one neither. The answer to the question whether the Balkan wars were wars of liberation thus depends entirely on the theoretical concept of occupation.

Since Emerich de Vattel has established the distinction between the notions of occupation and annexation the controversies about applying the concept of occupation do not abate. The case of the Austria-Hungary’s occupation/annexation of Bosnia is perhaps the most conspicuous in political praxis. Theoretical dilemmas are, of course, even more profound.

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<sup>118</sup> Dimitrije Tucović, *Sabrana dela*, Beograd 1980, knjiga 7. Prepared by Damjan Pavlica. Quoted from: <http://www.e-novine.com/srbija/srbija-tema/74560-Ruke-noge-zubi-rade-pomrini.html>

How to hence grasp the occupation? It is not only the matter of *positive* (international) right, but the matter of *natural* right as well, therefore a pure ethical matter. Raised from the standpoint of ethics, the question of occupation reads: is the occupation legitimate or not?

If the occupation as such is namely illegitimate, it logically ensues that the elimination of it, by any means whatsoever, is legitimate. Consequently, the elimination of occupation is – the liberation. Illegitimacy of occupation is thus what the liberation makes legitimate. *If* the five-century presence of the Ottoman state in the Balkans, in Europe, *is* the occupation of that part of Europe and peoples living there, then all wars against the Ottomans, including the Balkan wars (1912-1913), were legitimate. However, this big “if” opens the entire unfoundedness of the division of wars on occupying and liberating ones. Whereas the “liberators” were, even before the arrival of Turks to Europe, and the Balkans, also the occupiers of states and peoples having existed there earlier, then the question of legitimacy of their own “liberating” wars opens as well. And so endlessly, to the past. Up to 30.000 years in the past, when *homo sapiens*, the ancestor of our human species, exterminated the last *homo neanderthalis* from the soil of Europe.

Same ambiguity can be applied to the wars of liberation. Can liberation be “liberation”, thus illegitimate? If the liberation (of territory, people etc.) has no to do with occupation than it is illegitimate, and hence it itself turns to be an occupation. Therefore, *if* the five-century existence of the Ottoman state in Europe, and on the Balkans, *was not* the occupation, than the liberation of territories and peoples under the state was “liberation”, thus illegitimate, than the Balkan wars were not the wars of liberation, than it was actually – the occupation. The fate of two Balkan’s peoples, one of which, Albanian, got its state, and other one, Macedonian, was occupied by several Balkan’s “liberating” states, demonstrates the whole ambiguity of the term – liberation.

Viewed from the *natural right* standpoint the occupation can not be defined. All of us, individually and as social groups, have same right to every piece of territory. Any fencing (walling) is occupation, thus illegitimate.

However, we have to do with fences. And it is *positive right* which deals with them. Positive right endeavours to define the occupation. According to Fourth Geneva Convention (GCIV) the occupation is limited to one year after the end of military operations. Positive right, of course, does not solve the dilemma if dilemma is not previously resolved on the level of natural right. All issues stemming from natural right remain unsolved by positive right. Namely, what does the limitation to one year mean after all?

In short, the duration of an authority for a longer period of time can not be treated as occupation. The authority of the state of Turkey, which lasted some five centuries in the Balkans, was not the occupation. For that reason the war of Balkan states against Turkey was illegitimate from the standpoint of occupation. With this in mind, the Balkan wars were thus not the wars of liberation but conquering wars.

Therefore, even after the positive right answered to the question on occupation, but also in shortage of natural right response, one can say that the dilemma what, actually, the Balkan wars were, remains: the liberation or occupation?

The Balkan wars clearly demonstrated how the “solution” of so-called Eastern question looks like. Current European, as well as Balkan ones, of course, nationalism is also today, after hundred years, faced with the same “question”. The problem is that the today “East” is much further to the “West” than it was before the Balkan wars. In addition to considerable Muslim minorities in all European nation states, there are four states in the Balkans whose societies have bigger or smaller

Muslim majority. All four are waiting to be included into the European community of states. (Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo, Turkey) Therefore, Europe has to grasp that there is no a final solution of “the Eastern question”. I would rather say that it is necessary to open “the Western question”, i.e. the question of incompatibility of nation state with European principles, values and ideals, fundamental one of which is – ethnic diversity.

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
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## I International Symposium on Culture of Remembrance

„Bosnia and Herzegovina - Culture of Remembrance:  
Twilight or New Awakening”

12 - 13 April 2014

organised by

Alma Jević (International University of Sarajevo) and Sabahudin Hadžialić  
(Diogen pro culture Magazine)

Memory as a cognitive process involves receiving, retaining and re-producing of previously acquired content. However, it also has a social component that separates it from the rigid mechanism of adoption - retention - reproduction. In addition, the collective memory refers to the shared memories of group members that are often associated with the past conflicts.

Memorials, ceremonies and rituals are some of the ways to revive the past, honoring the victims and re-remembering. However, very often these rituals contribute to the re-induction of the conflict and the attribution of collective responsibility to the members of one group, making it difficult to establish and build reconciliation.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is a source of divided memories, unfinished discourse and constant returns in the past. Therefore, this Symposium is only one in a series of attempts to illuminate all forms of the past that exist in contemporary science, culture and art, as well as all the ways in which the past "suffers" because of the people. Accordingly, in the period of April 12 to April 13 2014, we shall talk about the past through various forms of discourse: science, art, literature, philosophy... The premises of the International University of Sarajevo will host scientists, artists, philosophers and writers from all over the region. In the name of past and its revival. Welcome!

Organizers:

Alma Jević, M.A.  
International University of SarajevoSabahudin Hadžialić, Mr.sc.  
Diogen pro culture Magazine

24.11.2013

## Call for papers

This symposium invites papers that investigate memory and remembrance in Bosnia and Herzegovina (and region as well) in the following streams:

Cognitive aspects of memories

War, peace and remembrance

Language and remembrance

Traditional art

Literature and poetry in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina

Social and political aspects of war memories

Culture of remembrance and reconciliation

Selling and/or preservation of cultural heritage

Culture of remembrance and future of tourism of the region

„Conspiracy theories of the past” and culture of remembrance

Other relates issues

## Types of presentations

Participants are invited to submit abstracts of papers to the conference Program Committee. All types of presentations will be in Bosnian/Croatian/Montenegrin/Serbian and English language.

## Papers

Paper presentations on any of the themes listed above are invited. The paper presenters are kindly asked to restrict their presentations to 10 minutes followed by 5 minutes for discussion led by the chair of the session. Each presentation will have a total duration of 20 minutes.

## Criteria for Acceptance

All abstracts will be blind reviewed by the Editorial Board. Relevance to the themes of the conference and originality of approach are key considerations in the acceptance of papers. The Board reserves the right to decline paper proposals without assigning reasons.

Presenters of papers will receive acceptance letters, thereby facilitating sponsorship from employers.

## Submission of Abstract

Abstract guidelines are given below. Please send an abstract of 300 words to [ajeftic@ius.edu.ba](mailto:ajeftic@ius.edu.ba) or Alma Jević, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, International University of Sarajevo, Hrasnička cesta 15, 71 210 Ilidža, Bosnia and Herzegovina. The preferred method is by e-mail (attachment in word document, docx or doc). Please, once you email your abstract in the Subject of your email include: **I Symposium on Culture of Remembrance 2014 Abstract**.

Due date for the submission of abstracts: 2<sup>nd</sup> March 2014

Selected full papers will be published after the event in a book published by DIOGEN pro culture magazine until the autumn of 2014. All participants will be informed of full paper guidelines by e-mail after Symposium.

## ABSTRACT GUIDELINES

Title of paper (Times New Roman, 12, bold, center)

Name and surname of first author, author's affiliation, address and e-mail address<sup>1</sup> (Times New Roman, 12, bold)Name and surname of second author, author's affiliation, address (Times New Roman, 12)  
(please mention names of all authors and co-authors)

Please insert your text here. Abstract should not exceed 300 words. Be sure that your abstract contains the following parts: aim(s), hypothesis, main methodology (method, participants, instruments), and major conclusions. In case you are submitting a review article, please mention major aim(s) and how your article contributes to contemporary research in particular area. (Times New Roman, 12, double space, justify)

Key words: (please mention up to five key words in this part) (Times New Roman, 12, bold)

<sup>1</sup> only first author's e-mail (for further correspondence)

## I Internacionalni simpozij „Kultura sjećanja”

„Bosna i Hercegovina - kultura sjećanja: sumrak ili novo buđenje”

12 - 13. april 2014.

organizatori

Alma Jević (Internacionalni univerzitet Sarajevo) i Sabahudin Hadžialić  
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Spomenici, ceremonije i rituali su neki od načina oživljavanja prošlosti koji se provode s ciljem odavanja počasti žrtvama i sjećanjima. Međutim, vrlo često ovi rituali doprinose ponovnim sukobima i pripisivanju kolektivne odgovornosti članovima jedne grupe, onemogućavajući tako izgradnju i uspostavu pomirenja.

Bosna i Hercegovina je izvor podijeljenih sjećanja, nedovršenih diskursa i stalnog povratka u prošlost. Stoga, ovaj Simpozij je samo jedan u nizu pokušaja da se rasvijetle svi oblici prošlosti koji postoje u savremenoj nauci, kulturi i umjetnosti, kao i svi načini na koje prošlost "trpi" zbog ljudi.

U skladu s tim, u periodu od 12.4. do 13.4.2014. godine razgovarat ćemo o prošlosti kroz različite oblike diskursa: nauku, umjetnost, književnost, filozofiju... U prostorijama Internacionalnog univerziteta u Sarajevu ugostit ćemo naučnike, umjetnike, filozofe i pisce iz cijelog regiona. U ime prošlosti i njenog oživljavanja. Dobrodošli!

Organizatori

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24.11.2013.

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U obzir dolaze istraživački i pregledni radovi koji ispituju tematiku pamćenja i sjećanja u Bosni i Hercegovini (i regionu) u okviru jedne od pomdenih podtema:

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Rat, mir i sjećanje

Jezik i sjećanje

Tradicionalna umjetnost

Književnost i poezija u postratnoj Bosni i Hercegovini

Društveni i politički aspekti sjećanja na rat

Kultura sjećanja i pomirenje

Prodaja ili očuvanje kulturnog naslijeđa

Kultura sjećanja i budućnost turizma u regionu

„Teorije zavjere iz prošlosti” i kultura sjećanja

Druge slične teme

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Učesnici se pozivaju da dostave sažetke radova Programskom odboru Simpozija. Prezentacije se dostavljaju na bosanskom/hrvatskom/srpskom/cmogorskom i engleskom jeziku.

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Prezentacije radova koji se odnose na neku od navedenih podtema Simpozija su poželjne. Pri tome se učesnici mole da ograniče svoje prezentacije na 10 minuta praćene sa 5 minuta predviđenih za raspravu koju će moderirati predsjedavajući sesije. Svaka prezentacija će trajati 20 minuta.

## Kriteriji za prihvatanje radova

Svi sažeci bit će pregledani od Programskog odbora. Relevantnost teme i originalnost u pristupu bit će ključni faktori u odabiru radova. Programski odbor zadržava pravo da odbije radove bez obrazloženja. Učesnici čiji radovi budu prihvaćeni bit će o tome pisano obaviješteni.

## Slanje sažetaka radova

Uputstvo za pisanje sažetka je dato u prilogu. Molimo Vas da sažetak do 300 riječi pošaljete na sljedeću e-mail adresu: [ajeftic@ius.edu.ba](mailto:ajeftic@ius.edu.ba) ili na adresu Alma Jević, Fakultet umjetnosti i društvenih nauka, Internacionalni univerzitet u Sarajevu, Hrasnička cesta 15, 71 210 Ilidža, Bosna i Hercegovina. Preferirani metod za slanje sažetaka je putem e-maila (kao attachment dokument sa ekstenzijom: docx ili doc). Prilikom slanja e-maila, molimo Vas da u subjektu e-maila navedete sljedeće: I Internacionalni simpozij Kultura sjećanja 2014. Sažetak.

## Krajnji rok za dostavljanje sažetaka je: 2. mart 2014.

Odabrani kompletni radovi će biti objavljeni nakon Simpozija u Knjizi radova koju će izdati Diogen pro kultura magazin do jeseni 2014. godine. Svi učesnici će biti obaviješteni o uputstvima za pisanje kompletnih radova putem e-maila nakon Simpozija.

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
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## **Controversy over the Sarajevo assassination – Is it a terrorist act?**

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### **Summary**

*The event that marked the 28<sup>th</sup> of June 1914 and which in world history indicates the immediate cause of the beginning of the First World War also means facing the world with the power of terrorism as well as the effects of a terrorist act in the form of assassination. This paper argues that assassination in Sarajevo is a terrorist act with characteristics of state-sponsored terrorism. The conclusion is made on the following basis: analysis (theoretical analysis, frequency analysis, critical evaluation) of the definition of the phenomenon of terrorism and assassination as the modus operandi of terror, synthesizing these findings and critical evaluation of the role of the assassination in political history. The constant feature of terrorism is its political utility and strategic instrumental rationality and assassination in history proved to be a very effective tool for achieving high utilization of terrorism and strategic effects of terrorism, which put terrorism in the framework of the phenomenon that has total power attributes. The elements that define terrorism are the strategic use of terror, the asymmetry of violence, focusing on non-combat targets, spreading fear as a mean of influence and coercion to the general public, seizing power and achievement of political goals. The assassination is premeditated, intentional, targeted and unlawful attack on the life of prominent person which has a political goal. The assassination in Sarajevo was carried out by members of the Serbian nationalist movement who advocated the unification of South Slavs and that resulted in the formation of a secret terrorist organization that stands behind the whole event. The policy objective, which directed assassination, was a South Slavic unification that was achieved in 1919 with the Treaty of Versailles after the end of the First World War, so it is possible to speak about the successful example of the classic state terrorism with delayed real effects.*

**Key words: Sarajevo assassination, terrorism, state terrorism, First World War.**

The middle of 2014, precisely June 28, marks the centenary of one event which may have been crucial for the political and other developments in the 20th century. This is an assassination of Austro-Hungarian Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo, which some analysts highlighted as the assassination of the century (Chaliand and Blin, 2007). All the facts about the event have long been known, but its meaning still causes disagreements, disputes and different interpretations. However, one thing is certain: this event marked the immediate cause for the beginning of the First World War, it was the spark that ignited the events that followed. For the first time in history, the world was faced with the power and global effects of terrorism as well as with assassination which in that period was its dominant mode of execution (terrorism *modus operandi*). This case is more than a good introduction to a deeper analysis of the role of the assassination as a form of terrorist activity in the overall political, social and security processes.

## Sarajevo assassination: historical context

The overall geopolitical and geostrategic relations on the eve of the First World War have convincingly demonstrated the scope of the meaning and consequences of terrorism. Assassination in Sarajevo, on 28 June 1914 in which heir to the throne of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Archduke Franz Ferdinand was killed, was the immediate cause for the world's first global conflict. Why the Austro-Hungarian heir to the throne was assassinated? Events in the Balkans has been turbulent since the Treaty of San Stefano, means from the 1878 and the Berlin Congress.<sup>119</sup> The Congress of Berlin awarded Austro-Hungary administrative control of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a prelude to later Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in October 1908. There are several important consequences of the Berlin Congress.

First of all, with these conclusions the former constellation in Europe and in the Balkans was changed. Secondly, it is obvious that the great powers had the same goal at the Congress – to not allow creating a regional superpower in the Balkans. Thirdly, the results of the Congress were the prelude to the further Austro-Hungarian and Serbian confrontation about Bosnia and Herzegovina but also about wider Balkan's issues.

For the Kingdom of Serbia, such a context has jeopardized the desire to expand westward. Starting from the Pan-Slavic idea, Serbia has been focused on creating a South Slav state seeing itself as the 'Balkan Piedmont', means leader. Austria-Hungary was standing in the way of achieving the desired Serbia's political and territorial objectives. Subversive activities undertaken since 1910 have not substantially weakened Austria-Hungary, and that is the reason why the Serbian side, which was nationalist reinforced after the Balkan wars, sought additional ways for weakening the Austro-Hungarian goals and thus achieve its goals (Renouvin, 2008; Kardum, 2009). In the terrorism "golden age", because of the importance that the assassinations played in the so-called first and the anarchist wave of terrorism (Rapoport, 2013), terrorism was quite convenient mean for use in the national-revolutionary issues.<sup>120</sup>

The assassination of a leader of Austria-Hungary as part of a strategy of decapitation was a logical choice for its fading. The direct executors were members of the organization 'Young Bosnia' led by Gavrilo Princip (Thompson, 2012: 404). It is a nationalist movement that advocated for South Slavic unification and the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Serbia.<sup>121</sup> Such pro-Serb dimension was the reason why the 'Young Bosnia' enjoyed the support of Serbian nationalist circles.

Primarily it was a Pan-Serbian secret organization 'National Defense'. 'National Defense' was established in 1908 to promote Serbian cultural and national interests. But gradually more and more

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<sup>119</sup> The importance of the Berlin Congress for relations between major world powers, for the subsequent movement of the historical scene and the outbreak of World War I see more in: Debidour (1933) and Šulek (1938 and 1939).

<sup>120</sup> An anarchist wave of terrorism lasted from 1880 to 1920. The anarchists who reject any form of government or state government determining them as a unquenched evil for which the despotism is inherent feature, promoted the assassination as a central instrument for achieving goals. In such way US Presidents were killed: Abraham Lincoln (1865), James A. Garfield (1881) and William McKinley (1901). Anarchists from many countries in Europe at that time were gathered in the International of Anarchist/Black International also frequently used assassinations: in 1898 in Geneva killed Austro-Hungarian Empress Elizabeth (killer Luigi Lucchi), in 1900 the Italian King Umberto I (killer Gaetano Brescia), on several occasions they tried to kill the famous German statesman Otto von Bismarck, French President Marie Francois Sadi Carnot was assassinated in 1894 (killed by an Italian anarchist Santo Caserio), while the Spanish Prime Minister Antonio Canovas was assassinated in 1897 (killer Michele Angiolillo), and Prime Minister Jose Canalejas 1912 (killer Manuel Pardinias), Egyptian Prime Minister Butrus Ghali was killed in May 1910 (killer Ibrahim Nasif al-Wardani). See more in: Jensen Bach, 2013; Laqueur, 1987; Townshend, 2003; Kalinić, 2003.

<sup>121</sup> About the role and significance as well as the ideological background of „Young Bosnia“ see more in Masleša (1990).

was turning to subversive activities directed towards Austria-Hungary. In this framework was created a space for manipulation of 'Young Bosnia', in accordance with the Serbian nationalist interests which were more and more pronounced and more connected with the Serbian authorities. The radical fraction of the 'National Defense' in 1911 has created a secret terrorist organization 'Unification or Death' ('Black Hand') which were led by the head of the intelligence services of Serbian General Staff, Lieutenant Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijevic Apis. His role in the assassination was proven at the Thessaloniki process on which he was sentenced to death and executed in 1917, but in the retrial in 1953 was rehabilitated. It's the organization 'Unification or Death' that gave 'Young Bosnia' instrumental, organizational and logistical support for the assassination of the Austro-Hungarian Archduke.

For the first time in history, the world has witnessed the case of state-sponsored terrorism. Two months later, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia and shortly after the storm of war engulfed Europe (Chaliand and Blin, 2007; Combs and Slann, 2007; Anderson; Sloan, 2009).

### **Terrorism: generic definition or pluralism of meaning**

Terrorism is on the world stage more than two centuries. Terrorism is the subject of interest of many scientists, scholars, politicians, journalists, professional members of the intelligence, security, military and police institutions, who are trying to answer one question: what is terrorism? However, extensive efforts have not succeeded: a generic definition of terrorism has not been achieved. Moreover, some authors point out that this is an 'intrinsically ambiguous' symbol (de la Calle; Sanchez-Cuenca, 2011). Depending on researcher view and interest, each author (actor) have variously defined the term terrorism.<sup>122</sup> Statistical data are very convincing. Within academia, 260 definitions of terrorism are used, while various governmental and international organizations are dealing with over 90 definitions (Schmid, 2011). The problem of defining terrorism affects not only public and political discourse, experts in terrorism also have not achieved accepted definition.

In science, the definition implies standardization of the meaning of any term. However, although terrorism is one of the most common topics of social sciences there are a number of dilemmas and controversies around it (Spencer, 2006). It is also one of the most politicized terms in the political vocabulary today. Political scientist Martha Crenshaw believes that the definition of terrorism necessarily involves the transformation of terrorism into usable analytical term, not its use as a means for debate (Crenshaw, 1995: 7).

Terrorism is a term that belongs to those in the social, political, academic and professional discourse that is most difficult to determine. British sociologist Philip Schlesinger, however, believes that the process of defining terrorism is a part of a wider dispute in relation to the ideological and political objectives (cited in Schmid, 2004). Terrorism is a combination of political goals and social disintegration and division in terms of national and ethnic issues, economic, cultural issues, religious, ethno-religious, symbolic and identity issues. Many of today's versions of terrorism assume that understand terrorism is actually understanding that this is a concept that cannot be fully understood (Furedi, 2009).

Definitional and other disputes and controversies within the social sciences on terrorism suggest that terrorism studies have analytical deficits and limitations.

Is it even possible to produce objective knowledge about terrorism? Can we therefore understand terrorism if it is not possible to determine the meaning of a word that represents the starting point of all knowledge or opinions? This brings up the question The question then arises - is it possible to study terrorism at the scientific level if it is not clearly defined? Scientific and professional

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<sup>122</sup>For example, the word "terrorism" in Google gives 23 500 000 results, while the phrase "definitions of terrorism" gives 515 000 results. Accessed on 03/24/2014.

positions are polarized. If terrorism is not an objective, coherent and consistently defined, the determination of a phenomenon and behavior as a terrorist can only be a matter of subjective labeling. Terrorism thus is not objective, empirically identified phenomenon, but socially constructed and historically contingent category of human behavior which depends on the particular circumstances, socio-political context and intentions of the actors. Therefore, the concept of terrorism has no its intrinsic essence, it is more a human (social) construct (Schmid, 2004). On the other hand, what says Harvard sociologist Lisa Stampnitzky seems plausible. She believes that the expert discourse on terrorism operates between science and politics, between academic expertise and state (Stampnitzky, 2013).

Regardless of the different views on terrorism and various scientific and expert definitions, analysis of existing definitions of terrorism clearly indicates its contents. Terrorism is the use of violence (terror) in order to achieve political goals. Such content in the mid-1980s clearly demonstrated the results of scientific research. In an attempt to answer the question - what is terrorism? - Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman (1988) investigated the frequency of certain words in more than 100 up to the mid-1980s known and relevant definition of terrorism. The results showed that violence, politics and terror are the words that have appeared in most definitions: violence in 83.5% of cases, politics in 65% and terror in 51% of cases. It was the first achieved 'academic consensus' (1984) regarding the definition of terrorism. This consensus has brought 22 elements of terrorism and three of them (indicated above) had the highest frequency of occurrence in the existing definitions. The second 'academic consensus' (1988) was based on comments by fifty scientists on the content of the definition (elements) of terrorism from the first 'academic consensus'. According to the results, the definition of terrorism included 16 elements (Schmid, 2004: 382).<sup>123</sup>

Finally, multidecadal rigorous academic and thorough expert analysis of the current definition of terrorism is the basis for Alex Schmid (2011) to speak on the achieved revised/upgraded academic consensus on the definition of terrorism, so-called 'revised academic consensus definition'. In terms of achieved consensus ten elements are defined that constitute the term terrorism or represent the explanatory definition of terrorism: 1) the dual character of the concept of terrorism: it is a doctrine that postulates the effectiveness of the use of a special political violence and assumed its strategic effects, which should produce power in the political conflict in which victims of violence (primarily civilians and non-combat forces) are not the primary target; and it is the practice, tactics or method of (de)personalized killing and production shocking violence on the public with the aim to influence the political process or manipulate the process; 2) the triple context in which terrorism occurs: the rule of fear (eg. a repressive and illegitimate regimes); continuous protests and propaganda by other means that lead to disruption of public order; context of irregular, psychological or asymmetric warfare; 3) executors as sources or agents of violence: terrorism is the product of man, no terror without terrorists who are non-state and state actors; 4) political character: terrorism is a political (not criminal) violence; 5) violent acts of terrorism involving the commission of a demonstrative, intentional, unilateral, illegal or illegitimate and without moral restraint, selective or non-discriminatory act of violence, which causes death or serious injury and which is undertaken in peacetime or outside the zone of combat operations; its goal is deterrence or coercion against a third party who is directly or indirectly connected with the victims, with the

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<sup>123</sup>Terrorism is: 1) an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated 2) violent action, employed by 3)(semi-) clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for 4) idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby—in contrast to assassination—the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. 5) The immediate human victims of violence are generally 6) chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or 7) selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. 8) Threat—and violence—based 9) communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used 10) to manipulate the main target (audiences(s)) turning it into a 11) target of terror, 12) a target of demands, or a 13) target of attention, depending on whether 14) intimidation, 15) coercion, or 16) propaganda is primarily sought.

ultimate aim of complying (subordination) executor goals; 6) communication based on threats: the threat of terrorist violence is a form of "conditional killing", it is creating a climate of fear, which implies a threat coming impact anytime, anywhere and to anyone if they do not comply with the requirements of terrorists; 7) the distinction between direct civilian victims and the final target audience: direct victims who are subjected to threats of violence or use of violence execution are different from the final target audience; therefore anyone can be a victim of terror; direct victims are impersonal target; they are passive means to achieve the goals of terrorists; most of the victims regardless of whether they are representative or symbolic targets of violence actually are the objectives of the secondary character<sup>124</sup>; 8) terror/fear/horror: the intended act of violence is designed to produce the effect of extreme fear or intimidation (terror) which is above the proportion of the results of violence; terrorists are trying to cause public shock, fear and an exaggerated climate of terror<sup>125</sup>; 9) intent: a terrorist act is undertaken with the intent to terrorize the aimed target and exploitation of uncertainty created by the act of execution of a terrorist act; threat of future terrorist act is in compliance (subordination) function of the terrorists or deter the other side from taking any action inconsistent with the aims of terrorists; 10) terrorism does not make an individual act of terror, but it is a campaign that takes place in a series of terrorist acts.

### **What is assassination?**

Premeditated, intentional, targeted and unlawful attack on the life of prominent person which has a political goal<sup>126</sup>; is a form of behavior that is human community has met long ago. The assassination is one of the oldest and most fundamental of terrorist assets. Philosophers and theologians question about the justification of killing political opponents are thematizing more than 2000 years. Plato in the *Republic* and Aristotle in *Politics* are talking about morality of tyrannicide or killing of despotic rulers. Cicero in his work *On Duties (Latin: De Officiis)* says that tyrants usually end up with a violent death (cited in Pettiford and Harding, 2005: 27-28).

In the framework of the doctrine of tyrannicide, the assassination was simultaneously presented as a strong ideological statement as well as a powerful political weapon. Yet the notion of 'assassination' (lat. *attentare* - try) was created much later. Its origin is linked to the group of Shia Islam, the so-called *Assassins* or *Isma'ilis* who were active from 1090th to 1275th, and argued for the expansion of the pure version of Islam. Assassins were the first group that has used assassination as a political weapon in a planned and organized way and as a long-term orientation, they have developed the doctrine of justification killings of religious and political opponents. Assassin (from Arabic *Ḥashshāshīn* – hashish committed) is a term for a militant sect which was located in the fortifications near the Caspian Sea in Persia. They stabbed the victims, usually politicians and religious leaders, who did not accept their sermons, and they did it at close range so the victims had no possibility of escape. Just like today's suicide bombers assassins believed to be sacrificed for more goals. During actions are neither planned nor tried to escape, since it is within the group, the mission of survival considered disgraceful (Chaliand; Blin, 2007(a); Thackrah, 2004; Wardlaw, 1990).

Scientists have been divided for decades on the issue of assassination – is it a terrorist act or is it a separate act of political violence with use of lethal force. They had different opinions about whether

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<sup>124</sup>In the case of non-state terrorism and having in mind that one of the fundamental functions of the state is to provide security to its citizens, a terrorist act causes instability of the social order proving that the state is unable to protect its citizens which brings into question the social contract between government and citizens.

<sup>125</sup>The degree of fear of secondary victims, means society (public) depends on the spatial and emotional distance to the direct victims and ranges from fear, over anxiety to despair. Social groups that have a positive attitude towards terrorists or negative towards the victims do not share such feelings.

<sup>126</sup>Killings of prominent people from criminal or personal motives, which in the wider sense could also be considered as assassination, are not subject of these considerations.

the occasion of the assassination distinguish target and final goal or target is also the ultimate goal. According to the first criterion (which, for example, represented by Adrian Guelke, Christine Fair) assassination is an act of terrorism. In the second case (Boaz Ganor, Jeffrey Simon) assassination is not considered terrorism. However, after 'second academic consensus' regarding the definition of terrorism, scientists have gradually harmonized their positions so that the third, revised/upgraded academic consensus on the definition of terrorism ('revised academic consensus definition') had undoubtedly involved assassination in the typology of terrorist acts. Additionally, from the perspective of a terrorist, assassination has a dual role: elimination opponent and intimidate the larger community to which he belongs (Schmid, 2011: 62-64).

Noting that the assassination is difficult to define, Audrey Kurth Cronin refers to customary international law which determines the assassinations as the selective killing of enemy individuals by insidious/secret means and methods (Cronin, 2009: 228fn57).

In the dictionary of terrorism, which is a supplement of impressive study *The Routledge Handbook of Terrors Research*, Alex Schmid (2011: 606-607) determines assassinations as deliberate and premeditated selective murder of high-ranking or prominent person in the community leadership that is prepared in secret and has the character of surprises. Assassinations could be motivated by different reasons and therefore may or may not need to have the character of a terrorist act, even if it is difficult to draw a clear distinction between them. The assassination is an act of terrorism if the victim is not only the primary objective but also serves as a generator of shock and fear among the population at large.

Professor of sociology and anthropology, Nachman Ben-Yehuda, from the Jerusalem Hebrew University, had investigated the assassinations in the wider sociological prism within the concepts of justice/injustice and social control. According to him, a rhetorical means of 'political assassination' can be used within the framework of an alternative system of justice, within the social systems that use this deadly act in the struggle for legitimacy and social control, and for setting the moral limits. In his work Ben-Yahuda referred to the definition of the assassination of Jamesa F. Kirkham, Sheldon G. Levy and William J. Crotty (*Assassination and Political Violence*, 1970) according to which this act is planned, tried and executed murder of prominent political figures by the assassin where the act is done in a different role from the role of government (Ben-Yehuda, 1997:28).

William Crotty distinguishes several categories of assassination: a) anomic assassination: the murder of political figures for private reasons; b) assassination due to replacement of elites (elite substitution): the murder of a leader for replacement; c) tyrannicide: murder of despotic rulers; d) propaganda of the deed: the assassinations focusing on broader problems, and e) terrorist assassination that is undertaken from different motives and reasons: as a form of demonstrating the inability of the authorities to fight against the rebels, as a form of neutralization of government support of the public, form of engagement in support of the revolutionary movement (Crotty, 1998).

The assassination as a political weapon, as well as the *modus operandi* of terrorism, in all its fullness proved at the time of so-called the first global wave of terrorism, in the second half of the 19th century. Anarchists were his loyal supporters. The assassination was their primary strategy of violence, so anarchists have turned assassinations and with them terrorism as well, in a global phenomenon.

Experts agreed on the fact that it was the *golden age of assassination* (Rapoport, 2013). The assassination had taken place again in the 'third wave' of terrorism: the wave of the New Left (*New Left Wave*) in the late 1960s. Analysis of terrorist organizations suggests that the terrorists are very creative in the commission of terrorist acts, and they have an innovative *modus operandi* which means that one form of terror usually replace with another.

Of course, this is conditioned by their instrumentally rational approach to linking the results of the analysis of the strategic environment, their own objectives and social effects of terrorist acts. Assassinations once had a strategic dimension, then the hijackings had a shocking effect, later were the kidnappings then tactics 'hit and run' while in recent years suicidal acts were those which paralyzed society/societies. Regardless of innovation, assassinations have not lost its importance even in the era of terrorism. After examining the authoritative global database of terrorist strikes, *Global Terrorism Database – GTD*<sup>127</sup>, drawn up by experts from the American University of Maryland notes that the assassinations are in third place on the ranking list of the most commonly used modes of execution of terrorist attacks. In GTD basis there were 125 087 terrorist acts that occurred in the period 1970-2013<sup>128</sup>. In the category *Attack Type* there are different categories: assassinations, armed assault, bombing/explosion, kidnapping, hostage-taking, etc. Assassinations make 15,913 or 12.7% of all attacks (*Table 1*).

Table 1: Terrorist Attack Types 1970-2013

Attack Type	Frequency
Bombing/Explosion	59968
Armed Assault	32027
Assassinations	15913
Facility/Infrastructure Attack	8024
Hostage Taking (Kidnapping)	7048
Hostage Taking (Barricade Incident)	724
Unarmed Assault	703
Hijacking	487
Unknown	3898

Source: GTD – Global Terrorism Database

Strictly statistically, assassinations have not lost its importance even in the today's era of terrorism. From the 1970s to the late 1990s the number of incidents (assassinations) in the world was continuously growing (*Picture 1*). The first peak was in the late 1970s when the world average was about 600 incidents per year while the culmination was in the early 1990s when the number of assassinations committed around the world, on an annual basis, had risen to 1,150. By the end of the 20th century the number of incidents has declined over the years. With the beginning of the 21st century, the average number of assassination is 300 per year with a clear increasing tendency.

<sup>127</sup>National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, START: A Center of Excellence of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, University of Maryland, The Global Terrorism Database - GTD, <http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data/gtd>. Accessed on 02/15/2014.

<sup>128</sup>Data for 1993 are not included in the database.

Picture 1: Incidents (assassinations) over time 1970-2013



Source: GTD – Global Terrorism Database

A number of world leaders and statesmen were victims of assassination. Pope John Paul II was wounded in an assassination in May 1981, the executor was Mehmet Ali Agca, a member of the Turkish extremist organization the Grey Wolves (*tur. Bozkurtlar*). Five months later, Egyptian Islamists killed President Anwar Sadat Mohammad. In 1984, Indian Prime Minister Indira Priyadarshini Gandhi was killed by her bodyguards, Sikhs. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in the same year in Brighton survived an unsuccessful assassination attempt of the Provisional Irish Republican Army. John Major was also the victim of a failed assassination attempt by the Republicans in 1991. Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was killed in 1995 in an assassination by Jewish rightists. Assassinations are one of the trademarks of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil homeland, who, until 2009 when they were defeated by government forces, through terrorism sought to achieve an independent Tamil state in Sri Lanka. They killed the leaders of Sri Lanka and India. In a suicide act committed by the Tamil Tigers on May 1 1993 in Colombo, president of Sri Lanka, Ranasinghe Premadasa, was killed. In October 1992 presidential candidate Gamini Dissanayake Lionel was killed while in December 1999 in a suicidal act the president of Sri Lanka, Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga was wounded. At an election rally in a suicidal act on 21 May 1991 in Sriperumbudur near Chennai, a member of the Tamil Tigers, Thenmozhi "Gayatri" Rajaratnam has killed Rajiv Gandhi, the Indian Prime Minister and 25 people more. In accordance with the Tamil Hindu tradition welcomed the prime minister, bent down to touch his feet and then activated 700 grams of explosives in an explosive belt.

### **Sarajevo assassination: a terrorist act**

Is Sarajevo assassination an act of terrorism? One of the lasting characteristics of terrorism is its political usefulness and thus the definition and understanding of terrorism in accordance with the political interests of specific actors, which is also one of the central sources of power terrorism: namely, what it is for someone terrorism, for someone else is a struggle for freedom. And while for some terrorists are really terrorists, for others they are, at the same time, freedom fighters and national liberators.

This is also a framework for observing the Sarajevo assassination. Therefore, the answer to the indicated question need a bit calm scientific approach. Why Sarajevo assassination is terrorism? Analysis of available definitions and extraction of the constituent elements indicates the following critical elements of the definition of terrorism: strategic use of terror; asymmetry of violence; focus on noncombatant targets; spreading fear as a means of influence and coercion to the general public; seizing power and attainment of political objectives. Furthermore, according to the *Global*

*Terrorism Database Codebook* assassination is an act which has the primary objective of killing one or more of the outstanding individuals.

The assassination in Sarajevo is terrorism, namely state-sponsored terrorism, because it passes two indicated determinations, as well as the definition of terrorism from the third, revised/upgraded academic consensus.

(Re)interpretation of events with some historical distance, their adaptation to specific political interests and contextual complications, controversies and dilemmas associated with the Sarajevo assassination can be observed in one Finnish case also. Finnish anarchist Eugene Schauman assassinated Russian General-Governor of Finland Nikolay Bobrikov in Helsinki in 1904 after which Schauman committed suicide. Russia, which ruled in Finland in that time, characterized this act as a criminal anarchist act. Finns had a different view of the case. After obtaining independence in 1917, Eugene Schauman took his place in the pantheon of the Finnish national heroes. He became a secular martyr, a symbol of the struggle for national independence, and the memorial plaque inscribed the following: *Se Pro Patria Dedit* (he had laid down his life on the altar of the homeland). However, during the celebration of the hundredth anniversary of the assassination of former Finnish Prime Minister Matti Taneli Vanhanen described the act as a pure political terrorism, as a poor act. However, commemorative plaques remained intact (Hanhimäki; Blumenau, 2013).

There are no grounds for disproving the fact that the Sarajevo assassination is a terrorist act. Controversy could only exist about the success of achieving the final political goals through this state-sponsored terrorist act. According to some opinions it was an unsuccessful act. The arguments for this approach are found in a possible strategy of 'Black Hand' whose aim was to destabilize the Austria-Hungary and delay the onset of the First World War in which Serbia after the Balkan wars was not ready. Opposing views that seem convincing say that the Sarajevo assassination was one of the most successful acts of terrorism in the history of terrorism. Their arguments suggest that the ultimate goal of politics, where the assassination was a tool, was the realization of the South Slavic (Serbian) unification. The act of assassination failed in the plan, but it happened with the final dismissal of events for which the assassination was the driving force: the peace agreement after the First World War at Versailles in 1919 where South Slavic state – Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes - was created.

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# DIOGEN

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**Sarajevo assassination in our memory  
(interpretation of the Sarajevo assassination in an example of elating /  
removal of Monument to Franz Ferdinand and Gavrilo Princip)**

**Nedžad Novalić, MA, weekly newspaper *New time*,  
Milana Prelog 12A, Sarajevo, BIH –**

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**Abstract:** In the last 100 years, monuments and commemorative plaques have been erected on and removed off the Latin Bridge in Sarajevo, the place of *the Sarajevo assassination*, to those murdered and to the assassin, to Franz Ferdinand and his wife Sophie and to Gavrilo Princip. By tracing the *life* of these monuments, their being placed and removed off the assassination site, in different time periods and in different countries, can best illustrate the attempts at the interpretation of a historical event. In the example of placing and removing of these monuments it is possible to see how our *memory culture* is in a way marked by our present, as well as how ruling elites had interpreted *the Sarajevo assassination* and how that interpretation changed and adapted to the needs of the political elites in the last 100 years. Special attention has been paid to the *transitional periods*, i.e. the succession of political elites and state-legislative frames in the Balkans. The method used in the article is the comparative-historical method. Based on primary archive documents and other historical sources (the press), we have traced the placing and removing of monuments to Franz Ferdinand and Sophie, as well as to Gavrilo Princip, and how those who placed/removed the monuments wanted to interpret the *Sarajevo assassination*. We have compared different interpretations, showing that the interpretation of *the Sarajevo assassination* has changed depending on the historical context and the needs of those who had the privilege to interpret the past and those who have been the political elites which have been creating and controlling the countries emerging in the Balkans. *Power balance* between the political elites in Bosnia and Herzegovina has led us to the point where we have no official interpretation of *Sarajevo assassination* which is reflected in the fact that today there is no monument to either Franz Ferdinand or Gavrilo Princip on the Latin Bridge.

**Key words:** Sarajevo assassination, cultural memory, Franz Ferdinand, Gavrilo Princip, monuments

The novel *Sara i Serafina* by Dževad Karahasan starts with the writer's memory of a conversation he had with Albert Goldštajn, who, among other things, said the following: "Human existence in this world happens in the shadows of bronze characters... By bronze characters I mean of course the monuments as symbols of a system of values, as an inescapable part of a political order, as a sign of the country." (Karahasan 2007)

According to the French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs, the entire memory is a social construct, be it institutionalized (as are the interpretations of the past offered by the political elites) or individual. The memory is, as Halbwachs claims in his work on cultural memory, susceptible to the present and it is used to explain and justify the new political order. According to Halbwachs, it is not possible for individuals to remember in a consistent way outside the context of the group they belong to. Belonging to a group is what 'equips' individuals with the material that makes memory, and groups can even 'manufacture' in individuals memory of an event which those individuals have not lived through in actuality. (Halbwachs 1992)

Commemorating events from the past, monuments and memorials as well as renaming streets and other public spaces are one of the elements of 'institutional', i.e. 'official' memory, with which the political elites use their view of the past in order to explain and justify the present in a certain

community. Official memory is the one promoted and supported by the power structures in a certain society. Such official memory claims to be collective as well, although it is always and inevitably selective because it includes the memory of only those past events and persons that are suitable in the given historical moment, while excluding those that are not. (Banjevlav 2012)

Serb sociologist Todor Kuljić emphasizes that every generation builds their own image of the past according to the needs of the present. For that reason, the official politics of remembering are always followed with official politics of 'forgetting'. Officially, collective memory is 'a political process with no end', and in order for it to function successfully, the skill of forgetting is as important as the skill of remembering. (Kuljić 2006)

Apart from the memory culture and forgetting, societies are prone to something Eric Hobsbawm called *the invention of tradition*. (Hobsbawm 2000) Although tradition inventing is a process that can be found in almost any time, it becomes especially prominent in time of a society transforming, i.e. weakening or destruction of society patterns for which the *old traditions* had been designed. Inventing new traditions does not necessarily mean complete repression of the old ones. The newly-invented tradition can be based on the already existing one which is adapted to the new needs of a society, or it may be a tradition which once existed and is now *forgotten*.

Creating monuments is in close connection with political occurrences and ruling ideologies in the society. Monuments are erected in public and representative places and they are an indicator of the values which the ruling elite want to establish in the society. Every disappearance of one state and the forming of another or the establishing of a new ideology, often means suppression of the former and the forming of a new official memory, where the visual messages have an extremely symbolic meaning because they speak to us about whose public space it is, what we must not forget and what we need to remember.

One of the more important theoretical bases of researching relations between history and general memory culture has been set by a French thinker Pierre Nora in his work *Sites of Memory*. Researching *sites of memory* in France, Nora came to the conclusion that those are the places institutionally constructed by every state. According to him, they are constructed intentionally; hence they are supposed to help in reviving the past and to hinder the forgetting. (Nora 2007) Nora speaks of several types of sites of memory: topographical (archives, museums, libraries), monumental (architectural monuments and cemeteries) and symbolic memories (commemorations, pilgrimages, anniversaries).

In most cases, those who create *sites of memory* try to combine many types of memory of which Nora speaks. In that manner, there are certain rituals associated with most of the monuments in time of the anniversaries, some of those monuments become places of pilgrimage and similar. Some museums can at the same time be places of pilgrimage as a *topographical type of memory*, their buildings treated as monuments as well. Only such connections give the monuments the possibility of their true role being fulfilled: to create memory culture within those who *pass them by*. It is Nenad Veličković actually who in his novel *Vremenska petlja* emphasizes all the insignificance of monuments after the rituals associated with them have ceased. When students *Suni* and *Bubi* discuss whether or not a monument should be built in Potočari, as pro cause we get the fact that the monument will help us not forget over 8000 of those who were murdered because they were Bosniaks. *Bubi* then make the following point: Sixty years ago, 4000 wounded were murdered here because they were Partisans and now everyone has forgotten. And the monument's high as a skyscraper. (Veličković 2011)

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From 1918 until today, 25000 bibliographical items have been made about the First World War, one fifth of which is about the sole act of assassination and the beginning of the war. The very assassination act has been interpreted differently by the science, however, it is beyond doubt that it has served as an excuse for the beginning of the WWI. Very soon after the assassination, its symbolic potential had started to be used with the aim of creating memory of this event. During the 20<sup>th</sup> century, considering the frequent social, state and ideological changes, the interpretation of the Sarajevo assassination had changed couple of times. All the interpretation changes had been embodied by the placing of monuments at the very site of the assassination.

The first monument erected at the assassination site had the official title of *Monument to a murder* and it was installed in 1917 in front of the Latin Bridge. In the year 1917, three years after the murder of Franz Ferdinand and the duchess Sophie, an enormous monument has been erected in the memory of the *innocently murdered*. (Kučuk-Sorguč 2005) Before this monument was erected, there had been a commemoration plaque in front of the building where the assassination took place: *At this crossroad, the Archduke and heir presumptive Franz Ferdinand and his wife the duchess Sophie Hohenberg died the death of martyrs by a murderous hand*. Although the information about the time of the monument differs, we can confirm with certainty today that the monument was set up at the anniversary of the Assassination. A great confusion about the date has been caused by the fact that photographs have been found in the Historical archive in Sarajevo depicting the unveiling of the monument and the year entered in the catalogue was 1915. However, the monument was made in 1916 and that year is engraved on the monument which was based on the idea of Eugen Bori, *first lieutenant in reserve* and Hungarian academic sculptor. The monument was built in Budapest, wherefrom it was transported to Sarajevo. It was unveiled ceremonially on the night of June 28, 1917, which was reported on also by the Sarajevo newspapers of the time, *Sarajevski list* and *Bosnishe post*.

The monument was approximately 12 meters high, and we can say that it was a three-piece composite. The first part is the pedestal made of Silesia stone, and the second one is a bronze medallion with the engraved faces of Franz and Sophia, while the final part of the monument is made by two large pillars with bronze crowns on top. The constituent part of the monument was a small niche where flowers could be placed, together with a bench made on the right side that has survived till this day. At the assassination site, a new plaque was placed, inscribed in Latin were the following words: *The Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife the duchess Sophie of Hohenberg have given their lives and spilled their blood for God and the country at this place on June 28, 1914*.

The sketches of professor Bori “with the highest patronage of His tsarist and kingly apostolic Majesty and Her Majesty the Tsaritsa and Queen”, show that a *Monument of Repentance* was planned across the Latin Bridge which was meant to consist of a commemoration church of Franz Ferdinand next to which a *Sophie’s home* was planned. Bori had already made the sketches that were printed in the “Tsarist court and state print” in Vienna, but the monuments were never built. Namely, the Austro-Hungarian monarchy had barely made it to the anniversary of the Assassination, and by the end of 1918, it no longer existed.

By building a monument under the highest state patronage and under the harshest war conditions, the Austro-Hungarian monarchy intended to impose their own interpretations of the Sarajevo assassination. Ferdinand and Sophie innocently ceased to be, they are the victims of the war, while the assassin is a terrorist. The *Monument to a murder* was at the same time the biggest monument which commemorated the Sarajevo assassination. That shows clearly that the Sarajevo assassination had the greatest symbolic meaning for the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, hence, it

would have possibly played one of the more crucial roles in the memory of the historical period, if the Empire had survived.

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In Sarajevo on November 6, 1918, the first units of the Serb army entered and they were, at least according to the historical sources, greeted with considerable delight. It was the very *reisul-ulema* Džemaludin ef. Čaušević who gave the greeting speech to the Serb army, headed by the duke Stepo Stepanović. (Đaković 1981)

After the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was formed, the *Monument to a murder* stayed on the Latin Bridge. The new state had reacted very swiftly; the new state which had taken much of its legitimacy from the very fight against the *abhorring Austro-Hungarian occupant*, against whom they fought a bloody war for four full years – that had become a full-fledged world war from its outset. It was unnatural for the new government to have a monument to Franz Ferdinand in the middle of Sarajevo, which became the symbolic center of the beginning of the war which resulted in the new state being created.

Already at the beginning of 1919, the monument was removed and the Latin Bridge changed its name into the Princip's Bridge, and the Franz Joseph Street was renamed into the King Petar I Karađorđević Street. In 1918, the Franz Ferdinand and Sophie Street was renamed into the Aleksandar Karađorđević Street, another new heir whose life ended with an assassination. We can claim with great certainty that the monument to Ferdinand and Sophie was not instantly brought down and destroyed but carefully deconstructed and removed to the garden of the National Museum of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Up until the 1990s, little was known about this monument. This reflected the post-1918 endeavor of the Yugoslavia governments to have people forget that there was ever a monument on the Latin Bridge.

The first commemoration plaque to Gavrilo Princip was placed in 1931 on the Princip's Bridge, while the initiative, at least officially, had not come from the government but from the citizens of Sarajevo. The plaque contained the following inscription: *On this historical place, Gavrilo Princip proclaimed freedom on St. Vitus Day [Vidovdan] on June 28, 1914.* The SCS Kingdom did not use the symbolic potential of the Sarajevo assassination all too much. The newly-created state community brought an array of serious contradictions with it. Those recent opponents on the battlefield found themselves in one common state which faced permanent foreign dangers and domestic political clashes which occasionally turned into violence. Therefore, the state politics, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, insisted on the crown dynasty as the unifying factor. The central square of Sarajevo at the time and the main city street both carried the name of King Petar, and a monument to this king was planned to be built. An ossuary-monument to the *Vidovdan heroes* was made in Koševo which is even today, and especially back then, outside the most immediate city core which is always used to *install* most important messages that are supposed to affect the memory culture.

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Only three days after the Kingdom of Yugoslavia capitulated in 1941, Hitler celebrated his 52<sup>nd</sup> birthday. The celebration was held in a specialized train which contained the *Führer's* main headquarters for Southeast at the Austrian and Slovenian border. One of the most significant gifts Hitler received on that day was the plaque brought down by German troops off the Latin Bridge right after they marched into Sarajevo. A ceremonial of a kind had taken place during the removal which was recorded and photographed. The moment this plaque was given to Hitler was eternalized by his personal photographer. It seems that for Hitler, who had lost the WWI as a soldier, this was an important gift indeed. (Bazdulj, 2013)

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Neither did the new Yugoslavia change the perception of the Sarajevo assassination as established in 1918 more significantly, which meant that Princip was given a role of an all-Yugoslav fighter against the *abhorring occupant* and Princip had, to make the correlation greater, shot the chest of a *Boche [Švabo]*. Immediately after Sarajevo was liberated, at the time of the Unified League of Anti-Fascist Youth of Yugoslavia [Ujedinjeni savez antifašističke omladine Jugoslavije] gathering in May 1945, the new Communist government placed a new plaque as a commemoration sign to Princip. The new plaque text (*As a sign of eternal gratitude to Gavrilo Princip and his comrades, fighters against the German occupants, the Youth of Bosnia and Herzegovina dedicates this plaque to you*) (*From this place on June 28, 1914, Gavrilo Princip expressed a people's protest against tyranny and the eternal striving of our people for freedom*) signified a new interpretation of the Sarajevo assassination which was now presented as an all-Yugoslav revolutionary act, the aim of which was fight for freedom which finally arrived not in 1918 but in 1945. In the socialist Yugoslavia, the Austro-Hungarian government had been presented as *occupational, foreign, colonial* and *Mlada Bosna* as having a revolutionary character. The assassins were presented as idealist believing that national freedom came after making the first step towards social freedom, and the assassination was presented as a legitimate right in the struggle. The most important representatives of the new government headed by Đuro Pucar Stari were present at the unveiling of the commemoration plaque and marking of the 1945 *Vidovdan*.

How important the Sarajevo assassination was in the memory culture for the new government after 1945 is shown in the fact that in 1953 a Mlada Bosna Museum was founded across the Latin Bridge and *Princip's footprints* were placed on the very bridge made by the famous sculptor Vojo Dimitrijević. In that year, a new commemoration plaque was placed in which the interpretation of the Sarajevo assassination was even clearer (*From this place, on June 28, 1914, Gavrilo Princip's shot expressed the people's protest against tyranny and centuries-old desire of our peoples for freedom*). Nevertheless, the socialist Yugoslavia had based its legitimacy on the heroism from the WWII, hence, the memory culture and the memorialization was trying to *revive* this very period.

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On the 90<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Sarajevo assassination, the journalist Indira Kučuk-Sorguč published a text in the magazine *Prilozi*, a science and history magazine, which illuminated to an extent the fate of the *Monument to a murder*. Namely, having been removed from the Latin Bridge, the remnants of the monument were placed in the National Museum garden in Sarajevo, whose new building at Marijin Dvor was barely four years older than the Ferdinand and Sophia monument. It is quite certain that all parts had remained in the National Museum garden not only during the existence of the SCS Kingdom and later the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, but they have survived the WWII at the same spot and at least three decades of the socialist Yugoslavia. However, in the mid-1970s, they have disappeared without a trace from this location and today the parts are to be found on at least three different locations. (Novalić 2013)

Only after Yugoslavia fell apart, after the Siege of Sarajevo and the 80<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Assassination that found Sarajevo completely surrounded, the interest for the fate of the Ferdinand and Sophie monument had risen. That interest was a consequence of a significant change in the perception of the entire Austro-Hungarian government, the assassination and the WWI in that part of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian society which we might name as the Bosnian-Bosniak part. The entire history of Yugoslavia was then interpreted from the perspective of the 1990s and the breaking of SFRY, by which the key starting-point was that Bosnia and Herzegovina had lost a lot by the very act of entering the Yugoslavia state frame, i.e. the Greater Serbia, which become more and more the way Yugoslavia, especially the first one, was looked at. *The Sarajevo assassination*

was seen as the initial powder charge that brought about the making of Yugoslavia, the positive values of the Austro-Hungarian period, witnessed by Bosnia and Herzegovina and its population, being (over)stated. There is an insistence on the fact that Bosnia and Herzegovina was a 'corpus separatum' within the dualist monarchy, the exclusiveness of which is at times exalted to the level of state. Such reinterpretation of the Sarajevo assassination from the beginning of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina is embodied in the very *site of memory*. Today, we have the *Latin Bridge* again, not the *Princip's Bridge*, the *Mlada Bosna Museum* was renamed into the *Museum of the Austro-Hungarian period 1878-1918*, while the very place of the assassination now has a plaque with a *neutral* text which informs you that you are at the place of the Assassination, the very act of assassination not being deemed as either a terrorist or heroic act.

Speaking of the post-war Bosnian-Herzegovinian society, it is necessary to speak of at least three memory cultures which in most cases oppose each other. How the assassination is perceived in today's Bosnian-Herzegovinian society can perhaps best be traced on the basis of announcements about building/bringing back the monuments to Ferdinand and Princip.

Although there has been an initiative by individuals, some citizen societies and partly by local government, the idea of a return of the *Monument to a murder* most certainly is not to be realized any time soon. First and foremost, due to the fact that it is not possible to achieve a consensus on the issue in the so-called Bosnian-Bosniak part of the society. There is a tendency for looking at Ferdinand and the Sarajevo assassination in Sarajevo in a *neutral manner*. It is also quite certain that Princip's footprints will not be returned back onto the Latin Bridge. That *neutrality* in interpretation will still be illustrated best through the very *site of memory* which will continue to be without a monument suggesting an interpretation. There are intentions for the Sarajevo assassination to be erased from the memory, because it does not play any important role in this part of the society and in these relations, the very memory of which necessarily brings a certain kind of conflict with it and within the group, as well as with others.

On the other side, in East Sarajevo, a monument has been erected to Gavrilo Princip for the 100<sup>th</sup> anniversary, while many Bosnian Serbs see the idea of placing a monument to Ferdinand in Sarajevo as the *last act of ethnic cleansing of Serbs from Sarajevo*. Princip is seen today by Serbs mainly as a Serb national hero who, first and foremost, fought for a Yugoslavia which made the unification of Serb people possible.

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
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**Featuring Artist:  
Fra Petar Perica Vidić,  
Bosnia and Herzegovina**

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## NEGATION OF SCIENTIFIC TRUTH ON CULTURAL PAST *BY DEFENCE MECHANISMS*

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*Bosna je moja velika stalna ljubav i moja povremena bolna mržnja. Bezbroj puta sam pokušavao da pobjegnem od nje i uvijek ostajao, iako nije važno gdje čovjek fizički živi: Bosna je u meni, kao krvotok. Nije to samo neobjašnjiva veza između nas i zavičaja, već i koloplet nasljeđa, istorije, cjelokupnog životnog iskustva vezanog za ovaj kraj, iskustva mog i tuđeg, dalekog, koje je postalo moje.*

*Bosnia is my great unending love and my sporadic painful hatred. Countless times I was trying to run away from her and always stayed, although it does not matter where one physically lives: Bosnia is in me, like the bloodstream. It is not only inexplicable connection between us and the homeland, but also spinning heritage, history, absolute life experiences related to this area, experience of me and the other, afar, that has become mine.*

*Meša Selimović*

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### **Abstract**

Written and spoken facts convincingly speak of century's long, multi ethnic and multireligious personality of Bosnian-Herzegovinian culture. They unfortunately also speak, about those who have previously denied and even today deny veracity of centuries long, multinational and multi-faith life of its particular being of culture, documentary substantiated and deeply woven into the consciousness of each individual, who has comprehended and emotionally felt sense of that what Bosnia and Herzegovina makes that she really is - country that lives and survives, despite constant attack of opponents, *in the complex unity in diversity*. In it, survived and persevered, mostly those of her citizens, who its "unique spirit" inspires and encourages not only in their successful steps, but in finding a way out of the persistent difficulties they immediately confronted.

In the last decades of the twentieth century, more pronounced salient ethno-nationalistic trends are expressed in which, latently and manifestly there is an effort to *delete consciousness* of citizens of Bosnia and Herecegovine, their experienced cognitions and beliefs about the value of living together of people of different ethnic and (or) religious affiliation. At the focus of the destructive plans, there are woven untruths about the justification for demolition and destruction of cultural heritage of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the inheritance centuries long created and guarded by its inhabitants. By destruction of cultural values, destroyers sought to achieve its planned goals: that the content of individual and common collective memory of the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina bring "tumble" that will, at their discretion, lead to *confusion of cultural identity not only among Bosniaks, but among all citizens who feel Bosnia and Herzegovina as their homeland*.

In the circumstances and the time in which we live today in our country, we are faced with two facts:

(1) the universal and specific complexity of bosnianhercegovinian culture, *true culture*, centuries long developed and passed on from generation to generation which still, not only in the traditional historical, but also in the present time lives,

(2) nowadays continued, long ago begun process of negating the value of a unique *complexity of diversity*, characteristic to bosnianhercegovinian culture, expressed in pronounced expression of ethnocentric, narrow, uniform aspirations. In the psychological approach to the issue of culture memories, psychological cognitions about memory proceses - encoding, storage and retrieval of retaining information - enable a better understanding of character and a sense of individual and collective memory of important events from the *distant and recent cultural history of Bosnia and Herzegovina*. In consideration of the level of reliability of memory and detection of intensity and direction of action of influential determinants, destructive ideology on different experiences of individuals and groups of individuals particularly, it is necessary to introduce scientific knowledge on the types of memory, especially the explicit (declarative) and long-term memory.

Individual and collective content of long-term memory is the source of memories. *The central issue in the culture of memory questions is which information is stored, how they were acquired and whether it can be changed.* The answer to this question points to the reasons for the difference in the past experience, or in attitudes towards *scientific truth*. In the current social circumstances deniers and destroyers of cultural values most commonly use mechanisms: *suppression* (suppression of consciousness, from unpleasant memories and unacceptable aspects of their behavior and the behavior of a group with which they identify), *rationalization* (justification of undesirable practices and bad deeds by socially acceptable motives), *projection* (attribution of other individuals, groups of individuals, and even, to the governments, own evil intentions and aggressive tendencies) and *identification* (identification with ideology, idealized individual, legend or myth in order to feel the self worth and pride for belonging to them).

Results of serious scientific research and verified experience contained in the individual and the collective memory of the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, show that there *are several approaches* to interpreting bosnianhercegovinian cultural events, many theoretical explanation, especially political, in considering the roots and meaning of expressed different individual or group memories, but *there are no more scientific truths of the same historical events, about the same events*, especially events related to *the war crimes, genocide, and urbicides by culturcide*. *Respect of scientific truth* about what is culture of Bosnia and Herzegovina, what is its centuries-old cultural tradition; its cultural heritage is an essential precondition of keeping its authentic cultural values. The peculiarity of the cultural survival principally manifest in esteeming *multicultural, multinational and multi-confessional essence of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian being lives for centuries despite* constantly present aspirations of various conquerors to challenge, threaten or violently destroy the fundamental basis of peoples centuries long life *in unity and diversity*. Appreciation of *scientific truth* is the proper way in finding pathways to overcome misunderstandings and conflicts between individuals and groups of individuals, in the exercise of tolerance between people of different ethnic and (or) religious belief in building bridges of cooperation between the state, which has prepared an aggression and a state which has defended herself.

## Historical facts talk about personality of Bosnian-hercegovian culture

In modern interpretations of credibility of historical events and behaviors of personality in them, their efforts of untrue presentations are visible. An interpreter of past event attempts to present them in the way which mostly corresponds to those who need *distortion* of historical facts, actually to individuals, groups of individuals, the dominant ideologies or influential centers of power. It is difficult to admit the truth of past events, especially the truth about war crimes or genocide, because the truth disturbs common self-confidence of these individuals about their own integrity, and erodes or completely destroys the myth of the "nobility", "moral greatness" and "heavenly cleanliness" of their ethnic group. Analysis of modern approaches in the falsification of past events show that the creators, bearers and executors of these efforts, have a good understanding of the psychological knowledge of *regularity of short-term and long-term memory* as well as means to abuse these important physiological processes. The need for "*wiping traces*" inwoven in the collective individual memory and reconstruction of real events, or even the construction of the new version of events by actual dropping, neglecting or transforming the actual facts into untruth, is result of conscious intention of holders of these approaches, so the traces of, to them unacceptable fact from past events, "covers oblivion". Built up of monuments, ceremonies and rituals, seeks also to bring to life the memory of the past but, unfortunately, in these manifestations as justified ways of unforgetting the past does not achieve what is an essential precondition for effective reconciliation: a scientific truth. Not bringing to life the past as it really was, but how organizers of those manifestations think "it was" conditions an increased level of assurance about the probity of actions, to those to whom, untruths about past fits, delays the process of catharsis where it is necessary and reduces the tolerance of frustration in interpersonal and intergroup relations.

In explaining the source of reasons for untrue presenting of past events and means of their lay or "scientific" justification, "interpreters" from various scientific disciplines, primarily in the social sciences: historians, political scientists, sociologists, lawyers, communicologists, psychologists and others appear. Given the importance of the psychological dimension of "cultural memory", psychologists usually indicate neuropsychological, psychological and psycho-social bases of memory and the "roads" that defense mechanisms, usually rationalization, projection, identification, regression serving the ego - trying to deny it, and ostracize falsify the actual truth about the past.

There are people living in Bosnia and Herzegovina for centuries who experience, regardless of their ethnic or religious affiliation, his native home, its environment in which they feel the best, experience joy when Bosnia progresses, grieve when she is suffering and defend her when is compromised. They defended and preserved its social personality in the various epochs of its long history. Dr. Fikret Bećirović "presenting original sources and psychologically accessible interpretations, illuminates everything that is important to understand the universal and specific beat of B&H cultural pulsations since the first days of its existence, its emergence and overgrowth in the times of the different civilizations that brought with them a lot and repulsive and unacceptable, that what in fact opposed the personality of mentality of the people of Bosnia and that they could not enter into themselves, as well as that valuable, spiritually receptive, human sublime, what is undeniable, but has gradually entered into the foundations of its culture" (Dizdarevic, 2013).

In well documented analysis of cultural events and personalities in them, especially in expressed contrasts of striving to keep primordial, unique and justified bosnianerzegovian identity of *unity in diversity* on the one hand, and efforts of denial of "Bosnian spirit" manifested in verbal denial and physical violence, in fact, in one-dimensional, religious and ethnic non tolerant ethno-nationalism, F. Bećirović points to the consequences of its manifestations in the last decade

of the twentieth century in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The concluding section of his study of cultural versatility and absurd crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, he notes that "in contrast to the common Bosnian cultural matrix of Bosnianhood, which was integrating factor commonly known as brotherhood and unity, and the dissolution of Yugoslavia, to the stage came rigid nationalists, who were discarding attributes of Bosnianhood, eagerly and hyperactively building up national "code" and even "passing the norm" in a grotesque way. Thus, very briskly and in a cruel way losing the Bosnian cultural versatility, which became prominent as a cultural value and wealth, suddenly differentiated by ethnic stiches with mutual animosities and negative charges. That way Bosnian identity was ruined, and a sharp nationalist was created, which brought many troubles, divisions, conflicts and crimes. In this tragic atmosphere Bosniak people passed the worse, to which the crime of genocide was committed "(Bečirović, 2013, pg. 405).

It is realistic to expect that any impartial investigator, in addition to the destructive revival of ethnocentric trends in culture, realizes the meaning of life and a sense of common backbone culture of Bosnia and Herzegovina, that its universality and cultural specificity is "the result of a multi-layer of living together in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with apparent numerous related elements and interconnections between the cultures of its modern inhabitants of Bosnians or Bosniaks, Serbs, Croats, Jews and members of other smaller national groups. Those are based on the traditions of the ancient beginning which should be sought in Illyrian, Thracian and old Slavic fundamentals and in the Bosnian medieval socio-historical sentiments "(Kujundzic, 2012, pg. 7). Documentary historical sources convincingly speak of *survival, contant outliving the one-dimensional ethnocentric closing, opposite to the fundamental pillar of Bosnian culture.*

The development of feelings of personal, spiritual values of each citizen is closely connected with the character and depth of weaving in his consciousness, in his memory of *BiH specific and universal cultural determination* and condemnation of any form of denial, especially the destruction of the spiritual and material basis on which this culture is based. In interpretation of the relation between the *specific and the universal concept of culture* and cultural heritage, one should always keep in mind, not only how the original, the Bosnian mentality of the inherent *cultural achievements of our pride, but also how much that what grew and grew in our cultural climate contributed to the value of diversity of the world, universal culture.* The fact is that Bosnian-Herzegovinian culture, enriched by valuable achievements of other cultures but also *its creative achievements, especially art, contributed to the development of other cultures.* In millennium-long history of B&H, its culture is preserved in "accordance with diversity", in the Bosnian heresy and cultural "difrentio specifica" in narratives and tradition, in the transfer of cultural models of living from outgoing generation to coming generations.

### **Destroyers of masterpieces cultural history**

The creators and executors of genocide and culturicide strived, by expulsion and killing of Bosniaks, destruction of institutions of great cultural importance (in the siege of Sarajevo, two important cultural institutions - City Hall and the Oriental Institute were shelled and burned) and by destruction and profanation of religious sacred, in order to "to delete from the individual and collective memory" historical truth that the Bosnian-Herzegovinian culture emerged and woven in experienced events and intimate beliefs that, it is possible, in complexitys of different cultural views, *in processes of multi-ethnicity and multi religiosity, to live happily and successfully operate.*

Content analysis and ways of psychological propaganda which was carried out before and during the application of the model of destruction of Bosnian culture, clearly shows that the ideologues and the executors of measures of cultural violence directed its activities in two

directions: (1) in the direction of raising awareness about *the moral justification of the destruction of Bosnian culture* among the citizens of their country, because this culture contradicts their "right" culture or a culture that is shaped by the "true historical values" and (2) in the direction of demonization, and the depreciation of "fairness" of fundamental destruction of the foundations on which the multi-ethnic and multi-religious life of the Bosnian man survived. Educators of potential iexecutors of destructive intentions of ethno-nacional ideologues, strived to revive or strengthen awakened traces of six centuries long implantation of untruths about the defeat in Kosovo as a victory, of themselves as "Heavenly people", on the need for achieving justified hatred of Turks and Muslims as "Poturice" (pejorative term for Bosnian converts to Islam, transl. rem.), because, as they pointed, they are responsible for all their troubles and hardships, and they tortured, persecuted and killed them. All this is done, especially by media manipulation, which could contribute to the belief that *evil is a moral act* if it is directed towards people who are "hostile" directed towards them, that desecration and destruction of Bosnian culture heritage an act not for condemnation, but an act that should *be honored and celebrated as the supreme act of patriotism*. It is obvious that this "ideologically concieved and systematically committed evil is not presented as pain and violence but as good, not as immoral but as morality. Evil has a clear goal, intention: to delete something that has evil as a legacy, not protect something good and valuable. To participate on the "right" side in the fateful battle. That is, that one is assigned the honor, not a punishment. To feel pride for its own and protected, not guilt or shame because of those expelled and destroyed "(Muratovic, 2014, pg. 113).

Atrocious consequences of mass ethno-nationalist manipulation, based on hatred and revenge, *encouraged by and developed by the holders of the highest state authority and of high church dignitaries*, citizens of Bosnia and Herecegovine experienced, especially Bosniaks and their cultural and religious sight. Results of scientific researches, verified experiential knowledge and dramatic testimonies of victims (inmates, raped women, eyewitnesses of destruction of cultural sights) eloquently speaks about the destructive, inhumane acts of perpetrators of evil. Ruined are or burned in flames valuable educational, cultural and religious buildings. *Burning of the City Hall and the Oriental Institute is the outcome of the planned destruction of the sources of the cultural identity of its citizens. Major works that written by Bosniaks, Croats, Serbs and Jews are burned in the City Hall and in the Oriental Institute, rich documentary material showing significant achievements in cultural creativity and for specific and universal cultural requirements disapered in flames.*

Objective facts about culturocide, contained in serious scientific studies and books, presented in excellent film and art creations and museums, unbiased point to the sources, trends and consequences of genocide, culturocide and urbicide. To illustrate culturocide in the Drina valley documented results, methodologically well founded research of Ph.D. Šemso Tucaković, the author of an important cultural and historical achievements, speaks the book "culturocide on the Drina". In this work, the author in the factual documented, not cold way, but in a warm, intimate description conceptually, revives our memories of the glorious fruits of oriental culture who, before their barbaric breakages by hate-intoxicated ideologues and executors of Greater pretensions, radiated its purity, benevolence, sublime beauty and genuine God-fearing. They ruthlessly desecrated, burnt and destroyed the cities of the Drina valley (Cajnice, Praca, Rudo, Rogatica, Visegrad, Vlasenica, Bratunac, Srebrenica, Zvornik and Bijeljina) everything that was radiant with beauty and functionality, everything that has silhouetted achievements of oriental culture, that talked about *the Bosniak ethnic identity and Islamic belief*.

Nicely described and documented complexity, by scientifically valid method of cognized facts about the origins, course, completion, and centuries of existence, the ultimate, *barbaric profanation and destruction of masterpieces*, evidently grown from a creative mind of humanity inspired master builders, Ph.D. Šemso Tucaković, by text and images, also vividly illustrates the

names of the famous Bosnians, prominent military and government figures of the Ottoman Empire which, most often, in their hometowns, villages and towns in Drina valley, endeavoured to initiate and fund mosques, bridges, and other city areas, aesthetically beautiful and functional cultural and religious buildings and wider space for contemporaries and future generations, as *lasting value*, *lasting token of cultural and religious identity of Bosniaks*. Historical sources and legends for themselves eloquently speak about who were the initiators, grantors and sincere devotees of the great creative architectural creations and how much attention was paid in selection of the best constructors and builders of its time. From selected gifted master builders whose creative personality traits and architectural craftsmanship were known, extreme highlights were expected, and builders have shown, by steadily, patient and inspiring realization of creative, obviously, the most beautiful and most functional ideas.

Documentary descriptions, based on scientifically valid research method of events and personalities, in 1992-1995., points to an extremely large numbers, ruined or in flames burnt, educational, cultural and religious, architectural beautiful and functional edifices. Šemso Tucaković, in nuanced and respectable delineation of beauty pervaded details of the interior, harmoniously and functionally shaped exterior of Aladža mosque, reveals not only the visible charms, but also the suspected, immersed in traces of interlaced yarns of architectural skill. The author writes about other components of the Aladža mosque woven into its original complexity, talk about the values for centuries admired by devotees of greatness of man, and about which compliments of scholars, especially historians and culturologists, islamicists and artists were given. About the value of the pearls of Islamic civilization, among other commendable rating, the author writes: "As an extremely valuable object of Islamic civilization and heritage of Bosniaks, as unequaled city decoration, Aladža Mosque, since its appearance attracted the attention of passers. Ordinary people admired its architecture, ornamentation and its mural painting as well as world travelers and diplomats of the past centuries whose paths and jobs induced to this Bosnian territory ... In recent decades a strong interest in Aladža mosque shown by investigators from our area, especially the time when that part of mighty Ottoman Empire. "

Destroyers have turned to ashes, a masterpiece of architecture, Aladža mosque, in early August 1992, after 442 years of its existence, leaving next to Čehotina indelibly act of darkness of hatred and absolute spiritual poverty. How much, intoxicated with hatred Serbian destroyers rejoiced, shown in organized ceremony at which, *desecrators and destroyers of religious and cultural relics were honored for their contribution to "Serbian heroism and Serbian spirit"*. Ph.D. Šemso Tucaković presents and places where visible marks of atrocities by myth possessed remained and how they spoke of themselves as "honorable" and "decent "defenders" of the "historic" heritage of "heavenly nation "expresses the attitude of expectation that *"the nation that spawned such barbarians, who they could resort to dynamite when it comes Aladža in Focai and other mosques, now and in the future, will be recognized by the acts which cultivated nations carry as burden of shame. For the commanders, the culture in Foca, Bosnia and for their descendants, it should be the dominant memory "*.

And prof. Dr. Fikret Becirovic, at the end of the description of his theoretical and empirical research on centuries of surviving unity in diversity, beliefs about the possibility of living together of people of different individual characteristics and different ethnic and religious affiliation, in fact, by full respect for the other and different in Bosnia and Herzegovina, notes that *"in the nationalist sharpened atmosphere the first attack was on the B&H identity and culture, because the planned division should build a new homogeneous identity, especially in culture, ideology, worldview and language, then B&H history should be tailored and then practically create great cultural distinctions till "candescence". This all in fact inevitably led to armed and "final showdown" with all the disturbing factors, either with the Bosniaks, who were the greatest "obstacle", or the*

*multiculturalists from all nations. In accordance with the already established ideology and the aggressor's plans, many were killed even before the official armed conflict, serving as tinder for a war flame, so all dosed the war option and inevitable Bosnian cataclysm"*(Bećirović, 2013, pg. 405).

### **Social impacts to change memory content**

Understanding the psychological aspects of the culture of memory implies *knowledge of the regularity of the process of remembering and forgetting which takes place in the most important organ of the central nervous system, in the brain*. Within a very complex and diverse functions performed by man's brain, it was found that the three functional systems participate in any form of mental activity. The first functional system allowing the brain to control the tone of the cortex or waking, the other performs the functions of receiving, processing and storage of information received, and the third functional system is responsible for programming, regulation and control of mental activity. The brain consists of white matter (nerve cell extensions) and gray matter (neuron bodies). Gray mass makes cortex (cortex), which is located on the outside of the brain. In the brain cortex important physiological and psychological processes that play a crucial role in *receiving, processing and archiving of information that come with the outside world* occur. Cortex, in fact, receives extrasensory stimuli, rework them, forms new connections and keeps them in the form of traces (engrams). The processes that occur in the cortex, in the psychological definition of memory are interpreted as *cognitive processes* of receiving, processing, retention, duration and renewal (reproduction). In compendiously determination of memory the *ability of retention (retention)* is emphasized as the most important determinant of memory. In the context of a compendiously defining remembering (memory), the term retention includes "adoption of information, as well as keeping, finding and reproducing them. Most authors consider that memory processes involve three basic operations: encoding, storage and retrieval. Encoding involves converting the input of sensory information in some kind of representation that can be stored in memory. Storage is related to the retention of information in memory, and finding how information in the memory become available "(Petz, 2005)

The psychological interpretation of the meaning of the term "declarative memory" emphasizes that this process takes place in the conscious memory of finding and reproducing remembered content, especially the content of events important for the individual and for the group to which it belongs. Although the scientific literature refers to sensory and short-term memory this time we will examine only the long-term memory, the memory of a large capacity, long-term retention of stored information (and even infinite) and obviously a significant impact on the attitudes and behavior of every person. In psychoanalytic interpretation of reasons for man's behavior, it is emphasized that his behavior is determined by memories of experiences from early childhood (Sigmund Freud, individual unconscious) or the revival of interweaving the lives of our ancestors in our subconscious (Carl Jung, the collective unconscious). This interpretation, in different psychological approach, confirms, scientifically and experientially know facts about genetically inherited and (or) by learning acquired contents of memory, long-term retention of traces memorized in the conscious and subconscious parts of the human brain.

It is obvious that this fundamental knowledge about the nature of long-term memory, can be used in a deeper and broader understanding of ancient and recent cultural history of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as in *differences in the experience* of the universal and the particular, contained in the processes of formation and enrichment of a single Bosnian cultural being, developed

from specific cultural trends that, *in the unity of diversity, loose nothing from its own peculiarities*. However, although the cultural unity in diversity is essential determinant of cultural characteristics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is evident that there lived, and still live opposite trends in which one-dimensional, ethno-nationalistic and negation trend of cultural values is also preferred. And *cultural memory*, understood as search of the adopted information, convincingly point to differences in the memories, on the one hand expressed in reproducing the content of long-term memory in terms of *commitment to unity in diversity* and on the other hand, the opposite, in denying existence of unique layer of Bosnian culture and *pronounced preference for ethnocentric concept of culture*. The views that are built on the "either-or" interpretation of past and present cultural trends - bosnianhercegovinian, "supranational" culturally complexity or exclusively ethnic cultural form still exists despite the historic foundations on which the Bosnian-Herzegovinian culture evolved and developed, in fact, not in the "either - or" but the "and –and"- *a single complexity of diversity that is best expressed as the Bosnian cultural mosaic composed of specific ethnic cultures* (Bosnian, Croatian, Serbian, Jewish and cultural trends of minorities).

Present variations in the memories strive to be interpreted as two acceptable "scientific truth", although, in the scientific interpretation of cultural events in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the most acceptable path is the approach, proven by appropriate scientific methods, and that, in accordance with that, can be accepted as scientific truth. In reliable explanation of complex cultural events and social relations, with these developments closely related, it is right to start from one scientific truth and from *more approaches* to interpreting. Results of serious scientific research and verified experience contained in the individual and the collective memory of the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, show that there are several approaches to interpreting bosnianhercegovinian cultural events, many theoretical explanation, especially political, in consideration of the roots and meanings of expressed different individual or group memories, *but not more scientific truths of the same historical process*, about the same events, especially events that are associated with *war crimes, genocide, urbicides and culturicide*.

The possible responses to questions about the reasons for verbal denial and, in the last decade of twentieth century, and distinctively expressed vandal destruction of fundamentals on which B&H cultural diversity in a single complexity was built and has existed for centuries, psycho-social interpretations allow a better understanding of the changes in the contents of memory which appear under the influence of increased ethnocentric trends. Preparation for the realization of Great serbian territorial claims necessarily entailed and action of ideologues, the holders of this destructive, inhumane, anti-cultural ideology in two psychological directions: (1) "brainwashing" the citizens of own country by revival of latently present myth of the Serbs as "Heavenly people" and "implantation" in their awareness of information on the justification of "righteous revenge" for all the "troubles" experienced by Serbs in its six-year history of the Turks and of "Poturica - converts to Islam" Muslims and (2) negation of national identity and denial of Islamic belief orthodoxy of majority of people of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosniaks and desecration and destruction of cultural fundamentals, in fact universal and specific cultural trends contained in a joint Bosnian-Herzegovinian mosaic, carriers and followers of these uncivilized, ethno-nationalist ideology, expected radical changes in the direction of their desirable expectations. No expected changes happen, but change did happen in the form of justifying and strengthening of long ingrained awareness of citizens of Serbia, stereotypes about extreme value of their national culture and nullity of culture of another nation, especially the Bosniak, which is also expanded and implanted not only during intense psychological propaganda, but for years, in the stories, the songs, usually with a fiddle, in described legends and myths about the past of the Serbian people, on its size and integrity, but also of their "troubles and tribulations" that they experienced in centuries long period of the Ottoman Empire. Students in schools gained knowledge which, as written in textbooks and lectured by professors, has to be acquired knowledge based on "historical truths."

Analysis of the behavior of war criminals clearly shows that the social impacts, expressed in need of reviving latently present aggressive contents of memory imprinted in the consciousness of citizens, who were not "burdened" by myths of their people and prejudices about other people, contents opposite to their, previous opinions and behaviors. The process of "revival" of latent memory traces, for centuries passed down from older generation passed to the younger, in the form of "facts" about the unjust, long timed martyrdom of the Serbian people and the need for execution of vengeance against "guilty" of their martyrdom, Turks and "Poturica", happened the way creators and carriers of policy of genocide and culturicide wanted it happening. Outcomes activated latent content of hatred and revenge have, in the behavior of war crimes, showed clearly in the physical and psychological violence, in the persecution and killing of innocent just because of their different ethnic and religious backgrounds. How, under social influence, saturated with the Greater Serbia, stereotypes and prejudices, latent desire for revenge was a strong motive for the committing of genocide in Srebrenica, points strong statement of war criminal Ratko Mladic imposed on the square in Srebrenica: "*Here we are on July 11 1995 in Serbian Srebrenica. On the eve of another Serbian holiday we give to Serbian people this city. Finally the moment came, that after uprising against the Dahi, we revenge to Turks in this area*" (Čekić, 2012, pg. 143). Statement of General "of the Army of the Republic Srpska" Ratko Mladic as obvious indicator of increasing demand for retribution, for decades instilled in him and his obedient followers, understood as a "legitimate" reason for revenge, as "righteous motive" for the persecution, torture and murder of innocent people of Srebrenica, and because they carry the "blame" for the plight of the Serb people.

It is obvious that, genocidal and kulturocidal behavior, could be expected of individuals and groups of individuals who have been, most likely exposed to the transfer of the same contents of memory from older to the younger generation, especially from parents to children in families, on the justification of retribution, because established beliefs did not change, but only added to the strong social pressures. However, the question of why there has been a change in the behavior of citizens who did not display an ethnic or religious intolerance towards others, especially the feeling of hatred and "moral justification" of physical and psychological violence against members of people who, in the electronic and print media, have been pronounced "guilty" for economic and social troubles of the Serbian people. The changes most likely occurred due to impacts of frequent presentation of "true" reasons, emotional stereotypes formed in the electronic and print media as the *majority opinion*, especially when it was sensed or completely learned, from the presented "reasons", and that with reported "arguments" the highest organs of state power, high religious dignitaries and members of SANU (Serbian Academy of Science and Art, rem. of inter.) agreed. Powerful social impacts of majority contributed to *the repression, reconstruction and, even in deleting, in their memory, previously established any ethnic and religious tolerance content*. Their conforming with majority views manifested in either verbal support of aggressive, genocidal kulturocidal Slobodan Milosevic's policies, or active participation in civic activities necessary for the exercise of conquest plans or, in their direct participation in the violence against innocent people and the destruction or desecration of their cultural heritage. Research in social psychology convincingly show that people most often conform to informational social influence, when they are in social circumstances of *crisis*, when the situation is *unclear* and when they are exposed to convincing "powerful" individuals, highly valued authority in those areas. In situations like these most do not know what to do or what was going on, therefore, "consequently we behave like everyone else, we conform, but not because we are weak or invertebrates without own support. Instead, the influence of other people leads us to conform because we see their interpretation of unclear situation as more accurate than our and it will help us choose appropriate behavior (Aronson, Wilson, Akert, 2005, pg. 255).

Which solution has been available to the citizens of Serbian nationality? The only one that is public, the media propagated and offered as a "broad peoples support" aggressive intentions of Slobodan Milosevic and his followers - the military, scientific and religious authorities. Public backdown and private acceptance of destructive, anti cultural plans and operational solutions also resulted from disseminated falsehoods about the "real danger", coming from those, who followers of occupational aspirations of Slobodan Milosevic, declared enemies of the Serbian people, among which dominant role Bosnian Muslims have. In order to convince its citizens, using contrived falsehood about vulnerability of Serbian people, followers of Greater Serbia territorial claims have attempted to realize, by presenting falsehoods as "source of truth", and incongruent change in attitude, not just congruent (enhancing latent stereotypes and prejudices about Muslims). Incongruent change of attitude, actually change of already formed attitude on equal rights of the people, and the intimately experienced or perceived sense of brotherhood and unity, to completely opposite attitude, the attitude of denial of the value of a nation and the glorification of the value of another. Resistance to change of attitude could be expected of members of the Serbian people, in fact, of a number of Serbs who lived and gained knowledge of "brotherhood and unity as the pupil of the eye" and who were exposed to "justification" of acceptance of a completely opposite point of view, point of view in which request for deletion or suppression of rationally accieed and emotional accepted and in memory long-termly retained attitude. Given the "ethnocentric demand" for deleting the information in the memory most directly directed towards the citizens of the state of Serbia and the Serbs who were born and who lived in Bosnia-Herzegovina, because to them, staying on the earlier proper attitude meant, to experience the unpleasant consequences: *isolation and rejection of the majority or punishment*. They felt, if counteract the influence of the majority, they will be "charged" to be cooperating with enemies of Serbs: the "apostates" of the Orthodox faith, "Poturicama" who are now, like in the past, trying to destroy everything that makes the culture of the Serbian people, to challenge and reduce the value of that is woven into construct of that culture- hospitality, warmth and love of justice.

Psychological analysis of the effects of social pressure of social majority clearly shows that there has been a change not only in the circumstances the changing congruent attitudes, but also in cases of incongruent, but the length of the process of conformation and depth of "deletion" of traces memorized content was different. Differences in resistance to attitude change expressed in citizens who were exposed convincing that it is necessary, and "it is better for them", to changes previously formed attitudes into opposing presented as social attitudes of the majority, and as attitudes "all Serbs", manifested in the differences in resistance and intimately experienced and explicitly expressed attitudes. The strongest social impacts were noticed when the "alarm appeal" (defense of "hints" of destruction of the Serbian people), which was permeated not only in numerous, ideological and emotionally colored, slogans, but when the ideologues of great serbian territorial claims, falsehood of "the threat to the Serbian people" founded on construed assumption that the "threat to Serbian people" built on the intention of the "enemy" of Serbian people to stop achiving the two most important global life goals - survival and safety. The difference in the level of resistance to change incruent attitude dependeds on the depth and durability of storage contents of memory, intelligence, suggestibility and tolerance to frustration.

Results of social impact and most personality traits of citizens to change their outcomes, previously formed attitudes, the attitudes that are, in a country that was preparing for aggression and genocide preferred by state and religion, in a country with a strong economic, political and psycho-social problems and troubles, were visible in the behavior of actors in these events. Experimental studies of Muzafer Sherif (influence of social norms), Solomon Asch (influence of group pressure) Milligrams (obedience to authority) and studies of other social psychologists have pointed to psychosocial reasons in individuals conforming with thoughts and behavior of the majority. Results of experimental investigations, among other things, pointed out that certain

circumstances lead to conforming and that "certain situations have particularly more impressive effect, for example, when the conforming phenomenon is associated with features of the group. People conform most when faced with the unanimous reports of three or more attractive, high-status people. Also, they conform most when their responses are public (in the presence of the group) and made without prior commitment" (Mayers, 1999, pg. 236). Experiments of social psychologists have shown that conforming depends on gender, personality traits and culture. It was found that females are more prone to conforming than males, and that "Global personality scores are poor predictors of specific acts of conformity but better predict average tendencies to conformity (and other social behavior). Trait effects are strongest in "weak" situations where social forces do not overwhelm individual differences. Although conformity and obedience are universal, culture socializes people to be more or less socially responsive"(Mayers, 1999, pg. 243).

These experimental findings can serve as an acceptable illustration in explaining the difference between the citizens of Serbia to agree with the attitudes of the majority. Some of them, "wisely" verbally expressed their agreement with the views of social majority and lingering in memory their former attitudes expressed in respect of other persons characteristics, ethnicity and other religious belief. Others, with rational reconstruction of their own memories, and even construction of new attitudes with strong emotional enthusiasm, showed their diligence to destructive, aggressive movements. Third have, not only with earlier rational and emotional transformation, in the socialist state organization developed beliefs, but also in behavioral readiness showed how loyal they are to Slobodan Milosevic's policies and how they want to practically demonstrate their belief in the "justification", "justice" retribution for all, centuries of injustice, which Serbian people suffered. These types of triple change of incongruent attitudes were, expressed by practiced behavior, during the war. The first have preserved in their memory their original belief "situational conforming", formally, seemingly expressing their loyalty and avoiding anything that could lead to distortion of their basic, honorable and humane beliefs. Individuals and groups of individuals who sought to radically delete, in fact to rationally reconstruct traces of previously stored information, to "prove" how much they are willing to participate in premium, state and religious institutions and organs planned realization by versatile, enthusiasm and patriotic activity,. The third have, most likely, their rational and emotional diligence, and behavioral readiness, expressed in persecution and killing of innocents and destruction of other cultural heritage. It is obvious, these characteristic forms are changes of a earlier attitudes, beliefs or behaviors towards acceptance of destructive, aggressive, evil norms of social behavior, or their compatibility with the imposed standards but their conformity is not manifestation in the same way: *some stayed at the level of implicit consent, second by rational procedures of emotional enthusiasm, proved how loyal to the current political trend they are and attitudes, beliefs and behavior of the thirds, proved to be accepting evil as morale and committed crimes without shame and remorse.*

Memories are not equal to the perceived knowledge, because qualitative change happens. Memory accuracy significantly depends on one hand, on *the depth of context of information processing and the interval length between*, and the gained knowledge acquisition or experiential experience of individual major cultural events and the length of time in memory, on the other. This means that finding stored information is better if the depth of information processing was higher. The memory is also more accurate if the context memories "correspond" to the context, mood, physiological condition, situational frames and other significant psychosocial factors of memorizing. The length of the passage of time from remembering to memories significantly affects the memory accuracy.

#### **Denial of cultural values by defense mechanisms**

In the context of generally accepted interpretations of culture, its meaning, normative design and intensity of its activities in the process of socialization of personality in defining the structure and values of bosnianhercegovinian culture, regarded as a *unique complexity of diversity*, it is obvious that it is not different from the world's cultural value trends. B&H culture meets the criteria of universality and specificity criteria, encourages every form of contribution to the cultural progress, constructively unites different manifestations of spiritual and material cultural products and preferred requirements respecting human rights norms, contributes to the achievement of important preconditions for the development of socially and emotionally healthy person, allows if an individual wishes to express the self in the experience of a number of human identity (personal, ethnic, religious, national, cosmopolitan and ...), encourages the transfer of human values to a new generation, and prevents the transfer of intolerance, hatred and malice and ... to the younger generation.

There is an ample evidence, scientifically established and empirically tested, about killing, torture and persecution of Bosniaks and destruction of their cultural heritage, of which we spoke above. Apparently, it is most likely that in the minds of the pioneers of perpetrator and evil, lives the belief that military means could not in the end, realize their plan and that it should continue through other means by which it is possible to negate this culture's personality by suppression and (or) complete "erasing" learned memories acquired through experience learned values, *in the form of memory traces*, living in the consciousness of every citizen that considers Bosnia and Herzegovina homeland. Realization of denial of cultural values sought to be achieved in various ways, especially through degradation of valuable artistic achievements of writers, painters and creators of achievement and by denying *the scientific truth* about the demolition and destruction of cultural values during aggression and the identified intentions that successors of these destructive plans want to realize.

Analysis of statements of the main genocide and culturicide successors and creators clearly shows that they, in open or ambiguous statements, express their disagreement with the evidence of atrocities of their counterparts. For them, mass graves, especially in Srebrenica and Lipošnica, tortures in dungeons and detention camps and traces destruction of cultural and religious heritage of Bosnia and Herzegovina's, and especially results of unbiased scientific research on the roots and consequences of the aggression on Bosnia and Herzegovina, are not evidence of evil intentions and actions of creators and executors of criminal activity, but an act of "righteousness", acts of "moral retribution for centuries of martyrdom of the Serbian people committed by the Turks and Poturice (converts to Islam)". Their belief based on untruths lives, in their minds as truth and as a "moral obligation" to continue that what is done but not completed by means of war, to complete it by psychological means. They are not "burdened" dilemma to do or not to do that what threatens another, but how to realize, for them, most desirable effects in *justification* of destructive actions of their counterparts in war circumstances while their effect at the same time is not evaluated as cultural destruction, but neighbors well intention. Norwegian philosopher Arne Johan Vetlesen, a connoisseur on the causes and consequences of genocide, culturicide and urbicide, aware of the dangers that might be repeated, points to the need and importance of *not forgetting these crimes*. He, in his essays on genocide, unlike most genocide researchers, focuses on the victims. In his works, he pays special attention to still present intention, to impose guilt (to the killed) and shame (to survivors) to the victims of genocide. When one reads Vetlesen's scientific explanation, such intention aiming to blame the victim can not escape the impression that it is a part of a political project, still at work in a new skillfully packed form, planning and organizing the incomprehensible to happen again. Projects themselves for execution of the crime, noted to be carried out by innocent people who will on the sign of authority obey orders and execute cruelest crimes without questions about ideology, under whose flags they kill, are almost unreal. Conscious, emotionally intelligent man can not accept this kind of crime nor any "violence" because it is bizarre, (evil) something

artificial, unnatural, something that is not from God, far from perfect. It is not mandatory that "happens once again in the same form and against the same group and by the same executors, but it can" happen" unless conditions for genocide prevention are made" (Muratovic, 2014, pg. 212).

One of acceptable psychological approach in such circumstances is a way of using personality defense mechanisms. Defense mechanisms noted by Sigmund Freud long ago defined as "a revolt against the ego's painful and unbearable affects of perceptions", commonly used in circumstances of *negating the value of experiencing joint, in diversity of cultural creativity, in justifying the destruction of the foundations of culture, in interpretation of unfair conduct as fair, in finding "evidence" about the impossibility of living together of groups of different ethnic or religious affiliation or in any circumstances in which ethnocentric syndrome is not respected*. In the current social circumstances critics and destroyers of cultural values most commonly use following mechanisms: suppression (suppression of consciousness, from unpleasant memories and unacceptable aspects of their behavior and the behavior of a group with which they identify), rationalization (justification of undesirable procedure and bad deeds by socially acceptable motives), projections (attribution of own evil intentions and aggressive tendencies to other individuals, groups of individuals, and even, to the governments) and identification (identification with ideology, idealized individual, legend or myth in order to feel the self worth and pride for belong to them).

Still there is no valid psychosocial research that would likely confirm characteristic forms of manifestation of personality defense mechanisms. Distinctively small numbers of individuals, especially genuine believers wants to "forget" their crimes, to *suppress* them by being silent, by the feeling of "internal pressure" when they think about their mostly "remote" participation in genocide and culturocide. In behavior of the largest number of war criminals now on trial and those who are still not brought to justice, it is observable that they attempt to "justify" their commitment to their crimes by reasons preferred in their areas, which agrees with their crimes explicitly or implicitly. By *rationalization* as defense mechanism, they try to prove the moral correctness of their evil deeds, and deeper and more lasting, and not only to social group who feel that their crimes are not immoral actions, but also to individuals and groups of individuals who, on the contrary, consider their crimes not source pride and honor, but a source of shame and inhumanity, to the people from which they originated. Third, *project onto others*, to the "Turks", "Poturice" apropos "Balije" (pejorative term for Bosniaks, rem. by inter.), their own intentions, their personality, their destructive beliefs. They claim that others are to blame for all their troubles, that they were defending themselves from "threats" and the planned "persecution, torture and murder" of "sworn enemies" of the Serbian people "in fact of peaceful, innocent people who in conditions of war were their victims. A number of children and elderly murderers, executor of rape of women and destroyers of cultural values of Bosniaks, in their behavior distinctively manifests *identification* with superior creators and instigators of genocide and culturocide, with the myth of the "heavenly people", with "historical truths" as falshood, with apparent obedience as evidence of unreserved loyalty to objectives of great serbina aspirations.

Deniers of, obvious traces of centuries steady special unity in diversity of culture of Bosnia and Herzegovina, built on respect for specific diverse cultural aspirations and traditions, even today tend to "prove" that intricacy common in diversity never worked and that even initiated in some earlier historical periods, did not exist long, because it did not "satisfy" cultural trends of the time, to them in fact, the only valuable, one-dimensional, closed ethnic aspirations. And because of this, in the minds of deniers, woven "facts" of "worthlessness", for centuries surviving, *universal and specific* cultural heritage of Bosnia and "manifested aggressive intentions" of builders and guardians of fruits of cultural unity, deniers today still perceive as "just retribution" and as a "moral act". The outcomes resulted planned and realized persecution and killings of innocent people and

the destruction of cultural and religious heritage and buildings, atrociously manifested in the last decade of the twentieth century in thinking and behavior of deniers, not experienced as evil, but as "unimportant" event that should be permanently forgotten.

Should be forgotten, as it is not been scientifically "proven" that genocide and culturicide was executed in Bi&, and neither should be proven because results of scientific research contribute, as deniers insist, not to *truth*, but to the new "demonization of the Serbian people. By this, indeed unscientific attitudes, they are trying to "consent", in fact to coerce victim to "erase" traces of their misdeeds from memory, that they "forget" because, as they consider, that is the best "way to reconciliation". In elaborate psychological program deniers of cultural values of another it is assumed to be possible, in denial of atrocities, by using defense mechanism of *rationalization* to achieve "*justification*" for killing the others and deny destroying the foundations of their culture, just because they are different ethnicity and different faith. Psychological analysis of practiced behaviors and actions of denial reveals that the deniers use psychological knowledge in order to create confusion and that they take current events and needs reasonable grounds to "justify" the atrocities, to achieve "scientific" debate in which by dialogues about trivial aspects of committed atrocities they ignore and blur actual crimes, emphasize pragmatism and political reality, because "clearing up the real roots and consequences of genocide and culturicide" does not contribute to world peace and the like. Deniers point to different paths, but not the right ways of processing of creators and perpetrators of genocide and culturecide, expressing feelings of responsibility and remorse for committed crimes and the "liberation from adopted prejudices and stereotypes about the other, a *catharsis*."

Continued denial of the crimes committed and obvious expression of resistance to the prohibition of the denial of genocide, are motivated by similar reasons that dominated during the psychological preparation of genocide and culturicide. In fact, criminal and destructive forms of cultural manifestation ethnocentric syndrome, observed during the period of psychological preparation for genocide, are still observable today. They manifest, implicitly or explicitly, in *fear of punishment* for the atrocities done and in pursuit of self satisfying exit from perceived state of helplessness, frustration and bitterness. At the time of preparation of genocide "exit" from the state of individual and group frustration was "located" in *grandiosity, in the sense of persecution and aggression*. Given that the Serbian people are "above" other peoples bothers others, especially Bosniaks, therefore they seek to prevent the development of the Serbian people and to "subjugate" and "destroy" them. From perceived feeling of being "endangered" aggression resulted, because as stated, we must defend ourselves, because we are "under attack." This is the obvious example of projection as defense mechanism, still used in denial of the genocide.

Deniers "defend" themselves or like-minded people - planners and perpetrators of crimes against other nations, attributing hostile intentions to others for criminal acts committed themselves (and today, despite numerous evidence of the killings of the people of Sarajevo in Markale by shells from Serbian positions, point out that Muslims killed themselves). They do so in fact, using the defense mechanism of projection to themselves good intentions, and the other evil. Continued behavior of deniers, filled with *prejudices and stereotypes retained about themselves and others*, of active participants in the realization of violence and those who approve supported it, obviously does not lead to good: *to tolerant relations between people of different ethnic and (or) religious affiliations, true reconciliation and experiences of feelings of justice in the souls of victims of genocide and culturicide*. One of the most important psychological conditions for achieving good is to experience feelings of remorse by perpetrators and their followers. Do they still believe that violent ways of satisfying their personal needs at the expense of others are justified human actions, and whether they think now that the myth of historical events followed without questioning, historical truth and not misconceptions or falsehood? Do they, by and large, ready for *awakening*,

*personal catharsis* or, in turn, continue to work on the persistence of earlier methods and approaches that have led to conflicts between people and which, even today, bring anxiety and discomfort to people trying to live in peace. *Scientific knowledge and personal experiences undoubtedly show that no radical change in understanding of own misdeeds of criminals and their institutional and personal protectors and that their non awakening, greatly complicates the process of reconciliation. Most criminals do not manifest feelings of guilt or remorse for the crimes committed. They even think they are not guilty because the crimes they committed they do not consider crimes but "righteous deeds".*

Confession is an important precondition to experience feelings of guilt. Honest confession in itself carries the knowledge of the committed atrocities, conviction of crime holder and personal participation in it and the need to seek forgiveness from victims of own crimes. The feeling of guilt resulting from a sincere confession may not be linked to the fear of punishment. Guilt is based on internal turbulence, the feeling of painful and difficult, and not the fear of punishment. Researchers of psychological phenomena of feelings of guilt and remorse Roy F. Baumeister, Arlene M. Stillwell, and Todd F. Heatherton (1994) suggests *three reasons* why the victim of a crime could feel better when they learn of an admission of guilt. First, the feeling of guilt by criminal points to the *presence of care in criminal for victims of crimes*. Second, if the offender pleads guilty, the victim can see his confession as an implicit confirmation that the *offense will not be repeated* or as realization of non-specific obligations of offender towards the victim. Victims expected better treatment in the future and the third, the victim can understand confession of crime as a form of "earned revenge". The victim, in fact, can feel satisfaction by knowing that criminal suffers from feelings of guilt. Miguel Asturias of Guatemala, Nobel Prize winner for Literature, on one occasion, spoke great deal of psychological truth, in the words "The eyes of the victims will be closed when justice is accomplished or will never close."

### **Revival of traditional cultural values**

We are in a very complex social circumstances, in finding the best solutions in the rehabilitation of destroyed and damaged cultural values in creating suitable precondition for versatile development of all types of cultural creations in encouraging higher quality of education of youth and adults in acquisition of culturally valuable insights. Development of sensitivity for true artistic accomplishments is important, and in fact development of a more critical attitude towards the aspirations, no matter where they come from, where tendencies to belittle peculiarities of bosnianhercegovinian culture, expressed in unity in diversity. Diligence in *guarding* the Bosnian cultural identity, often symbolically expressed in the phrase "Bosnian spirit", actually presented in the content and the form in which, in the long history of Bosnian statehood, in addition to distinctive efforts and pressures by occupying government to deny it, not only preserved, but also *enriched*. Enriched by introducing that what, in other civilizations was noted culturally worth and rejecting the standards of other cultures conflicting particular complexity, authentic structure, "the spirit" of Bosnian culture.

The experience of previous builders and guardian of Bosnian cultural are important messages and teachings that, today, we should act in preserving the cultural traditions and which paths to go in fostering and developing cultural standards tailored on the needs and demands of citizens. In terms of expressed demands for greater knowledge and closer experience in achievements of our rich cultural heritage, the message that the history- teacher of life, very long ago before more than two thousand years, Marko Tlulija Cicero sent, further develops the constructive intentions. In revival and development of cultural models that best fit not only to rich cultural knowledge of our past, but also successful application of the most effective measures to prevent culturally destructive intentions and behavior of denier in their denying of unity in

diversity, their persistent expansions of prejudice and stereotypes about the essence of our cultural past and reality, in fact, falsehoods based on the ideology of radical nationalism.

Success of deniers, in their denying the value of cultural diversity in unity, depends not only on the knowledge and skills of psychological actions of cultural destruction, but also on, unfortunately, that what is *today observable in behavior of people who, under the strong influence of other cultures, exhibit higher level of conformity and less criticism towards intentions of these cultures and, indirectly, less interest in the last cultural traditions and current cultural achievements of zealous workers*. It is evident that a number, younger and older, citizens remember less that, for preservation of bosnianhercegovinian personality culture expressed in the unity of the different cultural aspirations, in fact needed, as if consciously or unconsciously forgetting learned in the family and schools, as well as that, through life experience gained on great creative achievements of our artists and scientists, and what, in the course of personal and social life, convicts on the strength and beauty of unity of diverse cultural practices and aspirations of different ethnic groups. It is observable that people who live in Bosnia and Herzegovina, who were born in it and who identify themselves as its citizens, level of their knowledge and the depth and breadth of interest in everything, bosnianhercegovinian culture makes it special, not in accordance with expectation, because feeling that one is a citizen of *his country*, implies knowing what it is, and that is its culture. In fact, their memory is not long retained valuable knowledge about the cultural, material and spiritual, creations, traditions, rituals and customs that have lived for centuries in the "collective memory", and far more in their memories retain cultural trends that come from other countries of the world, towards which they, as descendents of great ancestors, do not relate as earlier generations: open to new values and critical culturally less significant and even non significant in relation to the nature and level of bosnianhercegovinian culture.

Phenomenon of complete "deletion" in the memory of previous content, under the influence of other content or, perhaps its' not retention in long-term memory due to non-renewal are, in a significant number of psychological, experimental research, proven. The results of psychological empirical research can be applied in explaining why forgetting happens, or weakening or disappearance of personal and collective cultural memory. Learned are the changes that occur during reproducing that what has been remembered. The research results actually show that the authentic content of memory "deforms", and that expressed does not correspond to the retained. In fact, under the influence of simplification and rationalization, *memories are not a faithful reproduction of events*; they are not their "image", but reconstruction of the original experience. Experts in memory regularity stress that memory is not a faithful reproduction of the original experience, but the *reconstruction, and sometimes entirely new design*. Certain parts are lost, amendments by new elements are done, connecting these elements into a new whole occurs. Distorted cultural memories are often the outcome of prejudice and stereotypes.

How much is regularity of memory process present in consciousness of deniers, clearly shown in contents of their statements, consistently continuing the destructive motives of like mind, and self deceiving that they are right, although not objectively.

Their belief in the appropriateness of their, indeed culturally destructive methods, is built on total reconstruction or construction of new beliefs completely opposite to the truth. In the previous considerations we have, in a few places, pointed to the possible psychological roots of aggressive behavior of destroyers of Bosnian cultural and religious sanctities and their present followers who are trying to "prove" the lack of special cultural complexity in unity and diversity. Meaning, based on scientific evidence, approaches and actions of deniers, can most likely be explained by changes in content of long-term memory caused by intense activity of social factors, especially political

ones towards *deleting or suppression of truthful cognitions* about the character of Bosnian culture and "implanting" in the minds of the subjects of their ethnic groups, *false, destructive content*.

An essential precondition for keeping the true cultural values of Bosnia and Herzegovina is, theoretically and empirically researched realization of the truth about its centuries created and carefully preserving culture. *Respect of scientific truth* about what is culture of Bosnia and Herzegovina, for centuries created, defended from denial of objective values and attempts to destroy and what we can expect in the coming process of its development. The first requirement of respect for scientific truth is related to learning about what is scientifically proven on the status and achievements of Bosnian-Herzegovinian culture, especially achievements in artistic creativity and persistence of preservation of characteristics authentic traditions and customs, standards of living and behavior of various ethnic groups. The need for a deeper exploration of the history of Bosnian culture since ancient beginnings to today, manifested in keeping their autonomy, contained in the "spirit" of universality and distinctiveness, applies only to those who, out of ignorance, express negative attitudes by the standards of our culture, but also to the citizens BiH who also from ignorance about genuine values and the high values of their culture, express not only the lack of interest, but also the need for *greater conformity, prominent conformity with other cultures*. The tendency to increase knowledge about past and contemporary cultural trends and standards and increase assurance about the value of it does not mean closure, because the culture of BiH endure to assimilate valuable achievements of other cultures with carefully preserving its distinctive cultural identity. It is also important to know how those who deny the cultural values and traditional ways of life are evinced and supported, who idealize single-mindedness and ethnic nationalism and who holders of evil declare righteous and mighty. In explaining the sources and consequences of negation trends, in addition to psychosocial, historical, legal, sociological, political science and other scientifically valid knowledge are particularly important.

In the dialogues, in optimal conditions of tolerance of diversity, by *scientific truth* it is possible to confirm the validity of own memories or, perhaps, to know the sources of own misconceptions about essential determinants of Bosnian unity in CULTURE diversity. In fact, to know and to eliminate effects of prejudices and stereotypes that are stored in our individual memory or, more broadly, in the collective one. It is also possible to expect dialogue and agreement on the need to intensify introduction of the content and trends of culture in primary, secondary and university education programs. The need for greater identification with the Bosnian culture, with its genuine values and its real potentials supportive for efficient exercise of cultivation is an important prerequisite of reviving the value systems of culture. It is significant because it results from the circumstances and the expected social change in which Bosnia and Herzegovina is at present, which in itself, clearly shows how, today, it is essential to realize the important, social preconditions in which Bosnian-Herzegovinian culture, in its special complexity in unity in diversity nourishing appropriate cultural values, by most preferred cultural values, to those who the best reflect cultural aspirations of our country and those who speak of the world's most renowned cultural trends. There is no doubt that the process of cultivation would go in the right direction, in the direction of greater acquisition of knowledge about the values of own culture and the cultures of other countries, greater respect for the cultural heritage of own country and active participation in programmed cultural activities. The outcomes of these approaches and appropriate procedures in the promotion of culture would, obviously, significantly contribute to deeper retention in long-term memory, acquired knowledge about the fundamental values of Bosnian culture contained in its long history and contemporary achievements.

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## **Historical and contemporary dimensions of the phenomenon of hatred in the former Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Herzegovina**

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### **ABSTRACT**

Despite the fact that man's hatred towards someone or something is primarily the concern of psychologists, it is an important social phenomenon in this region that is strongly influenced by social processes and events both historical and contemporary. One could even argue that today hatred is essentially determined by the political process. It is the driving force in crisis situations.

The promoters of hate are not just politicians. Others that have had an important role include the media, intellectuals, and religious leaders.

Why is the hatred present today? Why do we create more fear and hatred rather than build trust? Why do we spend more time scratching the wounds of the past than we do looking to the future?

Can BiH society in general get out of this situation?

***Keywords: hatred, destruction, nationalism, politics***

### **How to understand the hatred as a flexible phenomenon**

Hate exists in humans as an instinct which defends them against other humans or for them to cause harm as a means to achieve some of their objectives. That innate instinct forms deeply held beliefs in individuals and groups that construct their social identity and that of their enemies which are grounded in supposed "facts."

The hatred that exists in man may be the result of the long-term memory of the individual or collective memory, which is rich in facts about accidents, wars, and killings, especially negative things. This history of bad memories undoubtedly contributes to the existence of hate. Hatred and revenge are therefore strong drivers of many human activities. For almost every nation, like every individual, especially those that have lived longer, there is reason to blame men or nations that it for any bad treatment or outright hostility. The only question is how one will react to the evil done to them. For this there is already a common maxim - forgive but do not forget, remember and not forgive.

Different forms and manifestations of hatred are created out of and operate according to the laws of a spiraling system. Simply put, this hatred is food for itself. Hate is revenge for hate. Here lies, among other things, the existence of individual and collective memories.

These awakening memories of "our" dead, the injustices and atrocities that "we" are applied to re-living memories of someone else's evil and its removal from the darkness of the past and forgetting to see the light of day.

This should convince us that between our former calamities or the eternal and the present moment nothing significant has happened other than "our" unwarranted and unjust oblivion.

Thus, once the open hatred never closes, history turns into a rhythmic, jerky outburst of unrestrained hatred in which we lick our wounds and carefully preserve our memories.

When this happens and it encourages conflicts between people of different faiths and nationalities, then it is no longer necessary to evoke memories, they are already revived and every day the number of reasons for revenge increases.

### **Hatred as a social phenomenon**

Hatred in the historical sense as well as today in this region has become a very important social phenomenon that has strongly influenced social processes and events not only when these so-called crisis situations are in question. Today one might even say that hatred essentially determines the political process, especially in BiH.

Hate is a significant factor that appears in the disintegration processes, the processes of disintegration of a complex state community...

This hatred towards others is a consequence insight that other are to blame for not achieving the goals, as a result of memory or recollection of the time killing each other, was the main driving force that brought together and motivated, especially extreme nationalists, who were known as having a special role in crisis situations.

Hate that certainly has roots in the great differences in religion and culture is an integral part of the project of creating national states that are seeking a way out of the complex multinational state community. In addition to politicians, the media, intellectual, religious and other from the country and abroad are particularly engaged to this.

The aim of stimulating hatred and the showing of difference which wished to show as large and insurmountable were a complete negation of the value achieved in the same state. The ferocity of the conflict, various forms of crimes against civilians and soldiers and hatred that they feel is much greater within their own state than when it comes to conflicts of different countries.

How did it happen that hatred become such a significant factor in social processes, particularly in the war? How did the national policy, media, intellectuals and religion influence this...

### **Hatred as a generator and initiator of nationalism**

In the analysis of nationalists or as they are called nationalistic ideologists, there are several elements: loyalty to any person or any other entity; belief that the compatriots are in many ways superior to members of other ethnic groups; neglect or denial of the rights and interests of other national groups, which entails a feeling of hostility towards them; strongly expressing the belief that the individual fate depends on the fate of the national group.

Nationalist messages are always meant to provoke emotions rather than intellectual ideals. The aim is to appeal to powerful emotions (associated with a defensive reflex towards their own national group and hatred toward members of other, mainly rival national bodies) which will be enthralled in critical reasoning of those messages.

In the second half of the 19th century and in the first century of its existence, nationalism was a movement of the elite, the upper strata, especially the middle class that has been on the rise. Only in the twentieth century nationalism became a mass movement in which, as was noted by Kohn, seeking the participation of the masses, because people know what is good for them and what is not... Glorification of the little guy and placing him in the center of the action is the basis of populism in these movements. These populist nationalist movements sometimes (as it happened in the region of 90's of the last century) have an epidemic that is casual and temporary as all other forms of epidemics.

Nationalism is an ideology of closure, and turning towards the past. It glorifies the form of human community in which people are closely linked, depend on each other, follow tradition tied to the land, and are suspicious of strangers. These movements glorify epic culture, seeking support and inspiration in the traditions and rituals where they see a pledge of identity, its own ethnicity and compatriots.

In this respect, any acceptance of customs, views, signs which do not have indigenous, original ethno-national character and approaching international standards, causing a backlash and even public condemnation because it is treated as pollution authentic, national expression, as an act of negation of national identity.

### **What is the main reason for the popularity of nationalism?**

"It seems to me that the most convincing answer lies in the fact that nationalism provides an escape from triviality. People who live in troubled times, implicitly or explicitly, are questioning themselves: what's happening to us? The nationalist answer is unequivocal: the nation is reborn; it is fighting against the enemy and its own independence. This answer never contains the whole truth, and sometimes there is absolutely nothing to do with the truth ... "(Minogue, 1970: 32).

This awakening of nationalism occurred in this region in the early.

After the fall of communism and after the collapse of the state in the institutional sense, a difficult national conflict emerged. Dr.Franjo Tudjman says "communist, a communist and anti-communist, the Russians or the Americans, those who are willing to destroy Yugoslavia, to destroy by dialectic words or dynamite, to destroy it at any cost." (F Tudjman, 1987: 404).

Izetbegovic writes in "Islamic Declaration" about his crucial thesis: "Islam is the integral form of life and cannot be matched with any other political and social order." Biljana Plavsic, emphasizing the thesis of Serbs as "heroic" and "heavenly" people in this rapture stated that it would be justified to have half of the Serb population killed for the idea of a great Serbian state. This atmosphere was therefore ideal for the accumulation of frustration and hatred and has definitely created the conditions for the ethnic-religious war. Such a situation was particularly present in BiH, where there were objective and subjective assumptions that built up into tensions. This set off a destructive wave that destroyed Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The hatred in these conflicts was mostly focused against the civilian population. Numerous examples of the murder of the Zec family in Zagreb (1992) and over Vukovar, Sijekovac, Pakrac, Cemerno, Sarajevo and Srebrenica to Kravica, show that the destruction of the human mind remains an immutable variable that occurs in certain conditions. Various forms of torture and killing and humiliation of people were present in numerous camps and prisons that existed in all the warring parties. Yes, it was a completely anarchic situation that no one could control shown by the fact that even today there are a large number of missing persons which is the basis for many conspiracy theories. This is especially true for BiH, where inaccurate and incomplete information about the suffering on all sides mainly competes with each other as a criterion of what should not have been allowed to be done. It is difficult to differentiate between fact and fiction in this difficult matter.

Research and Documentation Center in Sarajevo published the results of research and documented that in the 1992-95 war in Bosnia, 92207 were killed or missing. This includes victims, regardless of their ethnic (national), religious or political affiliation, as well as their ideological beliefs and affiliation to military formations. In this respect, it is important to note that 9756 killed were women, and 3372 were missing children and with the following national structures: 2961-Muslim, Serbian-218 and 172 - Croatian. In Bosnia during the war there were 400 locations at which they were prisons and camps, 320 mass graves were discovered with 15,000 human remains exhumed so far.

This data are incomplete performance indicators of the actual hate and destruction in the processes that took place from 1992 to 1995.

### **How to generate hatred today?**

We still live in such an environment where it is much easier to produce fear than build confidence. Today's politicians and intellectuals prefer to revisit the wounds of the past rather than look to the future. Of course the solution does not lie in concealment of problems and hatred either.

For example, the Communists thought that by pouring concrete into the pits in Herzegovina and other mass graves, and similarly bombing the ones found in Prebilovci in the 90's, would make the hatred disappear, but this had a counter effect and elicited hatred.

What we must do now is get rid of hatred in politics and media. We must not use personal accidents and wounds created by the war in the creation of state policy. We must be careful not to profile the suffering caused in Jasenovac and Srebrenica in a way that produces hatred among people.

We need to improve and expedite the process of looking for the missing to give relief to their loved ones. We need to expedite and improve the process of punishing those responsible on all sides so to achieve a faster and better reconciliation process.

We all must allow ourselves to face the facts and the truths in order to move on. In BiH, the political elite, scientific and other circles must come together to arrive at a common truth as there cannot be three truths about the war in BiH.

The truth is the best barrier to hatred and the only way to tolerance. No post-war society and especially that of Bosnia and Herzegovina, has a future if it cannot escape the jaws of destruction, frustration and hatred, regardless of the gravity of this. A vision for

the development, optimism and prospects, especially in a new environment of globalization trends, gives hope and a chance for the survival of this society.

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**From Divided Memories to Divided Discourse:  
How Many Historical Truths Exist in Bosnia-Herzegovina**

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**Abstract**

Memory cannot be neutral, and this is particularly evident in the example of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Although it is a cognitive component, memory has a social category that was emphasized by Bartlett. Basically, memory is considered a mental facility that allows an individual to acquire, retain and, if necessary, recall knowledge relating to personal experiences that influence the formation of identity. The concept of collective memory involves understanding under which the groups and societies have their memory and remembrance. Sometimes, individual memories can be in conflict with the collective representations of the same event, for which different subgroups of society can be in a variety of ways to remember and report on the same events. Also, there is a difference between direct and indirect experience of the same event, so it is important to discover the way in which certain experiences can be transmitted through the generations.

The main objective of this study was to determine the relationship between the divided discourse in history teaching in Bosnia-Herzegovina today and divided memories that contribute to the formation of different truths about the past. The method applied was content analysis, therefore the frequency of mentioning and describing of significant historical events (the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1992 to 1995) was analyzed in three history textbooks for the fourth year of high school. Textbooks were also analyzed in terms of the language in which they were written, the publisher and place of publication, and the degree to which content follows the Guidelines for writing and evaluating history textbooks in elementary and secondary schools in Bosnia-Herzegovina prescribed by the Commission for the Development of Guidelines for history teaching in Bosnia-Herzegovina from April 2005.

The conclusion is that the three textbooks significantly differ in content, while teaching history affects the sense of belonging, and leads to the formation of several different truths in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Also, the paper examines the extent to which the quantitative and qualitative differences within the three curricula contribute to development of identity and the formation of collective memories that can be transmitted through the generations.

***Key words: historical truth, memory, collective memory, teaching, textbook***

**Introduction**

The aim of this paper is to describe how different cultures of memories persist in BiH, as well as how these cultures lead to the formation of groups and "dangerous" Others. "Other" becomes a threat and a burden bearer of "dead generations". As such, she/he finds salvation in the production of their own memories. Although BiH is an internationally recognized and independent state, the way of teaching history in elementary and secondary schools has not yet been agreed upon and it has been carried out by three different curricula: two entities (the Federation and the Republic of Srpska) and parts of BiH where teaching process is conducted according to Croatian curriculum. At the beginning of 2008 the OSCE Mission to BiH and the Institute for International Textbook

Research Georg Eckert conducted the survey among 184 history teachers from across the country, in order to determine the changes that teachers introduced in teaching, to determine the most commonly used textbooks and teachers' opinions on topics dealing with the period 1992-1995, which should be included in textbooks.

Results revealed that teachers found the content of textbooks as the most important criterion for selection, as well as efforts invested in order to obtain multiperspectivity. Also, about 53% of the examined teachers felt that the 1992 to 1995 war should be included in history textbooks as a special teaching unit. Teachers felt that the themes of "consequences of war" and "destruction of cultural and historical monuments" are very interesting and as such should be included in history textbooks.

However, one-third of teachers did not share this opinion, and a somewhat smaller number expressed uncertainty. In most parts of BiH, 1992-1995 war was not included in the official curriculum, which is in line with the recommendations of the Council of Europe to temporarily suspend teaching about the war years. In the "Recommendation 1454 (April 2000) Education in BiH", the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe argued the temporary suspension of the teaching of the 1992-1995 period until historians in BiH with the support of international experts do not establish a common approach to the study of this period in schools.

However, previous studies on history teaching in BiH and textbooks' analysis have not touched the period that preceded the war in Bosnia - dissolution of Yugoslavia. Therefore, this study aims to determine the differences in the presentation of the breakup of Yugoslavia in three history textbooks for the fourth year of secondary schools operating under three separate teaching curricula. Also, content analysis will be used in order to determine the way textbook authors describe the role of neighboring countries in this process, including the frequency of references to specific countries (Serbia, Croatia), because it is assumed that in the textbooks that are following Croatian curriculum the emergence of an independent and sovereign Croatian state will be emphasized, in textbooks issued by the Institute for Textbooks and Teaching Aids from East Sarajevo emphasis will be on the creation of an independent state of Serbia, while in Federation BiH the development of independent state of BiH will be emphasized. In addition, it will be analyzed how many times 1992-1995 period was mentioned in all three textbooks, regarding two issues: whether only the beginning of war was mentioned, or, whole period of war was described. Also, it will be described if (and to what extent) the war in Croatia was mentioned (only as a date or as more particularly described, as well as the way in which is called ("Homeland war", "liberation") and NATO bombing of Serbia.

It is considered that this research can complement the existing analysis of history textbooks as well as emphasize the role of religious and national Other (dissolution of Yugoslavia, the war in Bosnia, the war in Croatia, the bombing of Serbia). The very existence of three different curricula implies the formation of three different generational community memories of the war and the events that preceded it, which can lead to the perception of "dangerous" Other that should be avoided. The possibility of accepting Other, as well as identifying the barriers that separate people largely depends on the way in which historical information and facts are presented, so this analysis can provide a basis for exploring different approaches.

## **History teaching – importance and consequences**

Generation can be viewed as ambiguous term because on the one hand it indicates the continuity of life, and the other marks a new beginning (Kuljic, 2009). It is, as such, an important factor in selective memory, and the different generational relationships determine the structure of society. Life in the past can be very dangerous, because it prevents progress and creation of a vision of future. However, without knowing the past advanced vision for the future does not exist (Kuljic, 2009). Different generational communities form various community memories, and their relationships to the past define their system of values. The concept of social memory refers to the dynamic interaction between history, culture and cognition. At the individual level, there are three sources of knowledge: history, collective memory and individual experiences that are combined to create a subjective view of historical reality, another "common sense" narrative that is often manifested through identity and autobiographical context (Hewer and Roberts, 2012). This model of social memory, which comes from the theory of social representations, makes a distinction between collective memory, which is resistant to change, and representation of the past discussed within the broader social milieu, which has the potential to develop into a new or changed perspective, especially when they are sensitive to generations' shifts.

Revision of history flows in several directions (Kuljic, 2010): contents in historical narrative are either omitted or complemented, the meaning of the same facts is variously interpreted, ratio between the relevant historical facts is changing, the framework for the interpretation of historical facts is modified. History and history textbooks have always been trapped between the romantic view of the nation and the distorted image of "Other" (Cole and Barsaolu, 2006). Many researchers of historiography agree on two things: the rewriting of history always carries the risk of spreading the ideology and creating a negative history that can be misused to achieve special (exclusive) identity, and, multiperspectivity in textbooks allows students to identify described world as well as at the opposition to selective perception, values and stereotypes (Engelbrecht, 2008).

According to Slater (1995), there are intrinsic and extrinsic goals of teaching history. In doing so, the first objective relates to the very scientific discipline, while the other is a broader educational goal focused on changing society. Also, the teaching of history has the task to develop students' critical thinking and analysis, and objectivity in the evaluation of the main facts. Evaluation, analysis, synthesis and interpretation skills that develop during the teaching also deepen students' understanding of the past, but also provide a basis for taking a critical stance when "use" past for evaluation of present. The Council of Europe in the context of the "New Europe" from in 1990 states that "the lessons of history contributes to the development of citizens who have open views of the world, who are aware of the differences, willing to accept those differences and respecting members of other cultures, religions and languages" (Gallagher 1996, p. 22). This would be possible only through the modeling of democratic values in the teaching of history, which includes the commitment to democratic values by teachers, syllabus designed to include content that is related to the past, questioning, and connection between the teaching of history and teaching in related disciplines (democracy and human rights, civic education, etc.). According to Pingel (2008), teaching history has to achieve two main goals: to explain why there conflict exists and to provide a new narrative that will unite the cracks of the past and strengthen the cohesion of the damaged society. Although these two objectives are laudable and worthy, in reality they are faced with many difficulties. Highlighting the causes of conflict can contribute to the separation, rather than unite society.

## **Teaching history in a divided post-conflict society**

Smith and Vaux (2003) define reform of "national courses" (art, literature, geography, and history) as crucial for the establishment of awareness of national identity. In their view, the teaching of history is of particular importance in conflict societies and, as such, is particularly susceptible to bias. The connection between teaching history and sense of identity is explored in the form of the concept of "historical consciousness." Porat (2004) revealed that the Israeli students who attend religious schools and who equated himself with right-wing Israeli policies followed legendary and heroic narratives of Tel Hai event from 1920 (example of Jewish-Arab conflict) even when they read in the books descriptions of the event as accidental and insignificant. In this case, the students added or reinterpreted details from textbooks in a way that fits the context of their narratives. Secular students, leftists, accepted what was written in the textbooks and rejected descriptions of the events that were represented as Jewish heroism. Today their history textbooks contain both narratives with blank space between them, left for students and teacher to write their own opinions on "what happened" (Learning Each Others Historical Narrative, 2003). It is assumed that "third" narrative would bring closer two existing and opposite narratives.

For all these reasons it is clear that the teaching of history in a divided society is a challenge, especially if we take into account that history is closely linked with emotions, national identity and collective belonging. Also, the presentation of a single narrative as "the only accurate" has no value in the educational sense, especially in divided societies where ethnicity is debatable. Even in situations where a single narrative is agreed in advance it is impossible to avoid the emotional tension. Therefore, one of the possibilities in organizing the teaching of history is multiperspectivity.

However, multiperspectivity as such has its advantages and disadvantages. In their research on 958 students from different parts of Northern Ireland McCaffery and Hansson (2011) found that young people learn history from many more sources than the teaching and tutorial. Also, there is a variation in the level of knowledge they have about the past, but the fact that (regardless of place of residence and background) they are ready to accept other sources and alternative approaches to the past. What is interesting in the above-mentioned research are two different interpretations of what history is and what it represents. The first interpretation encompasses history as an academic subject that examines the sequence of events in Northern Ireland, people and places, in an abstract and less important way. Another explanation is related to the very idea of "history" that is highly relevant, since it entails the past where "Other" committed violence against the community. This is one form of the past that is not abstract, and that did not exist only on the pages of books, but also in real life and that continues to live for the majority of young people (McCaffery and Hansson, 2011).

Shortly after the collapse of Yugoslavia and the beginning of the wars for Yugoslav succession in both Serbia and Croatia textbooks have been changed. In both countries the textbooks were prescribed by the Ministry of Education, which indicates changing of ideologies, but did not change the principle of state control over education (Stojanovic, 2008). Changing textbooks was also affected by the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina in which the Republic of Srpska and Herceg-Bosna adopted textbooks from Serbia and Croatia. Sometime later special textbooks for Bosniak children were written, and Bosnia went not only through the division of the territory, but also the division of historical consciousness (Stojanovic, 2008).

Multiperspectivity in history teaching in divided societies has many drawbacks, and even "meeting" with the past is difficult, especially when it comes to societies that are characterized by a collective trauma, anger and grief. Therefore, "revealing the truth" is considered very important, but also the emotional component of the reconciliation process. Chapman (2007) considered deeply divided society as characterized by "politics of identity" and the experience of violence and human rights abuses, which is why it needs multiple levels and types of healing and reconciliation in order to be re-launched.

Teaching history therefore should not be merely a re-interpretation of past events, but should also include the return of the most uncomfortable or painful memories, the attribution of personal and collective responsibility and the principles of social justice (Chapman, 2007). Inability to achieve the abovementioned very likely lead to a resurgence of violence in the future and represents what Brandon Hamber (2009) called "toxic past". Therefore, the role of history teaching is much broader and more significant than it appears at first sight, because it can contribute to reconciliation, justice and the achievement of social reconstruction. However, when talking about "finding the truth", then history can play multiple roles. In the history textbooks from South Africa the statements of witnesses and victims that were recorded during their testimony in front of the Commission for Truth and Reconciliation can be found (Cole and Barsaolu, 2006). Although these stories may contribute to the understanding of one segment of the past, excluded their emotional significance should not be excluded, as well as the reactions they may cause in the classroom. Also, the "truth" imposed during testimony is often not considered "true" because of emotional tone. Therefore, the teaching of history should include a "humane" approach, according to which, within certain limits was right to ask questions about who were the perpetrators, what is important to remember from the past and what is needed learn in order to move on.

### **History textbooks in Bosnia-Herzegovina – tripartite narrative or triple silence?**

BiH is a country where history teaching suffers more because of the political situation and attempts to establish peace, than because of pedagogical methods. Dayton Agreement from 1995 "confirmed" and separate three teaching curricula for the three constituent peoples in BiH. In this way, the education has become a field of political games and the division. Therefore, there are three different teaching curricula in the two entities: the Federation of BiH and the Republic of Srpska. When society is ethnically divided, it is mostly reflected in the teaching of history, geography, literature and art, as each side is trying to emphasize its own history, its writers and artists, and ignore Other. Local politicians instrumentalized educational institutions in terms of their influence by emphasizing cultural differences and separating them at the same time. Despite the efforts of the international community and local institutions to achieve reform of curricula and textbooks until year 2000, these institutions have failed to overcome the existing parameters set by the Dayton Agreement (Pingel, 2008).

Generations of which is expected to create a new curriculum were also directly involved in the conflict that should now be objectively presented and described in history textbooks. Therefore, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted a resolution on "Education in BiH " in 2000 in which guidelines for teaching about the last war (1992 - 1995) were proposed. In this way, the historians from all three ethnic groups get a chance to collaborate with international experts with the aim to develop a common approach to that subject (Karge, H., Batarilo, K., 2008). Although they are still in effect, the guidelines did not stimulate work on textbooks, but only created a vacuum that has been blocked by intellectual curiosity and development of new approaches to the teaching process (Pingel, 2006). Similar situation occurred in Rwanda, where the government has made a decision on the termination of teaching history until a single agreement has been reached (Pingel, 2008). However, it will be difficult to achieve that in BiH, since the division

is strongly expressed, and past conflicts still evoke a lot of emotions and memories. However, research in Bosnia and Rwanda have shown that students want to learn about the war and genocide (Pingel, 2008).

The international community has intervened in the case of BiH in the curriculum during the second phase of reconstruction (since first phase was dedicated to the reconstruction of schools and repairing damage). Commission composed of three constituent peoples under the supervision of international experts, analyzed the history textbooks to eliminate "inappropriate" and "offensive" material that could be considered discriminatory from the position of one of three members of the constituent peoples, but also from the position of the International Convention on Human Rights (Pingel, 2008). Authors and publishers were obliged to change textbooks in accordance with the reached agreement. International Commission subsequently sent representatives from UNESCO, who had the task of monitoring teaching of history in schools. Of course, it sparked wide protests in public, and it also encouraged students to seek and read "prohibited" sources. In the third phase, the International Community has made cooperation with the Ministry of Education with the aim of organizing the review and verification of the manuscript prior to printing. Although the work of these committees largely "offset" language and exclude extreme interpretation, it did not change the views and opinions of experts from the three constituent peoples or has come to a unified history textbook to be used in BiH (Pingel, 2008).

The next step consisted of writing new history textbooks. In 2003 Guidelines for writing history and geography textbooks were adopted and they were supposed to serve as a basis for developing a balanced, comparative and multi-perspective narrative. "Guidelines for the evaluation of history textbooks for primary and secondary schools in BiH" were unanimously adopted and forwarded to the ministries of education. After three years they were officially signed and thus become an integral part of the decision to accept textbooks for printing (Pingel, 2008).

Guidelines for the evaluation of history textbooks for elementary and high school in Bosnia-Herzegovina consist of general, special and individual guidelines for writing history textbooks, their evaluation and use. The general guidelines are defined as the quantity of information relating to the political history that should be reduced, so that students get more information through other aspects of history, such as cultural, social, and economic history of everyday life. Specific guidelines are governing the writing of history textbooks, since the modern textbook is expected to not only educate, but to encourage, guide and lead the development of students. Individual guidelines are regulating how history textbooks of all grades should look like, from format to content.

Ability to accept responsibility and the recognition of the crimes is still one of the key problems authors of history textbooks are faced with, and certainly this is one of the reasons why the period from 1992 to 1995 is not mentioned in the two of the three history textbooks used in BiH today. It is questionable how long the identification and recognition of the crime can contribute to reconciliation and coexistence, especially when we take into account that the three constituent peoples in BiH have conflicting attitudes towards the credibility and importance of the tribunal, evidence of which are the different reactions of citizens of BiH to Tribunal's judgments.

It is clear that textbook authors and experts in the field of education refuse to use material from international courts and tribunals located outside the borders of their state, since the courts are considered biased (Corkalo et al., 2004, p. 147). Biro et al. (2004, p. 200) concluded that the results of the research represent the role of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in promoting peace in Croatia and BiH as problematic. Also, it is very questionable to what extent Tribunal judgments in the case of the former Yugoslavia may contribute to the recognition of

the crimes, and much less the extent to which they contribute to reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia (if any contributions exist).

Therefore, in this paper the results of content analysis will be presented, explaining the differences in three current (school 2012/2013 year) history textbooks used in the Federation of BiH, the Republic of Srpska and parts of the country in which teaching is conducted according to the Croatian curriculum with regard to the topic "disintegration of the former Yugoslavia". The reason for choosing this theme is reflected in the fact that this is the last event described in three books relating to the period just before the outbreak of the war in Croatia and BiH. Therefore, it is expected that different narratives, as well as emphasizing the role of certain neighboring countries, indicate the location and presentation of religious and national Other, but also enlighten the clues of events after the 1991 (if not described entire period).

### *Research aims*

1. to determine differences in the presentation of significant events from the past (dissolution of Yugoslavia, 1992-1995 war) in three history textbooks for high school (fourth grade) that are currently (school 2012/2013) applied in the Federation Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Republic of Srpska and in areas that are applying Croatian curriculum;

2. to determine if there are differences in presentation of religious and national Other's role within significant events from the history of Bosnia-Herzegovina (dissolution of Yugoslavia, 1992-1995 war).

### *Hypothesis*

1. There are significant differences in description of causes and events dealing with dissolution of Yugoslavia.

2. There are significant differences in frequency of naming neighboring countries (Croatia, Serbia) in three different textbooks.

3. There are significant differences in frequency of naming and describing of the following events: 1992-1995 war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, war in Croatia and NATO bombing of Serbia.

### *Method*

The study is planned in quantitative research design in which content analysis is applied. Important historical events are analysed within the frequency of their mentioning in three textbooks in 2012/2013 school year in two entities and in parts of the country that apply Croatian teaching curriculum:

1. Hadziabdić, H., Dervisagic, E., Mulic, A., Mehic, V. (2007). *Historija-Istorija-Povijest (History)*. Tuzla: Bosanska Knjiga.

2. Zivkovic, D., Stanojlovic, B. (2012). *Istorija za treci razred gimnazije prirodno-matematickog i za cetvrti razred gimnazije opsteg i drustveno-jezickog smjera (History for the fourth grade of high school)*. Istocno Sarajevo: Zavod za udzbenike i nastavna sredstva.

3. Matkovic, H., Mirosevic, F., Goluz, B., Sarac, I. (2003). *Povijest 4 – Udzbenik za cetvrti razred gimnazije (History – textbook for fourth grade of high school)*. Mostar: Skolska naklada i Zagreb: Skolska knjiga.

Textbooks are also analyzed in terms of the language in which they were written, the publisher and place of issue, and the degree to which analyzed content follows the guidelines for writing and evaluation of history textbooks for primary and secondary schools in BiH prescribed by the Commission for new history textbooks guidelines drafting in BiH in April 2005.

## Results

Although Guidelines for textbooks drafting exist, results of content analysis revealed that none of three currently used textbook follow it. This is especially true of the textbook used in the areas of BiH applying Croatian curriculum, within which period of the war in Bosnia (as well as in Croatia), is described in full.

Also, the differences are reflected in the way the dissolution of Yugoslavia was described, especially when it comes to highlighting the role of neighboring countries as well as the frequency of mentioning of the neighboring countries. Specifically, the textbook used in the Republic of Srpska mostly mentions Serbia and its role in the breakup of Yugoslavia, and the textbook used according to Croatian curriculum emphasis Croatia, its role, as well as the subsequent events during the Homeland war (events in Croatia were firstly defined, and events in BiH just followed them).

### *Frequency of describing of historical events from the period 1990-1999*

There are significant differences in the frequency of mentioning of some important historical events as well as neighboring countries, depending on which curriculum is a textbook designed for and where it is used (FBiH, RS, Croatian curriculum).

Table 1: Frequency of mentioning of certain historical events in three textbooks

TOPIC	Textbook applied in Federation BiH		Textbook applied in Republic of Srpska		Textbook applied according to Croatian teaching curricula	
	Number of pages (f)	Number of lines in text (f)	Number of pages (f)	Number of lines in text (f)	Number of pages (f)	Number of lines in text (f)
<b>Dissolution of Yugoslavia</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>154</b>	<b>1.5</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>167</b>
<b>War in BiH 1992-1995 (listed only the starting date of the war)</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>(whole war period was described)</b>	<b>-</b>
<b>War in BiH 1992-1995 (described whole war period)</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>120</b>
<b>War in Croatia</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>6.5</b>	<b>127</b>
<b>NATO bombardment of Serbia</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>

As shown in Table 1, the textbooks used in the Federation BiH and the Republic of Srpska follow the Guidelines for writing and evaluation of history textbooks for primary and secondary schools in BiH (Commission guideline concept of new history textbooks in BiH, 2005.), and the topic “war in BiH” is not included into its content, as well as the war in Croatia and the NATO bombing of Serbia. However, although the content of textbooks used in the FBiH is not mentioning war in Bosnia, reader can be noted of these topics from the preface:

“... This textbook deals with the world, European and Bosnian history of the late nineteenth and the entire twentieth century. This is the time in which very important events and processes in the history of mankind took place... It is particularly important to note that in this period, an independent state of Bosnia-Herzegovina was established, after a long and terrible war which was led against it by all means.” (Hadziabdic, H., et al., 2007, p. 5)

Also, textbook applied in Republic of Srpska contains interesting instruction for students/readers at the end of chapter on „Yugoslavia after World War II“:

„You can be informed of the events of our nearest past (after 1991) on the basis of interviews with contemporaries (teachers, parents, participants in events) as well as from other sources (newspapers, documents, photographs, documentaries, etc.). Information can be discussed during history class and tutorials.” (Zivkovic, D., Stanojlovic, B., 2012, p. 163)

The above guidance implies that, although not described in the book, the events after the 1991 (the war in Bosnia, the war in Croatia, the NATO bombing of Serbia) can be discussed during history classes, which is not in accordance with the Guidelines. Three books are written in three languages: Bosnian (Latin script), Croatian (Latin script) and Serbian (Cyrillic), which is in accordance with the division of the three official languages existing in BiH. Although textbooks do not contain chapters dealing with historical events after 1991, its content allows discussion on these topics, during the lectures and tutorials. However, textbook applied according to Croatian curriculum deeply analyses war in BiH and war in Croatia. NATO bombing of Serbia is not mentioned, but the United States of America bombing of Republic Srpska is described. However, these are not the only differences that can be observed in the aforementioned three textbooks. Specifically, in the chapters describing the disintegration of Yugoslavia, interruption of XIV Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (SKJ) is described in different ways when it comes to reasons for its termination.

Example 1: A quote from the textbook applied in Republic Srpska

„In order to prevent the breakup of the country, the Communist Party leadership is required to urgently hold an extraordinary congress... The protagonists of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, well knew that at the national level there are only two cohesive factors: the Communist Party and the Yugoslav People's Army. Therefore they decided to break firstly one (the Communist Party), then the other (Yugoslav Army) factor of unity... The Slovenian delegation, supported by the leadership of Croatian Communist Party left Congress, so it has not completed work.” (Zivkovic, D., Stanojlovic, B., 2012, p. 163)

Example 2: A quote from the textbook applied in Federation Bosnia-Herzegovina

“The culmination of the political crisis occurred at the XIV Congress of the Communist Party. A collapse of Yugoslav Communist Party occurred due to disagreements of Serbian representatives with representatives of Slovenia and Croatia, as well as Bosnian and Macedonian representatives, who left the session. All of these events heralded a major political crisis in the former Yugoslavia, which began to fall apart.” (Hadziabdic, H., et al., 2007, p. 172-173)

Example 3: A quote from the textbook applied according to Croatian teaching curriculum

"Serbia provoked organization of XIV Congress of Yugoslav Communist Party. Milosevic hoped to ensure dominance in the top of the Yugoslav Communist Party, which would allow him to ultimately achieve proposed aims... During the debate, the delegates of Serbia and Montenegro expressed great aggressiveness, roughly attacking delegates from the Croatia and Slovenia, who left Congress. The remaining delegates concluded that Congress had to be postponed. But Congress has never resumed, and termination signaled dissolution of Yugoslav Communist Party. ” (Matkovic, H., et al., 2003, p. 267)

From the above quotations noticeable difference in the description of the objectives and motives for organizing the XIV Congress of Communist Party, as well as causes for termination is evident. The textbook used in the Republic of Srpska does not contain a lot of pages devoted to the explanation

of dissolution of Yugoslavia, while textbook applied within Croatian curriculum deeply describes dissolution of Yugoslavia. Also, this textbook describes the events related to the war in Croatia and the war in BiH within the two separate chapters: "Homeland War" and "War in BiH."

*Frequency of mentioning of neighboring countries (Croatia, Serbia)*

Differences among the three analyzed textbooks regarding the frequency of mentioning of neighboring countries are presented in Table 2.

Table 2 Frequency of mentioning of BiH, Serbia and Croatia within the chapter „Dissolution of Yugoslavia“ in three textbooks

Frequency of mentioning of BiH/Serbia/Croatia	Textbook applied in Federation BiH	Textbook applied in Republic of Srpska	Textbook applied according to Croatian teaching curricula
BiH <sup>129</sup>	18	0	16
Serbia <sup>130</sup>	5	6	15
Croatia <sup>131</sup>	8	1	34

Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state commonly referred in the textbook applied in Federation Bosnia-Herzegovina under the chapter "The Dissolution of Yugoslavia," (18 times), and the textbook used within the Croatian curriculum (16 times). Textbook of the Republic of Srpska does not mention BiH within the chapter on dissolution of Yugoslavia, while Croatia is mentioned only once, and Serbia 6 times. Also, the textbook used in the Croatian curriculum mostly describes events that took place in Croatia and the Croatian position during the breakup of Yugoslavia, mentioning it 34 times. In the textbook applied in Federation BiH Bosnia is mostly mentioned country (18 times), then Croatia (8 times) and Serbia (5 times).

From previous quantitative data it is evident that in the same chapter two textbooks used in BiH (one within the curriculum of Republic of Srpska and the other within the Croatian curriculum) devote more attention to the events in the neighboring countries (Serbia and Croatia), than to the events in BiH. Differences in approach greatly influence the development and understanding of adolescent identity. A sense of belonging in this way becomes divided into three parts, and qualitative differences in the presentation of certain events as well as religious and ethnic Other also lead to different interpretations of the same issues and different attitudes towards the other parts of their own country and to neighboring countries.

**Reconstruction of history teaching in Bosnia-Herzegovina: pro and con multiperspectivity**

The reform of history teaching for reconciliation and coexistence in a post-conflict society implies two possibilities: the construction of a common narrative that would be widely accepted, or the presentation of conflicting narratives with an aim of their analysis and discussion. The first method applies to the most divided, post-conflict societies in which it is safest to choose one narrative which is deemed to be accepted by the majority and thus avoid further conflicts. However, we can not say for certain that something was the most secure, since in this situation it is difficult to avoid the resistance of a minority that does not agree with the offered narrative. If you offer multiple narratives, there is a possibility for an open discussion, but also for the grouping and selection of "their" narrative, which is also related to the development of identity and sense of belonging.

<sup>129</sup> How many times Bosnia-Herzegovina was mentioned within the chapter on dissolution of Yugoslavia

<sup>130</sup> How many times Serbia was mentioned within the chapter on dissolution of Yugoslavia

<sup>131</sup> How many times Croatia was mentioned within the chapter on dissolution of Yugoslavia

Multiperspectivity implies interpretation of the past in a way it looks from our perspective but also from the perspective of those who perceived past events. While learning different perspectives students acquire richer and more complex knowledge based on mutually conflicting narratives (Stradling, 2003). However, despite the emphasis on empathy in access to students during the teaching of history, multiperspectivity (especially the way it is applied in the previously described example of Israel and Palestine) can not be applied in BiH without the agreement on a common terminology that would be applied to the three (or maybe more!) narratives. Also, it will be of great importance to leave empty space in between the three narratives textbooks in order to students and teachers had a space for discussion, analysis and possible selection of a new narrative. In this way, it would be clearly stated that both students and teachers can freely and openly discuss all issues until they do not offend the dignity of the Other. The importance of recognition or acceptance of responsibility for war crimes may (but not necessarily) lead to a more positive climate in the teaching of history and therefore, may establish reconciliation. However, since the views of the importance and prestige of the International Tribunal for War Crimes are divided, we can not say with certainty that the recognition of guilt, judgment and punishment can contribute to the establishment of peace, as well as harmonization of narratives.

However, the key insight that is gained by this analysis is that people never learn history from a single source, and therefore the teaching and tutorial can be viewed only as additional resources. Just as it is stated in history textbook from Republic of Srpska, for all topics that were not covered, or were partially covered, students can consult with parents, friends, participants in the event, or simply find the relevant sources (books, internet, the media). Consequently, the number of narratives with three suddenly switches to a much higher figure, and it becomes almost impossible to track the flow of information and thought. That is why the advocates of multiperspectivity in history teaching should not ignore the fact of the existence of a lot of resources and the inability of reducing them all to only a small empty space between the three constituent narratives (and maybe a few more non-constituent).

### **Conclusion and recommendations for further research**

This paper seeks to explore the importance of teaching the history for the construction of identity, sense of belonging and self-awareness. Also, content analysis of three currently used history textbooks in the territory of BiH is done regarding the way of writing about the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the war in BiH and other events from 1992 to 1999 including BiH and neighboring countries, Serbia and Croatia.

It is concluded that the textbooks differ in certain parts of the chapter dealing with the disintegration of Yugoslavia (the XIV Congress of Yugoslav Communist Party), although all three are written according to the Guidelines for writing and evaluation of history textbooks for primary and secondary schools in BiH. Also, differences are reflected in the different presentation of certain events in the breakup of Yugoslavia, the way in which the war in BiH (1992nd to 1995th) was described, as well as the frequency of mentioning of the neighboring countries, Serbia and Croatia. Also, it is important to note that multiperspectivity, although desirable, is not expressed in any of the three used textbooks. However, in order to establish a real difference in the writing, it is advisable to compare the analysis of history textbooks with those that were used immediately after the war (1996/1997 school year) in order to determine if indeed there were big differences in the presentation of certain events. This would be especially important because in that period there were no guidelines for writing textbooks, so that the authors had full freedom of explanations and guidance of historical events.

History is not taught only in school. History is taught from a multitude of sources and as such it affects identity, self-awareness and membership in a particular group and a particular narrative. What this study does not cover, and what is proposed for future research is to analyze other sources used to inform students and learn about the past. This includes everything that teachers additionally included in the educational process in the form of essays, exercises, additional resources, but also all the students themselves use for their information: various sources (parents, peers, participants of events), the literature, the Internet, media and the like. Only a clear analysis of the additional resources may explain the ways of forming different narratives as well as the possibility of including multiperspectivity in teaching history in contemporary BiH.

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
# DIOGEN

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**DIOGEN pro culture magazine ...  
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**“Twilight of Remembrance in Bosnia-Herzegovina –  
Examples of Bugojno & Skopje & Donji Vakuf“,**

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**Abstract**

Through the examples of involvement within the analysis, determination of methodological matrixes, that are in comparison alongside each other, of the contemporary manifestation targeting the sustainability cultural heritage, of the action and lack of reaction, or negligible form of feedback, I will present the hypothesis which sets the twilight of remembrance in Bosnia-Herzegovina on the throne of sustainability of the current Bosnia and Herzegovina politics.

Through the relationship towards the culture of remembrance *sui generis*, as one of the most important assumptions of the adequate future references that will shape the treatment of the protection of cultural heritage in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also outside from that with reflections towards inner being of the survival of memories for the times that created today's modes of expression (as real, and as well as unreal reflectivity) we will be able to see that the behavior of the current "beggars of the mind", i.e. "the rulers of our thoughts", is directed towards the slogan "before me there was nothing, everything starts with me."

This erasure of remembrance is realized through the use of limited resources and of the past, in accordance with daily intentions of political manipulators of the culture of remembrance. Through the satisfaction of the basic assumptions of past memories in regards to the past, the modern BiH barbarians of the spirit, through examples of Bugojno (VI century BC - the oldest written monument in Bosnia) and Donji Vakuf (BH - selling of the treasure that is old more than 600 years) and Skopje (Macedonia - The tomb of Bosnian's Princess Catherine Tomasevic Kotromanac - 50 years after the earthquake, and (not)calm serenity) they ignore the importance of the messages that we get from the protection of the exact past which created today's Bosnia and Herzegovina.

DIOGEN pro culture magazine is through the starting and the realization of one action in the period from 2011 to 2012 and launching two more since 2012 focused not only on the individual shaping of the protection of culture of remembrance, but also for the far extensive education about alternative conception of culture of remembrance as a modality of development, but also of survival, of the general culture of local nations and citizens. Yes, as the basic prerequisite for survival of the state, this still exists today on the principle of organized anarchy. Even within the culture of remembrance.

**Keywords: *cultural heritage, culture remembrance, hypothesis of the Twilight of Remembrance, barbarians spirit DIOGEN pro culture magazine, action and reaction.***

## *Introduction*

### *Ignoring as Modus vivendi*

Anno Domini 1999, I have send a message to the then Mayor of Bugojno Municipality, Dr Mustafa Strukar. Anno Domini 2003, also, even including the offer to the Municipality of Bugojno to organize an event called "27 centuries later". Also, 2005, and to then, but also to the current Mayor of Bugojno Municipality, Mr. Hasan Ajkunić, proposing setting up billboards on all sides of roads that go towards Bugojno. The same year I even wrote an open letter to the public of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the aim of protecting the cultural heritage of Bugojno, but also of Bosnia and Herzegovina loudly ripen about one bowl/dish/vessel, the oldest written monument in Bosnia and Herzegovina from the sixth century BC.

Anno Domini 2011 DIOGEN pro culture magazine wrote about the neglecting of the ruined monument dedicated to Bosnian Princess Katarina in Skopje with a public appeal for Reconstruction..



*Sabahudin Hadžialić and Samira Begman (Deputy editor of DIOGEN pro culture magazine 2010 – 2013) in Skopje, Macedonia – at the location of the monument dedicated to Bosnian Princess Katarina, October 2011.*

Anno Domini 2012 DIOGEN pro culture magazine wrote about *doing nothing* by the side of competent authorities of the city of Bugojno to mark the locations of the oldest written monument in BiH.



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Sabahudin Hadžialić and the oldest written monument in BiH – premises of The National Museum of BiH, 2012

Anno Domini 2013 DIOGEN pro culture magazine wrote about "the Dubrovnik gentlemen who came to check out their colony in Prusac" on September 2013 and how and how much local as well as national or state structures do not respond immediately with the "right of first purchase" and/or an appropriate, legally regulated, way protected own cultural heritage.



DIOGEN pro kultura magazine, May 2013: <http://www.diogenpro.com/rasprodaja-bh-kulturne-bastine.html>

## Analysis of the negligence of recognizability of doing

### METHOD

- The review of the existing documentation, historical sources, written records
- Exiting on the site and examination of the legacy of cultural heritage: Bugojno, Skopje, Donji Vakuf
- Comparing the methodological manifestation of cultural heritage
- Proactive, and not reactive action within the monitoring of possible assumptions of further activities
- Analysis of the findings and proposals of solutions

But, let us asks the really intriguing and very inspiring question that can be applied to all areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and beyond, the former Yugoslavia: Why culture memories in Bosnia and Herzegovina means culture of forgetting, ignoring and/or partial and controlled memories of the facts with the methodological manifestation which place dusk of BiH remembrance placed on a pedestal of sustainability of current('s) Bosnia and Herzegovina('s) policy(cies). Does the mere act of placing the questions like this one in front of us makes New awakening of culture of remembrance?

Manifestation of the satisfaction of formal orientation is realized, as well as all directed towards the civilized world as for us, who lives in the pre-political and pre-transitional society, is the goal - satisfying form at the expense of substance. Specifically, it is a small or no step at all - before stagnation and *going in reverse* for understanding cultural heritage as a prerequisite of life today, but also of the formation of possible future indications. How so? There are my examples, and I prefer to emphasize my own, because I was a direct participant in the creation of culture of remembrance with the goal of preserving the essence of the term as a *condition sine qua non* of possible alternatives to the exclusive, twisted and monumentally and intellectually retarded awareness of new histories (triple kind of), regardless if we are talking about the system (before the last war) where we had a *religion of ideology* or about this one, in which we are contemporaries - the system of *ideology of religion(s)*. As cue to the above I am presenting you an example: The name of a street in Geneva, Switzerland from 2005 when I stood silent and focused on that name for more than five minutes, while the people, who were passing by me, looked at and I believe, thinking about - that this is one of the performance of the conceptual artist who sends a message *urbi et orbi*. While I watched the street name on which was written that it has not been changed since 1667. Here, at best case scenario, we talk about intermezzo of virtual peace not-touching the names of streets between the wars, and sometimes in much shorter period.

At the same time, not to mention the culture of remembrance which deals with the imposition of majority views on the minority population in one area, regardless we speak about the local community and/or about state level. Culture of remembrance is a democratic form of understanding that the quality of life in the communities we call the society is measured by how many shared memories of the time before us can help us to do well - for the entire community. Although, I repeat, in the pre-society in which during the elections the voters always vote "against", and never "for" we cannot expect more than what we have currently. And what we have, a logical question arises?

The answer is painfully simple: "Before me there was nothing. With me, it all starts." And, if do appear the facts that says the contrary, we will like Hegel, who is credited with the statement, say: "The facts? In that case, it will be the worse for the facts!" In other words, at best, in small doses, through satisfying the form (a classical example of such thing is the establishment of *the*

*Commission to Preserve National Monuments*) while we will, for further action, agreed upon, when we agree, on the agreement. Do we have to mention a closed institution of the National Museum in Sarajevo and other cultural institutions at the state level which, in the absence of support for the patterned survival strategy, are vegetating (and some of them already have closed their doors). But this is only part of the mosaic that gives shape to this space as immature, maniacal suicidal form of consciousness where that confirms the sentence: *"Today on the scenes the killing of society and creation of interest groups and not of any kind, but the groups that, through the closure in its own shell of insanity, creates preconditions for the disappearance of themselves.*" This sentence I wrote back in 2001 in an essay titled: *„COLLECTIVENESS OF DIVERSITY or Love thy Neighbor“* in the magazine for culture, art and education MOST. So, thirteen years ago, and later on re-published within the consolidated book of essays *„Organized anarchy“*, published in 2004.

### **Coming out to the scene/spot of the ground and the examination of the legacy of cultural heritage: Bugojno, Skopje, Donji Vakuf**

*For the Municipality of Bugojno and its authority the oldest written monument in BiH does not exist !*

The answer is simple. No authority in these areas, since the old Yugoslavia and up to these days has not paid attention to the oldest written monument in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Nine years ago, in 2005 the space where it has been found was labeled and marked as a national monument by the Commission to Preserve National Monuments ... *quote ... The archaeological site - Pod, a prehistoric hill fort settlement in Bugojno, is declared as a National Monument of Bosnia and Herzegovina ... end of quote.* Form satisfied until essentially nothing was done to make this place a pilgrimage of culture of remembrance.



*The oldest written monument in Bosnia and Herzegovina – The book „Written word in Bosnia and Herzegovina“ – part written by Đuro Basler and entitled: Greek\_Latin literacy“ <http://www.diogenpro.com/sumrak-bosanskohercegovačkog-sjećanja.html>*

Until the 27th of April 2012, two years ago, when DIOGEN pro culture magazine urged/appealed the public of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We urged/appealed to stop culturocide in the city where there is no marked location of the monument, billboard at the entrance to the city, souvenirs, postcards, WWW page, poem, story, video clips, brochures, flyers, posters, as well as there is no photo within the premises of the municipality about. ...written in the book "The written word in Bosnia and Herzegovina", editors Alija Isakovic and Miroslav Popadic in which is written ... quote:

"The oldest written monument in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina was discovered in the hill fort Pod near Bugojno, and it is etched in fresh edge of earthen vessel. The inscription on Etrurian - Umbrian language, contains the words devoted to gods Jan and Juturna, and as a giver has been signed a "tergito» trader or laborers ... is dated aprox. at the VI century BC. "... end of quote.

Let's try to be complementary bizarre by stating the following information:

1. In a private (catering, economic?) facility in the city/municipality of Bugojno is framed photograph of the oldest written monument on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina (private initiative).

2. Adina Kero, an artist (painter-sculptor from Donji Vakuf) is the author of the logo of the I International Art Colony, Bugojno 2012 where there is a drawing of the oldest written monument in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Through the adequate relations towards culture of remembrance *sui generis*, as one of the most important prerequisites of the future references of shaping of the treatment of cultural heritage in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also outside of it with reflections towards the inner being of survival of remembrance on the times which created today's modes of expression (as real, so and unreal reflectivity), we will find that the behavior of the current "beggars of the mind", i.e. today's "ruler of our thoughts" directed precisely to the mentioned slogan "before me there was nothing, it all starts with me".

Bugojno Municipality, as we have said, has never marked the location of finding of the oldest written monument in Bosnia and Herzegovina in any way, except from October 2013, since when, at the local level, awarding the prize for best short story "Bugojno vase". Marginalization of recognition and reduction of significant historic monument to the level of local award. How much has been done on propaganda and marketing across the country shows the fact that for the competition in 2013 has been received 20 short stories, as they said, from across the country. Still, moving towards the New awakening. Whatever that means in this particular case.

So, apart from marginal pop up reflections which may be an indication of the New awakening within the culture of remembrance, nothing significant has been done to further labeling of the specified as any serious significant historical deed of our history(s). For what? Because it does not belong to the the new history (s). Written by the side of modern "beggars of the mind" of green, red, blue and yellow provenances. Yeah, about that the winners are writing about. Or we all are the losers who do not understand the words engraved in the history of memories of these areas. Let us mention just that on the official WWW site of Bugojno Municipality there is no information whatsoever about the information above, as opposed to information on the web pages of other municipalities within the close environment - Jablanica, Prozor-Rama, Vitez, Jajce, Konjic, Kupres, Gornji Vakuf Uskoplje , Busovaca, Kresevo, Fojnica, which, at least in part, are focused towards culture of remembrance of these areas. Even on the official website of the Touristic Board of the Middle Bosnia Canton, which part is Bugojno as well, is written ... quote ... *In the area Poda has been found dozens of different objects and bowls, where has been also found the bowl with the oldest inscription which dates from the fourth (IV) century BC* ... end of quote. Was not specified at all what it is about the oldest inscription and not to mention a factual error in dating the monument in the fourth (IV) instead of the sixth ( VI) century BC.

#### KULTURNO-HISTORIJSKA OBILJEŽJA

Grad Bugojno je svoj najznačajniji ekonomski i društveni razvoj ostvario nakon II sv. rata, a posebno u posljednje dvije decenije kada se svrstalo u red najrazvijenijih općina BiH. Najraniji pronalasci, koji svjedoče o postojanju neke vrste naselja u ovim krajevima datiraju čak do 3000 godine prije nove ere. Pronađeni su ostaci naselja Ilirskog plemena Sardeti na Gomilama kod sela Karadže. "Ad Matricem" je Rimski naziv vojničke utvrde koju su oni utvrdili na ovim prostorima kako bi zaštitili jednu od važnijih raskrsnica rimskih puteva, koji su vodili iz Dalmacije i Hercegovine za Srednju Bosnu i Panoniju. Ostaci starih rimskih puteva se mogu i danas vidjeti. Očuvana kaldrima, dio puta sa Kupreške visoravni prema Prensi (Pruscu) je jedan od takvih puteva. Ostaci keramike, stakla i metalurgije Rimskog vremena mogu se naći na Gradini, pored sela Sultanovići u blizini Bugojna. Iz perioda tursko-osmanlijske uprave najznačajniji spomenici su Sultan-Ahmedova džamija, Rustempašića kula Sulejmanpašića kula. Iz austrougarskog perioda, značajne su katolička Crkva sv. Ante Padovanskog, Crkva sv. Ilje Proroka i Crkva prečisto srce Marijino. Na području Poda je pronađeno više desetina raznih predmeta i zdjela, gdje je pronađena također, zdjela sa najstarijim natpisom, koja potiče iz IV stoljeća prije naše ere. Bitno je spomenuti i srednjovjekovni grad Susid se nalazi na području između sela Gračanice i Kordića.

WWW page of Touristic Board of Middle Bosnia canton: <http://www.tzsbk.com/bugojno.html>

#### (Non)peaceful serenity of the last Bosnian Princess Katarina Tomasevic Kotromanić

In November 2011 I have with my colleague Mrs. Samira Begman, Deputy editor in chief of DIOGEN pro cultura magazine visited the grave of the last Bosnian Princess Katarina in Skopje, Macedonia, for whom it is assumed that she died in the period between 1510 and 1520 year as reported by historian Prof. Enver Imamovic within the statement given back 2011 for magazine "Slobodna Bosna". The catastrophic earthquake in Skopje destroyed a tomb that had previously existed in the Bosniak Mahala of Gazi Baba settlement in Skopje. It took a full 53 years to renew a tomb and today, in 2014 we can say that it has been renewed and all works recently, a few months ago, have been completed. But, why was it necessary to have almost six decades to come to the above, and especially because that for the reconstruction should have been invested "negligible" 5000 Euro, how much the cost the trip to Brussels and back of two modern beggars of the mind within creations of modalities of possible survival of Bosnia and Herzegovina state.

First, within the **religion of the ideology** that practiced atheism there was no interest of the renovation of the facility that was the part of one heritage that "has finished in the dustbin of history" and that was not talked about the new self-governing, inspiring thinker who will, in a few minutes, step through the door of communist paradise about which spoke "**the leader, led by the party**", as small kid Malik says in the film "Father on Business trip" by Emir Kusturica, in the early eighties of the last century. Because let's not forget, the leader is never blind, although Domanović stated otherwise. It is always different from the manifested. People(s) is/are blind that follows the leader, regardless was he a noble dictator and/or the other kind, obnoxious one. Secondly, the arrival of *democrature* to this area I have announced just prior to the first democratic elections in 1990 words in one article to as "Gentlemen, former comrades, I doubt that you can change anything ...." there was a change so I have to, today, twenty-four years later to admit my own error adding another sentence "... I made a mistake and they have committed a change - they took 24 years of my life.". Therefore, with the arrival of **ideology of the religion**, single-minded (three)mindedness exclusivity that tends for, there were not possibility to do the renovation of the above grave until the media have not wavered the public. But, even to that is needed at least ten years for the realization. And we have succeeded, including the listed media activities from DIOGEN pro cultura magazine as well.



*Monument for the Bosnian Princess Katarina in Skopje, 2014*

Why all this? Negligible amount that could have been able to extract from their monthly salary and the rest of the apanage that has any entity and /or state representative/politician, so far could not be targeted because of the culture of remembrance that the girl, the daughter of Queen Catherine, whose bones are still in Rome, although they say that for years are trying to transfer them in BiH. However, consensus about that has to be accomplished. Within the culture of remembrance: Whose was Queen Catherine? Of Bosnia and Herzegovina? Yes. It's exactly what is this problem about. Here the word "Bosnia and Herzegovina" is understood with the one of them as Unitarianism, in other ones as example of identification and among the third as example of tolerance. But, not at anyone still, in the culture of remembrance, there is no such example of universality in the fact that on these areas walked others prior to us and whose being of multi-identity we make today. And in a culture of remembrance.

### **Dubrovnik gentlemen - merchants visited their colony in Prusac, Donji Vakuf**

Motivated by the article published in Dnevni Avaz 19.5.2013.g. I was in Prusac, historical "town" near Donji Vakuf. Accompanied by professor of history and writer from Bugojno, Viktor Dundović I have visited a local historian, professor of history and Latin language, Husein Čepalo with the wish to visit together Dervo Hubljar, the local host and to assure myself, but also to inform the cultural public of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the world, readers of DIOGEN pro culture magazine, about the historical artifacts found in Prusac.

However, due to negligence, above all, of local government structures, presented in a slow and ignorant action of Mayor of Donji Vakuf, Huso Sušić, but also of the higher authorities responsible for the protection of cultural heritage, copper cannon old about 600 years is not longer in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Namely, in the country from which (or in which) is easier to export and import all kinds of drugs, but very difficult to import but also export books of domestic and foreign authors, everything is possible, and even that the copper cannon just found in Prusac is not any more in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

What we are talking about? Arriving at the location of finding of the copper cannon in Prusac we did not find a local man Dervo Hubljar, but we found out from his wife that as from Saturday,

18.5.2013 cannon is within the property of traders/merchants from Dubrovnik, whom have visited Prusac.

Of course, our assumption is that the cannon was already carried out from Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to Dubrovnik gentlemen we can only say that they always know how to use their skillfully own merchant Schmek and the time when to react.

And for us? We are left only to wonder:

1. Until when these areas will suffer the destruction of the spirit of the local being because of negligence and ignorance of local government, but also of the higher authorities responsible for the care of the heritage and legacy of the BiH?

2. Should we perhaps these days to send someone to Sotheby's or Christie's to buy of our own heritage when they announce to the world that it will be sold to the world brokers?

3. Why Bosnian cultural heritage disappears while being ceded under the price?

DIOGEN pro culture magazine has been, through launching and implementation of one action in the period 2011 - 2012 and launching two more in 2012 directed not only to individual shaping of the protection of culture of remembrance, but also far greatly expanded education about alternative of understanding of the culture of remembrance as a form of development, but also as the survival of the general culture of the local people(s) and citizens. Yes, as the basic prerequisite for survival of the country, this still exists on the principle of organized anarchy. Even within the culture of remembrance.

Fully understanding the fact that we cannot be the only one, and do not want to be that either, who warn about the destruction of the culture of remembrance in the mosaic of the comprehensiveness of the being of Bosnia and Herzegovina, we simply suggest mentioned in concrete forms of realization. Starting from the school system itself which interacts with the orientations of the media. Assuming that one day we will have if not common, but at least consensual curriculum. How to?

The following are ways that we are directly tie with professional, scientific field in which we are on our own ground of the methodological appearances:

1. Radio and TV shows of contact types - regular participation of the professors of history(ies) from a local school with discussions on certain sites where the monuments of significance exists for the culture of remembrance. And not only the participation of professors, but also students who express interest in study of the cultural heritage. The term should be matched with classes so that students can follow the show and participate (through telephone and/or electronic mail) to be bale to directly participate within the TV & Radio show.

2. In the same time participation of local radio and television stations at the history classes and monitoring of certain presentations that are related to the cultural heritage of the local habitat.

3. Use all the subjects that are in this way within the possible correlation relations with the theme: Fine arts, geography, history, native language.

4. Specialized shows during which can be watched, commented and analyzed certain epochs that have marked these areas and at the same time focusing on what is was part of the culture of remembrance within the epoch that is observed.

5. Covered by the marketing of the so-called "Quiz shows" which will, in a fun way make closer culture of remembrance about Bosnia and Herzegovina's cultural heritage to younger generations.

6. Functional *feuilletons* made in the press as a prerequisite for future analysis of events by the side of students.

7. Encouraging communication not only within the school between teaching staff and students, but also going out at the interesting locations and active learning "on the spot" with the comments of professors and students. At the same time it would be working visits (in the case of neglect space) where it will be on the so-called small "Labor actions", through the work, students build awareness not only about the cultural heritage but also about the country of which they are a part.

8. Develop a Web pages on the Internet relating to the cultural remembrance of Bosnian cultural heritage, and which will be, through the Internet connections, "linked" to each other and jointly create a common purposes of the wider areas of BiH.

9. The individual focused towards media presentation - Are student tours another valid form of communication with the cultural heritage within the culture of remembrance?

a) Going from local to global, and with the help of the responsible institutions, may be elaborated strategic forms of communication of local and global, and that on this occasion in the form of media coverage of the exchange of visits of students' field trip in Bosnia and Herzegovina. How to? It is really easy. If students from city of Jajce staying in a day trip in city of Bugojno and city of Trebinje, or *vice versa*, then to the local public, as well entity public services, but also as well the state public service certainly be able to find a space and time to follow up and broadcast those visits and gatherings which are targeting the strengthening of awareness about the cultural heritage within the culture of remembrance that does not belong to „this“ or to „that“ people, to „this“ or to that „nation, but belongs to the society as the whole.

b) What is the role of the entity institutions (and cantonal) that are dealing with cultural heritage and their role in all of this. How to take advantage of existing institutions and prevent further erosion of our own destiny by building a new understanding of ourselves, and with the help of the study of cultural heritage within the culture of remembrance?

c) Here appears the mentioned as the so-called *the main coordinators* of decentralization (in line with the Dayton peace agreement assumptions) of work and reflection of thoughts on cultural heritage. What is it here about? The education with the help of all the varieties of the listed media will not be sufficient if adequately are not included the appropriate entity and cantonal institutions, (and we should not forget the ones from the state level) engaged in the study and protection of cultural heritage. These are of course all the so-called Institutions for the protection of cultural and historical monuments, the Commission to Preserve National Monuments and others. And all this in coordination with the relevant Ministry of Education, Science, Culture and Sport, which is responsible for a specific, concrete the questions that pop ups. How to take advantage of the media here? Easy. Regular reporting with the means of public communication about the activities of the competent authorities with respect to the protection of cultural heritage of the area that is "covered" with the culture of remembrance.

Last but not least is certainly the media relations towards tourist indications of the sites of cultural monuments in this region. At the same time will be established also economic resources/potentials of certain areas as well as to inform the public about the attractive tourist sites. In the case the cliché "*Acquaint the homeland to prefer it more*" in this way get more quality considering that there

are small number of those who are familiar with the fact of the existence of a five-digit number of tombstones (BHS Language: „Stećak“) in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Tourism may succeed to create economic assumption for development of cultural heritage protection and not only externally (towards other countries), but also internally (within BiH).

As a logical conclusion of the imposed thesis we are coming to the simple formulation: The means of mass communication (ie mass media) are and remain the form of education of the youngest, but also an indispensable form of awakening of "sleeping consciousness" of the rest of the population (of us, the so-called *grown up little people*) when it comes to protecting of the cultural heritage of Bosnia and Herzegovina within culture of remembrance. We must deal with that, because the countries without memories are doomed to oblivion.

Absurdistan in which we live is confirmed by the fact that local tycoons are realigning the old forts, move old tombstones and "concreted" the remembrances by creating a new age focus to align runways for paragliding and or for their only known needs.

Bosnia and Herzegovina must not allow itself that because otherwise the hypothesis from the beginning of this paper that the twilight of Bosnia and Herzegovina remembrance is placed on a pedestal of sustainability of current(s) Bosnia and Herzegovina policy(cies).

And if to someone all of the above-oriented education of the righteous local ones, indicated within **the unifying of diversity** – slogan of DIOGEN pro culture magazine, sounds utopian, do not forget that the avalanche at the beginning was the snowflake. Even when we talk about the awakening. Related to the culture of remembrance.

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
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**Featuring artist:  
William Ashford  
Ireland**



**DIOGEN pro  
culture magazine**

...

**a month for  
DIOGEN artist ...  
and you ...**



**Knowing through culture  
– an important step to accept one to each over and to deal better difficult  
moments**

**Marius Chelaru**  
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**Abstract**

We are living times in which the conflicts (from declared or not politic, economic, religious “reasons”) take dramatic shapes.

The improper extrapolation of value/ politic systems or in a improper manner for some “conflict territories” lead to painful failures. The scourge of terrorism (a term used sometimes in a improper manner/ way) complicated more and more everything. There was attacks against some countries based on “reasons” considered to be at least questionable.

There are consequences beyond all these, deep in the collective peoples memories. It is really necessary to understand what is the culture of remembrance and reconciliation, even it is not easy and it is often difficult to speak about state politics in this direction.

In the region of South East Europe, with so many ethnic groups/ peoples, where were so many conflicts and boundaries between countries were changed over and over (often influenced by foreign powers), there are alive many of resentments, and people which can be convinced that there are „conspiracies” coming from the past and what we named “culture of remembrance” is seriously touched of all these.

A old sūtra from „Mikyō”, a treatise adopted by an oriental martial school, almost covered by the oblivion, remember us that hate is born from fear, fear from ignorance, and ignorance is a corollary of the missing of knowledge.

I believe that, even seems to be so common, it is important to know better and profoundly one to each over, an knowing through culture is a huge step, because involve to understand not only some books or movies, but mentalities, traditions, behavior etc.

Instrument are near us, we must only to have the willing to try to do it. Knowledge, in this way, really means power. The power to understand one to each over and to have peace.

***Key words: collective memories, ethnic groups, culture, culture of remembrance, knowledge through culture,***

**Knowing through culture**  
**– an important step to accept one to each other and to deal better difficult moments**

I presume that all of us know that manner in which, often, the “international community” (and I mean mostly the politicians speech) objectifies (or I should say „create” somehow a strange distance) using terms like “distant conflicts”. It is a paradox for “ordinary” people that today, even we try to built laws, International Organizations (which, we must to admit, didn’t had enough rapid and efficient answers, euphemistically speaking, till now faced with some issues) still the systematic murder of „others”, even „ethnic cleansing” and attempts (which globally speaking, there are “seen” mostly “after”) at cultural erasure.

We are watching on TV news about conflicts we really don’t exactly understand, but we receive “explanations” and “reasons why” to be “sure” that in former Yugoslavia, not so many years before, near our days or even today in Chechnya (or other places populated by peoples from Caucasus and nearby) or, recently, Crimea (where we hear about Tatars position<sup>132</sup>) or Iraq or Afghanistan or... unfortunately in so many places, “things” are... somehow “under control”.

But, in fact, we know so few about who are those people who are fighting there, for what, why they become enemies of a superpower or of the World itself.

When, in the time of Boris Yeltsin, named by some people “the tsar of Russian democracy”, started the war in Chechnya, I read that a western expert said that if we need to understand what’s there we must to read Hadji Murad, written by Lev Tolstoy. I agree. But I presume my reasons are very different. I want to understand the mentality, the cultural fundaments of the world of the new “Hajimurad al-Khunzaki” (thea real name of the man who inspired Hadji Murad character), that confederate of the Imam Shamil, who led the resistance to Russia’s annexation of the Caucasus<sup>133</sup>, and betrayed his ally, than went over to the Russians in years 1850. From the same reason I am grateful that I could travel in former Yugoslavia, after the war, or in Armenia, Nagorno Karabach and other places and I could understand many things better, I hope.

When I arrived in Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, I crossed Drina having in mine deeply thoughts the load of the „bridge metaphor”, from the cultural discourses on Ivo Andrić’s

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<sup>132</sup> They had a blood history with URSS, millions being killed in an almost “unknown” genocide of the Caucasus peoples. And, beyond this, from cultural and national identity point of view, they suffered some important changing – fist they wrote using Arabic letters, communists changed it with Cyrillic one, now they discuss about to change with the Latin letters. Each and every change led to loosing of the contact of the newest generations with all the creations written in the old alphabet.

<sup>133</sup> The „War of Caucasus” - 1817-1864.

*The Bridge on the Drina* or Mostar, Stari Most/ Old Bridge. I stepped with a lot of thoughts, after some days there, on Sarajevo's *Latinski most* (Latin Bridge).

I was located in a hotel named "Hayat", very near from a place famous from a famous movie about Sarajevo, *Valter brani Sarajevo/ Walter Defends Sarajevo*. And then my minds went to the scenes I watched on TV about 1990's terrified war of the people which were, till then, citizens of the same country, and I remembered Stevan Bulajić's *Bitka na Neretvi/ The Battle on the Neretva*, Hajrudin Krvavac's *Most/ The Bridge*... and what I knew from the past, from Romania, about Yugoslavia. Under Tito's leadership, the partisans troupes, the People's Liberation Army (*Narodno-oslobodilačka vojska*) and the Partisan Detachments of Yugoslavia (*Partizanski odredi Jugoslavije*) had a kind of center in Jajce, Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1943.

Bridges are complicated... "metaphors" faced with reality... and not only here...

Because I truly believe that knowing better one to each other we can not stop wars, maybe (because politics is a strange world where often logic is not a measure of the things, but money and interests), but we are able to understand better "the others". We can build in our mind a tool to eliminate or to understand why are used some cliché about peoples in a moment or other, for an interest or other, and it will be not so easy to be manipulate.

I believe that the communication through a "cultural/ literary magazine" means, through the choices you take, the way you write (vocabulary, speech, themes etc.) also the exposing of a way of thinking. I am interested of the way in which communicate individuals and peoples through cultures, how much they really want to know one to each other, beyond commercial or national purposes. I am interested to the way in which a nation, a people, a country is reflected in the culture of the other countries/ peoples.

I started from the presumption that when you write not only the art/ the literature are "determinant", but the way in which reader, as a "result" of a type of civilization/ mentality/ education "answers" to economic, social, politic and educational factors. So, from the art opera till the way you transmit a message there are "steps" which need to be understand.

Culture is as an alive organism. The world is changing from many point of views, and concepts as "globalization" involved many valences which must to be understand in as much as possible real parameters, with particular elements, from a place to another.

In order to this, I started (or I accepted to join other colleagues) to work on some particular directions, to built my program starting, on short, from some aspects:

1. even we discuss about “globalization”, with its multiple faces, about tolls for communication/ information much over we had 20 years ago, in reality we know one to each over, including the cultural point but others of view, rather slightly one to each other.
2. “globalization is a phenomenon which must be watched with high responsibility, maybe mostly regarding the identity/ diversity in the cultural domain, and because, beyond the theoretic concepts used, there are languages which are dying, cultures which are vanished.
3. I propose to myself to study these aspects on some socio-cultural “directions”, reported to some interest areas:
  - a. Romania and South-Eastern European Cultures
  - b. Romania in European context, and extended, in a Western/ global one
  - c. Romania and Oriental cultures
  - d. Romania and other area geographic areas cultures
  - e. Ethnic groups from Romania
  - f. Romanians from abroad

I built my “program” with a lecture plan, a travel plan, but also starting from collaborating with some important magazines from Romania and abroad, but mostly in four magazines which, in my intentions, are in way “used” by me “to go” in all over the world:

- a. „Poezia”/ “Poetry”, magazine of poetic culture (published in Iași, Romania)
- b. *Carmina Balcanica*. Review of South-East European Spirituality, Craiova, Bucharest, Romania
- c. „Doina”, **Revue de Littérature, Civilisation et Culture Universelle, bilingue, franco-roumaine, Paris, France (unfortunately now the project ends)**
- d. „Kadō”, Calea Poeziei, Review of Euro-Asiatic Poetry, Poetic Culture and Spirituality.

So, I started (concurrently with some travels for documentation and understanding in some places from West and East etc.), starting from Romania, (with „Poezia”, and „Convorbiri literare”/ “Literary Conversation”<sup>134</sup>), through South-Eastern Europe, with „Carmina Balcanica”, going then to the West and further, to Africa, Caribbean regions etc., with “Doina” (some issues, as it appeared), and completing the circle to East with „Kadō”.

Concerning the ethnic groups from Romania, for example, I initiated in „Poezia”, a column titled „The poetry of the minorities from Romania”, and creations signed by authors from various ethnic were published, thematic, in issues from „Carmina Balcanica” or „Kadō”. In the same manner I proceed with the Romanian authors from abroad – I initiated in „Poezia” a column titled

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<sup>134</sup> Maybe the most prestigious cultural magazine from Romanian, founded in March 1, 1867, where I own now a column titled “Foreign book”, and an other to book review books from my region.

„A Romanian language poetry map”, where I published authors from a region of Romania and Romanian authors form an abroad community or a country or other.

Various issues of these magazines dedicated to some countries or ethno-linguistic communities (for these we collaborate with poetry, essays, book reviews, cultural news etc authors from that places/ countries) showed that various interesting aspects.

Speaking about dedicated issues, for example „Kadō” has issues for Crimea, Turkey, Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina etc.

I tried also to apply various analyze methods starting from some „variables” and characteristics/ social indexes which, corroborated can give an better image (such as: index about gender, the report individuals – social group, national or regional index – which in particular situations are associated with aspects pending by ethnic/ religious/ linguistic differences, even inside a country - power distance index, I followed the generation/ class/ budget/ gender/ education etc. factors) facing with what I could see in each situation going there, on the place itself. And, many times, the concepts were “adjusted”/ “gradated” in my perception by the reality<sup>135</sup>.

All this didn’t changed my profoundly basic opinions, but they created for me a better and much gradated image of the manner we perceive from distance a “culture”, of the way they are build educational directions/ how inter-act some factors pending by social/ economic/ professional or/ and social mobility, macro-politic movements concerning individuals, and the culture of different peoples/ groups.

It is obvious that the world (and culture) evolves, there are all sort of changing which generate all sort of effects, but I really believe that Knowing through culture is an important step to accept one to each over and to deal better difficult moments. You could maybe even find a useful tool to have a different but better way to built the peace, or to repair war damages. And I don’t want to be in the position to ask myself (as, unfortunately, we are doing from centuries) “how is when a language in which was written a poem is dying near you). I am truly convinced that the world is so beautiful maybe mostly through its diversity. Real/ Concrete situations need a correct understanding, beyond politics or concepts, and mostly a perception which need to be earnest reflected and to transmit a clear, intelligible for the readers pending to the cultural matrix you address to.

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<sup>135</sup> I red rather recently some interesting papers which had various perspectives and about the differences between “theory” and “reality”/ what can you see “there”; I notice some of these: Ji Li, Leonard Karakowsky, *Do We See Eye-to-Eye? Implications of Cultural Differences for Cross-Cultural Management Research and Practice*, in *The Journal of Psychology*, 135 (5), 2001, p. 501-517.

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**Radovi učesnika Simpozijuma**  
**dostavljeni na jeziku autora**  
**(bez engleskog prijevoda)**

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## KOLIKO SU VJERNICI U BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI SPREMNI NA POMIRENJE?

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Petnaest godina nakon prestanka rata u BiH, postavlja se pitanje kako vjerska uvjerenja građana utiče na pomirenje. Pomirenje smo operacionalizovali preko četiri pokazatelja: nepovjerenje prema drugima, saradnja s drugim narodima, opraštanje i rehumanizacija. Istraživanje je sprovedeno u februaru 2010. godine, na uzorku od 1.412 punoljetnih Srba, Hrvata i Bošnjaka iz BiH, metodom ankete sa ličnim intervjuisanjem. Analizu pojedinih varijabli radili smo analizom varijanse. Među pripadnicima hrvatskog naroda najviše nepovjerenja nalazimo kod vjerenika koji prihvataju sve što njihova vjera uči, slijede nesigurni, agnostici i ateisti, dok je najmanje nepovjerenja kod ispitanika koji sebe vide kao vjernike, ali koji ne prihvataju sve što vjera uči ( $p=0,000$ ). Spremnost na saradnju sa drugim narodima najviše je prisutno kod onih koji vjeruju ali ne u potpunosti, a slijede nesigurni, agnostici i ateisti. Na saradnju su najmanje spremni uvjereni vjernici ( $p=0,00$ ). Spremnost za opraštanje najviše je prisutno kod nesigurnih, agnostika i ateista, potom onih koji vjeruju, ali ne sve i oni koji su uvjereni vjernici ( $p=0,000$ ). Rehumanizacija drugih naroda najviše je prisutno kod Hrvata koji vjeruju ali ne u potpunosti a slijede nesigurni, agnostici i ateisti. Na rehumanizaciju su najmanje spremni uvjereni vjernici ( $p=0,07$ ). Među Bošnjacima najviše nepovjerenja nalazimo kod vjerenika koji prihvataju sve što njihova vjera uči, slijede ispitanici koji sebe vide kao vjernike, ali koji ne prihvataju sve što vjera propovjeda, dok je najmanje prisutno kod nesigurnih, agnostika i ateista ( $p=0,000$ ). Spremnost na saradnju sa drugim narodima najviše je prisutno kod onih koji vjeruju, ali ne u potpunosti, a slijede nesigurni, agnostici i ateisti. Na saradnju su najmanje spremni uvjereni vjernici ( $p=0,00$ ). Spremnost za opraštanje najviše je prisutno kod nesigurnih, agnostika i ateista, a slijede oni koji vjeruju, ali ne sve i oni koji su uvjereni vjernici ( $p=0,000$ ). Rehumanizacija drugih naroda najviše je prisutna kod Bošnjaka koji vjeruju, ali ne u potpunosti, a slijede nesigurni, agnostici i ateisti. Na rehumanizaciju su najmanje spremni uvjereni vjernici ( $p=0,07$ ). Među Srbima najviše nepovjerenja nalazimo kod vjerenika koji prihvataju sve što njihova vjera uči ( $p=0,000$ ), slijede ispitanici koji sebe vide kao vjernike, ali koji ne prihvataju sve što vjera uči, dok je najmanje prisutno kod nesigurnih, agnostika i ateista. Na ostalim varijablama nisu pronađene statistički značajne razlike.

**Ključne reči:** *pomirenje, povjerenje, saradnja, opraštanje, rehumanizacija, Bosna i Hercegovina, religija.*

## 1. Uvod

Prošlo je devetnaest godina od prestanka rata u Bosni i Hercegovini. U tom ratu je poginulo nešto više od 100.000 stanovnika Bosne i Hercegovine (IDC, 2010)<sup>136</sup>, a 51,8% stanovništva postalo je izbjeglica ili raseljeno lice (prema Opačić i saradnici, 2005). Dodamo li tome veliki broj ranjenih boraca i civila, etničko čišćenje i ratne zločine, slika postaje još sumornija. Koliko god se mi u Bosni i Hercegovini trudili da vidimo sebe (i naše konflikte) kao nešto posebno i jedinstveno, moramo imati u vidu da se u svijetu vode, ili su se vodili, mnogi ratovi, a da je nakon njih uvijek, prije ili kasnije, slijedila neka vrsta pomirenja i normalizacija odnosa između zaraćenih strana. Primjera je mnogo, Francuske i Njemačke, nakon Drugog svjetskog rata, mirovni procesi u Sjevernoj Irskoj (Wall, 2002), Južnoj Africi (Nadler, 2000) ili Ruandi (Rombouts, 2002).

Ipak, život se polako vraća u normalne tokove, ratna dešavanja postepeno prerastaju u mitove, a političari su preuzeli ulogu generala. Da li je došlo vrijeme za pomirenje i kolika je spremnost građana Bosne i Hercegovine spremi za to?

Pomirenje možemo posmatrati kroz dva aspekta, individualni i kolektivni. Sa stanovišta pojedinca pomirenje je bitno za očuvanje njegovog mentalnog zdravlja. Mržnja i želja za osvetom pojedincu ne dozvoljava da se razvija i on postaje disfunkcionalan; jednostavno rečeno mržnja iscrpljuje čovjeka. Sa stanovišta kolektiva pomirenje je neophodno zbog sprečavanja budućih sukoba, koji bi sa sobom donijeli i nove žrtve. Pošto je malo koje društvo iz rata izašlo bogatije, sretnije i naprednije – ako izuzmemo jednu malu grupu profitera – jasno je zbog čega je uspostavljanje mira toliko važno za svaku pa i ovu zemlju.

Religija sastavni dio kulture i da je uticaj religije u sekularnim društvima veliki, mada često nevidljiv (moralna načela, istorija, spomenici, mitovi i dr.). Uticaj religije u bosanskohercegovačkom društvu je veoma izraženo i to je Abazović (2006) veoma dobro opisao:

1. Bosanskohercegovačko društvo je izrazito višekonfesionalno,
2. Uloga religije i religijskih zajednica u formiranju nacionalnog identiteta je izražena i
3. Uticaj religije i religijskih zajednica bio je veoma izražen u toku rata do danas.

Položaj vjerskih ustanova na našim prostorima varirao je kroz vrijeme i u zavisnosti od društvenog uređenja. U periodu poslije dugogog svjetskog rata pa do kraja sedamdesetih godina 20. vijeka, uticaj vjerskih ustanova u javnom životu Bosne i Hercegovine, kao i ostalih republika bivše

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<sup>136</sup> [http://www.idc.org.ba/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=section&id=35&Itemid=126&lang=bs](http://www.idc.org.ba/index.php?option=com_content&view=section&id=35&Itemid=126&lang=bs)

SFRJ, bio je sveden na minimum. Prema popisu iz 1953. godine u Jugoslaviji je bilo 12,5% ateista i taj broj je stalno rastao da bi prema popisu iz 1975. godine bilo 25% ateista (Radić, 2005). I kasnije istraživanja su pokazala da kod stanovnika bivše Jugoslavije preovladava nereligioznost (Vrcan, 1986; Pantić, 1988). Sa početkom ratnih dešavanja, pripadnost određenoj etničkoj grupi i vjeroispovjest postaju osnovni kohezivni faktor na našim prostorima. Etnička pripadnost se izjednačava sa vjeroispovješću. Došlo je do sakralizacije nacije i nacionalizacije svetoga. Promovišu se ideje o “nebeskom narodu” i “svetoj zemlji”. Univerzalne vrijednosti (ljubav, praštanje, milosrđe i nenasilje) sve tri monoteističke religije su marginalizovane pod uticajem etnocentrizma i šovinizma. Katoličanstvo, islam i pravoslavlje su zloupotrebljavani, sa ili bez saglasnosti vjerskih lidera, da bi se povukla jasna granica i istakla “ogromna” razlika između etničkih grupa (Abazović, 2006; Cvitković, 2005; Dušanić, 2007). Slična situacija je i danas. Istraživanje Magnussona (prema Abazović, 2006) urađenog na Bošnjacima i Hrvatima je pokazalo da 95,6% katolika sebe istovremeno opaža kao Hrvata dok među islamskim vjernicima nalazimo 56,3% Bošnjaka i 36,3% Muslimana. Možemo pretpostaviti da bi slične rezultate dobili i među Srbima koji sebe u najvećem procentu vide kao pravoslavce (Cvitković, 2004).

Iako religije na našim prostorima imaju isto porijeklo, Abrahamovsko, i ako promoviše vrijednosti koje su univerzalne, postavlja se sasvim opravdano pitanje da li je religija u Bosni i Hercegovini doprinosi ili sprečava pomirenje?

Čini nam se da je ovo pitanje sasvim legitimno imamo li u vidu rezultate istraživanja u svijetu i kod nas koja su se bavila povezanošću procesa pomirenja, u najširem njegovom značenju, i religije. Istraživanja u svijetu pokazuju da postoji korelacija između religioznosti i antidemokratskih stavova (Peres, 1995), autoritarnosti i vjerskih fundamentalista (Brown, 1962; Al-Thakeb, Scott, 1982; Hunsberger, 1996, Arglyle, 2004). Takođe neka istraživanja pokazuju da konzervativne religijske grupe su manje tolerantne prema manjinskim grupama, ženskim pravima, LGBT kategorijama i sl. (Silberman, 2005). Slične rezultate dobijaju i istraživači u Bosni i Hercegovini. Istraživanje Dušanića (2007) pokazuju da je ekstrinzička religioznost u pozitivnoj korelaciji sa proratnim stavovima, a religiozni fundamentalizam sa autoritarnošću, nacionalnom vezanošću i dogmatizmom. Isti autor 2009. godine prezentuje rezultate istraživanja na 1057 mladih, pretežno Srba, u kojem pokazujem 76% ispitanika sebe kao religiozne ili veoma religiozne, a religioznost negativno korelira sa prihvatanjem odnosa sa različitim socijalnim grupama. Takođe je pronađena poozitivna korelacija između religioznosti i autoritarnosti i samoživi arhiv

neprijateljstva. Doktorski rad Smajića (2010) je pokazao da postoji pozitivna korelacija između religioznosti i etnocentrizma, autoritarnosti i afektivno- spoznajnu netolerantnost.

Imajući u vidu gore navedene rezultate možemo da očekujemo da će religioznost ispitanika u Bosni i Hercegovini biti prepreka na putu pomirenja između tri etničke grupe.

## **2. Metod**

### **2.1 Uzorak**

Istraživanje je sprovedeno u drugoj polovini februara 2010. godine na uzorku od 1412 punoljetnih građana Bosne i Hercegovine, metodom anketiranja licem u lice. Prilikom izbora uzorka vodilo se računa o sljedećim demografskim elementima:

1. Broj stanovnika u pojedinim regionima i kantonima.
2. Odnos urbanog i ruralnog stanovništva u pojedinim regionima i kantonima.
3. Veličina pojedinih naseljenih mjesta u okviru regiona.
4. Broj muškaraca i žena je približno isti.

Istraživanje je sprovedeno u 25 opština u Federaciji BiH i 37 opština u Republici Srpskoj. U istraživanju je učestvovalo 124 Hrvata, 451 Bošnjak i 837 Srba. Broj muškaraca i žene je bio približno jednak kao i odnos između gradskog i seoskog stanovništva. Od ukupnog broja ispitanika njih 51,3% sebe opisuje kao uvjerenе vjernike koji prihvataju sve što ih vjera uči, 36,7% su vjernici, ali ne prihvataju baš sve što vjera uči i 12% onih koji su nesigurni u svoju religioznost ili su agnostici i ateisti.

### **2.2 Instrumenti**

U okviru ovog istraživanja mjerili smo četiri zavisne varijable koje mogu uticati na pomirenje stanovnika Bosne i Hercegovine i to: nepovjerenje, saradnja s drugim narodima, opraštanje i rehumanizacija, kao i dvije nezavisne varijable nacionalizam i dogmatizam, dok su ispitanici sami sebe procjenjivali koliki su vjernici.

U predstojećem tekstu pokušaćemo dati osnovne informacije o ovim varijablama

**Skala nacionalizma** koja se sastoji od 14 stavki na koje su ispitanici mogli da odgovore sa: uopšte se ne slažem, uglavnom se ne slažem, neodlučan sam, djelimično se slažem i otpuno se slažem. Što je skor na skali nacionalizma veći znači da ispitanik više podržava nacionalističke stavove. Katz (prema Đuriću, 1980) definiše „nacionalizam kao svojstvo nacionalne države, predstavlja ideologiju koja pomaže i održava glavne funkcije države. Kao vrednosni sistem, on ne samo da opravdava i veliča glavna djelovanja države, nego pomaže i da ih usmjeri. On je i posledica i uzrok funkcija države. Govoreći o nacionalizmu kao ideološkom sistemu, mislimo na integrisan skup vrijednosti i mišljenja koja predstavljaju jedinstven model zajednice.”

**Skala dogmatizma** (Bojanović, 2004) sastoji se od osam stavki sa petostepenom skalom odgovora: uopšte se ne slažem, uglavnom se ne slažem, neodlučan sam, djelimično se slažem i otpuno se slažem. Što je skor na skali dogmatizma veći to je kod ispitanika on i zastupljeniji. Dogmu možemo definisati kao „krajnje uprošćeno objašnjenje, konačna 'istina' u različitim oblastima, koje se ne zasniva na racionalnom prosuđivanju, već na autoritetu ili veri” (Bojanović, 2004: 44).

**Skala nepovjerenja prema drugim narodima** (Petrović, 2005) sastoji se od deset tvrdnji sa petostepenom skalom odgovora: uopšte se ne slažem, uglavnom se ne slažem, neodlučan sam, djelimično se slažem i otpuno se slažem. Što je skor na skali nepovjerenja veći to je kod ispitanika izraženije nepovjerenje. Povjerenje u druge ljude temelji se na pretpostavci da i drugi dijele naše temeljne vrijednosti, te da će se u odgovarajućim situacijama očekivano i predviđivo ponašati. Oni ne moraju nužno s nama biti saglasni (politički, kulturno ili vjerski), ali ako na osnovnom nivou prihvataju zajedničke vrijednosti, to će omogućiti i poduprijeti saradnju; ako vjerujemo da su naša predviđanja tačna, mi vjerujemo drugima. Povjerenje ima ulogu da pojednostavi složenost društvenih odnosa (Earle i Cvetkovich, 1995), jer utemeljuje društvene odnose i sistem na međusobno očekivanom ponašanju aktera u jednom društvu.

**Skala saradnje s drugim narodima** (Petrović, 2005) sastoji se od deset tvrdnji sa petostepenom skalom odgovora: uopšte se ne slažem, uglavnom se ne slažem, neodlučan sam, djelimično se slažem i otpuno se slažem. Što je skor na skali saradnje veći to su ispitanici spremniji na saradnju. Saradnja je „oblik interakcije pri kome osobe u interakciji jedna drugu podržavaju u aktivnostima koje izvode. Pri kooperaciji ljudi jedni drugima olakšavaju ostvarenje ciljeva koje svako od njih želi da postigne ili, opet, objedinjavanjem uloženi napora olakšavaju, odnosno omogućavaju realizovanje zajedničkih ciljeva” (Rot, 1999:275).

**Skala opraštanja** (Petrović, 2005) sastoji se od deset tvrdnji sa petostepenom skalom odgovora: uopšte se ne slažem, uglavnom se ne slažem, neodlučan sam, djelimično se slažem i otpuno se slažem. Što je skor na skali opraštanja veći to su ispitanici spremniji da oprostite pripadnicima drugih naroda u Bosni i Hercegovini. Za McCullougha (2001), najvažnija karakteristika opraštanja je priklanjanje prosocijalnoj motivaciji i odustajanje od nanošenja štete počiniozu zlodjela. Opraštanje nipošto nije isto što i pomirenje. Opraštanje može voditi pomirenju i predstavlja za njega nužan preduslov, ali uprkos tome do pomirenja nikad ne mora doći. Prema Exline i Baumeister (2000), oprost se podjednako ogleda na kognitivnoj, afektivnoj i ponašajnoj razini, pa tako žrtva ne razmišlja o nanesejoj šteti, iako se sjeća, ne ljuti se zbog nje niti žudi za osvetom ili kažnjavanjem krivca.

**Skala rehumanizacije** (Petrović, 2005) sastoji se od deset tvrdnji sa petostepenom skalom odgovora: uopšte se ne slažem, uglavnom se ne slažem, neodlučan sam, djelimično se slažem i otpuno se slažem. Što je skor na skali rehumanizacije veći to ispitanici prema drugim narodima imaju humaniji odnos. Nakon eskalacije sukoba protivničku stranu se sve manje opaža kao nekoga sličanog nama i veoma često neprijatelj gubi svoje ljudske osobine, što ima za posledicu smanjenu empatiju prema njegovom stradanju ili patnjama. A bez empatije prema žrtvi, teško je zaustaviti agresivne impulse. U takvim se situacijama prema žrtvama ne odnosimo kao prema ljudskom biću, već kao prema nekome ko želi da nas uništi, a da bismo to spriječili sve nam je dozvoljeno. Takvo ponašanje najčešće ne prati kajanje, jer smatramo da mi nismo uradili ništa loše, nego naprotiv dobro.

### 2.3 Opis postupka

Ispitanici nisu samostalno popunjavali upitnik, već su odgovarali na pitanja koja im je čitao anketar. Terenski rad obavili su kontrolori i anketari **Agencije Prime Communications** iz Banje Luke. Prilikom rada na terenu anketari su se pridržavali nekoliko pravila koja su nam omogućila da izbor ispitanika bude slučajan. Anketari su dobili ime mjesne zajednice u koju idu kao i uputstvo kako da izaberu određenu ulicu, broj kuće od koje se kreće s radom (start), kao i broj kuća koje se moraju preskočiti (korak) da bi uradili novu anketu. Po ulasku u domaćinstvo anketari su birali za ispitanika punoljetnu osobu kojoj slijedi rođendan. Ovim smo izbjegli bilo kakvu mogućnost da anketari na bilo koji način utiču na izbor ispitanika. Anketari su morali da ispituju podjednak broj muškaraca i žena.

## 2.4 Pouzdanost instrumenta

Budući da su u istraživanju učestvovali punoljetni građani Bosne i Hercegovine, pouzadnost je prilično zadovoljavajuća, veća od 0.80. Najmanju pouzdanost imamo na skali etičke superiornosti, dok je najveća pouzdanost na skali saradnja s drugim narodima.

Tabela 1. Pouzdanost skala

	□
Nacionalizam	.88
Dogmatizam	.81
Nepovjerenje prema drugim narodima	.89
Saradnja s drugim narodima	.90
Opraštanje	.88
Rehumanizacija	.87

## 3. Rezultati istraživanja

Dobrojene rezultate ćemo prikazati za svaku etničku grupu posebno. I to tako što ćemo prvo analizom varijanse vidjeti da li postoje statistički značajne razlike između tri kategorije vjernika i pojedinih aspekata povjerenja, a onda ćemo vidjeti kako nepovjerenje prema drugim narodima, spremnost na saradnju, spremnost na opraštanje i rehumanizacija koleriraju sa nacionalizmom i dogmatizmom.

### 3.1 Hrvati

**Tabela 2.** Vjerska ubjedenja Hrvata i četiri aspekta pomirenja

		N	M	SD	SE
Nepovjerenje	Uvjereni sam vjernik i prihvaćam sve što moja vjera uči	83	3.0614	.86867	.09535
	Vjernik sam, ali ne prihvaćam baš sve što moja vjera uči	28	2.2000	.54907	.10377
	Nesigurni, agnostici i ateisti	13	2.3231	.82275	.22819
Saradnja	Uvjereni sam vjernik i prihvaćam sve što moja vjera uči	83	3.5482	.72857	.07997
	Vjernik sam, ali ne prihvaćam baš sve što moja vjera uči	28	4.1429	.36457	.06890
	Nesigurni, agnostici i ateisti	13	4.0231	.76393	.21188
Opraštanje	Uvjereni sam vjernik i prihvaćam sve što moja vjera uči	83	3.4313	.70450	.07733
	Vjernik sam, ali ne prihvaćam baš sve što moja vjera uči	28	3.9250	.45997	.08693
	Nesigurni, agnostici i ateisti	13	4.0077	.51228	.14208
Rehumanizacija	Uvjereni sam vjernik i prihvaćam sve što moja vjera uči	83	4.0325	.58291	.06398
	Vjernik sam, ali ne prihvaćam baš sve što moja vjera uči	28	4.3857	.44946	.08494
	Nesigurni, agnostici i ateisti	13	4.3385	.62655	.17377

Među pripadnicima hrvatskog naroda najviše nepovjerenja nalazimo kod vjerenika koji prihvataju sve što njihova vjera uči ( $p=0,000$ ), slijede nesigurni, agnostici i ateisti, dok je najmanje nepovjerenja kod ispitanika koji sebe vide kao vjernike, ali koji ne prihvataju sve što vjera uči. Interesantno je da se pravi vjernici značajno razlikuju od onih koji vjeruju, ali ne u potpunosti ( $p=0,000$ ) i onih koji su nesigurni u svoju vjeru ili su agnostici ili ateisti ( $p=0,003$ ).

Spremnost na saradnju sa drugim narodima najviše je prisutno kod onih koji vjeruju ali ne u potpunosti ( $p=0,00$ ), a slijede nesigurni, agnostici i ateisti. Na saradnju su najmanje spremni uvjereni vjernici. Interesantno je da se pravi vjernici značajno razlikuju od onih koji vjeruju, ali ne u potpunosti ( $p=0,000$ ) i onih koji su nesigurni u svoju vjeru ili su agnostici ili ateisti ( $p=0,019$ ).

Spremnost za opraštanje najviše je prisutno kod nesigurnih, agnostika i ateista ( $p=0,000$ ), a slijede oni koji vjeruju, ali ne sve i oni koji su uvjereni vjernici. Interesantno je da se pravi vjernici

značajno razlikuju od onih koji vjeruju, ali ne u potpunosti ( $p=0,001$ ) i onih koji su nesigurni u svoju vjeru ili su agnostici ili ateisti ( $p=0,003$ ).

Rehumanizacija drugih naroda najviše je prisutno kod Hrvata koji vjeruju ali ne u potpunosti ( $p=0,07$ ), a slijede nesigurni, agnostici i ateisti. Na rehumanizaciju su najmanje spremni uvjereni vjernici. Interesantno je da se pravi vjernici značajno razlikuju od onih koji vjeruju, ali ne u potpunosti ( $p=0,005$ ).

#### Hypothesis Test Summary

	Null Hypothesis	Test	Sig.	Decision
1	The distribution of Nepovjernje is the same across categories of Vjera Sarajevo.	Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test	.000	Reject the null hypothesis.
2	The distribution of Saradnja is the same across categories of Vjera Sarajevo.	Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test	.000	Reject the null hypothesis.
3	The distribution of Opraštanje is the same across categories of Vjera Sarajevo.	Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test	.000	Reject the null hypothesis.
4	The distribution of Rehumanizacija is the same across categories of Vjera Sarajevo.	Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test	.007	Reject the null hypothesis.

Asymptotic significances are displayed. The significance level is .05.

**Tabela 2.1** LSD

			SD	SE	p
Nepovjernje	Uvjereni sam vjernik i prihvaćam sve što moja vjera uči	Vjernik sam, ali ne prihvaćam baš sve što moja vjera uči	.86145	.17563	.000
		Nesigurni, agnostici i ateisti	.73837	.23970	.003
Saradnja	Uvjereni sam vjernik i prihvaćam sve što moja vjera uči	Vjernik sam, ali ne prihvaćam baš sve što moja vjera uči	-.59466	.14616	.000
		Nesigurni, agnostici i ateisti	-.47488	.19948	.019
Opraštanje	Uvjereni sam vjernik i prihvaćam sve što moja vjera uči	Vjernik sam, ali ne prihvaćam baš sve što moja vjera uči	-.49367	.13987	.001
		Nesigurni, agnostici i ateisti	-.57637	.19090	.003
Rehumanizacija	Uvjereni sam vjernik i prihvaćam sve što moja vjera uči	Vjernik sam, ali ne prihvaćam baš sve što moja vjera uči	-.35318	.12252	.005

**Tabela 2.2** Korelacija između vrste vjernika, nacionalizma i dogmatizma

	Vrsta vjernika	Nacionalizam	Dogmatizam
Vrsta vjernika	1		
Nacionalizam	-,443**	1	
Dogmatizam	-,177*	,068	1

\*\* Korelacija značajna na nivou 0.01

\* Korelacija značajna na nivou 0.05

Kao što možemo da vidimo postoji negativna povezanost srednjeg intenziteta između vrste vjernika i nacionalizma kod Hrvata. To znači da što je ispitanik slabiji vjernik to je nacionalizam manje izražen kod njega. Slična je situacija i kod varijable dogmatizam s tim da je ta korelacija negativna statistički značajna, ali veoma slaba.

### 3.2 Bošnjaci

**Tabela 3.** Vjerska ubjedenja Bošnjaka i četiri aspekta pomirenja

		N	M	SD	SE
Nepovjernje	Uvjereni sam vjernik i prihvaćam sve što moja vjera uči	233	3.0657	.76046	.04982
	Vjernik sam, ali ne prihvaćam baš sve što moja vjera uči	178	2.6966	.80667	.06046
	Nesigurni, agnostici i ateisti	40	2.3825	.91059	.14398
Saradnja	Uvjereni sam vjernik i prihvaćam sve što moja vjera uči	233	3.7438	.72716	.04764
	Vjernik sam, ali ne prihvaćam baš sve što moja vjera uči	178	4.2404	.60501	.04535
	Nesigurni, agnostici i ateisti	40	4.1300	.78388	.12394
Opraštanje	Uvjereni sam vjernik i prihvaćam sve što moja vjera uči	233	3.3279	.74674	.04892
	Vjernik sam, ali ne prihvaćam baš sve što moja vjera uči	178	3.7978	.69265	.05192
	Nesigurni, agnostici i ateisti	40	3.9650	.74336	.11754
Rehumanizacija	Uvjereni sam vjernik i prihvaćam sve što moja vjera uči	233	4.0296	.60146	.03940
	Vjernik sam, ali ne prihvaćam baš sve što moja vjera uči	178	4.3910	.50882	.03814
	Nesigurni, agnostici i ateisti	40	4.2975	.62777	.09926

Među pripadnicima bošnjačkog naroda najviše nepovjerenja nalazimo kod vjerenika koji prihvataju sve što njihova vjera uči ( $p=0,000$ ), slijede ispitanici koji sebe vide kao vjernike, ali koji ne prihvataju sve što vjera uči, dok je najmanje prisutno kod nesigurnih, agnostika i ateista, Interesantno je da se pravi vjernici značajno razlikuju od onih koji vjeruju, ali ne u potpunosti ( $p=0,000$ ) i onih koji su nesigurni u svoju vjeru ili su agnostici ili ateisti ( $p=0,000$ ). Takođe nalazimo statistički značajnu razliku između onih koji su vjernici ali ne prihvataju sve sto vjera propovjeda i onih koji su sumnjičavi, agnostici i ateisti ( $p=0,024$ ).

Spremnost na saradnju sa drugim narodima najviše je prisutno kod onih koji vjeruju ali ne u potpunosti ( $p=0,00$ ), a slijede nesigurni, agnostici i ateisti. Na saradnju su najmanje spremni uvjereni vjernici. Interesantno je da se pravi vjernici značajno razlikuju od onih koji vjeruju, ali ne u potpunosti ( $p=0,000$ ) i onih koji su nesigurni u svoju vjeru ili su agnostici ili ateisti ( $p=0,001$ ).

Spremnost za opraštanje najviše je prisutno kod nesigurnih, agnostika i ateista ( $p=0,000$ ), a slijede oni koji vjeruju, ali ne sve i oni koji su uvjereni vjernici. Interesantno je da se pravi vjernici značajno razlikuju od onih koji vjeruju, ali ne u potpunosti ( $p=0,001$ ) i onih koji su nesigurni u svoju vjeru ili su agnostici ili ateisti ( $p=0,003$ ).

Rehumanizacija drugih naroda najviše je prisutno kod Bošnjaka koji vjeruju ali ne u potpunosti ( $p=0,07$ ), a slijede nesigurni, agnostici i ateisti. Na rehumanizaciju su najmanje spremni uvjereni vjernici. Interesantno je da se pravi vjernici značajno razlikuju od onih koji vjeruju, ali ne u potpunosti ( $p=0,005$ ) i onih koji su nesigurni u svoju vjeru ili su agnostici ili ateisti ( $p=0,006$ ).

**Hypothesis Test Summary**

	Null Hypothesis	Test	Sig.	Decision
1	The distribution of Nepovjernje is the same across categories of Vjera Sarajevo.	Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test	.000	Reject the null hypothesis.
2	The distribution of Saradnja is the same across categories of Vjera Sarajevo.	Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test	.000	Reject the null hypothesis.
3	The distribution of Opraštanje is the same across categories of Vjera Sarajevo.	Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test	.000	Reject the null hypothesis.
4	The distribution of Rehumanizacija is the same across categories of Vjera Sarajevo.	Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test	.000	Reject the null hypothesis.

Asymptotic significances are displayed. The significance level is .05.

**Tabela 3.1 LSD**

			MD	SE	p
Nepovjernje	Uvjereni sam vjernik i prihvaćam sve što moja vjera uči	Vjernik sam, ali ne prihvaćam baš sve što moja vjera uči	.36904	.07894	.000
		Nesigurni, agnostici i ateisti	.68317	.13571	.000
	Vjernik sam, ali ne prihvaćam baš sve što moja vjera uči	Nesigurni, agnostici i ateisti	.31413	.13875	.024
Saradnja	Uvjereni sam vjernik i prihvaćam sve što moja vjera uči	Vjernik sam, ali ne prihvaćam baš sve što moja vjera uči	-.49667	.06839	.000
		Nesigurni, agnostici i ateisti	-.38622	.11757	.001
Opraštanje	Uvjereni sam vjernik i prihvaćam sve što moja vjera uči	Vjernik sam, ali ne prihvaćam baš sve što moja vjera uči	-.46986	.07223	.000
		Nesigurni, agnostici i ateisti	-.63710	.12418	.000
Rehumanizacija	Uvjereni sam vjernik i prihvaćam sve što moja vjera uči	Vjernik sam, ali ne prihvaćam baš sve što moja vjera uči	-.36140	.05666	.000
		Nesigurni, agnostici i ateisti	-.26789	.09741	.006

**Tabela 3.2** Korelacija između vrste vjernika, nacionalizma i dogmatizma

	Vrsta vjernika	Nacionalizam	Dogmatizam
Vrsta vjernika	1		
Nacionalizam	-,211**	1	
Dogmatizam	-,119*	,222**	1

\*\* Korelacija značajna na nivou 0.01

\* Korelacija značajna na nivou 0.05

### 3.3 Srbi

**Tabela 4.** Vjerska ubjedenja Srba i četiri aspekta pomirenja

		N	M	SD	SE
Nepovjernje	Uvjereni sam vjernik i prihvaćam sve što moja vjera uči	408	3.2235	.87655	.04340
	Vjernik sam, ali ne prihvaćam baš sve što moja vjera uči	312	2.9888	.82128	.04650
	Nesigurni, agnostici i ateisti	117	2.9675	.83510	.07720
Saradnja	Uvjereni sam vjernik i prihvaćam sve što moja vjera uči	408	3.7248	.82816	.04100
	Vjernik sam, ali ne prihvaćam baš sve što moja vjera uči	312	3.8260	.70897	.04014
	Nesigurni, agnostici i ateisti	117	3.7128	.81912	.07573
Opraštanje	Uvjereni sam vjernik i prihvaćam sve što moja vjera uči	408	3.3885	.87957	.04355
	Vjernik sam, ali ne prihvaćam baš sve što moja vjera uči	312	3.4750	.78802	.04461
	Nesigurni, agnostici i ateisti	117	3.3897	.80477	.07440
Rehumanizacija	Uvjereni sam vjernik i prihvaćam sve što moja vjera uči	408	4.2240	.63915	.03164
	Vjernik sam, ali ne prihvaćam baš sve što moja vjera uči	312	4.1756	.68820	.03896
	Nesigurni, agnostici i ateisti	117	4.0299	.79060	.07309

Među pripadnicima srpskog naroda najviše nepovjerenja nalazimo kod vjernika koji prihvataju sve što njihova vjera uči ( $p=0,000$ ), slijede ispitanici koji sebe vide kao vjernike, ali koji ne prihvataju sve što vjera uči, dok je najmanje prisutno kod nesigurnih, agnostika i ateista, Interesantno je da se pravi vjernici značajno razlikuju od onih koji vjeruju, ali ne u potpunosti ( $p=0,000$ ) i onih koji su nesigurni u svoju vjeru ili su agnostici ili ateisti ( $p=0,004$ ).

### Hypothesis Test Summary

	Null Hypothesis	Test	Sig.	Decision
1	The distribution of Nepovjernje is the same across categories of Vjera Sarajevo.	Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test	.000	Reject the null hypothesis.
2	The distribution of Saradnja is the same across categories of Vjera Sarajevo.	Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test	.414	Retain the null hypothesis.
3	The distribution of Opraštanje is the same across categories of Vjera Sarajevo.	Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test	.653	Retain the null hypothesis.
4	The distribution of Rehumanizacija is the same across categories of Vjera Sarajevo.	Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test	.137	Retain the null hypothesis.

Asymptotic significances are displayed. The significance level is .05.

**Tabela 4.1. LSD**

			MD	SE	p
Nepovjernje	Uvjereni sam vjernik i prihvaćam sve što moja vjera uči	Vjernik sam, ali ne prihvaćam baš sve što moja vjera uči	.23475	.06397	.000
		Nesigurni, agnostici i ateisti	.25601	.08920	.004

**Tabela 4.2. Korelacija između vrste vjernika, nacionalizma i dogmatizma**

	Vrsta vjernika	Nacionalizam	Dogmatizam
Vrsta vjernika	1		
Nacionalizam	-,160**	1	
Dogmatizam	-,118**	,289**	1

\*\* Korelacija značajna na nivou 0.01

\* Korelacija značajna na nivou 0.05

Kao i kod ostale dvije etničke grupe i kod Srba imamo sličnu situaciju. Postoji veoma slaba negativna povezanost između vrste vjernika i nacionalizma. To znači da što je ispitanik slabiji vjernik to je nacionalizam manje izražen kod njega. Slična je situacija i kod varijable dogmatizam s tim da je ta korelacija negativna statistički značajna, ali veoma slaba.

#### 4. Rasprava

Pomirenje u Bosni i Hercegovini je proces koji se suočava sa mnogo prepreka od kraja rata do danas. Proces pomirnje je mnogo bolji i brži ako su neki preduslovi zadovoljeni (Deutsch, prema Petrović, 2010) kao što su: opšta bezbjednost, međusobno poštovanje, humanizacija protivnika, ekonomska sigurnost, obrazovanje i pružanje pravih informacija, pravičnost u rješavanju konflikta, obuzdavanje ekstremizma, razvijanje međusobnog povjerenja i poštovanja. Koliko su ovi preduslovi prisutni danas u bosansko- hercegovačkom društvu teško je reći, ali je sasvim sigurno da oni nisu rezultat zalaganja domaćih političkih elita.

Ovaj rad je imao za cilj da pokuša da odgovori na pitanje da li religija u Bosni i Hercegovini stoji na putu pomirenja ili doprinosi tom pomirenju etničkih grupa. Imajući to u vidu dosadašnja istraživanja u svijetu (Peres, 1995; Brown, 1962; Al-Thakeb, Scott, 1982; Hunsberger, 1996, Arglyle, 2004; Silberman, 2005) i kod nas (Dušanića, 2007 i 2009; Smajić, 2010) očekivali smo da religija u većoj mjeri bude prepreka na ovom veoma teškom putu.

Naše pretpostavke su se pokazale tačne.

Nepovjerenje prema drugim etničkim grupama je najviše izraženo kod Srba, Hrvata i Bošnjaka koji sebe opisuju kao uvjerenе vjernike koji prihvaćaju sve što ih njihova vjera uči. Povjerenje u druge ljude temelji se na pretpostavci da i drugi dijele naše temeljne vrijednosti, te da će se u odgovarajućim situacijama očekivano i predvidivo ponašati. Oni ne moraju nužno s nama biti saglasni (politički, kulturno ili vjerski), ali ako na osnovnom nivou prihvaćaju zajedničke vrijednosti, to će omogućiti i poduprijeti saradnju; ako vjerujemo da su naša predviđanja tačna, mi vjerujemo drugima. Povjerenje ima ulogu da pojednostavi složenost društvenih odnosa (Earle i Cvetkovich, 1995), jer utemeljuje društvene odnose i sistem na međusobno očekivanom ponašanju aktera u jednom društvu. Istraživanja Šalaja (2009) pokazuje da stanovnici Bosne i Hercegovine nemaju mnogo povjerenja u druge ljude. Prema istraživanju Agencije Prime Communicatons<sup>137</sup> 70,2% stanovnika Republike Srpske složilo se sa tvrdnjom da se danas nikome ne treba vjerovati (2009). Istraživanja koja je sproveo Puhalo 2009. godine pokazuju da se druge etničke grupe često opažaju kao neiskrene i nepoštene. Kao što su to neki autori i ranije isticali (Abazović; 2006; Cvitković, 2004.) vjera i etnička pripadnost se danas često izjednačavaju, pa otuda ne treba da nas čudi da povjerenje prema drugim ljudima ima domet samo u okviru sopstvene etničke grupe i nikako dalje.

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<sup>137</sup> <http://www.intermezzo.ba/latn/?page=4&kat=2&vijest=29588>

Spremnost za saradnju sa drugima je najviše izraženo kod ispitanika koji su vjernici, ali ne prihvaćaju baš sve što ih vjera uči, a najmanje kod onih vjernika koji prihvaćaju sve što ih njihova vjera uči. Naravno moramo imati na umu da je upravo religija bila “kriterijum” koji je jedne etničke grupe razdvajao od drugih u poslednjem ratu, pa je teško očekivati da će petnaest godina kasnije ta uloga da se promjeni i da postane faktor koji afirmiše saradnju među ljudima. Kod Bošnjaka i Hrvata razlika između ove tri kategorije vjernika je statistički značajna, dok to kod Srba nije slučaj. Izgleda da Srbi najmanje žele da zajedničke ciljeve ostvaruju uz pomoć druga dva naroda. Imamo li u vidu da veliki broj Srba, kao i njihova politička elita, želi da se Republika Srpska odcjepi od Bosne i Hercegovine razumljiva je i nespremnost Srba da sarađuju sa drugim etničkim grupama.

McCullougha (2001), najvažnija karakteristika opraštanja je priklanjanje prosocijalnoj motivaciji i odustajanje od nanošenja štete počiniocu zlodjela. Opraštanje nipošto nije isto što i pomirenje. Opraštanje može voditi pomirenju i predstavlja za njega nužan preduslov, ali uprkos tome do pomirenja nikad ne mora doći. Kada se govori o spremnosti na opraštanje tu vidimo da kod Hrvata i Bošnjaka su na to najviše spremni nesigurni, agnostici i ateisti, a najmanje kod vjernika koji prihvaćaju sve što ih njihova vjera uči. Kod Srba tu ne postoji statistički značajna razlika između tri kategorije ispitanika. Teško je objasniti zbog čega je vjera tolika prepreka u opraštanju drugima u Bosni i Hercegovini, osim ako tu vjeru ne povežemo sa nacionalizmom. Takođe je interesantno da su Srbi najmanje spremni za opraštanje, iako su recimo Bošnjaci imali više i vojnih i civilnih žrtava u proteklom ratu (IDC, 2010).

Među Bošnjacima i Hrvatima postoji razlika između tri kategorije vjernika u spremnosti na rehumanizaciju dojučerašnjih protivnik, dok kod Srba to nije slučaj. Na rehumanizaciju su najviše spremni ispitanici koji su vjernici, ali ne prihvaćaju baš sve što ih vjera uči, dok se to najmanje nalazi kod vjernika koji prihvaćaju sve što ih njihova vjera uči.

Interesantno je da su Hrvati i Bošnjaci međusobno razlikuju na svakom od ponuđenih faktora pomirenja, dok je to slučaj samo na varijabli nepovjerenje prema drugim etničkim grupama kod Srba. Postavlja se pitanje zbog čega su Srbi tako homogeni u odnosu na druge dvije etničke grupe?

Sasvim je jasno da religija u Bosni i Hercegovini je postala dio problema, a ne dio rješenja, kada se govori o pomirenju tri konstitutivna naroda koja žive u njoj.

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## **Kultura sjećanja u kontekstu definisanja i tumačenja pravnih vrijednosti**

**Prof. dr Mirjana Nadaždin Defterdarević**  
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### *Sažetak*

Pravo je bitno određeno svojim vrijednostima koje su stavovi o trebanju i koji govore kako valja uspostaviti političku vlast i prinudno raspodijeliti društvenu moć. Među tradicionalnim pravnim vrijednostima mira, sigurnosti, zakonitosti, najveći značaj pripada vrijednosti pravde.

Prisila koja suštinski određuje pravo prihvatljiva je ako je pravedna. Dobro je pretpostavka prihvatanja. Iskustvo dobrog, doživljenog i sačuvanog u sjećanju afirmisaće buduće sadržaje koji se na njega oslanjaju ili pozivaju.

Mada su vladajuće vrijednosti iskazane u pravnim normama izraz potreba i rezultat moći vladajuće skupine, one se izražene kao opše dobro ne doživljavaju na taj način. Pravda se, koja u pravu izražava dobro kao specifičnu pravnu vrijednost, izražava kroz različite ideološke oblike pravde. Temeljna pretpostavka integracije u zajednicu je usvajanje vrijednosti ili principa koje omogućavaju zajednički život heterogene zajednice.

Sjećanje, kao aktueliziranje sadržaja iz prošlosti, je dragocjen izvor pravnog legitimiranja. Zahvat u prošlost iz sadašnjosti je temelj okvira tumačenja i značenja koji na različite načine mobilise ili sputava akciju. Prošlost tako postaje sredstvo vladanja jer njen selekcionirani sadržaj učvršćuje autoritete i stvara socijalni smisao. Javna kultura sjećanja oblikuje se u skladu sa idejama i vrijednostima koje su u središtu politike globalne zajednice, i kao takva potiče afirmaciju društvenih i pravnih vrijednosti i olakšava njihovo prihvatanje.

Rad otkriva i analizira vezu koja postoji između kulture sjećanja i njenog uticaja na definisanje pravne vrijednosti pravde. Da li je ideološki oblik pravde autentičan? Da li je pravda definisana kulturom sjećanja? Doprinosi li kultura sjećanja perpetuaciji principa pravde? Uz ova pitanja rad će se osvrnuti i na hermeneutički aspekt kulture sjećanja u pravu. U radu će biti korišten uporedni metod i metod egzegeze.

***Ključne riječi: pravne vrijednosti, pravda, tumačenje prava, kultura sjećanja, legitimiranje.***

## **Uvod**

Brojnim otvorenim pitanjima vezanim uz definisanje i tumačenje pravnih vrijednosti svakako treba pridodati i pitanje uticaja kulture sjećanja na taj aspekt prava što je do sada nedovoljno problematizirano.

Uobičajeno je da se pravo veže uz pojam pravnih vrijednosti. No uprkos tome, pravo pravne vrijednosti ne valorizuje uvijek na jednak način.

Najstariji stav prema kome se može suditi o pravnoj prirodi društvenih odnosa i normi povezan je uz princip pravde. Pravo je, uostalom, najlakše prihvatiti kao ostvarivanje pravde.

Polazeći od tvrdnje da je vrednovanje utemeljeno na vrijednosnim stavovima koji su subjektivni i neprovjerljivi, pozitivisti su skloni da isključe vrijednosne stavove iz definicije prava.

Normativno-formalističke koncepcije koje odbacuju vrijednosni kriterij ne negiraju značaj i važnost vrijednosnih principa i sudova u pravnom životu, ali poriču njihov značaj za pravnu nauku i definisanje pojma prava.

Pravna pojava „očišćena“ od vrijednosti i ciljeva bila bi osakaćena u svojoj ljudskoj biti, a pravna nauka, koja bi se ograničavala na tako osakaćenu pojavu bila bi formalizirana i nepotpuna spoznaja stvarnog predmeta pravnog iskustva.

Vrijednosni aspekt prava treba zato da bude objekt pravne nauke i element prava (Visković, 1981). Zato je nužno ustanoviti aksiološki sastav bića prava, njegove osobine vezane za vrijednosti, shvatiti pravo kao vrijednost i vrijednosti koje ostvaruje pravo (Visković, 1981).

U odnosu između vrijednosti i pojma prava važno je imati na umu da su vrijednosti i vrijednosne koncepcije odraz različitih historijsko-ideoloških i političko-pravnih vrijednosnih sudova, i definiciju prava njima ne treba opterećivati.

No pravo, posebno njegov normativni aspekt, ne može se razumijeti ukoliko je odvojeno od vrijednosnih stavova i ciljeva kojima ono zapravo služi. Tako vrijednosni stavovi i vrijednosti nisu značenja koja čovjek proizvoljno pridaje predmetima, nego značenja uslovljena ljudskim potrebama, interesima, naslijeđenim idejnim šemama i samim svojstvima predmeta (Visković, 1981).

Mada je pravo dosljedno u svom objektivnom pristupu stvarnosti, koliko je god moguće, u domenu vrednovanja, koje je za neke autore u pravu već samo po sebi sporno, taj pristup mora da se napusti jer vrednovanje je uvijek subjektivno.

Da bi se vrednovanje u pravu ipak, koliko toliko učinilo objektivnim ono se zasniva na onim vrijednosnim stavovima koji se postavljaju kao „trebanje“ kojima se društveni odnosi disciplinuju putem organizovane fizičke prisile, a društvena moć i druga društvena dobra tako se raspoređuju među društvenim grupama i pojedincima na različit način.

Kako fizička prisila u društvu pripada političkoj vlasti, to pravne vrijednosti, prvenstveno, trebaju osigurati uspostavljanje političke vlasti i uređivanje društvenih odnosa u skladu sa njenim sopstvenim interesima. Temelj pravnosti zato i treba tražiti tek u sadržaju onih vrijednosti koje su refleksija dominantne ideološke svijesti.

U svakom konkretnom društvu samo jedan sistem vrijednosti postaje, u potpunosti, ili u većoj mjeri, dominantna normativno vladajuća političko-pravna ideologija, a svi ostali zajedno ostaju kao opozicione, nevladajuće i vannormativne, političko-pravne ideologije.

Što se tiče vrijednosnih principa kojima se osigurava njena legitimnost - principa mira, sigurnosti, zakonitosti, potpunosti i izvjesnosti, oni su sami po sebi vrijednosno neutralni, a historijski i situacijski mijenja se sadržaj i način njihove primjene, utoliko što se putem njih ostvaruju ili barem

manifestuju, različite vladajuće-normativne i nevladajuće normativne ideologije pravde (Visković, 1981).

### **Hermeneutički značaj kulture sjećanja**

Organizovano društveno pamćenje koje sklapa selektivne sadržaje prošlosti u misaoni poredak preuzima takvo značenje i sadržaj pojma i prosljeđuje ga dalje.

Pamćenje uspostavlja sklad u prihvatanju i tumačenju svijeta, a sjećanje je aktueliziranje, oživljavanje sačuvanih sadržaja. Obzirom na subjektivni kvalitet vrednovanja uvijek se nanovo nameće pitanje definisanja i tumačenja vrijednosti.

Pravo kao regulator društvenih odnosa ne može biti smješteno u strogi sistem iz koga se logički može izvući rješenje za svaki slučaj, nego se svaki slučaj mora posebno rješavati. Logičkom izvođenju rješenja iz norme često se suprotstavljaju razlozi zasnovani na usvajanju izvjesnih vrijednosti koje se ne mogu podvesti pod logiku.

Tumačenje u pravu smatra se ispravnim i društveno priznatim ako u velikoj mjeri poštuje važeća društvena shvatanja o tome koja su i kako se utvrđuju „prava“ značenja pravnih akata.

Hermeneutika uvjerljivo pokazuje kako pomoću odabranih prošlih sadržaja stvaramo okvire tumačenja i značenja za sadašnjost.

Hermeneutički pristup drži da je u svakom sjećanju prisutno ranije, sadašnje i moguće iskustvo, a odnos ovih vremena reguliše aktuelni kontekst.

Ta društvena shvatanja, koja usmjeravaju postupak tumačenja, osnove su društvenog konteksta pravnih akata, bez koga se bilo koji pravni akt ne može stvoriti ni razumjeti.

Kontekst tumačenja se mijenja. Da bi se osigurao kontinuitet prava i da bi se anulirala promjenjivost konteksta potrebne su pravne vrijednosti oko kojih postoji opšti konsenzus i koje djeluju kao njegove konstante.

Konsenzus najlakše osiguravaju nesporne vrijednosti.

### **Percipiranje vrijednosti**

Pelerman je uočio da sudovi vrijednosti i sudovi stvarnosti, koji se potvrđuju iskustvom, nemaju isti učinak. Univerzalne vrijednosti, kakva je pravda, predmet su saglasnosti ukoliko su neodređene, ali primjenom na pojedinačni slučaj ili konkretno ponašanje neslaganja su neminovna (Tadić, 2007).

Pravo tako kvalitet pravnosti nalazi u pravdi, miru, pravnoj sigurnosti, računajući na njihovo neupitno prihvatanje od svih koji pod njegovim normama žive.

Da bi ti sadržaji ostali jednako nesporni kriteriji njihovog tumačenja koje uspostavlja najuticajnija društvena grupa, i koji su zapravo refleksija njenih sopstvenih interesa, bivaju formulisani na način da se transformišu u univerzalno prihvatljivu vrijednost. Oni postaju opšti. Oni se percipiraju kao dobro. Kao takvi oni osiguravaju svoju legitimnost.

Determinisanje i prihvatanje vrijednosti, kao sadržaja koji su upamćeni i sačuvani, koji se kao takavi prenose i održavaju, koji djeluju kao živi motivacioni i mobilizacijski elementi sadašnjice, osigurava se i selektivno konstituisanom prošlošću, za što se uvijek pobrine najuticajnija društvena grupa, opravdavajući tako i svoju poziciju.

Smisao prošlosti usvojen kulturom, posredovan na različite načine, čini je djelotvornom, te prošlost više nije činjenica već djelotvorni sadržaj sadašnjosti.

Interes vladajuće društvene grupe utvrđuje odnos javnog pamćenja i zaborava jednako kao i način njihovog korištenja koje osigurava vladajuća ideologija transformišući taj partikularni interes u opšti, a selektivno pamćenje u autentično i neiskrivljeno.

Upamćena, od zaborava sačuvana prošlost, sredstvo je vladanja. Ona određuje vrijednosti i učvršćuje autoritete. Ona osigurava društveni smisao.

## Princip pravde

Da bi društvo – uprkos svom nejedinstvu i neminovnim sukobima opstalo kao trajno i relativno čvrsto, ono nužno traži jedan opšti mehanizam prisilne raspodjele društvene moći, vlasti, rada i bogatstva. U tom mehanizmu, koji društvo pretvara u pravni poredak, promoviraju se vladajući princip pravde koji postavlja i istovremeno opravdava taj odabrani način društvene raspodjele koji, u najvećoj mjeri odgovara vladajućoj društvenoj grupi.

Pravda je ideal kome je u najvećoj mjeri namijenjena zadaća standarda jer, kako Lon Fuller kaže: „Bez slike ideala ljudske egzistencije pred našim očima, mi ne možemo imati standarda, bilo za nametanje dužnosti bilo za otvaranje novih puteva za izražavanje ljudskih sposobnosti.“ (Fuller, 1999).

Princip pravde u njegovom najapstraktnijem značenju je princip po kome društvena moć i vlast, djelatnost i ostala dobra, treba raspodijeliti među ljudima na taj način, što će se utvrditi jedno ili više bitnih ljudskih svojstava kao osnove razlikovanja i što će svim ljudima koji imaju ista svojstva ili istu mjeru istih svojstava, jednakim međusobno, biti date jednake vrste i mjere dobara, a svim nejednakim, nejednake mjere dobara u jednom opšteprihvaćenom odnosu.

Pravdu treba razumjeti i kao određenu koncepciju zajedničkog života, odnosno organizacije zajednice, koja svakom pojedincu omogućuje da zauzme mjesto koje mu odgovara, u skladu s njegovom prirodom (njegovim željama i sposobnostima), čime se u isto vrijeme osigurava blagostanje zajednice kao cjeline. Drugim riječima, problem pravde jeste da ugodi pojedinim interesima, ujedno ih podređujući opštem interesu (Canivez, 1999)

Ova definicija pravde kulturom sjećanja se perpetuirala kao načelo jednakosti, kako pravdu određuje Canivez, ili kao izraz nepristrasnosti, kako je određuje Rols u svojoj Teoriji pravde (Rols, 1998). Način determinisanja sadržaja određuje njegovu vrijednost koja se u ovom slučaju percipira kao dobro. Pamti se kao dobro.

## Zaključak

Kulturom kodirana prošlost u sebi krije određeni potencijal tumačenja koji se u svakom trenutku može primijeniti na nove sadržaje. Sjećanjem koje je petrificirano na taj način ne tumači se ponovo prošlost, već sadašnjost (Kuljić, 2006). I željena budućnost. Prošlost tako postaje neophodni i sastavni dio kulturnog orijentisanja, i po potrebi obrazac ideološkog uticaja.

Ovdje se nužno moramo vratiti na percepciju definicije pojma pravde. U sjećanju sadržaj tog pojma je jednakost i nepristrasnost. No, da li je pravda samo to?

Jedan drugačiji pristup pravdi suočava nas sa sadržajem koji za krajnji cilj nema princip jednake raspodjele nego princip nejednake raspodjele ili diskriminacije. Pravda u ovom smislu nalaže najprije da sve ljude treba svesti na skupinu bitno nejednakih, a zatim društvenu moć i vlast, djelatnosti i dobra podijeliti nejednako pripadnicima različitih grupa i jednako pripadnicima istih.

Nejednakost je primarno obilježje principa pravde i, kako Visković (1981) kaže, „Samo za naivne ima božica Pravde povez na oba oka i jednako raspoložive tegove vage!“

Građanskoj pravnoj misli poznato je da opšti i formalni princip pravde „*sum cuique tribuere*“ sadržajno vrlo apstraktan (Radbruch, 1998), i da ona dobiva svoj stvarni sadržaj tek u konkretnim i nestalnim shvatanjima jednakosti koja su uslovljena historijskim prilikama. To je razlog postojanja različitih koncepcija pravednosti, kao interesno uslovljenih i pristranih stavova, koji su različiti ne samo kod različitih naroda već i kod istog u isto doba, kod različitih društvenih slojeva, ali se bez razlike, svaki od njih, jednako legitimiše pozivajući se na ravnopravnost i nepristrasnost koju svojom primjenom osigurava.

Shvatanja o pravdi su zapravo ideološki izraz stvarnih društvenih interesa u procesu produkcije i reprodukcije društvenog života.

Uopšteno poimanje pravde kao načela klasno-diskriminatorske raspodjele ostavlja uvijek bez odgovora najvažnije pitanje – zašto su u pojedinim tipovima društva ljudi međusobno nejednaki i

jednaki, i kako po pojedinim koncepcijama pravde treba raspodijeliti društvena dobra među jednakim i nejednakim.

Kriteriji jednakosti i nejednakosti rezultat su stepena materijalne i duhovne kulture i stvarnih odnosa nejednakosti u konkretnim društvima koje ti kriteriji legitimiraju ili negiraju sa aspekta vladajućih društvenih grupa.

Selektivno pamćenje koje afirmiše samo one aspekte stvarnosti koji su sa pozicije dominantne društvene grupe opravdani i osiguravaju opšte prihvatanje, kao što je to u slučaju pravde njeno definisanje kao ravnopravnosti i nepristrasnosti, jednako će u sjećanju insistirati samo na pozitivnom aspektu mira i samo na pozitivnom aspekt pravne sigurnosti.

Mir se uvijek percipira kao društveno stanje u kome nema privatnog nasilja i u kom djeluje vlast sa legalnim monopolom fizičke prisile. Mada je mir pretpostavka pravnog poretka i nesporno humana vrijednost, on je istovremeno i sredstvo kojim se održavaju nehumani odnosi društvenog ugnjetavanja. Istina, mir štiti potčinjene od nekontrolisanog tlačenja, ali mir je i tada prije svega mir vladajućih klasa i njihove pravde (Visković, 1981).

Bez ikakve sumnje i pravna sigurnost je inicijalno pozitivna vrijednost, ali zanemaruje se i potiskuje činjenica da je ona i opravdanje perpetuiranju istih okolnosti što znači njihovo konzerviranje, održavanje postojećeg stanja bez moguće promjene, čak i onda kada je ona opravdana i nužna.

Vrijednosti nisu autentične kreacije sadašnjosti naslijeđujemo ih iz prošlosti kulturom sjećanja. Upravo time osigurava se njihova trajnost u pravu, mada se njihov aktuelnoobavezujući sadržaj mijenja. Te promjene posljedica se društvenih kretanja na koja pravo odgovara svojom elastičnošću, ali temeljne vrijednosni ostaju nominalno uvijek iste. Kultura sjećanja je najpodesniji način kojim se osigurava konsenzus za njihovo prihvatanje.

Pravo je neminovno oslonjeno na vrednovanje, no problem je što uprkos utemeljenosti ove tvrdnje u pravnoj nauci nedostaju potpunija istraživanja vrijednosno-teleološke dimenzije pravne pojave. Nedostaje sistematična teorijska i empirijska obrada opštih problema teorije pravnih

vrijednosti, idejnih osnova pozitivnopravnih sistema, povezanosti teorije pravnih vrijednosti, pitanja pravne ideologije, itd. (Visković, 1981).

Uz sve ovo, kao da sve ovo već nije dovoljno samo po sebi, pravu nedostaje i teorijska elaboracija uticaja kulture sjećanja na definisanje i tumačenje pravnih vrijednosti.

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


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## Kultura sjećanja ili nekultura zaborava

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### Sažetak

U radu se relativizira spoznaja povijesnih činjenica, posebno ako se koriste u procesima indoktrinacije građana, te se kao oblik spoznaje značajniji za humanistički i što manje konfliktni razvoj društva razmatra pouka koju historija pruža. Nasuprot činjeničnom saznanju koje širi spoznajne vidike, humanizam gradi etičku dimenziju čovjeka, temeljeći njegove postupke, a samim time i „oblik stvari koje dolaze“ – našu zajedničku budućnost. Slobodan narod ili slobodna država ničim ne garantiraju slobodu svih jedinki; ako je svaki pojedinac slobodan, onda je i društvo kojega je dio zbilja slobodno. Kao kontrapunkt nastanku carstava, država i društvenopolitičkih sistema koji se tijekom povijesti svako malo mrve u prah, proteže se tanka - tim ne manje čvrsta - „zlatna nit“ humanističkog sazrijevanja čovječanstva, kojemu doprinos daju njegovi ponajbolji članovi. Evolucija, kako biološka tako i socijalna, nije demokratski proces – ne zahvaća sve odjednom i ne daje svima podjednako. Manjina stanovnika ove planete su zaista Homo *sapiensi*, a uzme li se u obzir i etika onda još i manje. Upravo ta činjenica treba motivirati prebacivanje pažnje s činjeničnog na humanističke aspekte povijesne spoznaje, dakako, ne zanemarujući uzročno posljedične povezanosti povijesnih zbivanja i njihovog kontekstualnog tumačenja. Tek kad utjecaj povijesnih naravoučenja na oplemenjevanje psihologije pojedinaca usmjeri iste u humanističkom smjeru, moći ćemo zaista reći da je historija Magistra Vitae – učiteljica života. U tom smjeru – vodeći računa da je autor laik u povijesnim pitanjima - treba gledati i utjecaj ovog rada na njegove čitaoce. Naravno, ukoliko ih bude.

**Ključne riječi: povijest, spoznaja, naravoučenje, etika, humanizam**

## Kultura sjećanja ili nekultura zaborava

Na simpoziju koji svojom tematikom uključuje kulturu sjećanja, planirao sam govoriti o nečemu što će možda većina sudionika nazvati upravo protivno – „nekulturom zaborava“. Otprilike se povodim za meni bliskim, *Einsteinovim* stavovima:

*„Kad sam već kod tog predmeta da kažem i koju riječ o najgorem izrodu života krda, o meni omrznutoj vojsci. Kad je netko u stanju sa zadovoljstvom marširati strojevim korakom, ja ga već prezirem: veliki je mozak dobio zabunom, jer za to bi mu bila potpuno dovoljna i leđna moždina. Ta civilizacijska sramota zvana vojska morala bi nestati što je moguće prije. Junaštvo po naredbi, besmisleno nasilje i slijepo rodoljubništvo, kako ja sve to silno mrzim, kako mi je rat niska i mrska rabota; prije bih se dao sasjeći na komade negoli sudjelovati u tom bijednom činu.“*

Na tragu toga su i sva moja promišljanja i shvaćanja povijesti, posebno njenog dijela uzrokovanog nasiljem a ne evolutivnim razvojem. Mada shvaćam da - u izuzetnim okolnostima - nasilje može biti inducirano kao još jedino mogući obrambeni mehanizam građana protiv postupaka vladajućih

elita krajnje nehumane vlasti, ili društvenopolitičkog sistema. Odavno sam zamijetio kako uz sve ostale, posjedujem jednu bitnu intelektualnu falingu odnosno manu. Radi se o izuzetno slaboj memoriji; zaljubljenici informatičkih uređaja rekli bi kako posjedujem vrlo mali RAM ili ROM, ili kako li već sve ne zovu memoriju svog hardvera. Istovremeno sam, ispočetka podsvijesno a kad mi je ta spoznaja dopuzala do svijesti i racionalno, shvatio kako bih taj manjak trebao na neki način preobraziti sebi u prid, želim li na bilo koji način da me okolina ne smatra rođenim idiotom. Svaki pisani izričaj, baš kao i svaki živi razgovor, sadrže sem sijaset slova, riječi i rečenica te, naravno, teme kojom se bave - i suštinu o kojoj govore. Dakako, i zaključak, eksplicitni ili implicitni, direktno ili posredno iskazan - naravoučenje koje je očito ili ga moraš izvući iz konteksta cijelog teksta, odnosno razgovora. Čitamo li, primjerice, neku knjigu koja na umjetnički način raspravlja o etici zločina i zločinaca, zaključio sam, nakon uživanja u fabuli, kako mi nakon nekog vremena ona sasvim iščezava iz sjećanja, međutim ostaje naravoučenje. Recimo: zločin se ne isplati – kazna (gotovo) uvijek slijedi - a zločinac je najčešće psihički defektna ili nečim frustrirana osoba. Pročitao sam u životu hrpu knjiga, što stručnih (studirao sam fiziku), što beletristike, no ako poželite sa mnom raspravljati o gotovo bilo kojem naslovu iz moje oveće biblioteke (realne ili virtualne, smještene u umu), teško ćete se razočarati. Slično je i sa doživljajima iz vlastitog života, od kojih mi u sjećanju ucrtavaju dublje tragove tek neki, koji su me se očito psihički jako dojmili. Povijest mog života, ispisana vlastitom rukom, obuhvaćala bi vrlo mali broj stranica, sa vjerojatno još manje detalja. Kad je tome već tako, a jeste, možete tek misliti koliko mi je u glavi ostalo od svekolike povijesti svijeta i regije – a time i BiH – koju sam bilo slušao od osnovne preko srednje škole ili djelomično doživio na svojoj koži, do vlastitih lutanja po tekstovima koji su me neobavezno zanimali.

Možda vas zaprepasti moj zaključak, da povijest za suvremene generacije ima mnogo manji značaj negoli joj se pridaje. Dakako da fakti o zbivanjima, a posebice naravoučenja koja možemo iz njih izvući – posebno ovo poslijednje - moraju ostati sačuvani za buduće naraštaje, ne toliko da oni steknu formalno znanje o prošlim događajima koliko da očvrstu inače tanku nit humanističkog morala koja prožima prosječnog čovjeka. Po mom skromnom mnijenju, postoji tanka, neprekinuta „zlatna nit“ koja prožima našu vrstu od njenih začetaka do dana današnjega, a koju pažljivi štioći djela naših predaka i proučavatelji historije mogu zapaziti – naravno, ako tome prilaze bez dogmatizama, predubjeđenja ili *baconovskih (Francis Bacon) idola*, odnosno *predrasuda* koje mu zastiru um i kvare njegove zaključke. S fizikalnog stanovišta, neki smatraju kako postoji samo sadašnjost; prošlost je nepovratno prošla dok je budućnost tek potencijalna, u smislu da vlastitim djelovanjem određujemo „oblik stvari koje dolaze“. Daklem, prošlost nam može biti važna tek ukoliko smo naučili neke pouke iz grešaka koje smo činili, a te pouke bi trebale korespondirati sa suvremenim humanističkim moralom. U centru pak njega nisu ni države, koje se rađaju i nestaju, te ni jedna ne može računati na vječnost, ni mase koje se mogu okupljati oko raznoraznih - vremenu korespondirajućih – ideja, i razilaziti se tijekom njegova proticanja od njih, nego čovjek pojedinac, osoba iliti ličnost. Stoga domoljublje blijedi pred čovjekoljubljem, nacionalizam pred kozmopolitizmom a klanjanje zastavama (obojenim krpama koje simboliziraju tek baconovske idole koji trenutno vladaju masama) i ukipljenje pred taktovima glazbe od kojih postoje duhu beskrajno privlačniji, postaje ništavno pred poklonjenjem čovjeku pojedincu i njegovoj utemeljenosti u božjim zapovjedima, odnosno humanističkom moralu; kako tko to želi shvatiti.

Bez namjere dociranja, tek podsjećanja radi, da ukratko samo spomenem devet načela suvremenog humanističkog morala, prvenstveno orjentiranog prema osobi, kako ih je naveo *naš*, upravo tako, *naš* - jer ne tako davno, prije no pođosmo različitim putevima; neki od nas svojevolumno a neki pod prinudom većine – poznati humanista *Ivan Supek*, u svojoj knjizi „*Na prekretnici milenija*“.

To su:

- *uvažavati prošlost i sačuvati život*
- *afirmirati jednakost među ljudima*
- *afirmirati slobodu*
- *proširiti solidarnost na sve ljude*
- *tražiti istinu i uvažavati načelo tolerantnosti*
- *gajiti ljepotu i umjetnost*
- *dići pravo na pravdu*
- *promicati svjetsko jedinstvo*
- *biti dobar*

Ugraditi u sebe ova načela i aktivno ih nastojati promicati u svim sferama života, meni lično je značajnije od pamćenja povijesnih fakata, vladara, država i datuma, bitnije od klečanja pred bilo kakvim i bilo čijim simbolima. Nekako sam svoj prijezir prema odnosu gomile spram vitlajućih simbola, koji utapaju pojedinca u masu čineći ga tek jednom kapi tog oceana, sasvim beznačajnih ličnih osobina, izrazio u pjesmici (za nekoga možda uvredljivoj, no to je moj stav kojega se ne stidim):

*Himnospjevni krpoljubi  
mjere otkucaje srca.  
Kao jarbol ukrućena  
gomila u transu grca,*

*dok plahta veselo vijori  
s motkina vrhunca  
hladeći se, što od užarene  
mase, što od sunca.*

Dozvoljavam si, kao čovjek koji je preživio dva vijorenja plahti i dvije srceparajuće melodije, uz spoznaju kolikima su se tek morali pokloniti moji preci izražavajući im nametnuto poštovanje, da znam o čemu govorim.

Možda će, nešto starijima moje viđenje postati jasnije prisjete li se kolikim smo se svi mi skupa zastavama klanjali, i na koliko pjesmuljaka stajali poput stijene ukrućeni, u stavu mirno. Sve prolazi, države umiru, ideologije se mijenjaju, krpe na vrhu jarbola mijenjaju svoj redosljed boja i oblike popratnih simbola, sad ovi a sutra oni taktovi paraju uši izazivajući nas da slijedimo instinkt gomile a ne svoj iskonski odnos prema suštinama ljudskog roda. Nekada svi mi (osim učesnika simpozija izvan regije) bijasmo sudržavljani, pod istom zastavom i istom melodijom „opčinjeni“ – zašto bismo se danas manje ili više uzajamno poštivali samo rad činjenice što tome više nije tako? Daleko od toga da propagiram ideju povijesnog zaborava, ali je podjednako daleko moje robovanje floskuli „*oprostiti da, zaboraviti ne*“, koja se ponavlja otkada je svijeta i vijeka. Jer, da smo si zaista oprostili (a govorim o svekolikom čovječanstvu koje si uzajamno vječno nešto „*opršta i ne zaboravlja*“, da bi koliko sutra zaboravilo na svoja zaklinjanja) – onda ne bi bilo klanja, krvi i genocida kojih je prepuna ljudska povijest; onda rečena izreka ne bi ni bila floskula, dapače – bila bi sasvim nepotrebna. Moja skepsa da će se ona i poslije nedavnih uzajamnih zločina na regionalnom tlu (ne želim ulaziti u raspodjelu i intenzitet krivice), ozbiljno uzeti u obzir, je ozbiljnija od vjerojatnosti da tome zaista bude tako. Ne, nisam za zaborav – povjesničari neka bez robovanja predrasudama i čista srca proučavaju činjenice, ali neka se mladim generacijama ne serviraju „argumenti“ u prilog opstojnosti ove ili one države, ovog ili onog naroda, od ovog ili onog stoljeća, jer – to je posve nebitno za izgradnju čovjeka s velikim, a na žalost u praksi uglavnom s

malim početnim slovom. Svaki narod zasigurno ima zaslužne pojedince, zaslužne ne za izgradnju nekih fantomskih, zamišljenih, „velikih“ ovih ili oni država u ime kojih se ljudi tretiraju kao topovsko meso i stoka za klanje, već nasuprot – onih koji veličaju neponovljivost osobe i ljudskog života. A ti su zasigurno „kraljevi nad kraljevima“, koji mogu proširiti kraljevstvo osobnosti više no što je ijedan vladar uspio proširiti svoju državu. O njima i treba govoriti, naučavati i isticati kao primjer, ideal koji treba poštivati i težiti mu.

Eto, ukratko, upravo je to moja kultura sjećanja – ili nekultura zaborava, ako vam je tako draže; jedino bitno, jedino važno, jedino ljudsko, jedino humano, jedino etičko što nas povezuje od davne prošlosti – preko država, vladara, ratova, genocida i nebrojenih žrtava koje možda u svojoj nevinoj naivnosti ni nisu bile svijesne zašto su to postale. To je ona zlatna nit, tanka tanašna ali vrijednija od zlata i država i vladara i simbolike kojoj se klanjamo, a koju humani pojedinci vjekovima i tisućljećima provlače kroz povijest ljudskog roda.

Nit koju još uvijek neizgrađene gomile, točnije – njeni sastavni dijelovi koje je teško nazivati potpunim ljudskim bićima (sem, naravno, u biološkom pogledu) – svako malo nastoje, nesvjesno doduše, bezuspješno razoriti. Ta je nit čvršća od Osmanskog carstva, Austro-Ugarske, Jugoslavije i njenih osamostaljenih konstituenata, čvršća od svih prošlih i budućih oblika formalnog udruživanja ljudskih bića u ove ili one aglomeracije.

Njena čvrstina ovisi tek o relativnom malom broju draguljara humanosti, koji i na razvalinama prošlosti uvijek iznova nastoje uzgajati ono jedino trajno i vrijedno (možda upravo stoga što je malobrojno) – ljudskost dostojnu poštovanja. Kako je i BiH – baš poput države iz koje i ja dolazim, i koja mi nije nimalo ni draža ni morskija od vaše – upravo jedan takav fragment ne tako davno raspukle cjeline, reći ću još tek toliko:

Sjećanje koje nastojim vući tijekom svog – u smislu trajanja i ličnog doprinosa društvu - značajnog života, je dovoljno da ispuni moju skromnu memoriju. To je sjećanje na ljude (naročito one koje cijenim), a ne na povjesne tvorevine.

One vrijede koliko i ljudi koji ih grade i nanovo ruše, a oni kojih se ja sjećam vrijede neizmjereno više! Moja duboka nada – ne uvjerenje, jer ono i prečesto krahira – je, da i učesnici simpozija većinom spadaju u takve. Na samom kraju, dozvolit ću si još kratki dodatak, zbog onih koji su me eventualno svrstali u kategoriju bezosjećajnih tipova, indiferentnih prema povjesnim zbivanjima i patnjama naroda.

Radi se o pjesmi napisanoj usred najtežih trenutaka za vašu državu, kada je Sarajevo bilo pod najžešćom opsadom, a šanse za očuvanjem BiH kao cjelovite države izgledale minimalne. Pjesma naziva „*Requiem za Bosnu*“, objavljena je u mojoj zbirci poezije „*Pjesme (za iščezle krijesnice)*“, a više puta je objavljivana i na raznim internetskim portalima.

## *Requiem za Bosnu*

*Dragulj u kruni što se runi,  
biser iz školjke koja ugiba,  
zlatna nit u prekinutoj struni,  
ponosno se, Bosno, ne sagibaš.*

*Bosno derviša, ćitapa i insana,  
mahala i ćuprija, Bosno islama i medrese.  
Umireš Bosno pod nožem hajvana  
što ih opanci i kravate mjesto časti rese.*

*Ti, Bosno onih za koje si jedina.  
Koji te Istoku i Zapadu ne prodaše...  
Bosno Andrića, Meše, Nasredina,  
Rizvan - bega Bosno i Sokolović paše.*

*Bosno Bosanaca. Svih koji su upijali  
ljudskost iz drugih civilizacija  
a zauzvrat ih mržnjom zatirali  
jer, "nisu baš nikakva nacija"...*

*Bosno kozmopolitska. Ne srpstva. Ne hrvatstva.  
Ona što nisi izlila s prljavom vodom  
svetu utopiju jedinstva i bratstva;  
uboga Bosno; sa zmijskim rodom.*

*Sad krvariš Bosno, teturaš se, svijaš.  
Obzor oko tebe se nepovratno mračí.  
Tanak ti srp već sve slabije sija...  
Oh Bosno moja, kako ti duša zrači!*

Žaleći zbog nemogućnosti ličnog sudjelovanja, želim svima nama sve najbolje i ljepšu budućnost od deprimirajuće sadašnjosti.

&

Rođen 1950. godine u Čakovcu, Hrvatska – tadašnja Jugoslavija. Studirao eksperimentalnu fiziku. Piše poeziju, kratke priče, SF pripovjetke, eseje i aforizme. Objavio dvije knjige poezije: „Pjesme (za iščezle krijesnice)“, „Odlazak“ – istu je satirički (elektronski) časopis „MaxMinus“ proglasio najboljom satiričnom knjigom 2011. godine - i epistolarnu knjigu ratne prepiske „Ja i njihov rat“ objavljenoj i u elektronskom obliku. Prije i za vrijeme rata objavljivao u nekoliko časopisa. Suraduje sa internetskim portalima. Zastupljen u dvadesetak zbornika poezije i kratkih priča iz Regije, te u „Antologiji ex Yu aforizama“. Prevođen na poljski jezik. Nagrađivan.

**Prvi internacionalni simpozij**

Izlaganjem dr. Hariza Halilovića počeo je radni dio Simpozija Foto: S. GUBELIĆ

## BiH - kultura sjećanja: sumrak ili novo buđenje

**O temi sudionici govore kroz različite oblike diskursa, a sva izlaganja bit će dostupna u posebnom broju magazina Diogen pro kultura**

“Bosna i Hercegovina - kultura sjećanja: sumrak ili novo buđenje” tema je Prvog međunarodnog dvodnevnog simpozija pod nazivom Kultura sjećanja, koji je s radom počeo jučer na Internacionalnom univerzitetu Sarajevo (IUS) na Ilidži, čiji su organizatori MA Alma Jefić, Program za psihologiju, fakultet umjetnosti društvenih nauka IUS; i mr. Sabahudin Hadžialić, gl. i odg. urednik Diogen pro kultura magazina.

### Odgovori i pitanja

- Svaki put počinje prvim korakom, a mi smo pokušali realizirati ideju koju je još inicirala Hannah Arendt u prošlom stoljeću, kada je rekla: Ljudi koji različito žele - ne mogu se dogovoriti, a ljudi koji različito misle - oni se mogu dogovoriti. Naš cilj je da pokušamo odgovoriti i postaviti neka pitanja, s obzirom na to da mi živimo u prostoru i vremenu podijeljenih diskursa, non-stop vraćanja u prošlost, podijeljenih sjećanja. Naš cilj je da se ljudi sastanu na jednom mjestu, politolozi, filozofi, sociolozi i svi oni koji mogu dati doprinos razumijevanju kulture sjećanja unutar prostora BiH, ali i šire. Ono što mogu reći slobodno je da smo uspjeli u činjenici da su nam se javili ljudi sa tri kontinenta,


ljudi koji žele razmatrati kulturu sjećanja u kontekstu shvatanja dobrog, da zle matrice pokušamo ostaviti iza sebe i da pokušamo neka nova sjećanja kreirati sa ciljem uobličavanja stvarnosti, ali nikada na uštrb drugog i drugačijeg, kazao nam je mr. Hadžialić.

### Razmatranja

Nakon pozdravnih riječi doc. dr. Muhameda Hadžiabdića, prorektora za nastavna pitanja IUS-a, i Alme Jefić, te dobrodošlice koju su sudionicima i prisutnima na Simpoziju priredili svojim nastupom učenici Srednje muzičke škole Sarajevo, izlaganje dr. Hariza Halilovića (izvanredni prof. na Monash University u Melbourneu, Australia) o temi Popularno sjećanje nasuprot “otuđenim” sjećanjima u kulturi pamćenja i memorizacije u poslijeratnoj BiH, bio je uvod u širok dijapazon razmatranja teme Simpozij, govora kroz različite oblike diskursa (znanstvenog, umjetničkog, književnog, filozofskog...).

Simpozij, čiji je medijski pokrovitelj, uz magazin Diogen pro kultura, i Oslobođenje, s radom nastavlja danas, a sva izlaganja zainteresiranima će biti dostupna u posebnom broju magazina Diogen, koji će naredne godine biti promoviran u travnju.

An. Š.



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
*I International Symposium on Culture of Remembrance*

*„Bosnia and Herzegovina – Culture of Remembrance: Twilight or New Awakening“*

I International Symposium on Culture of Remembrance „Bosnia and Herzegovina – Culture of Remembrance: Twilight or New Awakening“ IUS, Sarajevo, 12-13 April 2014  
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### *Multi-identitet kao nadgradnja mono-identiteta*

Obzirom da se u demokratskim društvima vlast može definisati kao „vladavina slobodno izabranih predstavnika naroda“, u tom slučaju građani, kao osnovni dio pretpostavki kreacije naroda države sekularnih težnji i uobličavanja jesu i moraju biti činilac integracije unutar interaktivnog oblika mogućih alternativa svijesti. Angažirani umjetnik-građanin u sebi sadrži multi-identitet kao nadgradnju mono-identiteta koji dobija pripadnošću ovoj ili onoj naciji, vjeri, rasi, genderu. To je za angažiranog umjetnika jedini i nadasve inspirativni cilj-pomoći građaninu, kako bi, unutar totalne kreacije sopstvenog bića, stvorio društvo dobrih namjera.

### *Multi-identity as an upgrade of the mono-identity*

Given that in democratic societies, power can be defined as a "rule of freely elected representatives of the people", in this case, the citizens, as a basic part of the assumptions of creations of nations of the state with secular aspirations and shaping up are and should be a factor in the integration of interactive forms of possible alternative to the consciousness. Engaged artist-citizen incorporates multi-identity as upgrade of mono-identity which gets through belonging to this or that nation, religion, race, and gender. It is for engaged artist only and the very inspirational goal-to help citizen in order, within the total creation of its own being, to create the society of good intentions.

*Sabahudin Hadžialić*





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